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Der Kopf des Magnus Maximus

Francis X. Ryan

Gratian wurde im Jahre 383 n. Chr. „auf der Flucht in Lyon getötet.“¹ Hieronymus berichtet darüber in einer im Jahre 396 verfassten Schrift. Nach ihm wurden die Bewohner von Lyon noch 13 Jahre nach dem Mord an jenes Verbrechen erinnert: *Gratianus ab exercitu suo proditus et ab obviis urbibus non receptus ludibrio hosti fuit cruentaque manus vestigia parietes tui, Lugdune, testantur* (Hieron. Ep. 60.15.3). Bei der Wiedergabe des Satzes ist durchweg von einer blutigen Hand die Rede. Der fragliche Satzteil wird etwa von F. A. Wright (Loeb: New York 1933) wie folgt übersetzt: „your walls, O Lyons, still bear the mark of that bloody hand.“ Erst vor wenigen Jahren wurde die herkömmliche Interpretation von D. Woods neu gedeutet. Er stellte die Frage in den Mittelpunkt, wem die Hand zuzuschreiben wäre. Da das Wort „bloody“ eine Gewalttat evoziere, jedoch keine Quelle eine solche dem Kaiser zuschreibt, wäre die Hand nicht auf ihn zu beziehen. Anstatt die Hand als die des Mörders des jungen Kaisers anzusehen, zog Woods in Betracht, dass die fragliche *manus* nicht als eine menschliche Hand zu deuten sei: „It is difficult to understand what it actually means to say that either Gratian or his enemy left the traces of his bloody hand upon the walls. On the face of it, this seems to require that the individual concerned left a bloody hand-print on the wall.“² Woods legte eine andere Definition des Wortes *manus* zugrunde: „I would like to propose an alternative translation and interpretation..., that *manus* here means ‘band’ rather than ‘hand’.... In brief, this passage refers to the ancient practice by which emperors placed the heads of those whom they had had executed as public enemies on public display.“³ Woods erinnert zu Recht, dass Theodosius I. im Jahre 388 Magnus Maximus, Gratians Gegenkaiser, drei Meilen entfernt von Aquileia (Cons. Constant. a. 388), in Norditalien, köpfen ließ (Claud. IV Cons. Hon. 85, Philost. HE 10.8) und dass keine Quelle glaubwürdig überliefert, was mit dessen Kopf geschah.

Einem Fragment Olympiodors zufolge wurde zwar der Kopf des Maximus, wie fünf andere auch (Olymp. fr. 20.1Bl=Phot. Bibl. cod. 80) in Karthago zur Schau gestellt, man darf allerdings von einem Überlieferungsfehler in der Nennung von Καρθαγέννης statt Παβέννης ausgehen.⁴ Erhärtet wird die Annahme eines Fehlers dadurch, dass die abgeschlagenen Köpfe des Iovinus (411-413) und seines Bruders Sebastian (412-413) gemäß der Lokalchronik der Stadt (Ann. Rav. a. 412) am 30. August 412 dorthin gebracht wurden; die Behauptung in einer Anfang des 9. Jhdts. verfassten Weltchronik (Theoph. Chron. AM 5904), dass die Köpfe nach Rom gebracht worden wären, ist nicht vorzuziehen. Laut dem Fragment Olympiodors waren Constantin III. (407-411) und sein Sohn Iulianus, wie vorher bereits Maximus (383-388) und Eugenius (392-394), dort enthauptet worden, wo die Köpfe von Iovinus und Sebastian gezeigt wurden. Woods hält die Nachricht über Constantin und seinen Sohn für glaubwürdig, da sich Constantin erst im Jahre 407 zum Gegenkaiser des Honorius erhob und Ravenna ab dem Jahr 402 die Hauptstadt war. Nach Woods ist der Fall von Maximus und Eugenius jedoch anders zu bewerten. Beide ließen sich während der Regierungszeit des Theodosius I. zu Gegenkaisern proklamieren, wie das Fragment Olympiodors auch ausdrücklich belegt, und Mailand fungierte zu dem

¹ Lippold 1980, 34.

² Woods 1999, 56.

³ Woods 1999, 57.

⁴ Vgl. Blockley 1983, 216 A. 50.

Zeitpunkt als Hauptstadt. Woods mag mit der Vermutung richtig gelegen haben, dass Photios eine Aussage über das gleiche Verfahren unter Theodosius dahingehend missverstanden, dass es auch am gleichen Ort angewandt wurde,⁵ denn Olympiodor selbst war über die Geschehnisse im Westen des Reiches gut informiert.⁶ Woods zog aber nicht den Schluss, dass der Kopf des Maximus nach Mailand gesandt wurde, obwohl nahegelegt wird, dass der Kopf des Eugenius dort zu sehen war: „Indeed, one doubts whether these two heads alone even need have been put on display in the same place.“⁷ Dem Fragment Olympiodors glaubte Woods entnehmen zu können, „that Theodosius put Maximus’ head on public display.“⁸ Aus der Bemerkung des Hieronymus folgte er aber, „that Theodosius sent the heads of Maximus and of some of his chief supporters to the city-walls of Lyons as their final resting-place.... One envisages a line of heads mounted upon stakes set upon the walls of Lyons....“⁹

Woods ging nicht auf eine andere Quelle (Cons. Constant. a. 411: *Constantini tyranni in conto caput adlatum est XIII kal. Octob.*) ein, der zufolge der Kopf des Constantin III. nach Spanien geschickt wurde. Diese Nachricht erhöht allerdings die Wahrscheinlichkeit seiner Rekonstruktion. Woods argumentierte, dass Theodosius die Köpfe von Maximus und einigen seiner Anhänger nach Lugdunum schickte, „and that he did so in memory of Gratian whom they had allegedly had killed nearby and whose murder he claimed to be avenging.“¹⁰ Honorius schickte seinerseits den Kopf des in Britannien zum Kaiser ausgerufenen Constantin III. nach Spanien, weil dieser dort zwei seiner Verwandten, die Brüder Didymus und Verenianus, wegen ihres Widerstandes hatte töten lassen (vgl. Olymp. fr. 17.1Bl).¹¹ Die Entscheidung, den abgeschlagenen Kopf eines Gegners sozusagen an den Tatort zu bringen und dort ausstellen zu lassen, ist für einen der unmittelbaren Nachfolger des Theodosius belegt, und die Möglichkeit, dass der Kopf des Maximus in Lugdunum ausgestellt war, ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen.

Gegen die Rekonstruktion von Woods erheben sich jedoch mehrere Einwände:

1. Es ist nicht als selbstverständlich zu betrachten, dass der Kopf des Magnus Maximus in Lugdunum permanent ausgestellt hätte werden sollen. Maximus wurde in Britannien zum Kaiser ausgerufen; wenn der Zweck darin bestand, Nachahmungstäter abzuschrecken, dann wäre der Kopf in Britannien besser aufgehoben gewesen. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Colonia Augusta Treverorum als Residenzstadt des Maximus fungierte¹² und früher Gratian ebenfalls als Residenz gedient hatte,¹³ hätte Theodosius den Kopf auch dort ausstellen lassen können.

Zudem wissen wir nicht, ob die Bestrafung des Constantin III. einen Parallellfall bietet. Es steht fest, dass Maximus allenfalls der Auftraggeber des Mordes war und sich zur fraglichen Zeit nicht am Todesort aufhielt. Vor Ort war damals Andragathius, der Kommandeur der Kavallerie;¹⁴ er hatte sich nach der Niederlage

⁵ Woods 1999, 58.

⁶ Rohrbacher 2002, 77-81.

⁷ Woods 1999, 58.

⁸ Woods 1999, 58.

⁹ Woods 1999, 58-59.

¹⁰ Woods 1999, 58 u. A. 13; er zweifelte, dass Maximus und seine Vertrauten den Mord anordneten, „though it served Theodosian propaganda afterwards to claim that they had.“

¹¹ Dazu s. Seeck 1900, 1029.

¹² Enßlin 1935, 2548.

¹³ Vgl. Seeck 1913, 166.

¹⁴ In der PLRE (1.62) wird er als Magister Equitum des Magnus Maximus eingestuft.

des Maximus von seinem Schiff ins Meer gestürzt¹⁵ und war gleichsam außerhalb der Reichweite der Justiz. Constantin III. hingegen dürfte am Geschehen direkter beteiligt gewesen sein als dies bei Maximus der Fall war.

Es ist bedauerlich, dass wir nicht mehr über die Bestrafung des Eugenius wissen, denn hier liegt der gleiche Tatbestand vor: Der romanisierte Franke Arbogast galt in der offiziellen Version als der Mörder des jungen Kaisers Valentinian II., der Usurpator Eugenius seinerseits lediglich als der Anstifter des Mordes (Claud. IV cons. Hon. 75-76). Gratians Halbbruder wurde im Mai 392 in seinem Palast in Vienna erhängt aufgefunden. Wenn feststünde, daß Theodosius später den Kopf des Eugenius nach Vienna schickte, dann würden wir mit ziemlicher Sicherheit wissen, daß er früher den des Maximus nach Lugdunum sandte.

2. Es ist nicht nachgewiesen, ob es Brauch war, den Kopf eines Usurpators permanent auszustellen; wenn nicht, dann können die *vestigia* des Briefes unmöglich die Köpfe von Maximus und seinen Anhängern sein, denn der Brief wurde erst etwa acht Jahre nach der Niederlage des Maximus verfasst. Woods räumte ein, „the evidence does not confirm...how long...these heads were left on display,“ fand es aber „consistent with the very purpose of such behaviour to assume that the heads were eventually set on semi-permanent display somewhere after the initial parades and festivities of abuse.“¹⁶ Man darf allerdings bezweifeln, dass der Schädel, der nicht mehr als der Kopf des Usurpators zu erkennen war, ausgestellt blieb. Caesar bekam seinerzeit lediglich den Kopf und den Ring (Vir. ill. 77.9: *caput...cum anulo*) des Pompeius präsentiert, und der Kopf war nicht zuletzt darum in ein Tuch eingehüllt (ebd.: *caput...Aegyptio velamine involutum*), weil er erkennbar bleiben sollte.

