TY  - UNPD
A1  - Laux, Volker
T1  - Board independence and CEO turnover
T2  - Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & accounting ; No. 154
N2  - It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 154 
KW  - Corporate Governance
KW  - Board Independence
KW  - Severance Pay
KW  - CEO Turnover
KW  - Incentive Compensation
KW  - Topmanager
KW  - Generaldirektor
KW  - Vorstandsvorsitzender
KW  - Geschäftsführer
Y1  - 2005
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3969
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-15230
EP  - 22
PB  - Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -