TY  - UNPD
A1  - Inderst, Roman
T1  - "Irresponsible lending" with a better informed lender
T2  - Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability ; 32
N2  - We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in "irresponsible"lending, approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household’s best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent’s superior screening ability.
T3  - Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability - 32 
KW  - Haushalt
KW  - Kreditgeber
KW  - Information
KW  - Vorteil
KW  - Konkurrent
Y1  - 2009
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/7319
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-72920
UR  - http://www.imfs-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/WP_2009_32_Inderst.pdf
N1  - Published in: Economic Journal, 2008, vol. 118, issue 532, pp. 1499-1519
ER  -