3. Auch wenn man einräumt, dass der Kopf des Maximus nach Lugdunum gebracht worden und dort jahrelang ausgestellt geblieben sein könnte, ist die Übersetzung eines Menschenschädels mit *vestigia* zu hinterfragen. Woods wurde möglicherweise durch das englische Wort „vestige“ verleitet, was „a small, degenerate, or rudimentary organ or part“ bedeutet.¹⁷ Zwar kann das Wort *vestigia* die übertragene Bedeutung „Ruinen“ haben (Lewis-Short, Oxford 1879, s. v.), wie in der Wendung *semirutae murorum vestigia* (Amm. 24.2.6), es war aber jedenfalls nicht üblich, mit diesem Wort sterbliche Überreste zu bezeichnen. Bei letzteren würde man eher das Wort *reliquiae* erwarten (Lewis-Short, s. v.: „the remains, relics, ashes of a deceased person; esp. of a body that has been burned“). Die eigentliche Bedeutung von *vestigium* ist „a footstep“ (Lewis-Short, s. v.), so dass das damit Bezeichnete nur schwerlich ein Teil eines Ganzen sein kann. Wie der Fußstapfen lediglich der Abdruck eines Fußes ist, nicht der Fuß selbst oder eine Zehe, dürfen die *vestigia* das sein, was ein Ereignis nur indirekt bestätigt. Körperteile scheinen als Erklärung auszuschneiden.

Woods geht nicht darauf ein, warum Hieronymus die Schädel nicht *capita* nennt. Es ließe sich argumentieren, dass die Schädel, die nicht nur Sonne, Regen und Wind, sondern auch den Vögeln ausgesetzt waren, nicht mehr ganz erhalten waren und deshalb nicht *capita* genannt wurden. Aber auch Schädel, denen etwa die Unterkiefer fehlten, wären wohl viel zu gut erhalten gewesen, um als *vestigia* gegolten zu haben. Der Brief des Hieronymus an Heliodorus, den Bischof von Altinum,¹⁸ war freilich ein ambitioniertes literarisches Unterfangen – es handelt sich um ein Trosts Schreiben zum Tode von Nepotianus, dem Neffen des Bischofs – , man

¹⁵ Seeck 1894, 2132.

¹⁶ Woods 1999, 57 A. 7.

¹⁷ Siehe beispielshalber The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Boston 1969, s. v.

¹⁸ Zur Person s. Larue 1995, 1406.

muss daher mit der Möglichkeit rechnen, dass der Autor ein alltägliches Wort wie *capita* umschreiben wollte. Das Wort *caput* besitzt jedoch wie im Deutschen „Haupt“ und im Englischen „head“ eine Zweideutigkeit, es kann nämlich sowohl „Haupt“ als auch „Hauptperson“ bedeuten (Lewis-Short, s. v.). Der Interpretation Woods folgend ließe sich zugleich von den „Köpfen“ bzw. „Schädeln“ und den „Anführern“ der Bande sprechen. Es fällt schwer zu glauben, dass sich Hieronymus ein anderes Wort ausgesucht hätte, wenn er an der fraglichen Stelle von den Schädeln der bewussten Anführer hätte sprechen wollen.

4. Woods beachtete nicht weiter, dass sich durch seine Interpretation von *manus* die Bedeutung des Wortes *cruentae* verschiebt: weder nahm er Anstoß an der Übersetzung des Wortes *cruentae* mit „bloody“ noch erwähnte er das Wort *cruentae*, als er seine neue Übersetzung für das Wort *manus* vorschlug. Eine „bloody hand“ ist „blutig“, eine „bloody band“ ist ebenfalls „blutig“, man kann sie aber auch als „bloodthirsty“ bzw. „blutrünstig“ bezeichnen. Für das Adjektiv *cruentus* werden beide Bedeutungen aufgeführt; der eigentlich Sinn ist „mit Blut befleckt“, der übertragene Sinn „blutdürstig“ (Lewis-Short, s. v.). Die Übersetzung von *cruentae manus* mit „der blutrünstigen Bande“ ist zwar nicht falsch, jedoch mag sie in diesem konkreten Fall nicht korrekt sein. Die Sinnverschiebung des Wortes *cruentae* hat zur Folge, dass die Mauer frei von Blut war. Es regt sich der Verdacht, dass Hieronymus den Usurpator und seine Anhänger anders beschrieben hätte, wenn nur deren Schädelknochen auf der Mauer zu sehen gewesen wären. Dieses Bauwerk zeigte (*parietes...testantur*) etwas; eine Mauer ist aber ein stummer Zeuge, sie kann kaum eine Charaktereigenschaft wie Blutrünstigkeit belegen, ohne weiteres aber eine eingetrocknete Flüssigkeit zeigen. Man will die wohl unerklärliche Übersetzung „die Abdrücke einer blutigen Hand“ nicht wieder beleben, man könnte aber aus der Kollokation von *cruentae* und *vestigia* schließen, dass an dieser Stelle von Blutflecken die Rede ist. Blutflecken sind nicht nur etwas, was eine Mauer zeigen (*testantur*) kann, sondern auch etwas, was im Lateinischen mit *vestigia* ausgedrückt werden konnte, denn wie Fußabdrücke sind Blutflecken Zeichen.

5. Die Pluralform *vestigia* scheint Woods veranlasst zu haben, die Strafe auf einige Gefolgsmänner des Maximus auszudehnen. Wenn es überhaupt richtig wäre, *vestigium* in der Singularform als einen Knochen aufzufassen, dann könnte man trotzdem unter *vestigia* den Schädel eines einzigen Menschen verstehen, denn der Unterkiefer, der bei Totenschädeln häufiger fehlt, lässt sich leicht von den anderen Schädelknochen unterscheiden.

