TY  - UNPD
A1  - Feess, Eberhard
A1  - Schieble, Michael
T1  - Credit scoring and incentives for loan officers in a principal agend model
T2  - Working paper series / Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Finance & Accounting [; No. 30]
N2  - We analyze incentives for loan officers in a model with hidden action, limited liability and truth-telling constraints under the assumption that the principal has private information from an automatic scoring system. First we show that the truth-telling problem reduces the bank’s expected profit whenever the loan officer cannot only conceal bad types, but can also falsely report bad types. Second, we investigate whether the bank should reveal her private information to the agent. We show that this depends on the percentage of good loans in the population and on the signal’s informativeness. Though we had to define different regions for different parameters, we concluded that it might often be favorable to not reveal the signal. This contradicts current practice.
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 30 
KW  - delegated expertise
KW  - loan officers
KW  - loan origination
KW  - limited liability
KW  - informed principal
KW  - Anreiz
KW  - Kreditwürdigkeitsprüfung
KW  - Finanzmakler
KW  - Sachbearbeiter
Y1  - 1998
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3664
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-18195
IS  - August 7, 1998
PB  - Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
CY  - Frankfurt, M.
ER  -