TY  - UNPD
A1  - Muermann, Alexander
A1  - Shore, Stephen H.
T1  - Strategic trading and manipulation with spot market power
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2006,07
N2  - When a spot market monopolist has a position in a corresponding futures market, he has an incentive to deviate from the spot market optimum to make this position more profitable. Rational futures market makers take this into account when setting prices. We show that the monopolist, by randomizing his futures market position, can strategically exploit his market power at the expense of other futures market participants. Furthermore, traders without market power can manipulate futures prices by hiding their orders behind the monopolist's strategic trades. The moral hazard problem stemming from spot market power thus provides a venue for strategic trading and manipulation that parallels the adverse selection problem stemming from inside information. Klassifikation: D82, G13
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2006, 07 
KW  - strategic trading
KW  - manipulation
KW  - spot market power
KW  - Devisen
KW  - Kassamarkt
KW  - Anlagepolitik
Y1  - 2006
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2806
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-25980
ER  -