6. Der Brauch, aufgespießte Menschenschädel auf einer Stadtmauer aufzustellen, ist tatsächlich allein durch die Trajanssäule für die Daker bezeugt.¹⁹

Nach den Schlachten bei Siscia und Poetovio ergab sich Magnus Maximus den Offizieren des Theodosius; vor letzteren, der sich drei Meilen vor der Stadt Aquileia einquartiert hatte, wurde er am 28. August 388 (Cons. Constant. a. 388, Fasti Vind. pr. a. 388) geführt und anschließend geköpft. Theodosius hielt sich im darauf folgenden Winter in Mailand auf;²⁰ wenn der Kopf dorthin gesandt wurde, dann könnte Olympiodor dies in seinem Originaltext richtig festgestellt haben. Dass man später den Kopf des Constantin III. nicht am Hinrichtungsort hinterließ, erscheint plausibel: Er und sein jüngerer Sohn wurden 30 Meilen vor Ravenna enthauptet (Olymp. fr. 17.1B1) und Honorius war in der Hauptstadt anwesend.

¹⁹ Lepper-Frere 1988, Pl. XX (Scene XXV), m. S. 72: „skulls set on tall poles“; aufgespießte, auf einer Mauer aufgestellte Köpfe sind nicht belegt.

²⁰ Gibbon-Milman 1846, 539.

Es sind keine Schriften überliefert, wie Theodosius mit dem Kopf des Eugenius verfuhr. Jedoch ist der gleiche Tatbestand wie bei der ersten Usurpation festzustellen: Im September 394 war Theodosius bei der Schlacht am Frigidus anwesend, in deren Laufe Eugenius gefangen und geköpft (Philost. HE 11.2, Sok. HE 5.25, Soz. HE 7.24) wurde. In diesem Fall ist überliefert, was unmittelbar danach geschah: Der abgeschlagene Kopf des Eugenius, aufgespießt auf einer Lanze, wurde im Lager herumgetragen, um die überlebenden Soldaten des Eugenius zu bekehren (Zos. 4.58.5). Wenn man mit Woods dem Fragment Olympiodors entnimmt, dass der Kopf des Maximus an einem nicht bekannten Ort ausgestellt war, fiel die erste Wahl auf Mailand. Die Aussage über den Hinrichtungsort scheint allerdings die eigene Zutat des Photios zu sein, und dies lässt eher vermuten, dass bei Olympiodor selbst kein Ausstellungsort für den Kopf des Maximus angegeben war.

Gibt es Grund zur Annahme, dass Theodosius den Kopf des Maximus überhaupt zur Schau stellen wollte? Nach der Schlacht bei Lugdunum schickte Septimius Severus den Kopf seines Gegenkaisers Clodius Albinus nach Rom (Dio Epit. 76.7.3, Hdn. 3.8.1): Führende Senatoren hatten mit Albinus in Korrespondenz gestanden und ihn gebeten, nach Rom zu kommen, als Septimius Severus im Osten des Reiches den Kampf gegen Pescennius Niger noch austrug (Hdn. 3.5.2). Septimius Severus wollte also vor allem die Senatoren einschüchtern. In einem Brief an das Volk erklärte er seine Entscheidung, den Kopf des Albinus in Rom öffentlich auszustellen; aus dem überlieferten Text, der einige Schwierigkeiten bereitet, geht trotzdem klar genug hervor, dass er von Zorn (Hdn. 3.8.1: ὀργήν) erfüllt war. Nach seinem Sieg über Maximus soll Theodosius dagegen seinen Zorn beherrscht haben (Pacat. 45.4: *tu...omnem cum armis iram deposivisti*). Diese Aussage in der Rede, die etwa ein Jahr nach der Enthauptung des Maximus²¹ im Senat in Anwesenheit des Kaisers gehalten wurde, scheint die Zurschaustellung des Kopfes des Besiegten vollends auszuschließen. Zieht man indes die Eigentümlichkeiten dieser Textgattung in Betracht, so könnte man vermuten, dass der Lobredner hier eine Floskel benutzt. Es heißt, Theodosius habe darüber nachgedacht, die Hinrichtung auszusetzen, doch seien die Seinen ihm zuvorgekommen (§44.2: *quin iam coeperas de eius morte dubitare et deieceris oculos... sed...tui te vindicant et invitum. rapitur...et...inter innumeras manus fertur ad mortem*). Nach Pacatus konnte Theodosius kaum ertragen, das Ende des Maximus auch nur erzählt zu bekommen (§44.3: *ecce iterum, imperator, averteris, et illam tyrannici exitus relationem gravaris*). Er versicherte dem Kaiser, dass er keine Angst zu haben brauche (ebd.: *iam, iam esto securus*): Was er nicht ansehen wollte, werde er sich auch nicht anhören (ebd.: *geram clementiae tuae morem: quod noluisti videre non audies*). Die Worte des Pacatus beweisen nicht, dass Theodosius mitfühlend war, sie verraten uns aber, dass ihm trotzdem daran lag in der öffentlichen Meinung für einen mitfühlenden Menschen gehalten zu werden.²² Diese Hoffnung des Kaisers setzt voraus, dass es zu einer öffentlichen Zurschaustellung des Kopfes in einer der Großstädte des Reiches eben nicht kam. Der Kopf des Maximus wurde daher vermutlich weder in Karthago noch in Ravenna noch in Lugdunum noch in Mailand noch in Rom ausgestellt.

²¹ Zur Datierung s. Nixon-Rodgers 1994, 443-444.

²² Vgl. Nixon 1994, 513 A. 164 (ad §46): "Pacatus seems to have been well informed about Theodosius' attitudes."

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Rezension zu: Ulrich Fellmeth, *Pecunia non olet. Die Wirtschaft der antiken Welt* (2008)

Ágnes Alföldy-Găzdac – Cristian Găzdac

The book, *Pecunia non olet. Die Wirtschaft der antiken Welt*, is an excellent work on the theory of economy for the Greek-Roman period of Antiquity. It details an approach on the complex mechanisms of the economy of the ancient Mediterranean. Although the book is designed for an overall view on the ancient economy, this achievement turns into a treaty on economic thinking and the perception of the economic structures by the ancient communities. The book analyzes the period from Archaic Greece through the end of the Late Roman Empire (c. 8th BC to c. 4th AD).

The book is chronologically and thematically organized. Ulrich Fellmeth uses ancient sources, ancient writers and epigraphic evidence, as well as iconographic and archaeological sources to illustrate his theories. He analyzes ancient authors from the earliest Greek sources to the first Christian authors (e.g. Lactantius). He uses such sources to decrypt each economic system for archaic and classical Greece, hellenistic Mediterranean, republican Rome, and, finally, the Roman Empire. Each chapter, with its subchapters, discusses individual chronological periods, and illustrates the issues using ancient sources and reviews the attitudes of philosophers concerning the economy of their time. The subchapters consist of reflections based on various personalities and known ancient works, such as Hesiod, Pericles, Pasion, Xenophon, Cato, Tiberius Gracchus, Verres, Pliny the Younger, etc. The sources are presented in the socio-economic context of their corresponding historical period.

Chapter One introduces useful sources to sketch out the ancient economy and the economic way of thinking. The author considers impact of archaeological evidence as limited, except to prove the existence of economic activities, such as painted pottery, funerary monuments, or other items from the archaeological record. Fellmeth suggests that the best information is from inscriptions, papyri, coinage, and ancient authors. From his point of view, inscriptions papyri and coinage are more expressive, however, the ancient authors offer the best information.

Fellmeth discusses the dogma of the Greek philosophers, Aristotle and Plato, and this referral to ancient philosophers and writers threads through the discussion of the economics of the later periods. The original idea suggests that landowners who practiced agriculture and trade were good and honorable people, the *kaloï kagatoï* (felicitous). Others who earned their living through work, such as craftsmen, traders and peasants, are people without civic values. The difference between the daily economic reality of work as a necessity, and the elite condescension towards labor was a paradox noticed by the ancients, such as Plutarch and Lucian.

The author discusses the main features of the Iron Age economy. His ideas of the early Iron Age are supported with quotations from Homeric texts. The concept of *oikos*, or the household, was the main form of social organization and created the kernel of economy based on autarchy. There was no market, and surplus was hoarded to increase and cement social prestige. Raw materials and luxury goods, which were not produced at a household level, were acquired through interactions, mainly gift exchanges. The main sources of income were war, plunder, and land ownership.

Trade was considered a dishonorable activity, and done by outsiders, like the Phoenicians.

The following sub chapter presents the economic mentality of yeomen in the 7th c. BC, and, by using Hesiod, the author highlights the idea that agricultural work is the only legitimate way to welfare. In contrast to the elite warrior society of Homer, Hesiod's farmers hated war, and the resulting plunder, because it jeopardized the products of their labor. It is during this time period that ancient authors mention the idea of rational organization of production and of households, which was the only way that yeomen survived (p. 28) under the pressures of "noble" society.

The next section describes socio-economic changes in the Greek world starting with the 7th century BC. The colonization of the Mediterranean shores resulted from the lack of agricultural land and food. Internal social movements, such as tyrannical regimes, led to the *polis*, or an autonomous form of government of the city-state. The burst of trade, however, was the result, but not the aim of colonization, and few colonies were established based purely on commercial needs, such as Cumae, Massalia, and Naukratis. The establishment of a central market, *agora*, was the catalyst in the change from the autarchic to the classical economy of the *polis*, which was closely linked to the change in warfare techniques that resulted in the creation of the hoplite phalanx which depended on individuals providing their own military equipment. The introduction of coinage did not have a sudden positive aspect on the commerce, because, initially, only high denominations were issued, perhaps for soldiers' pay or hoarding. There is no evidence for small transactions, however, by the mid 6th century BC, coinage was indispensable in economic transactions.

The following discussion focuses on private economy and uses as its foundation a Plutarch quotation regarding the progressive thinking of Pericles. A frequent topic of the Sophists, *oikeia pragmata*, had a decisive impact on the mentality of the *polis* citizens. Fellmeth uses select examples from Demosthenes' *Orationes*, to draw out various models of economic thinking in classical Athens. He identifies different concepts on investment and resulting profits (see the tables and graphs, pp. 44, 46-47).

Ulrich Fellmeth emphasizes weak points of state economy such as the lack of fiscal economy and the absence of budgets or long-term financial planning in classical Athens. The government practiced a daily economy and did not invest any surplus of money. This phenomenon existed because the Athenian government was a citizens' community, and the state did not have its own assets (p. 52). As a result, the package of economic reforms suggested by Xenophon, such as socio-political interests, foreign investments, social integration of trading investments in the rental of slaves for silver mining, the covering of investments with new taxes according to individuals' incomes, etc., represents a radical change in the economic way of thinking, which would be developed within Hellenistic states.

The domination of the big land properties, the development of a rational production of luxury goods, the orientation towards a market economy, and an intensive monetary economy characterizes the Hellenistic period. Ptolemaic Egypt is an excellent example on the evolution of the state economy because of the preserved documentation of information on various branches of the economy. One must be

cautious, however, and remember that the types of economical patterns are not the same for all regions in the Mediterranean during the Hellenistic period. The model of temple economy in Egypt influenced the state economy. As opposed to the polis economy in classical Greece, the Ptolemaic Egyptian state was the omnipotent element in economy. Private property was extremely limited, because the crown owned the land and held a monopoly on cattle breeding, mining, fishing and hunting, and the main branches of industry, olive oil, leather, textiles, glass, papyrus, and metallurgic production. Although, the state controlled prices and eliminated competition, it was not a complete autarchy because many raw materials and non-native items for many industries had to be imported. Profits from state-controlled industries, taxes and contributions, and custom taxes on the import-export merchandise (up to 50% of the product value) ensured the state a safe and constant income. The Egyptian population was obligated to annually declare the number of household members and property. The state-controlled economy of Ptolemaic Egypt required a large bureaucratic machine that demonstrated a planned political economy in the true modern definition. Rome took over this economic system by transforming Egypt in the “royal domain.” The private enterprises were possible only in those fields that required a certain risk: taxes, the large enterprises (*doerai*) held by high positioned dignitaries, and banking affairs.

Ulrich Fellmeth analyzed the monetary economy of Hellenistic Egypt because it adopted the Phoenician monetary system, in direct contrast to other Hellenistic Greek states ruled by *diadochs*, and created a banking economy. The state held the monopoly on banks headquartered in Alexandria, and the network of state banks included every important town of Egypt and some villages. Individuals made payments, bank deposits, and money transfers through banks. The entire population of Hellenistic Egypt, not just the very rich, adopted the banking system. The ability to loan funds was chartered to private banks, rich individuals, and temples, and the interest could reach as high as 18%. A papyrus document, known as the “Zenon archive,” details the complex economy of Ptolemaic Egypt. Zenon was the land agent of Apollonios, who was the minister of finances and economy during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphos in the mid 3rd century BC. The papyrus notes the work process at a *dorea* and the trade of its end-products. Fellmeth demonstrates the duality of the economic aims of the Ptolemaic administration, the quest for large profits balanced by the preservation of the political welfare of the state. Unfortunately, economic crisis appeared in 2nd c. BC Ptolemaic Egypt due to high taxes and government corruption.

The author discusses the economic development and changes that occurred as a consequence of Roman expansion, such as the concentration of provincial wealth in the hands of senators and business men, the importation of slaves as a result cheaper paid labor, an increase of agricultural work, and the rise of large agricultural-based estates in Italy. The appearance of skilled slaves determined the increase of industrial capacity in towns. Trade was encouraged by the introduction of coins around 300 BC, although products were traded on local markets, except for items, such as: fine pottery of Arezzo or from southern Gaul; metal vessels, textiles, jewelry, or special, imported luxury goods (e.g. Egyptian papyrus).

Unlike the traditional portrait of Cato, the author presents this enemy of extortionists as a true business manager. This *homo novus*, described by ancient

authors as a fancier of agriculture and a shrewd investor, was a skillful "businessman," who invested capital in zero risk tasks, such as lakes, thermal springs, pastures, slaves who were trained and then sold, as well as unsecured investments such as insurance. The *Lex Claudia*, 218 BC, was created to prohibit the senatorial class from investing in commercial businesses and banks. Taxes on luxury items attempted to control the Roman social structure and, as a result, increased the state income.

A subchapter reviews the complex social and economic issues of the Roman Republic: the material and social differences of the senatorial oligarchy; the use of slaves in all aspects of Roman economy; the economic crisis of Roman farmers who were forced to relocate to towns and cities because of the loss of their properties; and the increase of unemployed Romans inhabiting towns and cities. In conjunction with his discussion of the changes in the Roman economy, the author highlights the ideas of Tiberius Gracchus who separated himself from the social and moral obligations of his class more than any other Roman politician. T. Gracchus attempted to reform the difficult issues that threatened Roman society.

Another matter of socio-economic nature in the republican Rome was the corruption and the arbitrary exploitation of resources in the provinces. The only sources available of the 70 BC scandal involving Verres are the documents of the prosecution, represented by Cicero. He accused the governor of Sicily of corruption of justice, malversion of public positions and taxes, and theft of art work from private persons. Ulrich Fellmeth considers that this image of the marauder of the Roman elite was given a disadvantage to the state economy and stopped the development of the private economy. Both senators and *equites* contributed to the provinces' exploitation.

Fellmeth analyzes the writings of M. Terentius Varro and Columella who commented on agriculture in the Roman Republic, and suggests the existence of many references from other ancient authors on this subject whose discussions center around the work division between town (the marketplace) and the rural area (as the production place). The stultification of costs, the increase of production and the orientation towards market were signs that, at least, there was a rational economic thinking on agriculture with a single aim: the increase of profit.

