TY  - JOUR
A1  - Barz, Wolfgang
T1  - A remark on the bank cases
T2  - Acta analytica
N2  - Since their formulation by Keith DeRose (1992), the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition p does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against p. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow.
Y1  - 2021
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/69612
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-696122
SN  - 1874-6349
N1  - Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
VL  - 37
IS  - 4
SP  - 519
EP  - 529
PB  - Springer
CY  - Dordrecht
ER  -