TY  - RPRT
A1  - Elsas, Ralf
A1  - Heinemann, Frank
A1  - Tyrell, Marcel
T1  - Multiple but asymmetric bank financing: the case of relationship lending
N2  - Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank.
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 141 , vers 
KW  - Fremdkapital / Kredit / Bank / Finanzierung / Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung / Theorie
KW  - relationship lending
KW  - multiple bank financing
KW  - lender coordination
KW  - Bank
KW  - Firmenkundengeschäft
KW  - Internationaler Kreditmarkt
KW  - Unternehmen
Y1  - 2004
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3715
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-17658
N1  - Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 141
IS  - September 9, 2004
PB  - Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -