TY  - UNPD
A1  - Feess, Eberhard
A1  - Nell, Martin
T1  - The manager and the auditor in a double moral hazard setting : efficiency through contingent fees and insurance contracts
T2  - Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 24
N2  - Our article integrates the manager’s care in the literature on auditor’s liability. With unobservable efforts, we face a double moral hazard setting. It is well-known that efficient liability rules without punitive damages do not exist under these circumstances. However, we show that the problem can be solved through strict liability, contingent auditing fees, and fair insurance contracts. Neither punitive damages nor deductibles above the damages are required.
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 24 
KW  - auditor liability
KW  - duble moral hazard
KW  - team production problem
KW  - partnerships
KW  - insurance
KW  - Wirtschaftsprüfung
KW  - Haftung
KW  - Moral Hazard
KW  - Anreizsystem
KW  - Haftpflichtversicherung
Y1  - 1998
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/55333
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-553334
UR  - https://www.econbiz.de/archiv/f/uf/finanzierung/contingent_fees.pdf
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -