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Who Gains from Credit Granted  
between Firms?

Evidence from Inter-corporate  
Loan Announcements *Made in  
China*

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**Who Gains from Credit Granted between Firms?**  
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**Abstract**

Who gains from inter-corporate credit? To answer this question we measure the impact of the announcements of inter-corporate loans in China on the stock prices of the firms involved. We find that the average abnormal return for the issuers of inter-corporate loans is significantly negative, whereas it is positive for the receivers. Issuing firms may be perceived by investors to have run out of worthwhile projects to finance, while receiving firms are being certified as creditworthy. Subsequent firm performance and investment confirms these valuations as overall accurate.

**Key Words:** Entrusted loan, inter-corporate loan, credit misallocation, certification

**JEL Classification:** G30, G140, G210

## 1. Introduction

Credit between firms plays a crucial role in many economies around the world (Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006)). Firms with limited access to intermediated funds rely heavily on financial inter-linkages with other firms (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007)). This is particularly important in emerging economies, where the legal systems are weak. The absence of adequate legal enforcement makes it burdensome for firms to raise external financing (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), which may lead to credit rationing of formal finance by financial institutions. Inter-corporate lending may be less subject to credit rationing and therefore may support the high growth in emerging economies like China (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)).

Despite their ubiquity, research on inter-corporate credit continues to be hampered by a lack of direct firm-to-firm level data.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the inner workings of inter-corporate loans remain relatively unexplored. In this paper, we assemble a unique dataset to study the announcements of inter-corporate loans in the Chinese stock market during 2005-2012.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, as small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may face substantial obstacles in obtaining bank credit (Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche (2010)), the Chinese government has allowed firms to obtain credit from other non-financial firms under the coordination of financial institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2014) study U.S. firms' liquidity positions and Boissay and Gropp (2014) study defaults on payments to suppliers in France. Jacobson and Von Schedvin (2015) and Ellingsen, Jacobson and von Schedvin (2016) study a dataset that contains 52 million trade credit contracts issued by 51 suppliers over 9 years to about 199,000 unique customers in Sweden. See also Petersen and Rajan (1997), Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007), and Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2011), among others.

<sup>2</sup> Relying on similar data sources Allen, Qian, Tu and Yu (2016) examine the role played by inter-corporate loans in shadow banking, while Chen, Ren and Zha (2016) study monetary policy transmission and small bank risk-taking through the brokering of this lending.

These inter-corporate loans, also called “entrusted loans”, are playing an increasingly important role in supplying credit to firms in China.<sup>3</sup>

The inter-corporate loans must be disclosed as a separate report of listed firms according to Chinese regulations.<sup>4</sup> We can therefore observe the market reactions for inter-corporate loans, which is an important advantage over other studies. Analyzing stock market reactions to a corporate financing event can provide an immediate and comprehensive assessment for the valuation effect of such an event. We thereby break new ground in inter-corporate loan research providing novel evidence on the reactions of the stock prices to inter-corporate loan announcements for both the issuing and receiving firms. Furthermore, the announcements of inter-corporate loans enable us to glean specifics on the lending behavior involved, i.e., the relationship between lender and borrower, maturity, interest rate and collateral. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other published work has studied a dataset with such comprehensive information on inter-corporate loans.

Inter-corporate loans can be categorized as *inter-group* or *intra-group* loans, depending on whether the lender and borrower are both affiliated with the same business group. When the firm grants a loan to another firm outside the business group, it is called an inter-group loan. Due to weak legal enforcement of formal

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<sup>3</sup> According to the *China Securities Regulatory Commission* (CSRC), an entrusted loan is a type of loan in which the lender (i.e., the principal) extends credit to the borrower (i.e., the trustee) at specified amount, maturity, interest rate, and usage of the loan. Banks and other financial institutions only act as account managers who earn commissions but bear no default risk. Instead, the lending firm bears all the default risk. Entrusted loans amounted to 2.55 trillion RMB in 2013 (i.e., about \$400 billion) and accounted for 14.7 percent of the total amount of financing in the country. Data source: *People’s Bank of China*. The increase in entrusted loans in 2013 was equivalent to nearly 30 percent of bank loans, which almost doubled the portion of 2012. The *Wall Street Journal* featured reports on entrusted loans in China on December 8<sup>th</sup>, 2011, and May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014.

<sup>4</sup> The CSRC requires all listed firms to announce major events which may influence their stock prices.

contracts, formal credit provided by financial institutions may be rationed. Inter-corporate lending, which in essence is a type of informal financing based on reputation and inter-firm relationships, may be less subject to rationing and may therefore support the high growth rates observed in an emerging economy like China (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)). In this scenario, a firm has surplus financial resources, while the other one has an investment opportunity in need of external financing. The lending firm screens and monitors the borrowing firm as well as bearing the default risk. As suppliers could have information and enforcement advantages over financial institutions in providing credit to their own clients, inter-group loans could redistribute funds to more profitable firms. Thus, investors should react positively to the announcement of inter-group loans for the issuing firms. The issuance of inter-group loans, however, may also convey the information that the issuing firms are running out of worthy projects to finance, which may lead to negative market reactions for the issuing firms.

A firm may also lend to another firm within the same business group, which is then called an intra-group loan. These loans in effect funnel credit within the group's internal capital market. Stein (1997), for example, shows that an internal capital market can channel credit from less efficient projects to more efficient ones, and that the reallocation of credit within business groups is more common and important in countries with underdeveloped external capital markets. And indeed Buchuk, Larrain, Muñoz and Urzúa I. (2014) find that intra-group loans in Chile actually enhance firm investment and return and that, due to the country's strict regulation and disclosure

requirements, such loans do not suffer from tunneling.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015) show that internal capital markets of Korea business groups mitigate the negative effects on investment and performance during the Asian financial crisis. Thus, intra-group loans may be the outcome of an efficient credit reallocation decision within the business group, which may lead to a positive market reaction.

Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) show that in India the internal capital market within business groups is a support mechanism for financially weaker firms to avoid default and thus the negative spillovers to the rest of the business group. Also, large recipients of intra-group loans have lower abnormal stock returns and operating performance in the subsequent one- and two-year period. Similarly, Khanna and Yafeh (2005) show that the internal capital market provides mutual insurance within business groups among affiliated firms in unstable periods in Japan, Korea and Thailand. As a result, the issuance of intra-group loans may signal financial distress for a group firm among the uninformed investors, which may lead to a negative market reaction.

To examine whether announcements of inter-group versus intra-group loans convey information to investors about these non-financial corporate lenders and borrowers, we hand-collect the announcements of 719 inter-corporate loans that take place between 2005 and 2012. There were 564 announcements made by the lenders and 155 by the borrowers. We find that the stock market reacts negatively to the

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<sup>5</sup> The internal capital market may also come with a potential dark side, which is the expropriation of minority shareholders due to a separation of ownership and control (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000); Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010); Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000)) and the rent seeking behavior of divisional CEOs (Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). Fan, Jin and Zheng (2014) show the tradeoff between the negative and positive sides of the internal capital market in China, i.e., tunneling corporate resources versus alleviating credit constraints.

issuance of inter-corporate loans, and positively to their receipt. For example the two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the stocks of the lending firms are on average equal to a (statistically significant) -42 basis points (bps), while the CARs on the stocks of the borrowing firms are equal to 91 bps.

Specifically, we find that an issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries is associated with negative CAR, possibly signaling (to uninformed investors) financial distress for a group firm. Our results are consistent with the argument that firms support other firms in the same business group (Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015)). Moreover, because the issuance of inter-group loans also generates negative CARs, issuing intra-group loans may similarly signal a lack of worthy projects for the lending firms to finance.

In contrast, the receipt of both intra-group and inter-group loans generates positive CARs, which indicates a type of certification of the borrowing firms by these non-financial corporate lenders. The announcement effects for the receipt of inter-corporate loans stands in pointed contrast to the findings in Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) and Huang, Schwienbacher and Zhao (2012): They show that bank loan announcements in China result in negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. This may be due to banks' limited information and their well-known soft budget problem. Hence lenders of inter-corporate loans may have better private information and be less subject to social and political pressure to subsidize low-quality firms. Thus, receiving an inter-corporate loan in China may provide the type of certification similar to that associated with the receipt of a bank loan in the U.S. Besides, the receipt of intra-group loans from controlling shareholders is a type of corporate propping-up by controlling shareholders in emerging markets (Friedman, Johnson and

Mitton (2003); Jian and Wong (2010); Peng, Wei and Yang (2011)), which leads to the positive market reactions.

Furthermore, we investigate the factors affecting the likelihood of issuing or receiving inter-corporate loans. Firms with higher market to book ratio are less likely to issue inter-group loans, while the issuance of intra-group loans does not depend on this ratio. In contrast, firms with higher market to book ratio are more likely to receive inter-group loans, while the receipt of intra-group loans does not depend on it. Besides, state-controlled firms are more likely to issue and receive intra-group loans while this is not the case for inter-group loans, which suggests a potential credit misallocation by the state-owned enterprises.

We also find that the CARs on the issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans are associated with certain loan, counter-party, and (loan-announcing) firm variables. These findings deepen our understanding of inter-corporate loan announcements. On the one hand, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs on loans with high interest rate spreads, on intra-group loans, and on loans to firms with higher market-to-book ratios and larger amounts of other accounts receivable (i.e., inter-corporate loans outstanding). On the other hand, the receipt of inter-corporate loans is associated with lower CARs for loans with a higher interest rate spread, from state-owned lenders, and to non-state controlled borrowers. The results support the hypothesis that the issuance of inter-corporate loans signals (to uninformed investors) a lack of worthwhile projects to finance for the issuing firms, while the issuance of intra-group loans conveys additional information of financial distress about the group firm.

We further examine the impacts of inter-corporate loans on the long-run performance for issuers and receivers. Return on assets (ROA) declines after the issuance of inter-corporate loans in particular for firms with high market to book ratio and intra-group loans to subsidiaries, which confirms a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms and financial distress for the group firm. Specifically, ROA decreases when firms with high market to book ratio issue inter-corporate loans, while this is not the case for firms with low market to book ratio. Put differently, credit is misallocated when firms with high growth potential issue inter-corporate loans to others, while this is not so for firms with low growth potential. Besides, we also find weak evidence that ROA increases after the receipt of inter-corporate loans in particular for the intra-group loans from controlling shareholders, which confirms the receipt of inter-corporate loans as a certification for the borrowers and some corporate “propping-up”.

We also examine corporate investment after inter-corporate loan announcements. The capital expenditure increases less for firms issuing than for firms receiving inter-corporate loans, in particular for firms with high market to book ratio and when it involves inter-group loans, which confirms the signaling of a lack of investment opportunities for the issuing firms. Besides, firms receiving inter-corporate loans invest more, in particular for intra-group loans from controlling shareholders, which confirms the certification by the corporate lenders and propping-up.

Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we provide a novel result on the market reaction to announcements of inter-corporate loans, which extends the literature on information production by non-financial firms as creditors alongside banks and non-bank financial institutions (Best and Zhang (1993); Billett,

Flannery and Garfinkel (1995)). We show that the receipt of inter-corporate loans from non-financial firms is associated with positive market reactions, which indicates a certification effect by these non-financial firms as creditors. Second, our study is also related with the literature on the internal capital market of business groups (Stein (1997); Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007)). We show that the issuance of inter-corporate loans by a listed firm to another firm within the same business group is associated with negative market reactions, which suggests that the uninformed investors perceive the use of the internal capital market as a signal of rescuing distressed group firms, and that the lending firm is running out of worthy projects to finance. Finally, our findings shed light on informal finance (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)). We show that the issuance of inter-corporate loans to firms outside the business group (i.e., informal loans) is associated with weakly negative market reactions, which indicates that uninformed investors perceive these informal loans as unfavorable investments probably due to their lack of expertise in loan extension.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Chinese financial system. Section 3 sets out our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology. Section 5 provides summary statistics, determinants of loan issuance and receiving, and event studies of the issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans. Section 6 links CARs to a set of loan, counter-party and firm-specific characteristics. Section 7 shows the post-performance of inter-corporate loan announcements such as profitability and investment in the long-run. Section 8 concludes.

## 2. The financial system in China

The formal financial sector is dominated by banks in China (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)) with a bank credit to GDP ratio (1.11) that is substantially higher than the average for the other countries in their sample (0.73). According to *National Bureau of Statistics of China*, banks provided 51.4 percent of the total financing for Chinese firms in 2013. The banking system in China consists of a central bank, four large (national) state-owned banks,<sup>6</sup> three policy banks, 12 (regional) joint-stock banks, hundreds of local banks (i.e. city/rural commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, and village banks), and city/rural credit cooperatives, etc. There are also hundreds of branches and offices of foreign banks which can conduct a limited set of commercial banking activities in China (Allen, Qian, Zhang and Zhao (2013)). Generally speaking, the four large state-owned banks dominate the credit market in China. In particular state-owned banks are mandated to pursue social benefits and stability, and their credit allocation is often based on some “noisy” information about the borrowers and not on commercial judgment (Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011)). Moreover, small and private firms have limited credit histories and collateral, and will not receive a government bailout in case of default. Thus, banks favor lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and large private firms, and discriminate against small and private firms in China (Firth, Lin and Wong (2008)). In sum, a majority of bank credit is channeled to the SOEs and large private firms, while small and private firms face substantial obstacles in obtaining external finance from the formal financial sector.

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<sup>6</sup> The four large stated-owned banks are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, Construction Bank of China and Agriculture Bank of China.

The capital market, which mainly consists of a bond market and an equity market, is also relatively underdeveloped in China. The bond market remains under-developed until recent years, although corporate bonds were first issued already in 1986. The market value of newly issued bonds in China was only 1.74 percent of GDP at the end of 2012, and corporate bond issuance accounts for just 11.19 percent of total bond issuance in China. In contrast, the newly established *Shanghai Stock Exchange* and *Shenzhen Stock Exchange* have enjoyed rapid expansion since their founding in 1990. As measured by total market capitalization, both of these stock exchanges ranked in the world's top ten at the end of 2011. However, the combined stock market is still quite small compared to the banking system. The market capitalization-to-GDP ratio was 52 percent in 2011 in China, which is much lower than the U.S. Despite its rapid growth, the stock market does not play a proper role in the country, where insider trading and speculation are prevalent (He and Rui (2014)). For example, the turnover rates on the *Shanghai* and *Shenzhen Stock Exchanges* are 178.5 and 344.3 percent, respectively, which is higher than most industrial countries and may indicate widespread speculative trading (Allen, Qian, Zhang and Zhao (2013)). Moreover, the two stock exchanges were established so as to provide a new source of funding to SOEs and to reduce the financial burden of government bailouts. Up until 2005, about 80 percent of the (more than 1,100) listed enterprises were converted from SOEs in China, while a majority of listed firms are still owned or controlled by the government nowadays. The Chinese government's dual role as both regulators and shareholders reduces the effectiveness of the stock market in terms of resource allocation and risk diversification.

Informal financing, which has been growing rapidly in China (due to widespread state intervention and financial repression), channels credit from state-owned and large private firms to SMEs in support of a fast growth of the Chinese economy (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005); Bose (1998)). The formal financial sector is inefficient in allocating credit due to a severe information asymmetry and weak law enforcement. Informal financing channels based on reputation and relationship may be filling the gap thanks to their advantages in screening, monitoring, and enforcement (Stiglitz (1990); Arnott and Stiglitz (1991)).

One type of informal financing is the inter-corporate loan. Because direct lending activities among non-financial firms are prohibited in China, entrusted loans have moved in to facilitate inter-corporate lending.<sup>7</sup> Under financial regulations in China, non-financial firms can extend credit to other firms via entrusted loans in a process that is coordinated by banks and other financial institutions (banks hereafter). Lenders and borrowers can negotiate loan terms subject to certain financial regulations regarding for example amount, interest rate, maturity, and purpose.<sup>8</sup> Banks merely act as agents on behalf of the lenders and coordinate the loan procedures, i.e., the contract signing, loan withdrawals, and repayment, etc. However, banks do not bear any default risk for the entrusted loans, which are often treated as off-balance sheet items.

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<sup>7</sup> On March 8<sup>th</sup>, 1993, *People's Bank of China* (PBOC) promulgated administrative decrees on entrusted loans as regards financial trust companies. On April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the PBOC released a regulation on entrusted loans, "*Issues on Commercial Banks' Provision for Launching Entrusted Loans*". For an overview of the evolution of financial regulation of entrusted loans in China, see Appendix 1 for a survey of the laws relating to entrusted loans.

<sup>8</sup> *Lending General Provisions* by the *People's Bank of China* were formulated in accord with the *Law of the Commercial Banks* and other relevant laws on August 1<sup>st</sup>, 1996. Article 7 states that entrusted loans should comply with the *Lending General Provisions*.

Appendix 1 gives a timeline for the related laws and regulations (for what we will henceforth call inter-corporate loans).

The Chinese financial authorities imposed only a mild set of regulations on entrusted loans because of their beneficial effect on credit reallocation. The market for entrusted loans has witnessed a rapid expansion with the gradual liberalization of interest rates in China, and it has recently become a key source of financing.<sup>9</sup> The interest rate ceiling for entrusted loans was abolished by the People's Bank of China (PBOC) in October 2004, which enabled lenders to negotiate freely with borrowers on interest rates. Appendix 2 shows that the market share of inter-corporate loans has been growing rapidly, accounting for 15 percent of total financing in 2013 (the second largest financing source after bank lending) and totaling 2.55 trillion RMB.

The rapid growth in entrusted lending has however generated substantial concern about the credit risks involved, especially in light of the gloomy prospects for the Chinese economy since the global financial crisis. SOEs and large private firms often have very limited investment opportunities (as they struggle with inefficient organizational structures, policy burdens, and overcapacity problems) but still have easy access to bank credit. This abundant credit can be channeled to private SMEs at interest rates above the bank lending rate.<sup>10</sup> However, inter-corporate loans may also

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<sup>9</sup> The interest rates are under extensive regulation by the People's Bank of China (PBOC). PBOC set the benchmark interest rate along with a rate floor and rate ceiling. The interest rate is only allowed to vary within specified bounds. For example, PBOC set the benchmark lending rates, and the interest rate of commercial loans, including entrusted loans, must be between the floor and ceiling around the benchmark lending rate. China began its interest rate liberalization in 1996 by abolishing the ceiling on interbank lending rates. From 1998 to 2004, the ceiling for the lending rates gradually raised, and was abolished in October 2004 (except for credit cooperatives), while the floor remained unchanged at 90% of the benchmark lending rate. Recently, China took a further step toward a market-oriented rate by removing the lending rate floor on July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

<sup>10</sup> Beijing, June 25<sup>th</sup>, 2013 (*Reuters*) - A deputy general manager in a state-owned steel firm says that the firm doesn't use the bank credit to expand production, as the average loss is 100 - 200 RMB per ton of

be extended to poor borrowers if lenders do not conduct proper screening and monitoring due to a lack of expertise in lending; e.g., 28 percent of outstanding inter-corporate lending by the *Sunny Loan Top Co., Ltd* as at end-2013 could not be recovered at maturity.<sup>11</sup> The risks of inter-corporate lending can increase the systemic risks of the financial system as such credit often ends up in the real estate market and local municipal government investment platforms, which have become a major concern as regards the financial stability in China.

Although inter-corporate loans have come under substantial scrutiny in China itself, the gains and losses from such loans have not been assessed yet in the academic literature. We will provide such an evaluation by examining the market reactions to the announcements of issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans in the following sections, and also their impact on the profitability and corporate investment ex post in the long run.

### **3. The hypotheses**

Institutional lenders, such as banks, can enhance firm valuation by alleviating the information asymmetry of borrowers (Fama (1985); Boot (2000); Ongena and Smith (2000)). Approval of a bank loan is often perceived by uninformed investors as a good signal, especially for borrowers who suffer from severe information asymmetries. The positive excess returns on borrowers' stocks following bank loan announcements are

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steel sold. Entrusted loans are an attractive business option for his company. The firm borrows from banks at the benchmark lending rate (about six percent), and issues entrusted loans to borrowers at twice that rate.

<sup>11</sup> The firm is listed in *Shanghai Stock Exchange* (i.e. stock ID: 600830). Among 1.12 billion RMB entrusted loans outstanding at the end of 2013, 306 million is classified as doubtful and 5 million is classified as losses. Data from the announcement by *Sunny Loan Top Co., Ltd*: [www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2014-06-07/64111840.PDF](http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2014-06-07/64111840.PDF).

widely documented in the literature. For example, James (1987) finds positive CARs of almost 200 basis points in a two-day period surrounding bank loan announcements.<sup>12</sup> Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) show significant positive CARs on loans from non-bank financial institutions which are indistinguishable from bank loans. However, Lummer and McConnell (1989) show that the market reacts positively to loan renewals but not to new bank loan agreements.

The CARs on bank loan announcements are higher for borrowers who suffer more from information asymmetries (Best and Zhang (1993)), for example these could be the smaller borrowers (Maskara and Mullineaux (2011)). Certain types of lenders can also better alleviate the information asymmetry of bank loan agreements, as in the case of internationally syndicated loans in emerging economies (Harvey, Lins and Roper (2004)); for example also foreign or local banks, except for domestic banks that are located far from their borrowers, may play that role (Ongena and Roscovan (2013)); or lenders with higher credit ratings (Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995)).

However, the CARs on bank loan announcements change over time. Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) for example show that CARs on bank loan announcements were positive in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas they disappeared afterwards except for smaller and poorly performing firms and periods of high credit risk spreads, a result also present in samples studied by Andre, Mathieu and Zhang (2001) and Ongena, Roscovan, Song and Werker (2014) for example. And Li and Ongena (2015) find that the CARs on bank loan announcements were positive during

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<sup>12</sup> Following work by Mikkelsen and Partch (1986). James and Smith (2000) and Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) provide a critical review of the methodology and the extant empirical evidence.

the global financial crisis although they were close to zero before that. They surmise that in a booming credit market the certification of corporate borrowers by banks started to play a lesser role, while during the crisis the banks' role was revitalized. Wang and Xia (2014) show that banks exert less effort in ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring when they can securitize loans, which may also explain the changes in CARs on bank loans over the time.

Despite considerable anecdotal evidence, little direct evidence has been provided so far on the market reactions of lenders' stocks to loan announcements. A few studies investigate the loan announcement effect of lending financial institutions. For example, Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) show that the announcements of syndicated loans to Latin American borrowers in the 1970s are associated with negative CARs for the lending banks, while syndicated loans to U.S. borrowers in the 1980s are associated with positive CARs. However, little is known about the announcement effect of loans made by non-financial firms. Yook (2003) show that the acquirers' stock prices suffer from negative market reactions to M&A announcements, which may be seen to indicate that the acquirers have run out of other worthwhile projects to finance. Similarly, the issuance of inter-corporate loans may suggest that the issuing firms have run out of worthy investment projects, which can lead to negative market reactions. Thus, our first hypothesis is:

*Hypothesis 1: The announcement of the issuance of an inter-corporate loan will lead to significantly negative excess returns on the stock of the issuing firm.*

In contrast to bank loans, the granters of inter-corporate loans are non-financial firms, and loan default risks should incentivize them to acquire proprietary information about the borrowers, e.g., through long-term business relationships such as business group affiliation, supplier-customer relationship, or personal relationship of the CEOs, etc. Thus, obtaining an inter-corporate loan may certify the borrower and convey positive information to uninformed investors. Thus, our second hypothesis is:

*Hypothesis 2: The announcement of the receipt of an inter-corporate loan will lead to significantly positive excess returns on the stock of the receiving firm.*

Business groups are prevalent in emerging economies (Claessens, Fan and Lang (2006)), where weak creditor protection may make it too costly to raise external finance (Bae and Vidhan (2009)). Firms with good investment opportunities can obtain credit through the internal capital market if and when the headquarters of the business group allocates credit efficiently among group firms (Stein (1997)). But the headquarters of the group may also channel credit to other group firms in financial distress in order to avoid negative spillovers to the rest of the business group (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007); Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015)).

Ownership is often concentrated in business groups, and voting rights exceed cash flow rights through pyramid structures and cross-holdings by controlling shareholders in emerging economies (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000)). Thus, a majority of decision rights are often in the hands of controlling shareholders, which

may enable them to tunnel corporate resources for private benefits (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000)). For example, controlling shareholders used to tunnel resources away from listed firms through intra-group loans in China (Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010)). However, intra-group loans to controlling shareholders have been prohibited by the Chinese government since 2006, which alleviates the tunneling concerns with respect to inter-corporate loans in the country. As a result, intra-group loans among Chinese listed firms are more likely to reveal a lack of worthwhile projects in the issuing firms and financial distress of group firms rather than tunneling.

The receipt of intra-group loans, however, resembles bank loan agreements though the lenders are affiliated within the same business group. Firms may have proprietary information due to affiliation within the same business group. Furthermore, intra-group loans from controlling shareholders are a type of corporate propping-up (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003); Jian and Wong (2010); Peng, Wei and Yang (2011)), which may generate positive market reactions. Thus, our third and fourth hypotheses are:

*Hypothesis 3: The announcement of the issuance of an intra-group loan will lead to significantly negative excess returns on the stock of the issuing firm.*

*Hypothesis 4: The announcement of the receipt of an intra-group loan will lead to significantly positive excess returns on the stock of the receiving firm.*

Inter-group loans are extended by one non-financial firm to another not in the same business group. But inter-group loans often occur between firms with certain business relationships, e.g., customers, suppliers, or firms in the same industry. Lending firms may have an informational advantage over banks in screening and monitoring the borrowers when extending inter-corporate loans. In addition, lenders can benefit from inter-group loans via a higher rate of return than in alternative investments (e.g., bank deposits). What is even more important is that inter-group loans provide an alternative financing channel for credit constrained borrowers such as private SMEs.

Lenders of inter-group loans, especially SOEs and large private firms, can raise external finance more easily than private SMEs. The issuance of inter-group loans may signal to uninformed investors that the issuing firms have run out of worthwhile projects to finance, even though the inter-corporate loans indeed improve the credit allocation in the issuing firms as in Bose (1998) and Hoff and Stiglitz (1997). We surmise that the signaling effect dominates the credit reallocation effect, which results in a negative market reaction to the issuance of inter-group loans.

The receipt of inter-group loans, however, is also quite similar to the receipt of bank loans in terms of certification for the borrowers. Although the lenders are non-financial firms which may lack sufficient expertise in lending, they may have proprietary information obtained through long-term business relationship (e.g., suppliers or customers). The receipt of inter-corporate loans may reveal proprietary information to uninformed investors, which can generate positive market reactions. Thus, our fifth and sixth hypotheses are:

*Hypothesis 5: The announcement of the issuance of an inter-group loan will lead to significantly negative excess returns on the stock of the issuing firm.*

*Hypothesis 6: The announcement of the receipt of an inter-group loan will lead to significantly positive excess returns on the stock of the receiving firm.*

Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) show that the announcements of bank loans are associated with negative abnormal returns on the borrower's stock, and obtaining bank loans predicts poorer subsequent performance of borrowers in China. Banks do not screen or monitor borrowers in a proper way, which results in inefficient lending and thus credit misallocation in the country. In contrast, inter-corporate loans based on frequent interactions between borrowers and lenders are more likely to be driven by business considerations, which may reveal proprietary information to the uninformed investors and also provide alternative financing for high growing but credit constrained firms (e.g., intra-group loans from controlling shareholders as corporate propping-up). Hence, corporate performance and investment should be higher after the receipt of inter-corporate loans, which echoes with the positive market reaction to the loan receipts. In contrast, it may reveal a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuers when issuing inter-corporate loans, and may also reveal potential financial distresses in group firms when issuing intra-group loans to subsidiaries. Thus, we propose that firms issuing inter-corporate loans will have lower corporate performance and investment, and vice versa for firms receiving inter-corporate loans. Thus, our seventh and eighth hypotheses are:

*Hypothesis 7: The issuance of an inter-corporate loan will lead to a deterioration of corporate performance and investment in the issuing firm.*

*Hypothesis 8: The receipt of an inter-corporate loan will lead to an increase in corporate performance and investment of the receiving firm.*

#### **4. Data and variables**

Our sample consists of non-financial firms traded on the Chinese stock market (both *Shanghai* and *Shenzhen Stock Exchange*). We firstly identify a sample of 1,024 announcements of inter-corporate loans during 2005-2012 from *Resset* ([www.resset.cn](http://www.resset.cn)), which is a widely used database for the Chinese stock market (Calomiris, Fisman and Wang (2010)). The CSRC requires all listed firms to announce major events which may influence their stock prices.<sup>13</sup> We then crosscheck the announcements with the official documents of corporate announcements

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<sup>13</sup> According to Article 67 of Chapter 3 of the *Securities Law of China* (effective as of Oct 27, 2005), the term “major event” means: (1) A major change in the company’s business guidelines or scope of business; (2) A decision made by the company concerning a major investment or major asset purchase; (3) Conclusion by the company of an important contract which may have an important effect on the company’s assets, liabilities, rights, interests or business results; (4) Incurrence by the company of a major debt or default on an overdue major debt; (5) Incurrence by the company of a major deficit or incurrence of a major loss; (6) A major change in the external conditions of the company’s production or business; (7) A change in the board of directors, no less than one-third of directors, supervisors or managers of the company; (8) A considerable change in the holdings of shareholders who hold no less than five percent of the company’s shares; (9) A decision made by the company to reduce its capital, to merge, to divide, to dissolve, or to apply for bankruptcy; (10) Major litigation involving the company, or lawful cancellation by a court of a resolution adopted by the shareholders’ general meeting or the board of directors; (11) Criminal cases involving the company, and the arrest of board of directors, supervisors or senior management staff; (12) Other events specified by the *China Securities Regulatory Commission*.

published on the websites designated by the CSRC,<sup>14</sup> and the websites of the *Shanghai* and *Shenzhen* Stock Exchanges. We identify another 249 announcements of inter-corporate loans. So we reach a sample of 1,273 announcements of inter-corporate loans. Appendix 3 shows an example of an inter-corporate loan announcement record (translated by the authors).

We exclude all observations that coincide with other confounding corporate events (i.e., release of annual reports, announcement of seasonal offerings, dividend, law suits, etc.) within the [-2, 2] trading day window around the announcements date of an inter-corporate loan. We obtain a sample of 719 unaffected announcements of issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans. Appendix 4 tabulates the total volume of inter-corporate loans by all listed firms on *Shanghai Stock Exchange*, which shows that our sample covers a quarter of the total volume of inter-corporate loans.

We record the announcement date, loan type (i.e., issuance/receipt), existing relationship between lender and borrower (i.e., inter-group and intra-group, where the latter is further broken down into controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and firms with other relationships (i.e., firms affiliated with the same business group but without equity ownership of each other), and ownership of the counter-party. In addition, we also record whether an inter-corporate loan is a new loan (issuance/receipt) or a loan revision. A new loan indicates that the borrower and lender do not have a prior inter-corporate loan between them, while a loan revision means there is an existing loan. The announcement files for inter-corporate loans enable us to identify loan terms

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<sup>14</sup> The official designated websites for corporate disclosures are [www.cninfo.com.cn](http://www.cninfo.com.cn) and [www.cnstock.com](http://www.cnstock.com).

such as the loan amount, interest rate, maturity, and collateral, and also the name of the financial institution involved, among other characteristics.

The inter-corporate loan announcements are matched with stock prices and a set of firm characteristics at the fiscal year-end before the announcement year. We collect financial information for non-listed firms from the announcement files of inter-corporate loans, and also from the survey of industrial firms by the *National Bureau of Statistics of China*.<sup>15</sup> As a result, we can compile a set of firm characteristics which may be associated with the CARs on announcements of inter-corporate loans.

We include loan variables in the regression (loan size, interest rate, maturity, guarantee, and loan revision), as well as counter-party variables (intra-group and inter-group counter-party, counter-party industry, counter-party size, and state-owned counter-party). In addition, we include a set of firm variables: Size, age, market-to-book ratio, free cash flow, leverage, state-control, other accounts receivable, and other accounts payable. Finally, we include industry and year fixed effects in the regression. Variable definitions are listed in Table 1.

[Table 1 here]

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<sup>15</sup> We use the dataset for industrial firms in China, which include all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and all non-state owned firms with annual sales revenues above five million RMB, from 1998-2009.

## 5. Results

### 5.1 Summary statistics

We focus on 2005-2012, as our sample covers all announcements of inter-corporate loans in that period. Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of 719 “clean” announcements by type and year. A total of 564 announcements were made on the issuance of inter-corporate loans, and 155 announcements on their receipts. The number of announcements increases over the years, with a slight decrease in 2012, and there are more announcements of issuances than of receipts.

[Table 2 here]

Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution of inter-corporate loan announcements by industry. A majority of the inter-corporate loans are in the manufacturing industry. The utilities industry ranks second in the number of issuance announcements of inter-corporate loans, whereas the real estate industry ranks second for receipt announcements.

Panel A of Table 3 shows the characteristics of inter-corporate loans for issuance versus receipts as well as for intra-group versus inter-group loans. A majority of the announced inter-corporate loans are intra-group loans, on both issuance and receipts. Panel B of Table 3 shows a further decomposition of the intra-group loans into controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and firms with other relationships. All issuances of intra-group loans go to the subsidiaries of listed firms except for four loans to the controlling shareholders, while a majority of the receipts of intra-group loans comes from the controlling shareholders. Table 3 also shows that issuance size (in million RMB) is smaller than the receipt size for inter-corporate loans, the

respective average loan sizes for issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans being 185 and 300 (217 and 298 for intra-group loans).

[Table 3 here]

Table 3 also shows that the maturity is 18 months on average for the issuance of intra-group loans and 12 months for the issuance of inter-group loans. The maturity for the receipt of inter-corporate loans is slightly longer than that for inter-group loans. In addition, the average interest rate spread is 14 versus 115 percent over the basis lending rate for the issuance of intra-group versus inter-group loans; and 4 versus 17 percent for the receipt of intra-group versus inter-group loans. Furthermore, the issuance of intra-group loans has a lower proportion of guarantees than inter-group loans (i.e., 13 versus 66 percent), which also applies to the receipt of intra-group versus inter-group loans (i.e., 9 versus 40 percent).

## **5.2 Determinants of issuing and receiving inter-corporate loans**

In order to identify factors that may affect the likelihood of issuing or receiving inter-corporate loans, we use size-based matching method in Beasley (1996) and Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011). It allows us to identify a group of control firms with similar size and same industry. The dependent variable equals 1 for each firm-year in our sample, and 0 for a matching sample constructed for each firm-year from all firms that do not have any record on issuing or receiving inter-corporate loans. Specifically, for each firm-year in our loan announcement sample, we identify all other firms from the same industry and choose the one with the closest value of total assets, as long as it is within the ten percent band of the sample firms' total assets. We then pool these

matched firms with our sample firms, and run a regression of the likelihood of issuing or receiving inter-corporate loans on a set of firm characteristics.

Models (1)-(3) of Table 4 show that more mature firms are more likely to issue inter-group loans, while less likely for intra-group loans. In addition, firms with higher market to book ratio is less likely to issue inter-group loans, while it doesn't matter for the issuance of intra-group loans. Furthermore, firms with higher leverage are less likely to issue inter-group loans, while it does not matter for the issuance of intra-group loans. Besides, state-controlled firms are more likely to issue intra-group loans, while this is not the case for inter-group loans. What is more, firms with a CEO who is also a chairman of the board of directors are less likely to issue intra-group loans, which reflects the relative bargaining power in terms of credit re-allocation between the headquarter CEO and divisional CEO of a business group.

[Table 4 here]

Models (4)-(6) of Table 4 show that more mature firms are less likely to receive inter-group loans. Also, firms with higher market to book ratio are more likely to receive inter-group loans, while market-to-book does not matter for the receipt of intra-group loans. In addition, firms with higher leverage are less likely to issue inter-group loans but more likely to receive inter-group loans. Furthermore, state-controlled firms are more likely to issue and receive intra-group loans, while not so for inter-group loans. Firms with higher profitability, however, are less likely to receive inter-group loans, which may reflect abundant cash flow in the firm thus a lower external credit demand.

### 5.3 Market reactions to the issuance of inter-corporate loans

A standard market model (as in Thompson (1985)) is used to estimate the benchmark returns and then to calculate the abnormal returns. In order to measure market returns, we use the equally-weighted market return for the Chinese stock market (A-shares) from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We define the announcement date as the event date (i.e., “day 0”). For each “clean” announcement of entrusted loans, we run a daily market model for the firms over the estimation window of  $[-250, -21]$ , and calculate abnormal returns in the event windows accordingly.

Since December 16, 1996, the Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the ceiling and floor of the daily stock price. Based on previous trading day’s closing price, the ceiling and floor for the stock prices are set at ten percent for all stocks and five percent for stocks that are labeled as *special treatment status* (“ST”).<sup>16</sup> Thus, the stock price may continue to react after the announcement day, which makes  $CAR[-1, +1]$  an informative measure to capture a full market reaction besides the standard  $CAR[-1,0]$ . We also report results for various event windows (e.g.,  $CAR[-2,+2]$ ) to check the robustness.

The top panel of Table 5 shows the abnormal returns on the issuance of inter-corporate loans. The two-day cumulative abnormal return, i.e.,  $CAR[-1,0]$ , is

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<sup>16</sup> According to CSRC, a company can be downgraded to ST status if: (1) The firm records a net loss in two consecutive fiscal years; (2) The company is found to have committed financial fraud and, after taking remedial action, records a net loss in two consecutive fiscal years; (3) The company is found to have committed financial fraud, the company has failed to take remedial action within a specified period after being urged by the CSRC to do so, and the company has been temporarily delisted for two months; (4) The company has failed to issue its annual report or semi-annual report on the designated date and has been temporarily delisted for two months. Any company that fails to take steps to improve its situation after being designated ST will ultimately be delisted from the stock exchange.

-0.42 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in a Student's t-test and significant at the one percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (i.e., the proportion of positive CARs is less than 50 percent). The results for  $AR[0]$  and  $CAR[-1,1]$  are qualitatively similar. The upper panel of Appendix 5 shows the average abnormal returns for the issuance of inter-corporate loans in the  $[-20, 20]$  window, which exhibits a substantial drop in the average abnormal return on the event day.

[Table 5 here]

As multiple inter-corporate loan issuances may be announced on a single day, we split the sample into single-event versus multiple-events subsamples in order to get a cleaner effect. Thus, the middle panel of Table 5 shows that the  $CAR[-1,0]$  is -0.48 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level for the single-event subsample in both the t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and -0.17 percent and insignificant for the multiple-events subsample. We will focus on the single-event subsample for the issuance of inter-corporate loans hereafter.

Table 6 shows the issuance of inter-corporate loans by intra-group versus inter-group loans. The  $CAR[-1,0]$  for the issuance of intra-group loans is -0.62 percent and significant at the one percent level in both a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, while it is -0.25 percent for inter-group loans and significant at one percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test although statistically insignificant in a t-test. Furthermore, the results for  $AR[0]$  and  $CAR[-1,-1]$  are qualitatively similar. In sum, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates a negative market reaction, sending unfavorable signals to uninformed investors for both intra-group and inter-group loans. The issuance of inter-corporate loans may reveal a credit misallocation in a listed firm, e.g.,

a listed firm may run out of worthwhile projects to finance even when the inter-corporate loans may enhance the credit allocation.

[Table 6 here]

We also show the CARs separated into issuance of intra-group loans to controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationships. Table 7 shows that the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries constitutes a majority of the sample, while the set of loans issued to controlling shareholders contains only four observations due to government sanctions since 2006. Consistent with the tunneling of intra-group loans to controlling shareholders in Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010), the CAR[-1,0] equals -1.97 percent, though it is not statistically significant due to the limited number of observations. In addition, CAR[-1,0] is -0.65 percent for the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries, which is significant at the one percent level in both a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-test. We do not find any significant CARs for the issuance of intra-group loans to borrowers with other relationships.

[Table 7]

Besides indicating a lack of worthwhile projects in the issuing firm, the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries may also reveal financial distress in this subsidiary, which may spill over to the rest of the business group. Our results provide evidence consistent with the role of ICMs in supporting financially weaker firms in a business group (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007); Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015)).

In sum, the negative CARs for the issuance of inter-corporate loans may reveal a credit misallocation to the uninformed investors, or rather a lack of worthwhile projects to finance for the issuing firms, even when such loans would improve credit

allocation. Furthermore, the negative CARs for the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries may reveal financial distress in the subsidiary which may spill over to the rest of the business group. The negative CARs for the issuance of inter-group loans, however, may also show inefficient informal lending, i.e., non-financial corporate lenders may lack sufficient lending expertise as banks.

#### 5.4 Market reactions to the receipt of inter-corporate loans

Table 8 shows the abnormal returns for the receipt of inter-corporate loans. The  $CAR[-1,0]$  is 0.91 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in a t-test, and also at the ten percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. In addition,  $CAR[-1,0]$  is 1.09 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in a t-test and at the five percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the receipt of inter-corporate loans in the single-event subsample, and -0.59 percent in the multiple-events subsample (but not significant). Similarly, we will focus on the single-event subsample for the receipt of inter-corporate loans hereafter. The results are qualitatively similar for other event windows, such as  $AR[0]$ ,  $CAR[-1,1]$ , and  $CAR[-2,2]$ . The lower panel of Appendix 5 shows a substantial jump in the average abnormal return on the event day of the receipt of inter-corporate loans. In sum, the receipt of inter-corporate loans has a certification effect for the borrowing firms in China, as do bank loans in the U.S.

[Table 8 here]

We further tabulate the receipts of inter-corporate loans by intra-group versus inter-group loans. The top panel of Table 9 shows that the  $CAR[-1,0]$  for the receipt of intra-group loans is 1.06 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in

a t-test and also at the five percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The CAR[-1,0] is 1.33 percent for inter-group loans (but not statistically significant). The results are qualitatively similar for other event windows, e.g., AR[0], CAR[-1,1], and CAR[-2,2]. We find that the intra-group loans also have a certification effect for the borrowing firms, which may be due to their proprietary information due to affiliation with the same business group.

[Table 9 here]

We also tabulate the receipts of intra-group loans by those from controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and lenders with other relationships. Table 10 shows that intra-group loans from controlling shareholders constitute a majority of the sample. The CAR[-1,0] is 1.42 percent for the receipt of intra-group loans from controlling shareholders and is statistically significant at the one percent level in both a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Furthermore, the receipt of intra-group loans from lenders with other relationship has a CAR[-1,0] of 0.37 percent (but not statistically significant). However, we do not find any clear evidence for the receipt of intra-group loans from subsidiaries, likely due to the limited number of observations.

[Table 10 here]

In sum, the receipt of inter-corporate loans may provide certification for the borrowing firms. In particular, the receipt of loans from controlling shareholders can provide information to uninformed investors, which leads to positive CARs. The intra-group loan from controlling shareholders is also consistent with the corporate propping-up by controlling shareholders in emerging markets (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003); Jian and Wong (2010); Peng, Wei and Yang (2011)).

## 6. CARs and loan, counter-party and firm characteristics

We tabulate CARs in terms of sample median and by loan type, counter-party and firm characteristics in Table 11. The issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries generates higher CARs for loans with a guarantee, and lower CARs for loan revisions, and also lower CARs for those where the issuers have higher other accounts receivable (i.e., more inter-corporate loans outstanding). For the receipt of intra-group loans from controlling shareholders, the CARs are higher when the receiving firms have higher market to book ratio (though insignificant), higher ROAs and lower free cash flow.

[Table 11 here]

We also regress the CARs on loan, counter-party, and firm level variables. Firstly, we include loan variables, i.e., loan size, spread of the interest rate over basis lending rate, maturity, guarantee status (whether a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by third-parties), loan revision (whether a loan announcement relates to a revision of loan terms such as extension of maturities). We also include a set of counter-party variables, i.e., intra-group versus inter-group loans, whether the counter-party and the listed firm are in the same industry, counter-party size, and whether the counter-party is state-owned, etc. Finally, we include a set of firm level variables, i.e., firm size, age, market-to-book ratio, free cash flow, leverage, state control, other accounts receivable, and other accounts payable, etc. The balance of the issuance of inter-corporate loans is typically recorded in other accounts receivable, and while their receipt is recorded in other accounts payable. Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) show that other accounts receivable captures the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders. Because this channel has been closed since 2006, only four inter-corporate loans were issued to

controlling shareholders. We include other accounts receivable and payable to measure the balance of inter-corporate loans outstanding at the fiscal year-end before these announcements.

Appendix 6 shows summary statistics for the variables in the regression. Firms announcing the issuances of inter-corporate loans are more likely to be larger, more mature, state-controlled, and to have lower market to book ratio, lower leverage ratio, and lower other accounts receivable (i.e., lower inter-corporate loan issuances in the past) than those without any inter-corporate loan announcement. However, firms issuing inter-corporate loans are more likely to have lower free cash flow, which shows that the issuing firms may not simply relocate abundant cash for higher investment returns, e.g., rescuing group firms even though the list firm does not have abundant cash. In contrast, firms announcing the receipt of inter-corporate loans are more likely to be larger, more mature, state-controlled, and have higher leverage ratio, and higher other accounts payable (i.e., higher inter-corporate loans receipts in the past).

Table 12 shows the regressions of  $CAR[-1,0]$  for the issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans on the loan, counter-party and firm characteristics. Models (1) to (3) give the estimates for the issuance, and Models (4) to (6) for the receipt of inter-corporate loans. Model (1) of Table 12 shows that the CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans are negatively associated with the interest rate spread over the basis lending rate. Model (2) shows that CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans are lower for intra-group loans, which may be due to a signaling effect as to the financial distress of a group firm. Specifically, intra-group loans to subsidiaries at a

higher interest rate may reveal a high default risk in these subsidiaries, which could spill over to the rest of the business group.

[Table 12 here]

Model (3) of Table 12 shows that the more mature firms in the stock market generate higher CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans, as the uninformed investors may already know their low growth potential, and also be less concerned about default risks for the borrowing subsidiaries. Furthermore, firms with higher market-to-book ratios have lower CARs due to more severe credit misallocation in the fast-growing firms. In other words, an issuance of an inter-corporate loan by a firm with higher growth prospects may provide more valuable proprietary information to the uninformed investors on a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firm. Finally, the CARs are lower for issuers with higher other accounts receivable, i.e., the issuing firms already have substantial issuances of inter-corporate loans outstanding, which may further confirm credit misallocation in the issuing firm, and financial distress in a group firm.

Model (4) of Table 12 shows the regression results for CARs on the receipt of inter-corporate loans on loan variables, with no variables being statistically significant. The CARs are lower for loans with higher interest rate spreads, and these are significant at the ten percent level when we control for counter-party variables in Model (5) and further the firm characteristics in Model (6). A wider interest rate spread shows a higher default risk in the borrowing firm, which may attenuate the certification effect for these non-financial corporate lenders. However, there is no difference between intra-group and inter-group lenders for the market reactions to the receipt of inter-corporate loans.

State-owned lenders are associated with lower CARs in Model (6), which is significant at the five percent level and shows that these state-owned lenders are less credit-worthy in terms of certification for the borrowing firm. In contrast, state controlled firms are associated with higher CARs when receiving inter-corporate loans. State controlled firms are often worse in terms of performance, and inter-corporate loans may have a larger certification effect for such borrowing firms. Other accounts payable, however, is insignificant though the sign is positive in Model (6) of Table 12. Our results are generally consistent with the bank loan announcement literature in that certification is more effective if given by more credit-worthy lenders (Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995)), and also more effective for poorly performing borrowers (Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006)).

In sum, we find that the CARs on issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans are associated with various loan, counter-party, and (loan-announcing) firm variables. On the one hand, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs for loans with wider interest rate spreads, for intra-group loans, for firms with a higher market-to-book ratios, and with higher other accounts receivable (i.e., higher issuances of inter-corporate loans outstanding). On the other hand, the receipt of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs for the loans with a higher interest rate spread, loans from state-owned lenders, and loans to non-state controlled borrowers. The results support the hypothesis that the issuance of inter-corporate loans signals to uninformed investors a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms, while the issuance of intra-group loans conveys additional information of financial distress in a group firm.

## **7. Post-performance in the long-run**

### **7.1 Profitability**

The changes in the performance ex post the inter-corporate loans can cast light on their long-term wealth effect. We examine firms' accounting performance after the inter-corporate loan announcements. If the issuance of inter-corporate loans reveals credit misallocation in the issuing firms or financial distress in a group firm, we would expect the accounting performance to turn worse ex post. In contrast, if the receipt of inter-corporate loans provides certification for the receiving firms or corporate propping-up, we would expect a higher accounting performance ex post. Table 13 shows the return on asset (ROA) in the years before, during, and after inter-corporate loan announcements. We find that ROA indeed declines significantly after the issuance of inter-corporate loans from one year before to one year afterwards, which confirms a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms. The results are qualitatively similar when we look at the change from one year before and two years afterwards, and from the announcement year to two years afterwards.

[Table 13 here]

In addition, we find that ROA decreases for firms with relatively higher market to book ratio (i.e. above sample median) but not for firms with lower market to book ratio. A t-test between the two groups of firms shows that ROA decreases more from one year before to one/two years after inter-corporate loan announcements for firms with high market to book ratio, which are both significant at the ten percent level. Firms with higher growth potential indeed perform worse after the issuance of inter-corporate loans, which is consistent with a revelation for a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms. Besides, we find that ROA decreases

significantly after the issuance of intra-group loans while it decreases less for inter-group loans, though the t-tests for the mean difference are not statistically significant. It seems that the issuance of intra-group loans reveals a lack of worthwhile projects to finance and additionally the default risks within the business group.

We find that ROA increases from the announcement year to two years after the receipt of inter-corporate loans, in particular for intra-group loans in Table 13. However, there is no significant difference between receiving firms with high versus low market to book ratio, or intra-group versus inter-group loans. In contrast, a t-test between the issuing versus receiving firms show that ROA decreases more for firms issuing inter-corporate loans from the announcement year to two years afterwards for loan announcing firms with both relatively high and low market to book ratio. However, ROA decrease more for intra-group loans from the announcement year to two years afterwards and significant at the one percent level, while insignificant for the inter-group loans.

## **7.2 Corporate investment**

Changes of corporate investment behaviors may also shed some light on the wealth effect of inter-corporate loans. We explore the changes of capital expenditures scaled by the total assets in the year before the loan announcements for both the issuing and receiving firms. Table 14 shows the changes of capital expenditures in the years before and after the issuance of inter-corporate loans scaled by the total asset in the year before the loan announcements. We find that the capital expenditure increases less for the issuing firms than the receiving firms. In particular, this difference is significant for firms with relatively higher market to book ratios, and firms with

inter-group loans. However, we do not find any significant difference between issuers and receivers for firms with low market to book ratios, and firms with intra-group loans. Put it differently, firms issuing inter-corporate loans indeed invest less ex post, which confirms a lack of investment opportunities in the issuers and potential default risks in group firms.

[Table 14 here]

## **8. Conclusion**

The granting of entrusted loans in China provides us with a unique setting to evaluate the valuation effects of inter-corporate lending and borrowing. We find that investors react negatively to the issuance of inter-corporate loans but positively to their receipt. The issuing of inter-corporate loans may indicate credit misallocation to uninformed investors, i.e., the issuing firms run out of worthy projects to finance. Furthermore, the issuance of inter-corporate loans to subsidiaries may reveal financial distress in that subsidiary, which may eventually spill over to the rest of the business group.

On the other hand, the receipt of intra-group loans, especially those from controlling shareholders, provides certification for the borrowing firms. In contrast to bank loan announcements, which often provoke negative market reactions (Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011)), non-financial corporate lenders in China can convey proprietary information to the uninformed investors.

We also confirm our results by linking the CARs to loan, counter-party, and firm level variables. The issuance of inter-corporate loans generate lower CARs for the intra-group loans, for loans with higher interest rate spreads, and for loans granted by

young issuers, with higher market-to-book ratios and larger outstanding issuances of inter-corporate loans. In contrast, the receipt of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs on loans with higher interest rate spreads, on loans from state-owned lenders, and on loans to non-state-controlled borrowers. Our results shed light on inter-corporate loans as signaling devices for credit misallocation by issuing firms, and for financial distress in a borrowing subsidiary, which can spill over to the rest of the business group.

We further examine the ex post performance of inter-corporate loans. Firms issuing inter-corporate loans have lower accounting performance, in particular for firms with higher growth potential and firms issuing intra-group loans. The issuing firms increase the corporate investment to a less extent than the receiving firms, which suggests a credit misallocation in the issuers of inter-corporate loans.

Although the inter-corporate loans have played an increasingly important role in China, we still know little about the welfare gains from these loans. Because inter-corporate loans rarely arise between listed firms, we cannot calculate the net gains from such loans. Further research on the net gains from inter-corporate loans would provide more insight on whether or not such loans should be encouraged.

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**Table 1: Definitions of variables.**

<b>Variable category</b>	<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Loan	Loan size	The amount of inter-corporate loan, in millions of RMB
	Spread	The annual interest rate on the inter-corporate loan over the basis lending rate minus one, i.e., the interest premium over the basis lending rate
	Maturity	The maturity of the inter-corporate loan, in months
	Guarantee	=1 if the loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third-party, 0 otherwise
	Loan revision	=1 if the loan terms are revised, 0 otherwise
Counter-party Firm	Intra-group loan	=1 if the counter-party firm is a loan-announcing firm's subsidiary, controlling shareholder, or belongs to the same business group
	Counter-party ownership	A loan-announcing firm's equity ownership in the counter-party firm, or the controlling shareholder's equity ownership in a loan-announcing firm
	Counter-party industry	=1 if the industry of the counter-party firm is the same as the loan-announcing firm, 0 otherwise
	Counter-party size	The logarithm of the total assets of the counter-party firm
	State-owned counter-party	=1 if the counter-party firm is state-owned, 0 otherwise
(Loan-announcing) Firm	Firm size	The logarithm of total assets
	Sales growth	The annual sales' growth rate
	Market to book ratio	The ratio of the market value over the book value of assets
	Cash holding	Cash over total assets
	Free cash flow	Operating cash flow minus capital expenditure over total assets
	Leverage	Total liabilities over total assets
	State control	=1 if the ultimate owner is the state, 0 otherwise
	Other accounts receivable	Other accounts receivable over total assets
Other accounts payable	Other accounts payable over total assets	

**Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the announcement of inter-corporate****Panel A: Distribution of inter-corporate loan announcements by year and type**

Year	All	Issuance	Receipt
2005	15	11	4
2006	26	18	8
2007	39	31	8
2008	91	74	17
2009	93	73	20
2010	123	90	33
2011	180	133	47
2012	152	134	18
Total	719	564	155

**Panel B: Distribution of inter-corporate loan announcements by industry**

Industry names	All	Issuance	Receipt
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery	9	9	0
Mining	43	41	2
Manufacturing	337	264	73
Utilities	67	55	12
Construction	10	7	3
Transportation	29	22	7
Information technology	28	26	2
Wholesale and retail trade	51	48	3
Real estate	76	35	41
Social service	46	42	4
Communication and culture	5	5	0
Comprehensive	18	10	8
Total	719	564	155

**Table 3: Characteristics of inter-corporate loans.**

Loan size is the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Maturity is the loan maturity in numbers of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise. Loan revision equals one if the loan terms are revised, zero otherwise. The test of mean difference between issuance and receipt reports the t-statistics with significance \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

**Panel A: all inter-corporate loans**

	Issuance			Receipt			Test of mean difference
	# Obs.	Mean	Median	# Obs.	Mean	Median	T-stat
	All loans						
Loan size	564	185.23	70	155	300.26	180	-2.59***
Maturity	500	16.29	12	146	18.99	12	-2.14**
Spread	452	0.45	0.06	143	0.05	0	6.24***
Guarantee	564	0.29	0	155	0.12	0	4.19***
Loan revision	564	0.11	0	155	0.10	0	0.47
	Intra-group loans						
Loan size	396	216.57	80	140	298.28	150	-1.50
Maturity	339	18.22	12	134	19.07	12	-0.57
Spread	312	0.14	0	132	0.04	0	2.44**
Guarantee	396	0.13	0	140	0.09	0	1.05
Loan revision	396	0.11	0	140	0.11	0	0.05
	Inter-group loans						
Loan size	168	111.36	60	15	318.80	200	-3.97***
Maturity	161	12.24	12	12	18.17	12	-2.44**
Spread	140	1.15	1.21	11	0.17	0	3.79***
Guarantee	168	0.66	1	15	0.40	0	2.03**
Loan revision	168	0.11	0	15	0	0	1.38

**Panel B: subsample of intra-group loans**

	To/from controlling shareholders						
Loan size	4	189.50	340	105	305.09	200	-0.55
Maturity	4	9.75	12	104	19.09	12	-1.19
Spread	4	0.12	0	102	0.01	0	0.79
Guarantee	4	0	0	105	0.10	0	-0.64
Loan revision	4	0	0	105	0.08	0	-0.57
	To/from subsidiaries						
Loan size	375	216.93	80	10	165.50	80	0.27
Maturity	324	18.51	12	9	12.67	12	1.20
Spread	294	0.12	0	8	0.18	0	-0.40
Guarantee	375	0.12	0	10	0	0	1.16
Loan revision	375	0.11	0	10	0	0	1.09
	To borrowers/from lenders with other relationship						
Loan size	16	225.25	60.10	25	322.80	100	-0.49
Maturity	10	12.60	12	21	21.71	12	-1.64*
Spread	13	0.40	0.10	22	0.11	0	1.26
Guarantee	16	0.31	0	25	0.12	0	1.52
Loan revision	16	0.19	0	25	0.28	0	-0.66

**Table 4: The determinants of issuance / receipt of inter-corporate loans.**

The dependent variable is loan issuance / receipt which equals 1 if a firm issues/receives an inter-corporate loan, 0 otherwise. Firm age is the logarithm of the firm age; Market to book ratio is market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities scaled by book value of total assets; Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; State-control equals one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise. CEO also chairman equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated as \*\*\* at one, \*\* at five, and \* at ten percent level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Issuance			Receiving		
	Full sample	Intra-group	Inter-group	Full sample	Intra-group	Inter-group
Firm age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.19** (0.08)
Market to book ratio	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.55*** (0.18)
Leverage	-1.03*** (0.16)	-0.48 (0.32)	-2.24*** (0.38)	0.52 (0.67)	0.29 (0.69)	8.46* (4.98)
State control	0.37*** (0.09)	0.53*** (0.15)	0.13 (0.16)	0.34*** (0.11)	0.38*** (0.14)	-0.23 (1.05)
EBIT	-0.59 (1.04)	-0.19 (1.18)	-1.44 (1.84)	0.77 (2.07)	1.19 (2.27)	-22.41* (11.64)
CEO also chairman	-0.40*** (0.12)	-0.82*** (0.32)	0.10 (0.20)	-0.30 (0.21)	-0.26 (0.18)	-1.25 (0.81)
Constant	0.77*** (0.26)	0.56* (0.31)	1.05*** (0.35)	-0.26 (0.56)	-0.38 (0.63)	-1.91 (2.19)
Observations	486	317	181	161	136	25
Pseudo R2	0.049	0.075	0.109	0.025	0.025	0.357

**Table 5: CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans.**

Inter-corporate loans are classified as single-events if there is a single announcement for issuing a loan on the same date, and vice versa for multiple-events. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test report the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
<b>All loans</b>					
AR[0]	440	-0.37	-0.26	-4.14***	0.42***
CAR[-1,0]	440	-0.42	-0.41	-3.08***	0.40***
CAR[-1,1]	440	-0.49	-0.56	-2.74***	0.42***
CAR[-2,2]	440	-0.70	-0.59	-3.02***	0.42***
<b>Single event</b>					
AR[0]	350	-0.40	-0.31	-4.00***	0.39***
CAR[-1,0]	350	-0.48	-0.56	-3.07***	0.38***
CAR[-1,1]	350	-0.51	-0.66	-2.52**	0.41***
CAR[-2,2]	350	-0.67	-0.59	-2.53**	0.42***
<b>Multiple-events</b>					
AR[0]	90	-0.26	0.12	-1.28	0.54
CAR[-1,0]	90	-0.17	0.02	-0.65	0.50
CAR[-1,1]	90	-0.41	-0.26	-1.08	0.44
CAR[-2,2]	90	-0.81	-0.61	-1.72*	0.39*

**Table 6: CARs on the issuance for intra-group versus inter-group borrowers.**

Inter-corporate loans are in the intra-group borrowers subsample if the borrowers are in the same business group, and vice versa for the inter-group borrowers subsample. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

<b>Intra-group borrowers</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	222	-0.44	-0.29	-3.71***	0.41***
CAR[-1,0]	222	-0.62	-0.43	-3.32***	0.39***
CAR[-1,1]	222	-0.58	-0.54	-2.44**	0.43***
CAR[-2,2]	222	-0.56	-0.47	-1.82*	0.44**
<b>Inter-group borrowers</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	128	-0.32	-0.48	-1.81*	0.35***
CAR[-1,0]	128	-0.25	-0.63	-0.88	0.36***
CAR[-1,1]	128	-0.37	-0.73	-1.03	0.38**
CAR[-2,2]	128	-0.86	-0.79	-1.75*	0.40**

**Table 7: CARs on the issuance of intra-group loans to controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationships.**

Intra-group loans are in subsamples according to controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationships. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

<b>Intra-group loans to controlling shareholders</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	4	-0.61	-0.55	-1.28	0.25
CAR[-1,0]	4	-1.97	-0.83	-1.33	0.25
CAR[-1,1]	4	-1.42	-1.32	-1.15	0.50
CAR[-2,2]	4	-5.32	-4.13	-2.05	0.00*
<b>Intra-group loans to subsidiaries</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	206	-0.45	-0.25	-3.64***	0.42***
CAR[-1,0]	206	-0.65	-0.43	-3.35***	0.38***
CAR[-1,1]	206	-0.63	-0.54	-2.48**	0.43***
CAR[-2,2]	206	-0.51	-0.47	-1.60	0.44**
<b>Intra-group loans to borrowers with other relationships</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	12	-0.17	-0.54	-0.35	-0.42
CAR[-1,0]	12	0.43	-0.32	0.67	0.50
CAR[-1,1]	12	0.44	-0.48	0.57	0.42
CAR[-2,2]	12	0.22	0.45	0.20	0.50

**Table 8: CARs on the receipt of inter-corporate loans.**

Inter-corporate loans are classed as single-events if there is a single announcement of a loan receipt on the same date, and as multiple-events if there are multiple announcements of loan receipts on the same date. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
<b>All loans</b>					
AR[0]	140	0.35	0.04	1.45	0.51
CAR[-1,0]	140	0.91	0.10	2.67***	0.51*
CAR[-1,1]	140	1.01	0.49	2.55**	0.54*
CAR[-2,2]	140	0.9	0.51	2.14**	0.56*
<b>Single event</b>					
AR[0]	125	0.46	0.18	1.74*	0.53
CAR[-1,0]	125	1.09	0.57	2.95***	0.54**
CAR[-1,1]	125	1.31	0.84	3.04***	0.58**
CAR[-2,2]	125	1.15	0.62	2.52**	0.60**
<b>Multiple events</b>					
AR[0]	15	-0.58	-0.52	-2.14*	0.33*
CAR[-1,0]	15	-0.59	-1.34	-0.86	0.33
CAR[-1,1]	15	-1.45	-2.02	-1.97*	0.20**
CAR[-2,2]	15	-1.15	-2.36	-1.27	0.27

**Table 9: CARs on the receipt from intra-group versus inter-group lenders.**

Inter-corporate loans are in the intra-group lenders subsample if the lenders are in the same business group, and as inter-group lenders if the lenders are not in the same business group. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

<b>Intra-group lenders</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	110	0.43	0.18	1.69*	0.54
CAR[-1,0]	110	1.06	0.62	2.79***	0.55**
CAR[-1,1]	110	1.19	0.81	2.76***	0.59**
CAR[-2,2]	110	1.04	0.6	2.12**	0.58*
<b>Inter-group lenders</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	15	0.68	-0.73	0.56	0.47
CAR[-1,0]	15	1.33	-0.03	0.97	0.40
CAR[-1,1]	15	2.16	1.42	1.26	0.53
CAR[-2,2]	15	1.93	1.75	1.56	0.73

**Table 10: CARs on the receipt of intra-group loans from controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and lenders with other relationship.**

Intra-group loans are in subsamples according to controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationship. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

<b>Intra-group loans from controlling shareholders</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	81	0.55	0.30	1.99*	0.58
CAR[-1,0]	81	1.42	0.72	3.07***	0.58***
CAR[-1,1]	81	1.70	0.85	3.12***	0.60***
CAR[-2,2]	81	1.54	1.15	2.53**	0.60**
<b>Intra-group loans from subsidiaries</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	7	-0.6	-1.14	-1.13	0.29
CAR[-1,0]	7	-0.98	-1.35	-0.96	0.43
CAR[-1,1]	7	-1.15	-1.75	-0.93	0.43
CAR[-2,2]	7	-2.23	-1.96	-1.46	0.43
<b>Intra-group loans from lenders with other relationship</b>					
	# Obs	Mean	Median	T-stat	Signed-rank test
AR[0]	22	0.28	-0.06	0.39	0.45
CAR[-1,0]	22	0.37	-0.08	0.51	0.50
CAR[-1,1]	22	0.04	0.72	0.07	0.59
CAR[-2,2]	22	0.28	0.34	0.33	0.55

**Table 11: CARs sorted by loan, counter-party and firm characteristics.**

Loan size is the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Maturity is the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises previous loan terms, zero otherwise; Counter-party ownership is the ownership of the controlling shareholder in a loan-announcing firm, or the ownership of a loan-announcing firm's subsidiary; Counter-party industry equals one if the counter-party and loan-announcing firm are in the same industry, zero otherwise; Counter-party size is the logarithm of total assets of the counter-party; State-owned counter-party equals one if the counter-party is state-owned, zero otherwise; Firm size is the logarithm of the total assets; Age is the number of years listed on the stock exchanges; Sales growth is the annual sales growth rate; Market to book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities scaled by the book value of total assets; ROA is the return on assets; Cash holding is cash over total assets; Free cash flow is the free cash flow over total assets; Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets; State-control equal one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise; Other accounts receivable is the other accounts receivable over total assets; Other accounts payable is the other accounts payable over total assets. The t-test of CAR difference between subsamples reports t-statistics with significance \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

Variable type	Variable name	Category	Issuance of intragroup loans to subsidiaries			Issuance of inter-group loans			Receipt of intra-group loans from controlling shareholders		
			# Obs.	CAR[-1,0]	Difference of CAR	# Obs.	CAR[-1,0]	Difference of CAR	# Obs.	CAR[-1,0]	Difference of CAR
Loan	Loan size	> median	103	-0.0085***	-0.0039	64	0.001	0.007	41	0.0161**	0.0038
		≤ median	103	-0.0046*		64	-0.006		40	0.0123*	
	Spread	> median	69	-0.0044	0.0018	57	-0.0052	-0.0079	18	0.0136	-0.0005
		≤ median	95	-0.0062**		56	0.0027		60	0.0141**	
	Maturity	> 1 year	51	-0.0055	0.0005	24	-0.0017	0.0002	23	0.0136	-0.001
		≤ 1 year	133	-0.0061**		100	-0.0019		57	0.0146***	
	Guarantee	Yes	28	0.0055	0.0140**	84	-0.0055	-0.0089	7	0.0059	-0.0091
		No	178	-0.0084***		44	0.0033		74	0.0150***	
	Loan revision	Yes	20	-0.0181**	-0.0128*	18	-0.0003	0.0025	6	0.0238*	0.0103
		No	186	-0.0053***		110	-0.0028		75	0.0135***	
Counter-party	Counter-party ownership	> median	103	-0.0060**	0.0012				41	0.0201**	0.0120
		≤ median	103	-0.0071**		40	0.0082*				
	Counter-party industry	Same	109	-0.0067**	0.0001	17	-0.0061	-0.0055	30	0.0129*	0.0014
		Different	88	-0.0068**		90	-0.0006		49	0.0114**	
	Counter-party size	> median	89	-0.0063**	0.0013	40	0.0043	0.0081	27	0.0199**	0.0139
		≤ median	88	-0.0077**		40	-0.0038		27	0.006	
State-owned counter-party	Yes	150	-0.0064***	0.0013	30	0.0062	0.0109	58	0.0119**	-0.0083	
	No	54	-0.0077*		94	-0.0047*		23	0.0202**		
(Loan-announcing) Firm	Firm size	> median	103	-0.0052*	0.0028	64	-0.0001	0.0049	41	0.0149***	0.0014
		≤ median	102	-0.0080***		64	-0.0049		40	0.0135*	
	Age	> median	103	-0.0043	0.0046	68	-0.0009	0.0034	45	0.0099**	-0.0097
		≤ median	102	-0.0089***		60	-0.0043		36	0.0196**	
	Sales growth	> median	101	-0.0050*	0.0037	61	-0.0001	0.0035	41	0.0209***	0.0126
		≤ median	101	-0.0087***		61	-0.0035		38	0.0083	
	Market to book ratio	> median	103	-0.0058*	0.0016	62	-0.0032	-0.002	40	0.0199**	0.0099
		≤ median	102	-0.0074***		62	-0.0012		40	0.0100*	
	ROA	> median	103	-0.0063**	0.0006	64	-0.0017	0.0017	41	0.0224***	0.0165*
		≤ median	102	-0.0069***		64	-0.0033		40	0.0059	
	Cash holding	> median	103	-0.0055*	0.0021	64	-0.0003	0.0043	42	0.0155**	0.0025
		≤ median	102	-0.0076***		64	-0.0047		39	0.0129**	
	Free cash flow	> median	99	-0.0098***	-0.0063	59	-0.0026	-0.001	40	0.0042	-0.0168**
		≤ median	98	-0.0035		59	-0.0016		37	0.0210***	
	Leverage	> median	103	-0.0057**	0.0017	65	-0.0001	0.0049	41	0.0091**	-0.0104
		≤ median	102	-0.0074**		63	-0.005		40	0.0195**	
	State control	Yes	155	-0.0060**	0.0024	80	-0.0015	0.0028	59	0.0124**	-0.0068
		No	50	-0.0084**		48	-0.0042		22	0.0192*	
	Other accounts receivable	> median	103	-0.0098***	-0.0065*	64	-0.001	0.0030	41	0.0122**	-0.0040
		≤ median	102	-0.0033		64	-0.004		40	0.0163**	
	Other accounts payable	> median	103	-0.0090***	-0.0049	68	0	0.0053	41	0.0170***	0.0056
		≤ median	102	-0.0041		60	-0.0053		40	0.0114	

**Table 12: The regression of CAR[-1,0] on loan, counter-party and firm characteristics.**

The dependent variable is the CAR[-1,0] in percentage points. Log loan size is the logarithm of the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Log maturity is the logarithm of the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises the previous loan terms, zero otherwise; Intra-group loan equals one if the counter-party is in a same business group, zero otherwise; Counter-party industry equals one if the counter-party and loan-announcing firm are in the same industry, zero otherwise; Counter-party size is the logarithm of total assets of the counter-party; State-owned counter-party equals one if the counter-party is state-owned, zero otherwise; Firm size is the logarithm of total assets; Age is the number of years listed in the stock exchanges; Market to book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities scaled by the book value of total assets; Free cash flow is the free cash flow over total assets; Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets; State-control equals one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise; Other accounts receivable is the other accounts receivable over total assets; Other accounts payable is the other accounts payable over total assets. Industry and year dummies are included and the coefficients are omitted. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

		Issuance of inter-corporate loans			Receipt of inter-corporate loans		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Loan	Log loan size	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.26)	-0.52 (0.54)	0.01 (0.65)	1.16 (1.15)
	Spread	-0.69** (0.30)	-0.90* (0.49)	-1.10** (0.53)	-1.19 (1.81)	-5.44* (2.78)	-11.42* (5.75)
	Log maturity	0.24 (0.35)	0.04 (0.43)	0.00 (0.49)	-0.50 (0.93)	-0.40 (1.09)	0.28 (1.31)
	Guarantee	0.62 (0.43)	0.72 (0.54)	0.95 (0.62)	-0.31 (1.47)	0.93 (2.30)	2.91 (2.91)
	Loan revision	-0.64 (0.76)	-1.04 (0.90)	-1.11 (0.92)	1.48 (1.55)	0.58 (1.48)	-1.10 (2.35)
	Counter-party	Intra-group loan		-1.64** (0.78)	-1.74** (0.84)		-0.20 (3.81)
	Counter-party industry		0.22 (0.57)	0.19 (0.59)		0.46 (1.35)	1.17 (1.99)
	Counter-party size		-0.14 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.15)		0.20 (0.35)	-0.36 (0.52)
	State-owned counter-party		0.73 (0.52)	0.72 (0.62)		-1.86 (1.99)	-7.40** (3.28)
(Loan-announcing)	Firm size			-0.08 (0.29)			-1.03 (1.50)
Firm	Age			0.10* (0.06)			-0.30 (0.32)
	Market to book ratio			-0.42* (0.24)			0.43 (1.05)
	Free cash flow			-1.58 (1.37)			-9.27 (7.30)
	Leverage			-1.16 (2.03)			-6.47 (5.80)
	State control			-0.19 (0.59)			9.04* (4.70)
	Other accounts receivable			-14.49** (7.16)			
	Other accounts payable						7.07 (8.65)
	Constant	2.71 (1.85)	3.19 (2.60)	6.34 (5.94)	9.58 (6.49)	4.21 (10.24)	23.05 (34.72)
	Industry and year dummie	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Observations	277	207	194	92	57	53
	R-squared	0.117	0.192	0.234	0.301	0.429	0.668

**Table 13: ROA after inter-corporate loan announcements.**

ROA is net income over total assets. [-1] / [0] / [+1] / [+2] indicates the number of years before / of / after the inter-corporate loan announcement. The t-test of the mean difference reports the t-statistic. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

Summary statistics	Issuance			Receipt			T-test of mean difference
	N	Mean	St.Dev	N	Mean	St.Dev	
ROA[-1]	270	0.0459***	0.0040	93	0.0316***	0.0108	0.0143
ROA[0]	270	0.0369***	0.0030	93	0.0100	0.0119	0.0269***
ROA[+1]	270	0.0330***	0.0033	92	0.0246***	0.0066	0.0084
ROA[+2]	270	0.0262***	0.0041	92	0.0297***	0.0055	-0.0035
T-test of mean difference							
ROA[+1] – ROA[-1]	269	-0.0125***	0.0042	92	-0.0068	0.0121	-0.0057
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]	269	-0.0192***	0.0048	92	-0.0017	0.0108	-0.0175*
ROA[+2]–ROA[0]	270	-0.0107***	0.0041	92	0.0204*	0.0119	-0.0310***
High market to book ratio firms							
ROA[+1] – ROA[-1]	133	-0.0182***	0.0053	46	0.0012	0.0217	-0.0194
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]	133	-0.0261***	0.0072	46	0.0002	0.0205	-0.0263
ROA[+2]–ROA[0]	133	-0.0134**	0.0061	46	0.0164	0.0181	-0.0298**
Low market to book ratio firms							
ROA[+1] – ROA[-1]	132	-0.0031	0.0062	45	-0.0148	0.0112	0.0117
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]	132	-0.0079	0.0061	45	-0.0032	0.0072	-0.0047
ROA[+2]–ROA[0]	132	-0.0071	0.0056	45	0.0252	0.0158	-0.0324**
Difference of high versus low market to book ratio firm							
ROA[+1] – ROA[-1]		-0.0151*	0.0081		0.0160	0.0245	
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]		-0.0182*	0.0094		0.0034	0.0219	
ROA[+2]–ROA[0]		-0.0063	0.0083		-0.0088	0.0241	
Intra-group loans							
ROA[+1] – ROA[-1]	171	-0.0153***	0.0050	78	-0.0027	0.0134	-0.0126
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]	171	-0.0208***	0.0054	78	0.0002	0.0126	-0.0210*
ROA[+2]–ROA[0]	172	-0.0123**	0.0051	78	0.0242*	0.0139	-0.0364***
Inter-group loans							
ROA[+1] – ROA[-1]	98	-0.0077	0.0074	14	-0.0295	0.0276	0.0218
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]	98	-0.0164*	0.0093	14	-0.0122	0.0101	-0.0041
ROA[+2]–ROA[0]	98	-0.0078	0.0069	14	-0.0006	0.0092	-0.0072
Difference of intra-group versus inter-group loans							
ROA[+1] – ROA[-1]		-0.0138	0.0087		0.0268	0.0337	
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]		-0.0105	0.0101		0.0125	0.0302	
ROA[+2]–ROA[0]		-0.0046	0.0086		0.0248	0.0331	

**Table 14: Capital expenditure after inter-corporate loan announcements.**

CAPX is capital expenditure scaled by the total assets in the year before loan announcement. [-1] / [0] / [+1] / [+2] indicates the number of years before / of / after the inter-corporate loan announcement. The t-test of the mean difference reports the t-statistic. Significance is indicated as \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

Summary statistics	Issuance			Receiving			T-test of mean difference
	N	Mean	St.Dev	N	Mean	St.Dev	
CAPX[-1]	268	0.0550***	0.0035	92	0.0492***	0.0063	0.0058
CAPX[0]	269	0.0693***	0.0058	93	0.0739***	0.0209	-0.0046
CAPX[+1]	268	0.0786***	0.0068	87	0.1554**	0.0729	-0.0768*
CAPX[+2]	269	0.0812***	0.0070	91	0.1190***	0.0381	-0.0378
T-test of mean difference							
CAPX[+1] – CAPX[-1]	266	0.0239***	0.0061	86	0.104	0.0744	-0.0801*
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[-1]	267	0.0267***	0.0065	90	0.0719*	0.0388	-0.0451*
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[0]	269	0.0119**	0.0057	91	0.0447**	0.0220	-0.0328**
High market to book ratio firms							
CAPX[+1] – CAPX[-1]	130	0.0260***	0.0086	46	0.1957	0.1381	-0.1697**
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[-1]	131	0.0236***	0.0083	46	0.1161	0.0725	-0.0926**
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[0]	133	0.0035	0.0068	47	0.0536	0.0367	-0.0501**
Low market to book ratio firms							
CAPX[+1] – CAPX[-1]	133	0.0241***	0.0087	40	-0.0014	0.0092	0.0255
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[-1]	133	0.0319***	0.0101	44	0.0256	0.0228	0.0063
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[0]	133	0.0208**	0.0093	44	0.0352	0.0234	-0.0145
T-test of high versus low market to book ratio firms							
CAPX[+1] – CAPX[-1]		0.0019	0.0122		0.1971	0.1485	
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[-1]		-0.0083	0.0131		0.0906	0.0775	
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[0]		-0.0172	0.0115		0.0184	0.0442	
Intra-group loans							
CAPX[+1] – CAPX[-1]	172	0.0278***	0.0088	72	0.0425	0.0312	-0.0146
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[-1]	172	0.0334***	0.0092	76	0.0402*	0.0215	-0.0068
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[0]	174	0.0171**	0.0078	77	0.0318	0.0196	-0.0148
Inter-group loans							
CAPX[+1] – CAPX[-1]	94	0.0167***	0.006	14	0.4207	0.4308	-0.4040**
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[-1]	95	0.0146**	0.0071	14	0.2436	0.2215	-0.2290***
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[0]	95	0.0025	0.0077	14	0.1157	0.0945	-0.1132***
T-test of intra-group versus inter-group loans							
CAPX[+1] – CAPX[-1]		0.0019	0.1222		0.1971	0.1485	
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[-1]		-0.0083	0.0131		0.0906	0.0775	
CAPX[+2] – CAPX[0]		-0.0172	0.0115		0.0184	0.0442	

# Appendix



**Appendix 1: Timeline of laws and regulations related with entrusted loans.**

Date	Type	Name	Note	Institution
1992/12/30	Entrusted loan	A reply to the ICBC on the issues of entrusted loan	It clarifies several issues on entrusted loans correspondingly the request of the <i>Industrial and Commercial Bank of China</i> (ICBC), e.g. the definition of entrusted loans.	PBC
1996/5/16	Litigation guidance	A reply to Sichuan People's Higher Court on the qualification of subjects in the entrusted loan contracts	It specifies the rules for the subjects in the litigation cases on entrusted loan contracts corresponding a request by the <i>Sichuan People's Higher Court</i> .	PSC
1996/8/1	Entrusted loan	General rules on loans	It specifies detailed rules on entrusted loans.	PBC
1997/12/13	Litigation guidance	Issues on the litigation cases on certificates of deposit	It specifies several rules for the disputes in entrusted loan contracts.	PSC
1998/1/1	Disclosure requirements	Regulations of IPO by Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange	It specifies the disclosure requirement on entrusted loans, and also related party transactions. It has been revised seven times, and the latest version is effective from July 2012.	SSC and SZSE
1999/4/1	Interest rate lateralization	Interest rate regulations of RMB	It specifies the regulations for the interest rate of deposits and loans denominated in RMB.	PBC
2000/4/5	Entrusted loan	Notice on the issues for entrusted loan by commercial banks	It specifies a definition of entrusted loans, and switches the approval system to the registration system for entrusted loans.	PBC
2005/10/19	Entrusted loans	Notice on the CSRC suggestion on enhancing the quality of listed firms	It prohibits the entrusted loans from the listed firms to the controlling shareholders.	SCC
2005/10/27	Disclosure requirements	China securities law	It specifies the types of major events that should be announcement timely in Article of 67 at Chapter 3, e.g. entrusted loan.	NPC
2007/2/2	Disclosure requirements	Explanatory notice on the regulations on information disclosure of listed firms	It specifies the information disclosure of extraordinary items for listed firms, e.g., entrusted loans.	CSRC
2013/7/19	Interest rate lateralization	Notice on the further reform for the marketization of interest rate	It lifts the regulation on the floor of the lending interest rate, and also the ceiling of the lending interest rate for rural credit cooperatives.	PBC
2013/12/10	Entrusted loan	Notice on several issues of tightening the regulation on shadow banking	It tightens the regulation for the shadow banking system including entrusted loans	SCC

Abbreviations: NPC is the National People's Council; PBC is People's Bank of China; PSC is the People's Supreme Court; SSC is the Shanghai Stock Exchange; SZSC is the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. SCC is the State Council of China; CSRC is the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

## Appendix 2: Market shares of financing sources in China.

The upper panel shows the proportion of inter-corporate loan over total financing (left-axis, in percentage points) and the trend of total financing (right axis, in trillions of RMB), and the bottom panel shows the market share of various types of financing in the total financing of 2013. Data is retrieved from the PBOC website.



### **Appendix 3: Translation of an inter-corporate loan announcement.**

Stock abbreviation: Guiyan Boye      Stock code: 600459      No: Temporary 2011-4

#### **Announcement of an entrusted loan to a fully owned subsidiary**

The board of directors and all members declare that this announcement contains no false documentation, misleading statement or omission of important items, and bare individual and joint liability for the truthfulness, validity and completeness of the announcement.

#### **Important notices for the entrusted loan**

Financial institution: *Kunming* branch, *China Citic Bank*

Borrower: Guiyan Yimen Ziyuan Ltd (hereafter Yimen Ziyuan Ltd)

Amount: 30 million RMB

Maturity: One year

Interest rate: 7.07 percent per year

#### **1. Summary**

On Feb 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011, the eighth session of the fourth board meeting of the listed firm passes the proposal of providing an entrusted loan to a fully owned subsidiary. The board agrees to extend an entrusted loan of 30 million RMB to *Yimen Ziyuan Ltd*. This transaction does not constitute a related transaction. This entrusted loan does not need an approval from the shareholders' meeting.

#### **2. Basic information about the borrower**

*Yimen Ziyuan Ltd* is fully owned by the listed firm *Guiyan Boye*. It was set up on April 1st 2010 with the approval from the *Industrial and Commercial Administrative Bureau* of *Yimen County* at *Yunnan Province*. It has a registered capital of 50 million RMB, with the registered address: *Xiaolongkou Meishicheng, Xihuan Road, Longquan Town, Yimen County, Yuxi City, Yunnan Province*. Main businesses of the firm: the development and applications of the refinery skills for the resources of precious metals; the collection and processing of second-hand resources of precious metals; the manufacturing of basic products of precious metals; the manufacturing of special powder materials; the operation of skills and products made by the listed firm (according to the approved project and maturity if the operation involves special approvals by the laws).

Up until Sep 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010, the total assets of the *Yimen Ziyuan Ltd* is 54.76 million RMB; the total liabilities is 4.95 million RMB; total shareholders' equity is 49.81 million RMB; net profit is -188,000 RMB. None of the above numbers are audited by a third party.

#### **3. Main content of the entrusted loan**

According to the demand of *Yimen Ziyuan Ltd*'s operation and development, the listed firm provides an entrusted loan of 30 million RMB to *Yimen Ziyuan Ltd*. The loan has a maturity of one year, and an annual interest rate of 7.07 percent. (Please refer to the signed contract for the detailed items of the entrusted loan)

#### **4. Sources of the fund for the entrusted loan**

The fund is from the listed firm's self-owned fund. *Yimen Ziyuan Ltd* will repay the principal and interest in a lump sum at maturity.

#### **5. Purpose of the entrusted loan and its effect on the listed firm**

The entrusted loan will be used for *Yimen Ziyuan Ltd*'s operation and development. It will not affect the listed firm's normal operation as the fund is from the self-owned fund. *Yimen Ziyuan Ltd* is fully owned by the listed firm, so it can repay the entrusted loan at maturity.

Here announces the transaction.



**The board of Guiyan Boye Co. Ltd., 2011/2/26**

**Appendix 4: The size of the entrusted loans in 2011 for firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (in billions of RMB).**

Data source: “*An analysis on entrusted wealth management products and entrusted loans in 2011 for firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange*” released by Shanghai Stock Exchange.

Categories	Balance 2010 year end	Loan issued	Loan received	Balance 2011 year end
Subsidiaries with a full or controlling ownership	52.77	65.56	30.25	88.08
Subsidiaries or joint ventures without a controlling ownership	4.18	5.15	2.87	6.47
Unconnected parties	7.26	14.52	8.34	13.44
Other connected parties	0.18	0.78	0.19	0.77
Total	64.38	86.01	41.64	108.75

**Appendix 5: Average abnormal returns for issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans in event window [-20, 20].**



## Appendix 6: Summary statistics for loan, counter-party and firm characteristics.

Log loan size is the logarithm of the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Log maturity is the logarithm of the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage increase of the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises previous loan terms, zero otherwise; Intra-group loan equals one if the counter-party is in the same business group, zero otherwise; Counter-party industry equals one if the counter-party and listed firm are in the same industry, zero otherwise; Counter-party size is the logarithm of total assets of the counter-party; State-owned counter-party equals one if the counter-party is state-owned, zero otherwise; Firm size is the logarithm of total assets; Age is the number of years listed on the stock exchanges; Market to book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities scaled by the book value of total assets; Free cash flow is the free cash flow over total assets; Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets; State-control equals one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise; Other accounts receivable is the other accounts receivable over total assets; Other accounts payable is the other accounts payable over total assets. The test of mean difference is conducted between firms, with issuance/receipt of inter-corporate loans versus firms without inter-corporate loan announcements. T-statistics are reported with significance \*\*\* at one percent, \*\* at five percent, and \* at ten percent level.

		Issuance of inter-corporate loans			Receipt of inter-corporate loans			No inter-corporate loan firms			Test of mean difference (T-stat)		
		N	Mean	St.Dev	N	Mean	St.Dev	N	Mean	St.Dev	Issuance v.s. No loans	Receipt v.s. No loans	Issuance v.s. Receipt
Loan	Log loan size	338	4.39	1.26	103	4.95	1.31						-3.90***
	Spread	281	0.54	0.76	95	0.04	0.34						6.21***
	Log maturity	312	2.56	0.61	99	2.63	0.57						-1.02
	Guarantee	338	0.33	0.47	103	0.13	0.33						4.11***
	Loan revision	338	0.11	0.32	103	0.06	0.24						1.61
Counter-party firm	Intra-group loan	338	0.62	0.49	103	0.85	0.35						-4.52***
	Counter-party industry	308	0.42	0.49	96	0.41	0.49						0.27
	Counter-party size	261	1.81	1.77	68	4.73	2.10						-11.64***
	State-owned counter-party	332	0.55	0.50	103	0.67	0.47						-2.08**
(Loan-announcing) Firm	Firm size	337	22.12	1.11	103	21.86	1.39	11,738	21.46	1.45	8.28***	2.78***	1.98**
	Age	337	10.95	4.71	103	11.34	5.09	10,926	9.61	5.16	4.71***	3.39***	-0.71
	Market to book ratio	333	2.14	1.22	102	2.29	1.59	11,461	2.32	1.58	-2.01**	-0.18	-1.02
	Free cash flow	319	0.02	0.17	97	0.03	0.14	10,441	0.04	0.15	-2.29**	-0.74	-0.94
	Leverage	337	0.47	0.19	103	0.61	0.22	11,738	0.50	0.24	-2.69***	4.81***	-6.64***
	State control	337	0.71	0.45	103	0.67	0.47	11,050	0.51	0.50	7.24***	3.24***	0.76
	Other accounts receivable	337	0.03	0.04	103	0.02	0.03	11,580	0.04	0.06	-2.80***	-2.16**	0.82
	Other accounts payable	337	0.04	0.04	103	0.08	0.10	11,585	0.05	0.07	-4.07***	3.84***	-6.21***

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