TY  - JOUR
A1  - Barz, Wolfgang
T1  - The distinct existences argument revisited
T2  - Synthese <Dordrecht>
N2  - The aim of this paper is to take a fresh look at a discussion about the distinct existences argument that took place between David Armstrong and Frank Jackson more than 50 years ago. I will try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be successfully defended against Jackson’s objections (albeit at the price of certain concessions concerning Armstrong’s view on the meaning of psychological terms as well as his conception of universals). Focusing on two counterexamples that Jackson put forward against Hume’s principle (which is central to Armstrong’s argument), I will argue that they are either compatible with Hume’s principle, or imply a false claim. I will also look at several other considerations that go against Hume’s principle, such as, for example, Kripke’s origin essentialism and counterexamples from aposteriori necessity.
KW  - Armstrong
KW  - Jackson
KW  - Incorrigibility
KW  - Hume’s principle
KW  - Necessity
KW  - Natural laws
Y1  - 2021
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/63749
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-637493
SN  - 1573-0964
N1  - Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
VL  - 199
IS  - 3-4
SP  - 8443
EP  - 8463
PB  - Springer Science + Business Media B.V
CY  - Dordrecht [u.a.]
ER  -