TY  - UNPD
A1  - Lee, Samuel
A1  - Moisa, Nina
A1  - Weiss, Marco
T1  - Open source as a signalling device : an economic analysis
T2  - Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 102
N2  - Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 102 
KW  - open source software
KW  - signalling
KW  - career concerns
KW  - economics of organization
KW  - Open Source
Y1  - 2003
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3671
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-17962
IS  - This version: March, 21st 2003
PB  - Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -