TY  - UNPD
A1  - Becht, Marco
A1  - Boehmer, Ekkehart
T1  - Transparency of ownership and control in Germany
T2  - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (Osnabrück): Arbeitspapiere ; Nr. 69
T2  - Institut für Bankrecht (Frankfurt, Main): Arbeitspapiere ; Nr. 69
N2  - We first analyze legal provisions relating to corporate transparency in Germany. We show that despite the new securities trading law (WpHG) of 1995, the practical efficacy of disclosure regulation is very low. On the one hand, the formation of business groups involving less regulated legal forms as intermediate layers can substantially reduce transparency. On the other hand, the implementation of the law is not practical and not very effective. We illustrate these arguments using several examples of WpHG filings. To illustrate the importance of transparency, we show next that German capital markets are dominated by few large firms accounting for most of the market’s capitalization and trading volume. Moreover, the concentration of control is very high. First, 85% of all officially listed AGs have a dominant shareholder (controlling more than 25% of the voting rights). Second, few large blockholders control several deciding voting blocks in listed corporations, while the majority controls only one block.
T3  - Arbeitspapiere / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut für Bankrecht - 69 
KW  - Deutschland
KW  - Aktionärsstruktur
KW  - Corporate Governance
KW  - Publizitätspflicht
KW  - Kapitalmarktrecht
Y1  - 1999
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4707
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7909
UR  - http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/42780841/arbeitspapiere
N1  - publ. u.d.T. Ownership and Voting Power in Germany in: Barca/Becht [Hrsg.], The Control of Corporate Europe, 2001, 128
PB  - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht
CY  - Osnabrück
ER  -