TY  - UNPD
A1  - Hallak, Issam
T1  - Why borrowers pay premiums to larger lenders : empirical evidence from sovereign syndicated loans
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2002,02
N2  - All other terms being equal (e.g. seniority), syndicated loan contracts provide larger lending compensations (in percentage points) to institutions funding larger amounts. This paper explores empirically the motivation for such a price design on a sample of sovereign syndicated loans in the period 1990-1997. I find strong evidence that a larger premium is associated with higher renegotiation probability and information asymmetries. It hardly has any impact on the number of lenders though. This is consistent with the hypothesis that larger lenders act as main lenders, namely help reduce information asymmetries and provide services in situations of liquidity shortage. This constitutes new evidence of the existence of compensations for such unique services. Moreover, larger payment discrepancies are also associated with larger syndicated loan amounts. This provides further new evidence that larger borrowers bear additional borrowing costs.
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2002, 02 r 
KW  - Relationship Lending
KW  - Number of Lenders
KW  - Syndicated Loans
KW  - Sovereign Debt
Y1  - 2003
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4500
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-9921
N1  - Revised Version: October, 2003. First version (June 2002) with the title: "Price Discrimination on Syndicated Loans and the Number of Lenders: Empirical Evidence from the Sovereign Debt Syndication"
IS  - Revised Version: October, 2003
ER  -