The author reviews the main features of changes following the change from the Republic to the Empire. The famous *pax Romana* was not only a substantial demographic boom, but also an increase of property warranty and security. The constant improvement of the infrastructure (roads, harbors etc.) made merchandise circulation easier. In the author's view, there was a direct connection between a demographic increase and a flourishing economy. There also seems to be a role played by the army in regional economies, in relation to the army supply and the buying capacity of soldiers. For the frontier provinces, it resulted in an economic boom (p. 124). Fellmeth also presents the negative impact on economic development and offers representative examples, which were expensive long distance trade (the transportation for more than 100 km raised the costs of a product in accordance with the mode of transportation: 1.3% by sea, 6.4% by river, 44% by camel caravan, 55% by cart), poor money supply, absence of machines in the production process, etc.

The author elucidates aspects such as organization of the agricultural production, partition between land, capital and labor, and agricultural techniques. It is difficult to estimate the quantitative production as no documentation survives. It is estimated that 80% to 90% of the Empire's population lived in the rural areas and was involved in the agricultural works. During the Empire, extension of fields took place in Germania, Gallia, Hispania and Africa. The enhancement of production occurred through different systems to work the fields: crop rotation every two to three years and the use of dung. However, agriculture had a low enhancement (three to five times) in comparison with the normal productivity of fields in the 19th century (five to ten times) or today (thirty times). The most productive areas were the Black Sea, Northern Africa, Egypt and Sicily because of their more temperate climates. Owners invested in fruit trees plantations, vineyards, olive trees or cattle breeding as these options had good potential as income sources.

Population increases also led to the intensification of industrial production. The rise of market demand and the accessibility of raw materials helped the appearance of big enterprises in the fields of textiles, glass, metallurgy, etc. Specialization in various branches of industry increased the possibilities for higher profits. Fellmeth briefly analyzes fine pottery from production centers in southern Gaul and gives a clue on the success which eliminated competitors who made Aretine ware, based on a finer quality of clay, a better distribution from the centers to the marketplaces, and the implementation of cheaper river transportation from Gaul towards northern and western markets. Industrial specialization is also demonstrated by the 200 known professions from Roman inscriptions, and by 500 Latin expressions regarding various handicraft jobs. The author addresses the question of Roman industry's dislike of technical innovations and the avoidance of known wind and steam powered machines. He also suggests that bankers lacked the desire to invest in industry. Another possible explanation offered by the author is one of economic nature: the bankers were not interested to invest in industry.

Ulrich Fellmeth briefly describes the Roman monetary system in the early Empire (the Principate). The system was based on the "metallism" principle where the coin value is equal to the intrinsic market value of precious metals, gold and silver, and the value of the small denominations, copper, orychalum, and bronze are established in relation to the metals of higher values. He draws attention to the gold and silver fluctuations on the market (e.g. the strong injection on market with gold after the Dacian wars in the time of Trajan). Fluctuations of the value of the precious metals were controlled by the monopolies of the gold and silver mines (a large majority of mines were government property by the reign of Tiberius), and adjustments in the weight and the purity of the silver and gold. Prices were stable until the 3rd c. AD when the debasement of the coinage caused inflation. Fellmeth reveals the errors in the imperial monetary policy by the emperors by using the writings of the Roman historians. Suetonius states that Augustus minted more coins for circulation, while Tacitus identifies that the small quantity of coins in circulation during the reign of Tiberius led to a decrease in prices and deflation. The lack of money was a consequence of various elements: a negative balance of external trade (a loss of 7% from the state budget), the stipends paid to barbarians, the private and state hoarding and the bank deposits (p.141). New monetary issues (estimated to 20% annually) were not minted in large quantity and could not cover the need of coinage on the market.

Numerous banks in Rome, and elsewhere in Italy, attest to the high level of monetization and development of banking. The Hellenistic banking system was taken over by the Romans but with little change. Fellmeth discusses the existence of banking transactions, similar to modern banks, without the physical movements of money in Egypt where taxes were paid at local banks and the sum was transferred to the central bank in Alexandria. It is likely that such transactions were more common in the eastern provinces than the western ones because of the long banking tradition already in place. The author underlines the regional patterns of the development of industry, trade and coin circulation.

The most interesting chapter discusses the analysis of the iconography of funerary monuments to establish the evolution of self-representation and social appraisal of craftsmen. Fellmeth discusses the idea that, in regards to social prestige, craftsmen were never a homogenous group. Itinerant workers employed for wage were at the bottom of scale while independent craftsmen who owned their own workshop and a small shop were considered to be part of the Roman middle class. The ability to change one's social status is exemplified by a funerary monument from Fossano, near Torino, which boasts that its owner, a *faber*, or wheelwright, had been an *ab asse quaesitum*, a relatively poor position, but eventually became a *sevir augustalis*, a higher position. The affiliation with guilds, *collegia*, included material support, social prestige and appreciation. There is no certain evidence that these *collegia* were in charge of production organization, quality control, price control, or protection against competition. Despite the negative appraisal from the higher societal castes, long distance merchants (*negotiatores, mercatores frumentarii*) were wealthy and influential people who held important positions within local communities. A geography book on trade published in late antiquity, *Expositio totius mundi et gentium*, mentions Syrian towns on the Mediterranean coast which "export textiles all over the world," and the people "are rich from all points of view." The merchants' attitude towards profit is well demonstrated by Pompeian graffiti: *salve lucrum* (Hail, Profit!) or *lucrum gaudium* (Profit is joy!).

The chapter "The emperor and the food supply of Rome" focuses on the state commission, *praefectus annonae*, established by Augustus with the purpose of assuring the Roman food supply in the time of crisis. Fellmeth addresses whether the types of measures taken by emperors to indicated a deliberately planned political economy of Roman state. He uses a series of significant examples of the provision of wheat and construction of public works to provide the answer. Wheat prices were maximized in order to stifle the increase of costs, while in crises starvation was averted by means of *liberalitas*, offerings to the people from the emperor's personal accounts. There is some evidence for measures with long term effects. Claudius I gave privileges to wheat merchants to ensure a constant wheat (grain) supply for Rome. Emperors established additional measures, such as road and bridge constructions, establishment of *mansios* (lodgings), and military protection against robbers. Fellmeth considers these activities as part of an established conception of the Roman political economy. Emperors did not interfere in the economy aside from general actions and exceptional rules in the times of crisis. One exception was the organization of production in Egypt because the province was the private property of the emperor. The Roman Empire was a market network where almost all of the components regulated themselves. In comparison with the modern economy, the passive attitude of the Roman state could be called a liberal political economy. Roman emperors,

however, did not know how this functioned, thus their reactions to the crisis was exploratory or naive (p. 158).

Fellmeth uses a letter by Pliny the Elder, which documents the sale of property in Umbria, to demonstrate the various types of agricultural enterprises. The author identifies the following categories: family households, *villae*, big *villae* (over 250 ha), and *latifundia*. He also analyzes two types of rent. The rent of land based on a certain percentage from products had a positive impact on the increase of production (more specific in the western parts in the first two centuries AD) and the type of rent for money. The second type was more risky as it gave the owner a chance for a higher profit but there was a possibility of financial ruin. Fellmeth highlights the changes in the economic mentality through time from Columella to Pliny the Younger.

A demographic decrease and the lack of a labor force (*agri deserti*) was the result of wars and pestilence and resulted in a negative impact upon town supplies. Army costs rose significantly and caused the increase of taxes that pressured urban inhabitants. Buying power decreased and resulted in the decline of craft production and long distance trade. Fellmeth analyzed the series of Diocletian's reforms, such as his monetary reform and his the Price Edict. He reviewed the efficiency and the impact of putting the economy at work. Diocletian's reign is defined by frequent interference by the state in the Roman economy (e.g. where the state has a direct interest the jobs were permanently given to the same family, the child had to take the job after father retired or died). A part of industry became property of state. The armour and uniforms were produced in state units. Pressure from the state was a feature of the late ancient economy, especially in the western provinces of the Empire.

The final chapter of the book is titled "The end: the ancient economy and the ancient homo economicus." Fellmeth addresses the importance of studying ancient economies and whether the study of ancient economies impacts only antiquarians. Ulrich Fellmeth believes that ancient economic practices are intrinsic to the study of modern economies as it allows recognition of the main features of modern economic behavior. Modern examples are quite eloquent. The rural European households the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries echoed autarchy similar to the "*oikos-economy*" of archaic Greece (p. 176). The ancient Greek autarchic system was succeeded by the "*polis-economy*," while the 19th and 20th century autarchic economy was followed by an industrial economy. Both the ancient and modern autarchic economies are identified by work distribution and market production. Another example comes from monetary industry: The mentality of hoarding in ancient is compared to the modern practice of keeping low interest savings accounts.

One idea concerning modern theories of consumption is the conception of a "satisfier," who is a comfortable, passive consumer who is easy to convince, in contrast to the idea of the "optimizer," who is a cautious, economic consumer orientated towards efficiency. The author identifies the economic behavior of the "satisfier" among the wealthy structures of the Roman Empire. An example of a "satisfier" is Pliny the Younger who knew how to increase the efficiency of the agricultural works. He was, however, a comfortable agrarian with no interest for agriculture, and who was happy to have a limited but safe income (p. 177). Another question refers to guided state interference in the economy and if the interferences benefited or ruined the entire economy. The Hellenistic state economy (where the

state laws oppressed the private initiative) and the Roman economy (when the state interfered only in moments of crisis) are opposite models of political economies (p. 178). According to Ulrich Fellmeth, the historiographic concept of "primitivism" of ancient economic thinking must be regarded as a specific pattern of a non-industrial mentality. Unlike the modern societies, where the economy is priority in an individual's life, in antiquity, man's life was guided by other values and the economic interest was not present in all the aspects of human existence.

The book was written in an academic style with specific language for modern economic theories and doctrines. The bibliography is presented at the end of book with select titles for each chapter. Unfortunately, this system does not allow the reader to delve deeper in the study of the topics discussed by the author. It is not known if the graphs presented in this book were the author's or if they were taken from other sources. Even with these small omissions, however, the book is a success in regard to the topic. The author gathered and synthesized information on a complex and large subject: the economy of antiquity. He answered the fundamental question if the ancient societies possessed an economic way of thinking and a political economy. We believe that the author used good arguments for each ancient period discussed. The author's approach to social frameworks via ancient economics and his prudence in accepting theories are positive arguments to read *Pecunia non olet, Die Wirtschaft der antiken Welt*.