TY  - UNPD
A1  - Laux, Christian
T1  - Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2008,54
N2  - The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm’s risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm’s objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting.
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2008, 54 
KW  - Multiline Insurance
KW  - Umbrella Policies
KW  - Integrated Risk Management
KW  - Deductible Insurance
KW  - Unternehmen
KW  - Risikomanagement
KW  - Versicherung
Y1  - 2008
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/6196
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62339
ER  -