TY  - UNPD
A1  - Inderst, Roman
A1  - Klein, Manuel
T1  - Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay
T2  - Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability ; 33
N2  - We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.
T3  - Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability - 33 
KW  - Kostenplanung
KW  - Planungsrechnung
KW  - Unternehmenswachstum
KW  - Investition
KW  - Finanzplanung
KW  - Budgetierung
Y1  - 2009
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/7320
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-72931
UR  - http://www.imfs-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/WP_2009_33_Inderst.pdf
N1  - Published in: RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 881–904
ER  -