TY  - UNPD
A1  - Hoeberichts, Marco
T1  - The credibility of central bank announcements
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2002,09
N2  - In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation. Klassifikation:E52;E58
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2002, 09 
KW  - monetary policy
KW  - private information
KW  - announcements
KW  - Geldpolitik
KW  - Glaubwürdigkeit
KW  - Asymmetrische Information
Y1  - 2002
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4493
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-9992
IS  - August 2002
ER  -