TY  - UNPD
A1  - Roure, Calebe de
A1  - Pelizzon, Loriana
A1  - Thakor, Anjan V.
T1  - P2P lenders versus banks: cream skimming or bottom fishing?
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 206
N2  - We develop a simple theoretical model to motivate testable hypotheses about how peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms compete with banks for loans. The model predicts that (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (iii) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We confront these predictions with data on P2P lending and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates the P2P lenders are bottom fishing when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 206 
KW  - P2P lending
KW  - bank lending
KW  - competition
Y1  - 2018
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/46672
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-466728
UR  - https://ssrn.com/abstract=3174632
N1  - FIRST VERSION: January 31, 2017 ; THIS VERSION: April 18, 2018
IS  - THIS VERSION: April 18, 2018
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -