TY  - UNPD
A1  - Camera, Gabriele
A1  - Gioffré, Alessandro
T1  - Asymmetric social norms
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 162
N2  - Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 162 
KW  - cooperation
KW  - repeated games
KW  - social dilemmas
Y1  - 2017
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/42722
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-427221
IS  - January 10, 2017
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -