TY  - UNPD
A1  - Laux, Christian
A1  - Laux, Volker
T1  - Performance measurement and information production
T2  - Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 133
N2  - When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 133 
KW  - Leistungsbewertung
KW  - Leistungsmessung
KW  - Informationsverhalten
KW  - Betriebliche Kennzahl
KW  - Anreizvertrag
KW  - Theorie
KW  - Agency Theory
Y1  - 2004
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4718
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7874
PB  - Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -