

**Criteria of German Political Parties for the Selection of
Candidates of Immigrant Origin**

Neutrality, Opening or Closure?

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1 Introduction

1.1 Initial Situation and Problem Statement

Owing to migration movements, Germany's cultural diversity is on the rise. Though immigration is far from being a new phenomenon, it became one of the most ubiquitous implications of globalization (Castles/Miller 2009). It challenges the former notion of nation states, originally defined as culturally and ethnically homogenous entities (Brubaker 1992). The sources of Germany's cultural diversity relate not only to recent immigration movements but to the influx of migrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s.

After the USA, Germany is the second largest immigration country among the OECD countries (OECD 2014). The continuing inflow of immigrants has changed the face of the population. In the wake of an increasing cultural diversity, new segments of the population need to be represented in Germany's legislative bodies. However, the social change has not been paralleled by a comparable political integration. Although citizens of immigrant origin (IO)¹ make up a high percentage of the population of all Western European countries, they are descriptively underrepresented in most legislative bodies (e.g. Bird et al. 2011; Ruedin 2009; Ruedin 2013: 39; Schönwälder 2012). Descriptive representation refers to the degree to which elected institutions mirror the socio-demographic composition of the population that is to be represented (Pitkin 1967). In contrast to substantive representation, it is not about the representatives' actions and decisions but about how representative they are of the socio-demographic composition of the population (Mansbridge 2000).

Even Germany, which experienced its first immigration wave after World War II, cannot yet record representational parity. While 20 percent of the German population are of immigrant origin and 11.3 percent are German citizens (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013), the same applies to only 5.9 percent of the Members of Parliament (MPs) in the 2013 German Bundestag (Mediendienst Integration 2013a). Apart from the city states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, the German state parliaments are characterized by an even larger bias (Donovan 2007: 462; Schönwälder 2013). In the 2013 Hessian state parliament for example, 5.5 percent of the MPs had an immigrant origin, but IO-citizens made up 25 percent of the population. Thus, a disconnect between the cultural diversity of the German population and of the legislative bodies in charge of the political representation of the population becomes evident. One intensely debated

¹ The author uses the terms immigrant origin and immigrant background interchangeably.

question at present is therefore whether parliaments are drifting apart from the society along various lines, pertaining not only to substantive but also to descriptive representation.

By selecting parliamentary candidates, political parties form the most crucial nexus of the population to be represented and legislative bodies (Katz 2001: 278; Zeuner 1970: 3-4). They constitute the key channels through which societal dynamics and developments are fed into parliament. If one conceives political parties as institutions that are meant to connect legislative bodies with their societal environment (Mair et al. 1999), shifting demographics can be expected to impact their candidate selection in order to produce socio-demographically representative samples of candidates and establish representational ties with all relevant segments of the population. In other words, representation is a two-sided process, which calls not only for endeavors of the underrepresented groups to achieve an equal representation but also of party organizations. Beyond the representation of their traditional voter groups, political parties must look out for new groups, such as IO-citizens, to adapt their representational ties to societal changes, crucial in maximizing votes and adequately representing the population (Mair et al. 1999). Faced with an increasingly multicultural society on the one hand, but a poor representation of IO-citizens in parliament on the other, political parties come under mounting pressure to compile candidate tableaux that capture the cultural diversity of the population.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that German political parties are under pressure to intensify their representational ties with IO-citizens. The conservative political party CDU submitted a resolution at its 2015 party convention in which, among other claims, a stronger incorporation of IO-citizens into the party organization was postulated (CDU 2015). When presenting the state leadership's proposal for the state party list in the run-up to the 2013 Bundestag election, Nils Schmid, chairman of the social democratic party SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg, highlighted the number of IO-candidates placed on viable list slots. The intra-party organization "Migration, Integration and Anti-Racism" of the leftist party DIE LINKE prompted the state party organizations to field more IO-candidates on viable list slots (DIE LINKE 2013). On the verge of the 2013 Bundestag election, the association "Liberal Forum Diversity" was brought into being, which is affiliated to the liberal party FDP and intends to woo IO-citizens with liberal political stances. Compared to the other party organizations, the environmental party BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN started earlier focusing on IO-citizens. With Cem Özdemir, the party was the first to send a Turkish-origin legislator into the German Bundestag in 1994, together with Leyla Onur of the SPD. As the anecdotal evidence reveals, the cultural diversity of the German population exerts noticeable pressure on party organizations to respond to the descriptive underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament by including more of them on their candidate tableaux.

1.2 Objective of the Dissertation

But why does a descriptive representation of IO-citizens matter? Normative theorists attributed a symbolic and substantive value to descriptive representation. As to its symbolic value, a lower *de facto* legitimacy is ascribed to legislative bodies that fail to reflect society's socio-demographic diversity (Mansbridge 2000: 100; Norris/Franklin 1997: 185). Seeing group representatives in parliament can make marginalized groups feel better represented and more affiliated to the political system. Even if the IO-citizens' preferences are adequately represented by native-born parliamentarians, the exclusion from parliament reinforces their perception of having no voice in politics and can alienate them from the political institutions and their actors (Dovi 2002; Griffin 2014; Pantoja/Segura 2003). In the majority population, it can create the impression that IO-citizens are ill-suited to holding positions of political power which aggravates their exclusion from influential positions in society and thwarts their political integration (Mansbridge 1999: 649). Additionally, voters are more likely to confide in representatives with shared socio-demographic characteristics, which contributes to a functional representational relationship (Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo/Gilliam 1990; Mansbridge 1999, 2000; Pantoja/Segura 2003).²

Furthermore, descriptive representation was argued to produce policy effects (e.g. Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Williams 2000). Some social groups need group representatives to find their interests adequately represented in parliament (Mansbridge 2005). Descriptive representation can make contributions to substantive representation if group representatives pay more attention to issues which are relevant to the groups they represent and put these on the political agenda.³ In addition, members of the same group communicate more effectively with each other due to a higher mutual trust and stronger feelings of a shared identity, increasing the chance of policy effects (Mansbridge 2000). Also, the physical presence of parliamentarians from underrepresented groups can remind other legislators of these groups and can make them pay more attention to their interests (Goodin 2004; Phillips 1993). Furthermore, group representatives can represent the group's concerns more credibly than other legislators, increasing the chance of policy effects (Mansbridge 2005: 626).

² Prior research indicated that ethnic minorities feel better represented by legislators of the same socio-demographic background, which can increase their political participation and trust in political institutions (Abney/Hutcheson 1981; Banducci et al. 2004; Barreto 2007; Barreto et al. 2005; Bergh/Bjørklund 2011; Bobo/Gilliam 1990; Gilliam 1996; Griffin/Keane 2006; Griffin 2007; Lublin 1997; Matson/Fine 2006; Rocha et al. 2010; Tate 2003; Zingher/Farrer 2016). Other studies, however, found no strong effects on political trust (Gay 2001, 2002).

³ IO-MPs were found to put more migration-related issues on the political agenda than native-born MPs (Saalfeld/Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014b; Wüst/Saalfeld 2011). Experiments in the US-context furthermore showed that black MPs are more responsive to black constituents than white MPs (Broockman 2013, 2014a; Butler/Broockman 2011).

In Germany, the access to parliaments almost inevitably leads through the parties' candidate selection processes. Only contenders who come out on top in the candidate selection can compete for a seat in parliament. Given the gatekeeper role of political parties, certain informal recruitment trajectories emerged that are completed by the vast majority of parliamentary candidates before running for office in a state or national parliament (Borchert 1999: 7; Borchert/Golsch 1999: 125; Herzog 1975: 45). These recruitment patterns result from the fact that party selectorates define the informal rules of legislative careers by applying certain criteria when selecting nominees. The most valued characteristic is a longstanding track record of services to the own party organization (Best et al. 2011: 171; Borchert 1999: 27; Borchert/Zeiss 2003: 151-152; Herzog 1975). Despite the pivotal role of the intra-party candidate selection in shaping who can run for election, the question of how IO-candidates fare in the candidate selection and whether the criteria political parties use for selecting IO-candidates are the same as for native-born candidates remained a blind spot of the research on minority representation.

One reason for the sparsity of empirical evidence is that studying the parties' candidate selection behavior is a challenge, as it is neither laid down in the national legislation nor in the party statutes, but has a more concealed character. While formal rules apply equally to IO- and native-born candidates, the parties' informal selection criteria can make a difference. It is therefore essential to peer into the "secret garden of politics" (Marsh/Gallagher 1988) and scrutinize how political parties cope with the political underrepresentation of IO-citizens in their candidate selection. Motivated by this lacuna, the dissertation attempts to get to the bottom of the question of how political parties respond to the legislative underrepresentation of IO-citizens in their candidate selection and whether IO-candidates must meet the same selection criteria as native-born candidates to compete for a seat in parliament. The present study thus explores the thresholds IO-candidates need to overcome to run for office. The paramount questions are how political parties go about selecting IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates and which contextual factors drive their choice of selection behavior. More precisely, the following research questions will be addressed:

1. How can political parties select IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates?
2. How do political parties select IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates?
3. Which context factors influence the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates?

1.3 Argumentation Outline and Empirical Approach

The main argument of the dissertation advances from the notion that most parliamentary candidates must exhibit certain political biographies to run for election at the state or national level.

By building upon these default selection criteria, which will be sketched in greater detail in what follows, it is conceptualized how political parties can deviate when nominating IO-candidates. Understanding whether political parties are able to adapt their selection criteria helps assess their ability to respond to the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament and to feed novel societal developments into the legislative bodies. However, contrasting the recruitment profiles of successful applicants with those of failed contenders to assess whether IO-candidates need other recruitment profiles than native-born candidates to stand for election is ruled out for lack of data on non-selected applicants. As a solution, the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates are employed as empirical reference points. By contrasting the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates that are claimed to reflect the default selection criteria in a cross-section with those of IO-candidates, it can be clarified whether political parties use other criteria to select IO-candidates.

Political parties have three ideal-typical options for selecting IO-candidates at hand, referred to as neutrality, opening and closure. These options are heuristic models, which have no normative implications, but are first and foremost benchmarks that help identify and describe patterns in the empirical data. If political parties act neutrally, IO-candidates must pass through the default recruitment process as defined by their native-born counterparts to run for office and they receive a similar amount of party support in the selection process. Consequently, political parties are willing to nominate IO-candidates for election but only on the conditions that hold for their native-born peers.

Conversely, in the case of opening, political parties respond more offensively to the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament. To open their candidate selection, political parties treat IO-candidates preferentially by applying less demanding selection criteria and by providing them with more party support in the candidate selection than applies to native-born candidates. By doing so, political parties attempt to downsize the selectivity of their nomination proceedings to make them more permeable for candidates from so far underrepresented groups.

Yet, political parties cannot foretell how their established representational groups will react if they start setting up closer representational ties with IO-citizens. Moreover, previous research indicated that at least some voter segments are prejudiced against IO-candidates (for Germany: Bieber 2013a; for France: Brouard/Tiberj 2011; for GB: Fisher et al. 2015; for GB: Stegmaier et al. 2013; for Germany: Street 2014). As the electoral implications of nominating IO-candidates are hard to predict, political parties might opt to behave highly defensively towards aspiring IO-candidates. In the case of closure, IO-candidates must therefore outperform native-born candidates in their political experience and they receive less party support in the selection process.

Studying parties' selection behavior poses a tremendous challenge to researchers. As it is not legally defined, it is hard to identify (Bjarnegård 2015; Marsh/Gallagher 1988). To explore parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, the dissertation integrates the advantages of quantitative analysis, intended to identify broader patterns in the parties' selection behavior, with the advantages of qualitative analysis to validate the quantitative results and unveil underlying mechanisms. The inspection of candidates' recruitment profiles does not follow a candidate-centered approach but is supposed to provide information about the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates. The candidates' recruitment profiles – more precisely, their political experience when standing for election and how much party support they received in the nomination process – substantially reflect the parties' selection behavior. Candidate surveys can provide detailed information on the candidates' personal recruitment profiles, which alternative data sources, such as media outlets, cannot provide in the same depth (Bailer 2014).

By employing a unique data set that combines aggregate data on constituency characteristics with survey data on the candidates' personal recruitment profiles, the dissertation attempts to provide a recent snapshot of how political parties go about selecting IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates. The data set contains responses from candidate surveys conducted on the occasion of the state elections in Hesse and Bavaria in 2013 and in Saxony in 2014, and survey data from the German Candidate Study collected on the occasion of the 2013 German Bundestag election as part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) (Rattinger et al. 2014).

To validate the quantitative findings, qualitative data are supplemented, collected through media research on the candidates' career trajectories and their selection proceedings via Nexis, the candidates' personal and party websites, *Kürschners Volkshandbuch*, and eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews with IO-candidates of SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. While the quantitative analysis is aimed at revealing broader and generalizable patterns in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, the qualitative approach inspects whether the found patterns are truly related to parties' selection behavior and adds more complexity to the findings by providing information on underlying processes and mechanisms (Coppedge 1999).

1.4 Contributions to Research

The dissertation seeks to contribute to an improved understanding of the implications for minority representation that result from the parties' candidate selection behavior. The empirical evidence presented in the following stands at the intersection of two strands of literature and

speaks to two distinct bodies of research; on the one hand, I supplement to the literature concerned with legislative recruitment, and on the other, to the research dealing with minority representation. As to its aim and scope, the dissertation attempts to make two main contributions to the state of research. First, it sheds more light on the question of how political parties cope with the legislative underrepresentation of IO-citizens in their candidate selection. So far, the recruitment literature focused chiefly on recruitment patterns exhibited by most parliamentary candidates, but – except for the literature on women representation – left aside the question of whether and to what extent they apply to candidates from underrepresented groups. The adaptivity of the parties' candidate selection behavior is highly relevant as it is at least to some degree parties' responsibility to ensure that legislative bodies reflect the socio-demographic composition of the population and can ingest more recent societal developments, such as the increasing cultural diversity of the population. By investigating how political parties go about selecting IO-candidates, the dissertation tries to provide a deeper understanding as to whether political parties can make their candidate selection processes more permeable for aspirants from underrepresented groups.

Second, the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates remained a blind spot of the research on minority representation (Bloemraad/Schönwälder 2013: 571-572). Despite the gatekeeper role political parties play in shaping minority representation, little is known about the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates. Instead, the main thrust of research has studied which institutional or context factors shape the level of minority representation. Although these studies significantly advanced the scholarly knowledge about minority representation, they cannot provide insight into the candidate selection behavior of political parties that, along with other factors, lie beneath these aggregate patterns. Those studies which focused on intra-party selection processes investigated chiefly legislators of immigrant background. But it is the candidate selection which constitutes the bottleneck in the legislative recruitment process (Hazan/Rahat 2010; Rahat 2007). Scrutinizing how IO-candidates fare in the candidate selection is therefore more insightful than examining IO-parliamentarians, as the biggest selection happens prior to the election. Moreover, previous studies often suffer from a lack of reference points. In order to understand whether IO-candidates take unique pathways to parliament for background-specific reasons, or whether their recruitment profiles simply reflect patterns which hold for most parliamentary candidates, the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates are required. By comparing the recruitment profiles of IO-candidates with those of native-born candidates, the dissertation breaks from previous research to provide more insight into the selection behavior that political parties employ towards IO-candidates.

1.5 Organization of the Research

The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is devoted to IO-citizens whose descriptive representation takes center stage. I begin with a definition of immigrant origin (chapter 2.1), before the IO-population in Germany is portrayed to illustrate that cultural diversity is an increasingly relevant phenomenon which puts pressure on political parties to establish closer representational ties with IO-citizens (chapter 2.2). In chapter 2.3, I elaborate more thoroughly on the theoretical proposition that IO-citizens form a representational group that is represented by IO-candidates.

By identifying recruitment factors which play the most pivotal role in coming forward in the candidate selection and beyond, a framework for analysis is set forth in chapter 3. Chapter 3.1 introduces a heuristic model of the legislative recruitment process, which defines the broader research context. Chapter 3.2 substantiates why the focus of the following analysis is on parliamentary candidates. By drawing upon empirical evidence provided by the research on legislative recruitment, chapter 3.3 identifies the most decisive factors in succeeding in the candidate selection and beyond. Building upon these factors, chapter 3.4 conceptualizes how political parties can select IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates. Next, context factors cited in the literature on minority representation are introduced which presumably impact the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates (chapter 4).

Chapter 5 presents the research design of the empirical analysis. Chapter 5.1 discusses the case selection. In chapter 5.2, the modelling strategy and the used data sources are depicted, before further details of the operationalization are provided (chapter 5.3). Chapters 6 to 8, organized along the framework developed in chapter 3, are devoted to the empirical analysis. Chapter 6 illustrates the socio-demographic and political background of IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates to provide a better intuition of both candidate groups that will be contrasted in the subsequent analysis. Chapter 7 concentrates on the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates at the stage of candidate selection, while chapter 8 shifts the focus onto the stage of standing for election. Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of the empirical results and discusses the dissertation's limitations to point to directions for future research.

2 The Representation of Immigrant-Origin Citizens in Germany

The present chapter is devoted to IO-citizens whose descriptive representation takes center stage in the following analysis. After introducing a definition of immigrant origin (chapter 2.1), the cultural diversity of the German population is illustrated, which puts pressure on political parties to establish closer representational ties with IO-citizens by nominating more IO-candidates for election (chapter 2.2). Taking heed of the religious and national heterogeneity of IO-citizens, I put forward arguments that substantiate why IO-citizens are treated as one representational group in the subsequent analysis (chapter 2.3).

2.1 Immigrant Origin

A first essential step is clarifying what I mean by immigrant origin. In order to identify IO-citizens independently of their citizenship status and personal immigration experience, the German Federal Statistical Office introduced the concept of immigrant background in 2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 4-5). Compared to the previously employed indicators, such as foreign citizenship or birth in a foreign country, it is comprehensive. In essence, it is an attempt to adapt the statistical indicators to the social reality after increasing numbers of IO-citizens were naturalized⁴ or born in Germany with German⁵ or foreign citizenship.

Table 2.1: Definition criteria of immigrant origin

Group	Subgroups	Definition criteria
Immigrant origin	First generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Born in a foreign country and immigration after 1949 ▪ Born with foreign citizenship
	Second generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Born in Germany ▪ At least one parent born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship
	Third generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Born in Germany ▪ At least one parent born in Germany with foreign citizenship
Native-born		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Born in Germany ▪ German citizenship at birth ▪ Parents born in Germany with German citizenship

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2015).

⁴ The requirements for naturalization were reduced in 2000. After eight years of legal residence in Germany instead of 15 years, foreigners can obtain German citizenship.

⁵ After the citizenship reform in 2000, children born in Germany to legal foreigners can obtain German citizenship at birth (*ius soli*). Children born on or after January 1, 2000 to non-German parents obtain German citizenship at birth if at least one parent has a permanent residence permit for at least three years and lives in Germany for at least eight years. In contrast to the *ius sanguinis*, the descent is no longer decisive but the country of birth.

Pursuant to the definition of the Federal Statistical Office, three immigration generations can be distinguished (see table 2.1). It is important to mention that the concept of generation does not refer to age cohorts but to the generational distance from the event of immigration. First-generation immigrants are born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship and immigrated to Germany after 1949 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013: 6). They have immediate immigration experiences, and, therefore, are immigrants in a narrow sense. Since war-related migration reached its peak prior to 1949 due to expulsion during and after World War II, the time restriction is intended to exclude war-related migration. Even though immigration of displaced Germans (“Vertriebene”) still occurred after 1950, its numerical strength was far below the number of migrant workers whose immigration started in 1955 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 4). Hence, the focus of the definition is on post-war immigration. Second-generation immigrants are born in Germany, and, therefore, lack a personal migration experience. However, as at least one parent is born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship, they have an immigrant background which is conveyed by at least one parent. Second-generation immigrants are German citizens – either by naturalization or by birth – or foreign citizens or both. Third-generation immigrants are born in Germany but have at least one parent born in Germany with foreign citizenship. By contrast, those persons commonly defined as native-born are born in Germany, are German citizens since birth, and both parents are born in Germany with German citizenship.

For two major reasons, the volume at hand will make use of the definition proposed by the German Federal Statistical Office. First, the definition is unambiguous and sufficiently comprehensive to take account of all relevant immigrant subgroups, such as second-generation immigrants. Second, most previous studies concerned with minority representation in Germany (e.g. Claro da Fonseca 2011; Wüst 2014b) used this definition. The empirical results presented in the following can be linked to their findings without encountering problems of unequal definitions.

2.2 Cultural Diversity in Germany

To illustrate the growing relevance of cultural diversity in Germany, which exerts pressure on political parties to establish closer representational ties with IO-citizens by nominating more group representatives for election, this section will provide a concise portrait of the migration flows towards Germany (for a detailed overview see Bade 2000; Green 2004; Koopmans 1999; Münz 1999). Broadly speaking, three migration flows can be distinguished (Geddes 2003; Koopmans 1999; Martin 1994). The first results from repatriates of German ancestry that emigrated from Poland, the former Soviet Union, Romania and other Eastern European countries

(Green 2004; Thränhardt 2002: 353). Since repatriates were faced with discrimination in their countries of residence due to their German ancestry, Germany guaranteed them naturalization upon arrival (Geddes 2003: 84-85). While repatriates were entitled to be naturalized until 1999, they were guaranteed German citizenship without undergoing any formal naturalization proceeding after 1999 (Currell 2004: 27; Treibel 2008: 32). In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the influx of repatriates increased significantly with 2.5 million between 1990 and 2013 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2015: 102).

The second migration flow dates from migrant workers. After World War II, Germany experienced an economic upswing that brought about an extraordinary need for industrial workers (Thränhardt 2002: 350-351). As the domestic labor market was unable to meet the high demand for industrial workers, the German government started recruiting industrial workers from foreign countries. It contracted recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Dancygier 2010: 225; Green 2004: 32). For a long time, the German government saw no reason why to take integration measures, since labor migration was expected to be a temporary phenomenon (Rensmann 2014). Yet, momentary migration changed into permanent residence after parts of the guest workers had decided to stay in Germany and have their spouses and children join them. In 1966, after the economic recession, the German state started providing monetary incentives to make migrant workers return to their countries of origin. After the oil crisis in 1973, the recession aggravated and the German government banned any further recruitment of migrant workers (Green 2004: 36-37; Thränhardt 2002: 351). The belated declaration by the German government of being an immigration country in 1998 and the late adoption of integration measures caused integration problems among IO-citizens, which are, for example, reflected in lower educational attainment and income (e.g. Alba et al. 1994; Diehl/Fick 2016; Granato 2003; Granato/Kalter 2001).

Third, Germany received many asylum seekers from the late 1970s onwards as political asylum is a constitutionally guaranteed right (Green 2004: 5). In the wake of political and humanitarian conflicts, growing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers from Turkey, the Middle East, former Yugoslavia, Africa and Asia immigrated to Germany. In the 1990s, Germany was faced with a new wave of asylum seekers from Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo. As a response, Germany aggravated its legislation in 1993 by defining safe countries for which the right of asylum is suspended (Geddes 2003: 87-88). Notwithstanding, the number of asylum seekers and refugees tends upwards since 2009 due to military conflicts in Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East, especially in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Syria.

Table 2.2: IO-legislators in the German Bundestag

Election	CDU/CSU		FDP		SPD		Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen		Die Linke		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1990	4	1.2	0	0	3	1.2	0	0	1	5.3	8	1.1
1994	4	1.3	0	0	5	1.9	1	2.0	2	6.5	12	1.7
1998	4	1.5	0	0	5	1.6	2	4.0	2	5.1	13	1.9
2002	5	2.0	0	0	5	1.9	4	7.0	0	0	14	2.2
2005	4	1.7	0	0	7	3.1	5	8.9	4	7.33	20	3.1
2009	4	1.6	4	4.0	4	2.6	7	9.3	7	9.0	26	3.9
2013	9	2.9	-	-	13	6.7	7	11.1	8	12.5	37	5.9

Source: Mediendienst Integration (2013a); Schmuck et al. (2016).

The sources of immigration sketched above lead to a growing cultural diversity of the German population. Most of the IO-citizens in Germany originate from Turkey (17.4 percent), Poland (9.9 percent), the Russian Federation (7.3 percent), Kazakhstan (5.6 percent) and Italy (4.7 percent). The share of IO-citizens increased from 18.5 percent in 2011 to 20.3 percent in 2014 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). In the 2013 Bundestag election, about 9.4 percent of all persons eligible to vote had an immigrant origin (Bundeswahlleiter 2013). In 2005, the same figure was only 8.1 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). Unquestionably, these numbers reflect an increasing cultural diversity of the German population, which puts political parties under pressure to provide for an equal descriptive representation in parliament.

When comparing the cultural diversity of the German population to the descriptive representation of IO-citizens in the German Bundestag, a mismatch comes to light. As shown in table 2.2, the descriptive representation of IO-citizens lags behind with 5.9 percent in the 2013 German Bundestag. But although a bias still exists, the number of IO-parliamentarians increased markedly – especially in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE which have the highest share of IO-parliamentarians. While only eight IO-MPs were present in the German Bundestag between 1990 and 1994, this number quintupled with 37 IO-legislators in 2013. The strongest increase occurred after the citizenship reform in 2000 when political parties started realizing the untapped voter potential of IO-citizens (Claro da Fonseca 2011). Up to this point, the SPD counted on winning the electoral support of IO-citizens by ideological default but was now put under pressure to compete more actively for the electoral support of IO-citizens by providing for their descriptive representation and nominating more IO-candidates. The reason was that the CDU recognized the electoral impact of IO-voters, and, therefore, started refraining from its critical stance on immigration (Schönwälder/Triadafilopoulos 2016: 372).

The increase in party attention IO-voters attracted is reinforced by the changing party affiliations of IO-citizens. Traditionally, labor migrants and their descendants feel affiliated to the SPD (Kroh/Tucci 2009; Wüst 2002). They have a blue-collar background and many of them

are organized in trade unions (Öztürk 2002; Schmidtke 2016). Repatriates, on the contrary, feel affiliated to the CDU as the conservative party fostered their immigration to Germany (Brubaker 1992). However, the traditional party affiliations are dissolving and second-generation immigrants start departing from the established patterns (Kroh/Tucci 2009; Wüst 2012, 2014c). Therefore, political parties must compete harder for votes from IO-citizens.

2.3 Immigrant-Origin Citizens as a Representational Group

As illustrated in the previous chapter, IO-citizens are by far no homogenous group but come from different countries of origin. Their heterogeneity raises the question of whether IO-citizens can be treated as one group that is represented by IO-candidates, as their only common denominator is the immigration to Germany. The present chapter puts forward reasons why treating IO-citizens as one representational group.

Following Bartolini and Mair's (1990: 215) definition of social cleavages who tied in with Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) original work, social representation relates to conflicts between different socio-structural units of society which are characterized by a set of shared values and policy positions, giving rise to a sense of common identity and making group-specific party appeals necessary. Enyedi (2008) widened the definition by including not only socio-structurally defined units but also political-culturally defined groups. In the light of these definitions, representational groups can be defined as socio-structurally or political-culturally distinct units of society that are characterized by shared policy preferences which diverge from the policy preferences of other groups and a collective sense of unity, making group-specific party appeals in terms of substantive and descriptive representation necessary.

IO-citizens may have preferences for a separate set of issues or of different priority which are not shared by their native-born counterparts and would turn them into an own representational group. For instance, their political preferences might mirror personal experiences of discrimination, different perspectives on multiculturalism and immigration or feelings of societal exclusion and otherness. Moreover, immigration-related issues, such as voting rights for foreigners, dual citizenship or foreign policy issues, might be of higher salience for IO-citizens than for other citizens as they concern them personally. Regarding their policy preferences, no strong disparities between IO- and native-born citizens are disclosed in the literature (Dancygier/Saunders 2006; Saggar 2000; Sobolewska 2005; Wüst 2016; Wüst 2002, 2014c). No immigrant-specific policy agenda appears to exist – this also holds true for migration-related, social and foreign policy issues. Evidently, IO-citizens do not form a homogenous and distinct representational group as far as their policy preferences are concerned.

No empirical research is available which inquires whether IO-citizens believe they have more in common with each other than with native-born citizens. IO-citizens may feel a sense of shared fate or mutual empathy due to joint experiences related to immigration, such as racial discrimination or difficulties with integration, which can give rise to group solidarity and may override internal differences within the group of IO-citizens. But the immigrant background represents a personal characteristic rather than a collective identity. It is no homogenous marker but captures nationally and religiously diverse groups. From this it follows that the collective sense of identity is probably weakly pronounced among IO-citizens as a whole but is more marked within the various national and religious subgroups.

For the research question, however, it is less important whether IO-citizens form one distinct representational group but whether political parties regard them as such. If political parties treat IO-citizens as no distinct and relevant representational group but situate them in other groups, such as women, employees, employers, seniors or youths, group-specific appeals, such as nominating group representatives for election to establish closer representational ties, would become dispensable. Whether political parties define groups as socially distinct not only depends on the fact whether they are given as such but political parties, to some extent, have agency in constructing representational groups (Bartolini/Mair 1990; Enyedi 2005, 2008).

This explains why IO-citizens, although immigration is by far no new phenomenon, have been recognized as a relevant group rather recently in the aftermath of the citizenship reform in 2000. But political parties not only have a bearing on the relevance of representational groups but also define them as such by downplaying their internal subtleties or highlighting their commonalities (Enyedi 2005). Even if structural and attitudinal differences within representational groups exist, political parties “can also identify symbols that unite various groups by tapping what is common in them” (Enyedi 2005: 700). This said, it is stated here that political parties are aware of the internal heterogeneity of IO-citizens. But to them, the external differentiation of IO-citizens who are addressed by group-specific party appeals, such as descriptive representation, is for two reasons more relevant than their internal differentiation.

First, vote seeking is the major motivation which drives party efforts to establish representational ties with social groups and makes them update their representational ties if new relevant groups emerge (Mair et al. 1999). Representational ties can either be established by proposing policy programs geared to the concerns of specific representational groups in terms of substantive representation or by running group representatives for election in terms of descriptive representation. Consequently, one way for political parties to intensify their representational ties with IO-citizens and lay claims to their representation is to nominate IO-candidates for election. Yet, political parties must reduce the complexities of relevant groups by focusing on broader

sociological categories, such as trade unionists, blue-collar-workers, women, seniors, LGTBs, farmers, environmentalists, IO-citizens or youths. Each group is internally heterogeneous and could be split up further (Goodin 2004). Political parties cannot consider the myriad of representational groups with all their particularities but must bundle them to keep the representation process running efficiently. To pull the maximum number of votes, they try to cover a broad universe of representational groups. Subordinating the internal differentiation of IO-citizens to their external differentiation and treating them as one representational group is a rational way to handle the complexities of representational claims placed on political parties. If political parties define IO-citizens as one representational group that is believed to be addressed by IO-candidates, the latter will automatically be treated as group representatives in the candidate selection.

Second, political parties are aware that voters make use of heuristics to avoid high information costs in their voting decisions (Lupia 1994a, 1994b). The acquisition and processing of information needed for voting decisions implicate high costs in terms of time, money and cognitive efforts. To save costs, voters employ selective heuristics, such as candidates' party affiliation or their descriptive characteristics, rather than full and comprehensive information (Cutler 2002; Lau/Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994a, 1994b; McDermott 1997, 1998; Mueller 1970; Popkin 1994; Stambough/O'Regan 2003). For political parties, the candidates' descriptive characteristics are therefore selling points that are instrumental in establishing representational ties with specific groups which share these characteristics. To get their central message over to the voters, it is enough to have IO-candidates placed on their candidate tableaus instead of covering all national and religious particularities. First, voters impute policy positions to political parties based on their candidate tableaus. In other words, "the candidates [a party] nominates play an eminently important role in defining what the party is" (Katz 2001: 278). If political parties nominate IO-candidates for election, they attempt to convey the message that they act in accordance with the interests of IO-citizens, are open to them, offer equal participation opportunities, do not act discriminatory and acknowledge the cultural diversity of the population. Second, voters ascribe different areas of expertise to candidates depending on their descriptive characteristics. In the context of the 2009 Bundestag election, Bieber (2013a), for example, found that voters attribute more expertise in immigration-related issues to fictitious candidates with foreign names than to fictitious candidates with German names.⁶ The selection of IO-candidates is therefore a way to signal to voters that a political party has expertise in immigration

⁶ In the US-context, McDermott (1998) found that black candidates are stereotyped as being more concerned with minority rights than white candidates. Similarly, Sigelman et al. (1995) found that Hispanic and African American candidates are perceived as being more compassionate towards disadvantaged groups.

policy and pays attention to migration-related issues relevant to the immigrant population. Third, the nomination of IO-candidates might be believed to create psychological bonds with IO-voters and to serve as a confidence-building measure (Valdini 2012: 742). Voters were argued to confide more in representatives with shared socio-demographic characteristics (Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo/Gilliam 1990; Mansbridge 1999, 2000; Pantoja/Segura 2003).

Even if subordinating the internal differentiation of IO-citizens to their external differentiation, political parties do not lump together immigrant groups, but are aware of their internal heterogeneity. In fact, certain immigrant subgroups stand out more clearly from the majority population than others (Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Ford 2011). Therefore, their nomination sends out a stronger and more striking signal that political parties are open to IO-citizens and acknowledge the cultural diversity of the population that is to be represented. Empirical studies based on surveys, vignette experiments and voting results revealed that the country of origin and the religious denomination matter most for the acceptance of immigrant groups (e.g. Appelbaum 2002; Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Dustmann/Preston 2007; Fietkau 2016; Ford 2011; Hainmueller/Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller/Hopkins 2015; Iyengar et al. 2013). Generally speaking, immigrant groups that are culturally more distinct from the majority population face stronger opposition, as they cause concerns for the preservation of the own cultural traditions and values. Moreover, their cultural beliefs are more likely to be viewed as incompatible with the own lifestyle.

On the religious dimension, Muslims turned out to be particularly discernible since their denomination, appearance, language and names set them apart from the majority population. On the geographic dimension, the same applies to persons from non-European countries. As to religious distance, Mäs et al. (2005) found in a vignette experiment that Muslims are perceived as less German than Christians. According to Czymara and Schmidt-Catran's (2016) vignette experiment, Muslim immigrants furthermore gain less acceptance from the German population than Christian immigrants. Moreover, Muslims were found to face growing islamophobia in most Western countries, including Germany (Adida et al. 2013; Creighton/Jamal 2015; Green 2015; Helbling 2012; Helbling 2014; Kalkan et al. 2009; Peucker/Akbarzadeh 2014; Sides/Gross 2013; Stolz 2006; Strabac et al. 2014; Strabac/Listhaug 2008; Yendell 2013). They constitute a highly contested group since their lifestyle is partly perceived as incompatible with the liberal and secular lifestyle of the majority population.

With regard to geographic distance, Czymara and Schmidt-Catran's (2016) vignette experiment also revealed that immigrants from Kenya or Lebanon face more opposition than immigrants from France. Apparently, immigrants from European countries gain more acceptance

from the German majority population than immigrants from non-European countries. Hainmüller and Hangartner (2013) studied Swiss referendums on the citizenship applications of foreigners. The country of origin was found to outperform any other characteristic, such as language skills or the economic status, in predicting the naturalization success. Most notably, immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Turkey were found to face opposition.

Bringing the previous reasoning and the empirical insights together, I state that political parties treat IO-citizens as one representational group in comparison to other representational groups, as their external differentiation overshadows their internal differentiation. But within this representational group, Muslims and IO-citizens from non-European countries are regarded as particularly distinct. Consequently, the nomination of IO-candidates of such background is a stronger and more striking commitment to the cultural diversity of the population and to the political integration and representation of IO-citizens than the nomination of IO-candidates of Christian denomination or from European countries. Moreover, Muslims are viewed as the group which struggles most with integration, reflected in lower educational achievements and a lower presence in well-paid jobs (e.g. Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007; Haug et al. 2009; Peucker/Akbarzadeh 2014: 33, 39; Sauer 2007). The nomination of Muslim candidates is therefore a symbolic signal that political parties endeavor to integrate Muslims and acknowledge them as a part of the German society. This said, I must take account of potential variances in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates across different immigrant subgroups. It is expected that the empirically found selection patterns are more pronounced if candidates from more distinct immigrant subgroups are concerned – either in the direction of opening or in the direction of closure.


3 How Political Parties Can Select Immigrant-Origin Candidates

Before the question is addressed how political parties behave towards IO-candidates in their nomination proceedings, an analytical framework that guides the empirical analysis is set forth. To begin with, a heuristic model of legislative recruitment is introduced which demarcates the broader research context (chapter 3.1). Chapter 3.2 substantiates why the focus of the following analysis rests on parliamentary candidates. By a review of the legislative recruitment literature, chapter 3.3 identifies those factors which are most relevant in coming forward as a parliamentary candidate and beyond. Taking these recruitment factors as a point of departure, chapter 3.4 envisions how political parties can go about selecting IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates.

3.1 Setting the Context: The Legislative Recruitment Process

Legislative recruitment is a multi-stage selection process through which aspirants for legislative office are recruited. Norris and Lovenduski (1997d: 1; 1995: 1) developed a well-established heuristic model of legislative recruitment, which they defined as “the critical step as individuals move from lower levels into parliamentary careers”. As illustrated in figure 3.1, the legislative recruitment process is composed of four sequential stages that individuals must travel through to win a seat in parliament (Norris/Lovenduski 1993: 376; 1995: 15). In a first step, eligible party members apply for a candidacy. Their applications are either confirmed by the party selectorate or rejected. In a last step, candidates competing for a seat in parliament are either elected or fail to enter parliament.

Figure 3.1: The legislative recruitment process



Source: Norris/Lovenduski (1995: 16).

By analogy with economic market models, Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 14-15) proposed distinguishing supply- and demand-side processes that are operating in the legislative recruitment process. The complex interplay of supply- and demand-side factors explains the final composition of parliaments. While supply-side factors affect who is available to be selected, and, in a way, shape the “‘offer’ on the recruitment market” (Best/Cotta 2000a: 11), demand-side factors explain for which reasons some applicants are preferred to others.

Supply-side approaches trace the legislative underrepresentation of IO-citizens back to the fact that only few group members are available to be selected (e.g. Juenke/Shah 2015; Shah 2014, 2015). Not every eligible party member at the grassroots that meets the legal requirements for nomination, such as the minimum age or citizenship requirements, is willing to make use of the right to stand for election. According to Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 15, 108), political resources, such as time, money, education, rhetorical skills, political expertise, political networks and party experience on the one hand, and motivational predispositions, such as political ambition and involvement on the other, make individuals able and willing to strive for office. As these are not evenly distributed in the population, IO-citizens were argued to lack the political resources and motivational predispositions needed to enter the electoral competition in the same numbers as native-born citizens. As socio-economic inequalities are systematically related to the immigrant origin, disparities in education, income, language skills, networks and interest in politics result in a biased supply, which imposes a bias on the candidate selection (Norris 1997d: 1). Moreover, the political socialization of first-generation immigrants in foreign countries might adversely affect their and their descendants’ political involvement, as they are less familiar with the political system of the host country (Bloemraad/Schönwälder 2013: 568).

Equally important to being able and willing to stand for election are demand-side processes that determine who comes forward in the recruitment process. On the demand-side, party selectorates and voters constitute the pivotal gatekeepers (e.g. Norris 1996; Norris 1997e; Patzelt 1999b). In the intra-party selection process, party selectorates choose candidates from the pool of applicants to compile the candidate tableau for the upcoming election (Ranney 1981: 75). Their selection decisions are based on:

[...] complex choices considering the probable value of the contenders’ resources for electoral success, to their ideological fit with and their practical function for the selectors themselves and their likely loyalty, that is, their expected obedience to the implicit and explicit expectations of the selectors after becoming a parliamentary actor (Best/Cotta 2000a: 11-12).

Demand-side studies which lay stress on nominating bodies attribute the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament to a discriminatory behavior of party selectorates in the nomination proceedings (Ashe/Stewart 2012; Dancygier et al. 2015; Durose et al. 2013). Since applicants are in most cases not well known to the nominating bodies, their

evaluations are affected by prejudices (Norris/Lovenduski 1993: 377). In this context, Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 14) introduced a distinction between direct and indirect prejudices. In the case of direct prejudices, party selectorates harbor personal feelings against specific social groups, such as IO-citizens, which inevitably enter their selection decisions. In the case of indirect prejudices, party selectorates themselves are unbiased but they impute prejudices to voters that make an impact on their selection decisions as they aim to make appealing candidate offers to the electorate. Due to direct or indirect prejudices against IO-candidates, party selectorates may hesitate about nominating IO-candidates for election, leading to an underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament.

In democratic political systems, voters make the final decision as to who will represent them in parliament. For them, candidates' credibility, socio-demographic characteristics, experience, competence, rhetorical skills and their conformity to the voters' political preferences are the most decisive factors in their voting decisions (Best/Cotta 2000a: 12; Campbell/Cowley 2014). Due to prejudices against IO-candidates and doubts as to whether candidates of such background are able to adequately represent them, voters might hesitate about balloting for IO-candidates and through this, might produce a misrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament. Consequently, demand-side studies on minority representation that place focus on the role of voters attribute the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament to voter prejudices against IO-candidates, albeit with mixed empirical findings, ranging from penalty effects (Stegmaier et al. 2013) to no excessive electoral effects (Bieber 2013a; Brouard/Tiberj 2011; Street 2014).

3.2 Setting the Stage: Reasons for Studying Parliamentary Candidates

After setting out the entire legislative recruitment process, I bring parliamentary candidates and their selection into sharper focus. The first reason why parliamentary candidates take center stage is that the dissertation addresses the question of how political parties respond to the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament. In line with the research question, the focus is placed on recruitment factors which come under parties' influence. Recruitment factors that are beyond the parties' sphere of influence are neglected, such as the application stage that is shaped chiefly by the personal decision to apply for a candidacy, and the election stage which is primarily in the hands of voters. For the research question tackled in the dissertation, the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates are most instructive as the candidate selection falls to political parties (Hazan/Rahat 2006b).

Second, the candidate selection is crucial in responding to the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament, since its outcome exerts great influence over the final composition of legislatures. Even though voters have the final say in which candidates will enter parliament, they can only ballot for candidates that came out on top in the candidate selection. Applicants that were vetoed by the party selectorates are not listed on the ballot papers. Consequently, the choices given to voters are to large extent truncated by the party selectorates' decisions (Arnim 2003; Atmor et al. 2011; Hazan/Rahat 2006a; Hazan/Voerman 2006; Rahat 2007). Therefore, the largest part of competition for parliamentary seats does not take place at the ballot box but in the candidate selection.

Third, party selectorates not only decide who runs for office but how viable candidates are for election. The electoral prospects of nomination can either make or break candidates' legislative careers: "In marginal seats, who gets into parliament is determined by voters. But in safe seats with a predictable outcome the selector have the *de facto* power to choose the MP" (Norris/Lovenduski 1995: 2, emphasis in the original). In safe seats, the candidate selection becomes tantamount to election (Detterbeck 2011b: 245; Norris/Lovenduski 1995: 2; Rush 1994: 570; Schüttemeyer 2002: 145). If political parties nominate IO-candidates only as sacrificial lambs to fill less sought-after ballot positions, the doorway to an equal representation of IO-citizens is barred.

The influence of political parties over the electoral prospects of candidates is particularly great in the German political system as most candidates run on closed party lists. In electoral systems that employ closed party lists, political parties compile a list of candidates to be elected. Voters can only choose between political parties but cannot change the party-determined order in which candidates are elected. Which candidate makes it into parliament therefore depends largely on the candidate selection. But also in open list systems, used for example in the Bavarian state election, the intra-party candidate selection matters tremendously for the final composition of parliaments (Karvonen 2011: 120; Katz 1986). Although voters can engage in intra-party voting by electing one particular candidate on a party list, and, by doing so, take influence on the rank order of candidates, the initial list slot allocated to candidates is determined by the nominating body (Kunovich 2003: 157). Candidates who rank low on party lists hardly have any chance of winning sufficient preference votes to make it into parliament. Moreover, voters tend to ballot for candidates at the top of party lists (Blom-Hansen et al. 2016; Brockington 2003; Faas/Schoen 2006; Geys/Heyndels 2003; Lutz 2010; Marcinkiewicz 2014).

3.3 Relevant Recruitment Factors in the Parties' Candidate Selection

After setting forth why the focus is on parliamentary candidates, the most decisive recruitment factors in coming forward in the parties' candidate selection need to be identified to arrive at a framework for analysis. The question of why specific political biographies predominate amongst parliamentary candidates is closely related to the political qualifications political parties seek in their candidate selection. In accordance with Downs' (1957) landmark theory, political parties are defined as rational actors which strive to maximize votes. The goal of harvesting votes is superordinate to other objectives, such as office-seeking or policy-seeking (Strøm/Müller 1999). If political parties fail to win sufficient numbers of votes, only few, or, at worst, no elected office is obtained and their impact on policy-making is heavily curtailed (Strøm 1990). Therefore, candidates with the ability to pull votes are needed. Such assets are more likely to be possessed by contenders who are politically experienced, qualified, credible, and knowledgeable. For one thing, voters prefer candidates with these political properties (Bochel/Denver 1983; Campbell/Cowley 2014; Norris/Lovenduski 1995: 139), and for another, politically experienced candidates are capable of realizing the political expectations of voters. When candidates embark on their political careers, they only have a nebulous picture of the constituents' expectations, which changes with a wealth of political experience.

But political parties are rational actors which not only work towards the forthcoming election but let future considerations flow into their selection decisions. To ensure that they can enact policy goals most effectively (Strøm 1990: 567) and do not lose agency, political parties appreciate candidates who reliably represent party interests, act as team players, toe the party line, are highly committed and do not threaten party unity once they entered parliament (Andeweg/Thomassen 2011; Becher/Sieberer 2008; Bowler et al. 1999; Carey 2007; Sieberer 2006). Party loyalists nourish the image of a cohesive political party that speaks with one voice and help seek policy goals most effectively.

Consider, however, that vote maximization abilities and loyalty to party interests are for the birds if candidates are unable to make their voice heard in parliament. Therefore, political parties hinge on politically experienced candidates who are familiar with politics as a profession and possess the political and strategic abilities to contribute to the implementation of parties' policy preferences by being well versed in the political processes and routines. Novices at the political game are neither familiar with the numerous tasks parliamentarians need to perform, such as how to deliver a speech, nor with the rules of the game that are instrumental in mastering these tasks most effectively and navigating through politics, such as establishing strategically relevant networks or negotiating with others to reach a compromise. While I do not claim that

these aspects sketched above are all-encompassing, they certainly touch upon the most crucial issues guiding the candidate selection.

But how can political parties make sure of selecting candidates that can live up to the expectations described above? Generally speaking, the access to candidacies at the state and national level is hallmarked by a high uncertainty, as no standardized pathway to professional politics exists (Borchert/Stolz 2003: 152). This is even more true as the candidate selection in Germany is regulated by law, unlike most other Western European countries (Hazan/Rahat 2006a; Schüttemeyer 2002: 148), but only imposes formal procedures and does not lay down any political requirements, except for age and citizenship requirements. More precisely, it is stipulated that the candidate selection must follow the principle of intra-party democracy as defined in the Basic Law (Roberts 1988: 97). The Electoral Law, the Federal Election Regulation and the Party Law add further requirements, such as the selection of candidates by secret ballot. The German mixed-member electoral system combines a PR electoral tier with (closed) party lists in multi-member districts (MMDs) with a nominal tier with plurality rule in single-member districts (SMDs) (for details see chapter 4.2) (Ferrara et al. 2005; Kaiser 2002; Manow 2016; Massicotte/Blais 1999; Shugart/Wattenberg 2003a). Candidates can therefore run for election in SMDs, on party lists or on both electoral tiers. The candidate selection in SMDs and MMDs is prescribed to be made either by party membership meetings or by a caucus of delegates elected by meetings of eligible party members to prevent any undemocratic top-down nominations dictated by the party leadership.

Although the access to candidacies appears to be very open at first glance, legislative careers do not proceed randomly. Instead, specific recruitment patterns have emerged that resemble standardized career patterns with party organizations constituting the professional associations (Borchert 2003a: 29-30; Herzog 1990: 35; Schlesinger 1966: 118). These patterns point to the “shadowy pathways” (Bjarnegård/Kenny 2015: 749) of the candidate selection, which are not based on legally defined rules but on informal practices, generally defined as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke/Levitsky 2004: 727). The informal selection practices of political parties are disclosed by the fact that most candidates competing for office have particular political biographies in common (Herzog 1975: 45; 1982: 90). By applying certain selection criteria in the nomination process, political parties, and most notably their party selectorates, generate these recruitment patterns. The reason behind is that party selectorates have no perfect information on whether applicants will meet the expectations outlined above or will fall short of them. The best readily to hand indicator of whether contenders are likely to come up to the expectations are their political biographies. By having a closer look at the contenders’

political track record, political parties try to keep aspirants at bay that are not helpful in vote maximization and policy seeking (Müller 2000: 327-328). To reduce their information deficit and predict the contenders' future performance, political parties draw on informational proxies, such as applicants' previous political experience.

The most valued property is a longstanding track record of political services within and on behalf of the own party organization. Best et al. (2011: 171) and Müller (2000: 327-328) called these probation periods screening processes. The process of working up one's way within party organizations through a longstanding party membership, a high amount of party activity and experience in political office – the so-called *Ochsentour* – help screen potential candidates for higher political office (Best et al. 2011; Golsch 1998: 142). The toilsome recruitment process serves as a training ground to acquire and hone those political skills required to stand for election at higher political level. Although political experience does not guarantee that contenders hold all qualifications instrumental in vote maximization and policy seeking, it at least increases the probability. Vote maximization abilities are more likely to be possessed by applicants who gained experience in political office and are familiar with the demands made on politicians, with election campaigning, with the political rules and procedures and who have already established support networks. To reduce the risk of selecting renegade candidates who jeopardize policy maximization, applicants must furthermore prove themselves reliable, committed and loyal by being longstanding party members, devoting a lot of time to party activities and having previous experience in political office. By selecting party loyalists instead of novices, political parties can ensure, at least to some extent, that candidates will perform in line with their political positions (Pemstein et al. 2015: 1424).

Consequently, candidates can take the short path to professional politics only in exceptional cases (Bailer et al. 2013; Borchert/Stolz 2003: 156; Herzog 1975; Lorenz/Micus 2009b: 13; Mögel 2008; Römmele 2004: 272; Wolf 2007, 2011). Lateral entrants are generally defined as legislators with little or no political experience (Bailer et al. 2013: 16; Borchert/Stolz 2003: 156; Lorenz/Micus 2009b: 13). In most instances, they are recruited due to their networks outside of the party context, their celebrity status, specific sought-after characteristics or their expertise in specific policy fields from which political parties hope to benefit electorally (Bailer et al. 2013; Lorenz/Micus 2009b: 12). According to Herzog's findings (1975) on the 1965 Bundestag, only 9 percent of all legislators have completed cross-over careers by switching from leading positions outside of the political sphere to political top positions. Correspondingly, Bailer et al. (2013) found for the 2009 Bundestag that only 10 percent of all legislators were lateral entrants, which confirms the significance of the lengthy intra-party recruitment process for running for a professional legislative mandate.

Against the backdrop of the legislative recruitment literature, the following chapters set out to describe in greater detail which factors are most crucial in coming forward in the candidate selection and beyond. By building upon this framework of recruitment factors, I conceptualize in a next step how political parties can go about selecting IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates. As the dissertation asks which criteria political parties use for selecting IO-candidates, the focus is on recruitment factors which lie in the parties' sphere of influence. For the benefit of analytical lucidity, I distinguish recruitment factors that are relevant to the candidate selection from factors that are crucial in standing for election as a parliamentary candidate but still lie in the parties' sphere of influence.

3.3.1 Relevant Recruitment Factors at the Stage of Candidate Selection

3.3.1.1 Time of Party Membership

The starting point for most legislative careers is the political engagement as a party member. Although running for election as an independent candidate is legally possible, the backing of a party organization is nearly indispensable for winning a seat in parliament (Herzog 1975: 175). While a party membership is required to stand for election for the CDU (CDU 2016c: § 6), no legal regulations are stipulated in the party statutes of CSU, SPD, FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, and DIE LINKE. Regardless of legal regulations, however, a longstanding party membership is an essential prerequisite for being nominated (Edinger 2009: 194; Herzog 1990). Best et al. (2011: 171) found that MPs in West Germany were party members for about 17 years before entering parliament for the first time, while it was ten years in East Germany. According to Golsch's finding (1998: 128) on the 1994 Bundestag, it was 13 years on average. These numbers reflect that a longstanding party membership is crucial in running for a professional mandate.

The first reason behind is that party selectorates prefer nominating candidates who will reliably represent party positions. Since party gatekeepers cannot foresee how closely candidates will toe the party line, party seniority is a decisive indicator of the candidates' reliability, diligence and loyalty. Second, party seniority helps establish intra-party support networks and alliances required to beat potential competitors at the nominating convention. Lateral entrants often face acceptance problems within party organizations and lack the networks crucial to winning the support of the party selectorate. Third, longstanding party members are more fa-

miliar with the political rules and routines. Since political parties can expect them to be politically more experienced and knowledgeable than novices and to meet the expectations outlined above, they are more likely to be entrusted with a nomination.

3.3.1.2 Encouragement

The origins of the decision to run for elected office, often discussed as candidate emergence, attracted surprisingly scant attention in the recruitment literature (Maisel et al. 1990; Maisel/Stone 1997). The individual decision to run for legislative office follows from complex considerations that often imply cues from the party organization. In the political ambition theory (Schlesinger 1966), aspiring politicians were taken for granted and candidacies were envisioned as a matter of self-recruitment, sparked by the individual desire for political power. Preponderantly, however, candidates do not arrive at the decision to run for office by themselves. The external encouragement from other party actors plays a decisive role. Party actors can inflame office-seeking ambitions of party members who otherwise would not strive after legislative office by bolstering their confidence in the own political abilities or by bringing this idea to their mind (Sanbonmatsu 2006b: 31).

In the research on women representation, the relevance of encouragement was emphasized. Most female candidates are encouraged to run for election, while a minority makes a bid for office on its own (e.g. Carroll 1994; Crowder-Meyer 2011; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Fox/Lawless 2004; Fox/Lawless 2010; Lawless 2012; Lawless/Fox 2005; Niven 1998; Preece/Stoddard 2015; Rallings et al. 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006b). Although women hinge on an external encouragement due to a lower political self-confidence, they were found to receive less encouragement from party leaders or elected officials than male candidates (Allen 2013a; Allen/Cutts 2017; Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fulton et al. 2006; Lawless/Fox 2010; Preece/Stoddard 2015; Preece et al. 2016). Also in Germany, party actors play a pivotal role in motivating potential candidates to run for a candidacy (Patzelt 1999a: 262). About 80 percent of the candidates are asked by other party actors to compete in the candidate selection, while only 20 percent make the decision by themselves. In the US-context, Broockman (2014b) found that political parties shape their candidate pools by encouraging specific individuals to run for election. His field experiment revealed that encouragement significantly increases the interest in a candidacy. Evidently, the encouragement from other party actors plays an essential role in the candidate selection and allows party actors to take influence on the final pool of contenders.

3.3.1.3 Mentoring

Having the support of a political mentor improves the individual chances of passing through the candidate selection. Mentors are politically experienced and knowledgeable persons, such as former or current legislators with a longstanding track record within party organizations, who guide less experienced mentees through their legislative careers. Although it is widely acknowledged that mentors are crucial to candidate emergence, research on their importance for aspiring candidates is rare. Only in the literature on lateral entrants, the relevance of mentors is stressed (Lorenz/Micus 2009a: 487-488; 2009b: 21-22). Owing to their political experience and professional knowledge of the political rules and routines, mentors can prevent less experienced rookies from making missteps in the preparation of their candidacies and can provide them with practical advice and supervision in the run-up to and during the candidate selection. Moreover, mentors can use their visibility and reputation within party organizations for supporting rookies that are less known within party organizations and lack access to the relevant party networks.

3.3.1.4 Level of Competition in the Candidate Selection

The applicants' chances of passing through the candidate selection depend, among other things, on the level of intra-party competition for nomination. Highly contested selection procedures pose a bigger challenge to contenders than uncontested selection proceedings. By encouraging potential candidates in their political ambition of striving for a candidacy or discouraging them, party leaders can attempt to pre-structure the level of competition that prevails in the candidate selection (Niven 2006; Reiser 2011: 254-255). This is to say that they can try to clear the field of contenders in conformity with their preferences in order to increase their control over the outcome of the candidate selection.

The degree of intra-party competition for nomination attracted first scholarly attention in the 1960s and 70s. After realizing that party selectorates pre-shape to a great extent the composition of parliaments and derogate voters from their democratic influence, the research focus shifted from the democratic quality of elections to the democratic quality of the intra-party candidate selection. A minimum level of competition among alternative contenders was deemed necessary to guarantee the democratic quality of the candidate selection. In their pioneering studies, Zeuner (1970) and Kaack (1969a) found that most of the candidate selection procedures were non-competitive with only one contender (see also Kaufmann 1961; Mintzel 1980; Roberts 1988). If the party leadership had agreed upon its favored contender prior to the

official nominating convention, as happened most of the time, the nominating body was deprived of any influence. However, if alternative contenders were competing at the nominating convention, party selectorates had a genuine influence on the selection outcome. In the 2000s, the research on the level of intra-party competition for nomination was reawakened. For the 2002 Bundestag election, Schüttemeyer and Sturm (2005: 547-548) found evidence that in 80 percent of the candidate selection procedures in SMDs of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, FDP and PDS only one applicant could be selected. In the nomination proceedings of the SPD and CDU, a choice between two applicants was given in 34 and 43 percent of the SMDs. As SPD and CDU win most of the nominal races in SMDs, their selection procedures are more contested than those of the smaller political parties. Reiser (2011: 250) corroborated these findings for the 2009 Bundestag election. In 23 percent of the nomination procedures in SMDs, two or more applicants competed for a candidacy, whereas party selectorates could only confirm the available contender in 77 percent of the cases.

The level of intra-party competition in SMDs was found to be affected by the vacancy of SMDs, the electoral winning chances and the candidates' incumbency status (Reiser 2013; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). Vacant SMDs in which the incumbent legislator no longer runs for election and electorally promising SMDs show systematically higher levels of contestation. Conversely, incumbents who made it into parliament in the previous election either via SMDs or via party list slots face less competition (Reiser 2013; 2014: 135; Zeuner 1970). It is a common practice in German party organizations that incumbents are not challenged. One reason behind is that incumbents can boost the parties' nominal and PR vote share due to their name recognition and previous service to voters (Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Hainmueller et al. 2006). Moreover, political parties know what to expect from incumbents in terms of election campaigning and tenure of office. With regard to party list nominations, no empirical research on the level of intra-party competition is available yet.

3.3.1.5 Party Support in the Candidate Selection

Whether applicants stand good chances of nomination is also influenced by the amount of party support they receive. In SMDs, the candidate selection is entirely in the hands of district party organizations. Either the local party membership decides on the candidate selection or the nomination is made by delegates elected from within the ranks of local party members. Consequently, the candidate selection in SMDs is widely under the control of district party organizations. Therefore, the support of the district and sub-district party leadership, of the local party selectorate and of the local rank-and-file party members are most crucial in being selected

(Zeuner 1970: 58-59). State party leaders cannot place their preferred candidates in SMDs, as they lack legal access to the local candidate selection (Reiser 2011: 251; Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 546).

On state party lists, the support of the state party leadership can tip the scales. The placement of parliamentary candidates on state party lists falls to a large extent to the state party leadership and the responsible party selectorate, which is either a party member assembly of all eligible party members of the state party organization or a delegate assembly elected by the party membership of the district party organizations (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005). To facilitate the complex nomination process, in which manifold representational claims are made (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970), state party leaderships often submit proposals for the list ranking before the nominating assemblies vote on these (Burmeister 1993: 64; Roberts 1988: 106; Wessels 1997: 79). As in most political parties, state party leaderships pre-structure the ranking of party lists, they can attempt to place their favored candidates, making their support conducive to running for election on party lists. Yet, their proposals are approved only if they are in accordance with the representational claims of the intra-party groups, the regional party branches and the district party organizations (Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 546). Otherwise, crucial votes are imminent at the nominating convention which disturb the proposed list ranking.

3.3.1.6 Political Office Experience

Working one's way through the party ranks by holding lower-level political office before running for a professional mandate at the state or national level is an integral part of the parties' screening processes (Burmeister 1993: 68, 79). It refers to the longstanding and toilsome career trajectories through lower-level political office, in which candidates can hone their political profiles, increase their visibility in the own party organization and pile up political resources, such as intra-party networks, rhetorical and strategical skills and knowledge of the political rules, routines and party structures. By a gradual qualification in lower-level office, the solid professional foundation for a higher-level candidacy is laid (Herzog 1975: 64).

With regard to the type of previous office held, party office – for instance, chairmen positions in the district or sub-district party executive – is virtually obligatory to run for election at the state or national level, while experience in elected and executive office – for example, in a city council or county council – is certainly helpful (Borchert/Golsch 1999: 126; Borchert/Zeiss 2003: 151; Fiers/Secker 2007). The service to the own party organization is a way to prove reliability and loyalty. Having a so-called *Stallgeruch* – literally meaning to sniff out the smell

of the own stable – by being deeply anchored in the own party organization on a longstanding basis is crucial in running for election at the state or national level, and can be obtained through party office. Furthermore, experience in party office is a helpful vehicle to gather resources instrumental in being nominated, such as becoming familiar with the intra-party rules, structures and processes, developing a political profile within the own party organization, increasing the own visibility and name recognition and establishing relevant party contacts.

Turning to the level of previous office experience, the political recruitment literature noted the importance placed on experience in local-level office. Local-level politics is the breeding ground for most legislative careers at the state or national level and serves as a political training ground for higher-level office (Gruber 2009: 150; Herzog 1975: 85). Party members must prove themselves reliable and loyal to the own party organization by accepting less prestigious and unpaid positions at local level, learn to address local problems, deal with the voters' concerns in a small compass and cultivate a local power base before they are deemed qualified enough to hold a higher-level office. Whether contenders have been serving party interests by accepting less prestigious local-level positions is an acid test to screen the applicants' commitment and devotedness. The positions of the chairman and vice chairman in the district and sub-district party leaderships in particular are strategically important. They provide influence over the district party organization and its candidate selection, help form an alliance of supporters by being in close contact with other local office holders and the rank-and-file party members and contribute to getting 'your face known' in the district party organization (Borchert/Golsch 1999: 127; Borchert/Stolz 2011: 215; Borchert/Zeiss 2003: 152; Gruber 2009: 141).

Due to their strategic importance, legislators not only start their political careers at the local level but often attempt to keep local-level positions throughout their political career, or try to obtain such positions *ex post* (Borchert/Stolz 2003: 167-168; Herzog 1975: 71; 1990: 36). Vertical office-holding profiles are aimed at ensuring the own re-selection in SMDs, as it is the district party organization which controls the candidate selection in SMDs (Bailer et al. 2013: 37-38; Borchert 1999: 27; 2003b: 17; 2011b: 133; Borchert/Stolz 2003: 167-168; Burmeister 1993: 79-80; Detterbeck 2010: 150-151; 2011b; Herzog 1975: 88-90; 1990: 36-37; Kaack 1969b: 72; Zeuner 1970). Through local-level positions, incumbent legislators can stay in touch with the local party membership and other office holders and can make sure of their support.

Against this backdrop, most legislators at the state and national level have previous political office experience. Experience in local-level and party office are most widespread (Best et al. 2011: 172-173; Borchert/Golsch 1999: 125; Borchert/Stolz 2003: 158; 2011: 211; Detterbeck 2010: 149; 2011a). Bailer et al. (2013: 38), for example, found for the 2009 Bundestag that 80 percent of all legislators held a party office at the local level. According to Borchert and Stolz

(2011: 213), 75 percent of the German state legislators have experience in local-level office. Of these, 77 percent had a legislative or executive office, while 61 percent held a party office. Seven positions were most striking in the legislators' career profiles: city council positions, sub-district party chairs, county council positions, district party chairs, party staff positions, offices in the party youth organizations and mayor offices.

3.3.1.7 Organizational Affiliations

The aspiring candidates' organizational affiliations are of paramount importance in the candidate selection. Although the influence of civil society organizations on the candidate selection has decreased (Borchert/Stolz 2003: 163-164), political parties still endeavor to select candidates with close ties with politically relevant organizations. On party lists in particular, organizational links are conducive to being nominated (Roberts 1988: 108). By nominating candidates who are members of civil society organizations, the numerous group-related interests prevailing within party organizations can be balanced and a unity within the diverse party membership can be accomplished, which is necessary to get party lists approved. Moreover, it helps enlarge the parties' voter appeal in the election by addressing diverse segments of voters (Poguntke 2005b). But also in SMDs, organizational ties are assets, as they increase the candidates' extra-party visibility, contribute to a voter mobilization and can equip political parties with financial and personnel campaign support.

Most political parties are intertwined with civil society organizations that are in accordance with their political positions and hone their representational profiles (Poguntke 2005a). These organizations are referred to as collateral organizations, formally or informally linked to party organizations (Poguntke 2000: 35-41; 2006). The forms of interconnection can range from ideological affinity, to shared issues and policy positions, overlapping membership, financial transfer payments and leadership meetings (Allern/Bale 2012: 13). Collateral organizations cover a broad universe of sociological groups, such as employers, small-business owners, employees, gays and lesbians, women, churches, environmental organizations, trade unions or immigrant organizations. In addition to collateral organizations, ancillary organizations exist which are party-created networks (Poguntke 2006). They represent the heterogeneous sectoral group interests of the own party membership, such as women or youths (Köllner/Basedau 2006; Poguntke 2006: 398; Spier 2015; Trefs 2007). They intend to diversify the parties' voter appeal by catering to specific sociological target groups, but most crucially, they are meant to maintain the party unity by representing the heterogeneous party membership and its preferences within the party organization and can serve as support networks in the candidate selection.

The marriage between collateral and party organizations is mutually beneficial. Political parties shape the political decision-making process which makes them relevant addressees of organizational groups (Heaney 2010). By looking for close alliances with political parties, collateral organizations can try to influence the political agenda in accordance with their preferences (Binderkrantz 2008). Vice versa, collateral organizations can provide political parties with expertise in specific topics, hone parties' representational profiles, provide information about the political attitudes of specific voter segments, provide personnel and financial campaign support, and, most importantly, help political parties harvest votes among their members and sympathizers (Allern 2010; Allern/Bale 2012: 8; Poguntke 2000: 27-28). Political parties thus use their ties with social organizations for stabilizing their voter support or tapping new voter groups and accomplishing a collective voter mobilization (Heaney 2010; Lawson 1980; Panebianco 1988: 209; Poguntke 2000; 2005a: 45; 2005b; Winter 2013). Collateral organizations which are not yet closely linked to party organizations are most relevant to political parties, because they allow to address voter groups that are otherwise difficult to mobilize (Poguntke 2006). The selection of parliamentary candidates with close ties with social organizations is therefore a form of linkage politics pursued by political parties to reach out to voters.

3.3.1.8 Politics-Facilitating Professions

A large number of parliamentary candidates and legislators worked in so-called politics-facilitating professions (Allen 2013b; Borchert/Golsch 1999; Cairney 2007; Cowley 2012; Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003; Keating/Cairney 2006; King 1981; Saalfeld 1997; Wessels 1997). In the recruitment literature, a wide range of occupations are subsumed under politics-facilitating professions, such as solicitors, civil servants, employees of political parties, of trade unions and other social organizations, journalists, publishers, teachers, lecturers, researchers, representatives of interest groups and lawyers (e.g. Best 2003: 109-110; Cotta/Tavares de Almeida 2007; Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003; Kintz 2010; Norris/Lovenduski 1995; Saalfeld 1997; Wiesendahl 2006). King (1981: 261), for example, defined facilitating professions as journalists, authors, people in public relations, barristers, solicitors, lecturers and teachers. In a related fashion, Keating and Cairney (2006: 45) included journalists, authors, PR people, political workers and researchers, trade union officials, employees of quangos, interest groups, think tanks, lobbyist or members of assemblies, but discarded teachers and lawyers as their political quality remains unclear. In response to the latter, Cairney (2007: 214) made a distinction between brokerage occupations, such as barristers, solicitors, lecturers, or teachers, and instrumental occupations that have a clear link to politics and provide an apprenticeship for higher

elected office, including journalists, public relation professions, trade union officials, interest group representatives, fulltime councilors, MPs, party workers and MP assistants. While brokerage professions are politics-enabling, as they provide qualifications that are also needed in politics, such as rhetorical or organizational skills, instrumental occupations are situated in politics and its offshoots.

Compared to the population, professions that are completely unrelated to politics are underrepresented in parliament (Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003). Contenders from politics-facilitating professions have a higher chance of being selected, because they have the professional skills and resources which aid legislative careers, such as communication skills, organizational skills, knowledge of how to behave strategically, political contacts, knowledge of the political rules, processes, norms and routines, familiarity with the institutional settings and access to politically relevant networks (Keating/Cairney 2006; Saalfeld 1997). Since in politics, no standardized apprenticeship exists that imparts the basic skills needed for legislative careers, politics-facilitating occupations serve as professional environments in which these skills and resources can be acquired.

This is reinforced by the fact that political parties consider aspiring candidates reliable, trustworthy and qualified enough to stand for election at the state or national level only after completing the toilsome recruitment process through lower-level political office. However, being highly involved in party politics and taking unpaid political positions is time-consuming and comes along with high opportunity costs. Therefore, candidates need professions that give them flexibility to combine their paid work with a volunteer party engagement (Wiesendahl 2006: 107). Politics-facilitating professions were argued to offer flexibility in working hours and to allow an easier compatibility between party engagement and paid jobs (Keating/Cairney 2006; Saalfeld 1997). Moreover, politically relevant resources and skills acquired in the paid job, such as intra-party contacts or the knowledge about the political institutions and their working processes, can easily be transferred to political careers and vice versa, reducing the opportunity costs.

This results in a social closure of parliaments, as legislators are drawn from professions which diverge from the occupational structure of the population (Best/Cotta 2000b). The share of parliamentarians from instrumental occupations increased from 6.7 in the 1998 German Bundestag (Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003: 26) to 11.6 percent in the 2013 Bundestag (Kintz 2014: 584). Brokerage occupations, such as civil servants, are strongly overrepresented among German legislators with 40 to 45 percent (Bailer et al. 2013: 26-27; Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003; Patzelt 1999a; Wessels 1997: 84-85). Beyond civil servants, advocates and notaries are clearly overrepresented in parliament (Kintz 2010). By contrast, the private economy is only poorly

represented (Best et al. 2000). The same applies to farmers, craftsmen and merchants which form minorities in parliament (Bailer et al. 2013: 25-29).

3.3.1.9 Localness in Single-Member Districts

In the majority of cases, parliamentary candidates that compete for office in SMDs are locals (Burmeister 1993: 65; Kaack 1969b: 70; Zeuner 1970: 93-100). Having personal ties with the local constituency and the local party organization is crucial to coming forward as a candidate in SMDs. As candidates need to seek personal votes (André/Depauw 2014; Cain et al. 1984; Carey/Shugart 1995; Gallagher 1980; Shugart et al. 2005), candidates from outside of the electoral district that lack a local name recognition find it difficult to convince local party selectorates to nominate them (Marsh/Gallagher 1988: 251; Pedersen et al. 2007). Rush (2001: 204) defined localism as “being born, educated, living or working in the constituency; having property interests or serving or having served as a member of a local government body in the constituency [...]”. From this definition, two dimensions of localness emerge. While political localness takes the shape of experience in local political office and of being in close contact with the district party organization, biographical localness reflects the candidates’ personal ties with the electoral district in terms of birth and residence in the electoral district (Gschwend/Zittel 2016; Pedersen et al. 2007; Tavits 2010: 221). Biographical localness creates an emotional closeness to the electoral district and boosts the motivation for representing local concerns. Political localness, by contrast, is said to increase the ability to succeed in the local candidate selection, to represent local concerns and to mobilize party volunteers and voters in the local election campaign (Gschwend/Zittel 2016).

The first reason for the importance of localness is that the candidate selection in SMDs is the exclusive dominion of district party organizations (Burmeister 1993: 64; Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). Therefore, it is advantageous to be personally acquainted with the district party organization and to be supported by local party authorities, such as the district and sub-district party chairmen, by the local rank-and-file party members and by the local party selectorate (Zeuner 1970). Second, locals have higher electoral prospects of winning personal votes due to personal ties with the local constituency and a local name recognition. Vast empirical research corroborated the value of localness as a vote earning attribute in SMDs (Arzheimer/Evans 2012, 2014; Blais/Massicotte 1996; Campbell/Cowley 2014; Cowley 2013; Górecki/Marsh 2012; Jankowski 2016; Marsh 1987; Pedersen et al. 2007; Put/Maddens 2015; Shugart et al. 2005; Studlar/McAllister 1996; Tavits 2010; Vivyan/Wagner 2015). The electoral effects of localness generate strong incentives for party selectorates to

favor locally anchored candidates over external candidates. Third, localness provides party selectorates and voters with informational cues concerning the candidates' familiarity with the local needs and preferences, and indicates how likely they are to advocate these in parliament (Tavits 2010: 217).

3.3.2 Relevant Recruitment Factors at the Stage of Standing for Election

Even though voters constitute the pivotal principles on whose electoral support candidates hinge when standing for election (Norris/Lovenduski 1995: 16), the influence of political parties over the candidates' electoral prospects reaches out to this recruitment stage. First, the candidates' chances of making it into parliament depend on the electoral viability of their nominations. Second, election campaigns are a decisive factor in winning a seat in parliament. The amount of campaign activities depends, among other things, on the financial and personnel campaign support of party organizations.

3.3.2.1 *Electoral Viability*

The candidates' electoral fate is contingent upon their party-determined electoral prospects. Owing to their monopoly on the candidate selection, political parties can make or break candidates' legislative careers. With respect to the electoral viability of SMD nominations, empirical research has missed addressing which candidates can run in viable electoral districts. With regard to party lists, some informal but highly institutionalized rules for the assignment of viable list positions were disclosed (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970).

First, nominees that succeeded in coming forward as SMD candidates are prioritized in the party list ranking. Although mixed-member electoral systems create the impression that two independent electoral tiers are combined (Moser/Scheiner 2004: 575), this intuition is misleading. Scholars pointed to contamination effects across both electoral tiers that are common to mixed-member electoral systems (Cox/Schoppa 2002; Ferrara et al. 2005; Herron/Nishikawa 2001). These contamination effects are most evident in dual nominations which apply to 80 percent of all parliamentary candidates in the German Bundestag election (Manow 2012: 53; 2016). The main reason why priority is given to SMD candidates is that candidates' local presence in the electoral districts and their campaign activities boost not only the parties' nominal vote share but also their PR vote share (Ferrara/Herron 2005; Manow 2011). By placing SMD candidates on higher ballot positions, political parties can create incentives which motivate candidates to run for election in SMDs and campaign on behalf of their party organizations, even

if the electoral race is beyond hope (Manow 2013: 289). A SMD nomination – especially if the nominal race is in vain – forms one precondition for receiving electorally viable party list slots (Borchert/Reiser 2010; Kaack 1969a: 80-82; Reiser 2014: 59; Zeuner 1970: 149).

As a second priority rule, incumbents usually receive the most viable slots on party lists (Reiser 2014; Zeuner 1970). Owing to their name recognition and legislative record, incumbents are at an electoral advantage (Dahlgaard 2016; Erikson 1971; Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Lee 2001; Levitt/Wolfram 1997; Mayhew 1974). The incumbency advantage creates strong electoral incentives to place incumbents on visible list positions. Moreover, political parties know what to expect from incumbents in terms of election campaigning and performance in parliament. These candidates have already proven their ability to win elections and master the complex tasks of parliamentary work. Furthermore, they are familiar with the institutional working processes of parliament, so they can continue their legislative work as soon as re-entering parliament.

3.3.2.2 Election Campaign Activities

After being nominated, heading for the campaign trail is the last possibility for increasing the own electoral prospects. Campaigning was shown to make positive impacts on voter mobilization and turnout (Fisher et al. 2016; Gerber/Green 2000; Karp et al. 2007). It is most important to those candidates whose election is at risk (Farrell/Webb 2002; Schmitt-Beck/Farrell 2002b; Tenscher/Rußmann 2016; Zittel/Gschwend 2008: 984). But also candidates that compete for safe seats or have no chance of winning at all are incentivized to campaign on behalf of their party organization. If candidates duck out of campaigning, political parties are likely to penalize these candidates at the next election by electorally poorer re-nominations, by no re-selection at all, or by discarding those candidates for alternative posts. Therefore, candidates face incentives to campaign on behalf of their party organizations, albeit with varying intensity. But it is not only the electoral viability which affects the intensity of campaign activities but the mode of candidacy forms another critical incentive structure. List candidates face fewer incentives to run election campaigns than contenders nominated in SMDs. While they ride on the party ticket, the personal electoral success of the latter depends on individual campaign activities (Zittel 2015; Zittel/Gschwend 2008).

To be sure, vigorous election campaigns can yield electoral payoffs (e.g. Denver et al. 2004; Giebler et al. 2014; Gschwend/Zittel 2011; Gschwend/Zittel 2014; Schmitt-Beck/Farrell 2002a; Zittel/Gschwend 2008). Yet, they are cost-intensive as candidates must produce marketing material, election posters and flyers, organize campaign events and campaign stands and invest a

lot of time and energy in election campaigns. From a structural perspective, political parties have two opportunities to support the candidates' election campaigns. By providing financial and personnel campaign resources, political parties can give direction to the scope and intensity of the campaign activities that candidates can conduct.

Financial resources are necessary for producing campaign material like campaign posters and flyers, to place ads in newspapers, set up own websites and produce giveaways. The higher the financial contributions political parties make to the candidates' campaign budget, the more campaign activities can be run. Moreover, campaign teams composed of party volunteers are of importance for vigorous campaign activities. For parliamentary candidates, it is nearly impossible to organize all campaign activities by themselves. By providing candidates with financial and personnel campaign support, political parties can attempt to increase the candidates' chances of electoral success.

3.4 The Parties' Selection Behavior towards Immigrant-Origin Candidates

Against the backdrop of the legislative recruitment research, the previous chapters identified recruitment factors that are most crucial in coming forward in the parties' candidate selection and beyond and fall into the parties' sphere of influence. By building upon these factors, the present chapter fleshes out three ideal-typical benchmarks envisioning in what ways political parties can select IO-candidates. Prior to that, the state of research concerned with the legislative recruitment of IO-candidates is sketched to situate the dissertation in the field of existing studies.

3.4.1 State of Research

In the face of a persisting underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament, scholars pointed to the candidate selection as a culprit. It was said to be too selective to produce an equal representation of marginalized groups (e.g. Durose et al. 2013; Kittilson/Tate 2005). But in fact, only scant attention has been paid to the selection of IO-candidates. The sparsity of empirical evidence can be traced back to the current preoccupation with aggregate patterns of minority representation at the expense of studies on intra-party recruitment processes.

Broadly speaking, the landscape of research on minority representation can be broken down into two clusters. The first cluster dwells on aggregate patterns of minority representation and employs the share of candidates or legislators of this category as a dependent variable. It ex-

plores which context or institutional factors explain variances in the level of minority representation in either a cross-national framework or within specific countries. Inter alia, the political opportunity structure like citizenship and integration regimes turned out to be decisive (e.g. Koopmans/Statham 2000b; Michon/Vermeulen 2013), along with the electoral system (e.g. Canon 1999; Kostadinova 2007; Moser 2008; Ruedin 2013; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Togeby 2005, 2008), the ethnic concentration in SMDs (Dancygier 2014; Shah 2014; Trounstein/Valdini 2008), the economic deprivation in SMDs (Dancygier 2013), cultural attitudes (Bird et al. 2011; Ruedin 2009, 2013) and party ideology (Eelbode et al. 2013). This body of research has to a great extent advanced the scholarly understanding of how context and institutional factors shape the level of minority representation. However, it cannot shed light on the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, lying, among other things, beneath these aggregate patterns. Rather than focusing on aggregate patterns, I therefore center the dissertation on one part of mechanisms underlying the aggregate patterns and this is the candidate selection behavior of political parties.

The second cluster treats the immigrant background as an independent variable to explore how it impacts legislative behavior once IO-candidates are elected into parliament, finding effects on the content of their parliamentary questions in favor of integration-related issues and a higher probability of sitting in migration-related committees (Aydemir/Vliegenthart 2016; Saalfeld/Bischof 2013; Saalfeld/Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wüst 2014b; Wüst/Heinz 2009). Moreover, the questions of whether the candidates' immigrant background induces IO-voters to go to the polls were raised, finding mobilization effects (Banducci et al. 2004; Fisher et al. 2015; Martin 2016), whether the candidates' immigrant background makes IO-voters ballot for IO-candidates, finding positive effects in Australia and the UK (Zingher/Farrer 2016) and in Norway (Bergh/Bjørklund 2011), and how responsive black MPs are to constituents of the same demographic background, finding a higher responsiveness than it applies to white parliamentarians (Broockman 2013; Butler/Broockman 2011). In addition, general voter effects were investigated when IO-candidates run for election with mixed findings, ranging from penalty effects (Stegmaier et al. 2013) to weak deterrent effects (Bieber 2013a; Brouard/Tiberj 2011; Street 2014).

In fact, only a handful of studies scrutinized how IO-candidates fare in the parties' candidate selection (but Ashe/Stewart 2012; Claro da Fonseca 2011; Dancygier et al. 2015; Durose et al. 2013; Markowis 2015; Nergiz 2014; Norris/Lovenduski 1995; Schmitz/Wüst 2011; Sobolewska 2013; Softic 2016; Soininen 2011; Thrasher et al. 2013). But it is important to mention that these studies address very disparate research questions. Nergiz (2014), for example, adopted a candidate-centered perspective and studied through qualitative interviews how

German Bundestag MPs of immigrant background have coped with their immigrant origins in the parties' recruitment process and in parliament. Different strategies for dealing with the marker of having immigrant origins exist, ranging from emphasizing this marker to downplaying it by highlighting meritocratic qualifications.

Schmitz and Wüst (2011) also employed qualitative interviews but studied German city councilors of immigrant background and their personal recruitment experiences. Even though parts of the respondents faced difficulties at the beginning of their party engagement, arising from cultural and communication problems, most of them experienced no racial discrimination in their party organizations.

Markowis (2015) also employed qualitative interviews but investigated German state legislators of immigrant background. One of her most noticeable findings is that the immigrant background was perceived as an advantage to come on a party list – this applied chiefly to female parliamentarians of immigrant background. At the same time, however, the practice of othering in which IO-parliamentarians were presented as too distinct from the majority population to run for election was used for keeping them out of the competition for legislative mandates. Moreover, many respondents felt reduced to the role of immigration experts, which curtailed their chance of demonstrating their proficiency in other policy fields.

Sobolewska (2013), by contrast, focused on party strategies for increasing minority representation in the 2010 British General Election. She found that Labors and Conservatives embarked on strategies for increasing minority representation, such as selecting more IO-candidates into winnable seats. At the same time, however, political parties did not make full use of the available options for increasing minority representation. Nonetheless, a clear departure from the selection strategies previously adopted was found.

By employing qualitative interviews with IO-legislators, Durose et al. (2013) showed for the 2010 British General Election that where IO-MPs were elected, they had to conform to characteristics of the average native-born parliamentarians, such as having a university degree, a longstanding party activism, experience in local-level office and in politics-facilitating professions to become acceptably different. This was argued to pose a high obstacle to their election.

By studying the local candidate selection in Sweden on the basis of qualitative interviews with local party selectorates and party leaderships, Soininen (2011) found that the local level is an obstacle to the nomination of IO-candidates. Local networks within party organizations, which play a crucial part in the candidate selection, seem to shut IO-candidates out and prejudicial attitudes of local party members prevent party selectorates from nominating IO-candidates.

When trying to link these empirical findings with the research question addressed here, an ambiguous picture of the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates emerges. Some findings pointed to efforts of political parties to nominate IO-candidates more viably, and, in doing so, remedy a poor minority representation in parliament (e.g. Sobolewska 2013). Others found evidence for neutral selection patterns in which IO-candidates must conform to the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates to run for election, which were, however, high hurdles to be overcome (e.g. Durose et al. 2013) and still others referred to a closure (e.g. Soininen 2011). As the studies sketched above pursue very disparate research questions, draw on distinct empirical approaches and focus on different settings, the inconsistent patterns come as little surprise and can only provide limited insight into the selection behavior of German political parties. On top of this, one flaw inherent in most studies presented above is a lack of reference groups. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the found patterns are unique to IO-candidates and disclose specific selection strategies, or whether they reflect patterns applying to most candidates. The question of which lessons can be learned from the recruitment profiles of IO-candidates about the selection behavior of political parties towards candidates from underrepresented groups therefore remains inconclusive in the current research. I address this limitation common to most empirical work on this topic by incorporating the recruitment profiles of native-candidates into the analysis.

3.4.2 How to Select Immigrant-Origin Candidates – Neutrality, Opening and Closure

To unearth how political parties behave towards IO-candidates in the candidate selection, benchmarks are needed that help identify patterns in the empirical material. By building upon the recruitment indicators introduced in the preceding chapters, the present chapter conceptualizes how political parties can respond to the legislative underrepresentation of IO-citizens in their candidate selection proceedings. These heuristics, which have no explanatory but only descriptive purposes, help identify patterns in the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates that are informative of the parties' selection behavior. These benchmarks have no normative implications in the sense that one is said to be superior to the other, but they are heuristic tools that instruct the empirical analysis.

Table 3.1: The parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates

Selection behavior	Indicators	Selection policy
Neutrality	Equal political qualifications Equal amount of party support	Neutral
Opening	Less political qualifications More party support	Offensive
Closure	More political qualifications Less party support	Defensive

Source: Author's own illustration.

The universe of possible selection practices employed towards IO-candidates embraces three ideal-typical patterns, referred to as neutrality, opening and closure (see figure 3.1). They result from systematic conceptualizations of the deviations from the default selection patterns, measured by the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates. As argued earlier, the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates are used as reference points to unveil whether political parties select IO-candidates differently. While neutrality implies the adherence to the default selection criteria also used for nominating native-born candidates when selecting IO-candidates, both opening and closure emphasize alternative selection practices. Opening refers to a weaker compliance with the standard selection criteria if IO-candidates are concerned, whereas closure refers to a stricter adherence to them. As a descriptive and explorative approach is taken, no expectations concerning the emergence of specific patterns are put forward.

3.4.2.1 Neutrality – “We Want You Just Like We Want Any Other Candidate!”

In the case of neutrality, political parties are willing to respond to the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament by letting IO-candidates compete for a seat in parliament. But they impose the same conditions for nomination on IO-candidates as on native-born candidates. Hence, political parties apply similar screening criteria to IO-candidates as to native-born candidates to ensure that candidates are selected who can contribute to their vote- and policy-seeking goals. Neutral selection practices are indicated by two paramount criteria: First, IO-candidates need equal political qualifications as native-born candidates to stand for election, and, second, they receive similar levels of party support in the candidate selection. In other words, neutrality refers to a selection behavior that stresses equal requirements for native-born and IO-candidates rather than alternative selection practices employed towards representatives of underrepresented groups. The standard selection criteria define the meritocratic rules of the game.

In the candidate selection, these rules apply to all contenders likewise – irrespective of belonging to an underrepresented group.

The established recruitment process serves as a screening to assess the applicants' political qualifications. If contenders have skipped significant parts of the default recruitment process, political parties risk selecting candidates who are not familiar with the political business and impede the parties' vote and policy maximization efforts. In the case of neutrality, political parties therefore adhere to their standard criteria used in the candidate selection – regardless of whether nominees belong to underrepresented groups. This is to say that IO-candidates cannot circumvent the toilsome recruitment process delineated in chapter 3.3, but must undergo the same probation period as their native-born peers to vie for a seat in parliament. In the trade-off between inducing an opening of their candidate selection to increase minority representation and a closure to ensure that candidates are qualified to stand for election, political parties prioritize meritocratic selection criteria.

For the empirical analysis, clear-cut indicators that are indicative of a neutral selection behavior vis-à-vis IO-candidates are needed. By building upon the framework of recruitment factors established in chapter 3.3, indicators that suggest neutrality will be carved out next (see table 3.2). While some recruitment factors, such as length of party membership, office experience, organizational linkages, politics-facilitating professions and localness, are assigned to the dimension of political qualification, other indicators, such as encouragement, mentoring, level of competition in the candidate selection, party support in the candidate selection, electoral viability and party support in election campaigning, capture the dimension of party support.

Table 3.2: Indicators of neutrality

Stage of candidate selection
1. Equal length of party membership
2. Equal probability of encouragement
3. Equal probability of mentoring
4. Equal competition in the candidate selection
5. Equal party support in the candidate selection
6. Equal office experience
7. Equal number of organizational affiliations
8. Equal probability of coming from politics-facilitating professions
9. Equal localness in SMDs
Stage of standing for election
1. Equal electoral viability
2. Equal party support in election campaigning

Source: Author's own illustration.

Neutrality at the stage of candidate selection

A minimum length of party membership is in most cases indispensable in running for office at the state or national level (Edinger 2009: 194). Rookies barely have any chances of being selected but must wait until it is their turn (Borchert/Golsch 1999: 126-127; Borchert/Stolz 2003: 156-157; Herzog 1975). The length of party membership indicates whether party selectorates face reliable and loyal applicants who are familiar with the party organization and deeply anchored in it. In the case of neutrality, IO-candidates need to be party members for an equal period of time as native-born candidates before standing for election for the first time. The same requirements that hold for any other candidate when striving after nomination also apply to IO-candidates.

Political parties can inspire party members that otherwise would not strive for elected office to office-seeking (Allen/Cutts 2017; Broockman 2014b; Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox/Lawless 2010; Lawless/Fox 2005). In the case of neutrality, IO-candidates have equal chances of encouragement from other party actors as native-born candidates. They neither experience more encouragement attempts than native-born candidates to enlarge the pool of IO-candidates nor are they self-recruiters in larger parts.

Being backed by a party mentor can be instrumental in the candidate selection. Mentors, such as longstanding and highly experienced office holders, can use their intra-party influence, networks and visibility for supporting aspiring candidates in the candidate selection – for example, by advocating their mentees at the nominating convention, by mobilizing supporters, and by giving practical advice about the application for nomination. Given that party mentors are of equal importance for IO- and native-born candidates, neutral patterns are indicated.

On the cusp of being nominated, the competition for nomination considerably affects the applicants' chances of selection (Reiser 2011, 2013; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005). Through negative recruitment, such as advising aspirants to desist from application or to revoke their application, political parties can attempt to clear the field of contenders and to take influence on the degree to which selection proceedings are contested (Niven 2006). In the case of neutrality, IO-candidates are expected to face equal levels of competition in the selection proceedings as native-born candidates. They are neither privileged by being nominated without the burden of challengers nor do they face a higher counter-mobilization by running against a higher number of competitors.

Moreover, the support of the own party organization impacts the applicants' chances of coming forward as candidates. In SMDs, the support of the district party organization, especially of the local party leadership and the party selectorate, is of great importance, while the

support of state party leaderships is relevant to party list nominations (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005). If IO-candidates have equal chances of gaining party support in the candidate selection as native-born candidates, political parties treat them as equals, which is in line with neutrality.

Working one's way through prior political offices before running for a professional mandate at the state or national level is integral to parties' screening processes (Borchert 1999; Borchert/Golsch 1995; Burmeister 1993: 68, 79; Edinger 2009; Golsch 1998; Herzog 1975; Saalfeld 1997). Moreover, the probation in previous political positions helps aspirants develop a political profile, increase their visibility within the party organization and acquire political resources like intra-party contacts, rhetorical and organizational skills and knowledge about the political rules and party structures, all of which are conducive to coming forward as a candidate. Most notably, experience in party and local-level office is at the heart of the political probation period. If IO-candidates must show equal levels of office experience as native-born candidates to run for election and have equal probabilities of having experience in party and local-level office, a neutral selection behavior is indicated. Aspiring candidates must slog their ways through lower-level positions before running for election at the state or national level, irrespective of representing a marginalized group.

Most party organizations seek to establish close ties with social organizations. In doing so, they hope that these external linkages will provide them with electoral support (Allern/Bale 2012; Heaney 2010; Panebianco 1988: 209; Poguntke 2000; 2005a: 45; 2006; Winter 2013). Furthermore, close linkages with civil society organizations that correspond with the parties' representational focus can underpin their political profiles. By nominating candidates that are closely affiliated to civil society organizations, political parties attempt to establish personnel ties with these. Given that IO-candidates need to show an equal number of organizational affiliations as native-born candidates to run for election, a neutral selection behavior is indicated.

Numerous candidates come from politics-facilitating professions (Borchert 1999; Borchert/Golsch 1999; Cairney 2007; Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003; Kintz 2014; Saalfeld 1997). As no standardized pathway to professional politics exists that provides aspiring candidates with the political qualifications and knowledge needed for professional political careers, politics-facilitating professions serve as an environment in which these resources can be acquired. In the case of neutrality, IO-candidates have equal probabilities as native-born candidates of coming from politics-facilitating professions since similar requirements for nomination are imposed.

In order to run for election in SMDs, localness is a great asset (Burmeister 1993: 65; Herzog 1975; Zeuner 1970). As the candidate selection in SMDs falls to district party organizations,

external candidates that are lacking in localness will have a hard time being selected. Being known by the local party authorities, such as the sub-district and district party chairmen, by the rank-and-file party members and the local party selectorate are most essential for being entrusted with a nomination. Supposing that IO-candidates are as likely as native-born candidates to have local ties, neutrality is revealed.

Neutrality at the stage of standing for election

Being listed on a ballot paper is not equivalent to winning a seat in parliament. Only on condition that political parties nominate candidates in viable SMDs or on promising ballot positions, candidates stand good chances of being elected. Neutrality in the selection behavior of political parties is indicated if IO-candidates run as viably for election as any other candidate.

Election campaigning is the last opportunity for parliamentary candidates to increase their electoral prospects before voters make the final decision on their electoral fate (Farrell/Webb 2002). Vigorous election campaigns can yield electoral payoffs. As established earlier, the amount of financial resources provided by political parties and the size of the personal campaign teams are crucial resources on the campaign trail. In the case of neutrality, political parties endow IO-candidates with financial and personnel campaign resources that are widely similar to those of their native-born counterparts.

3.4.2.2 Opening – “We Want You at Any Price!”

In the debate on minority representation, the candidate selection was said to be a culprit that inhibits IO-citizens from claiming more legislative seats (e.g. Ashe/Stewart 2012; Durose et al. 2013; Kittilson/Tate 2005). On the one hand, it is regarded as too selective to spawn equal shares of IO-candidates: “[...] this ‘traditional’ pathway to national politics is narrow and has not been very effective in providing access for under-represented groups, including ethnic minorities” (Durose et al. 2013: 253). On the other hand, though, the parties’ monopoly on the candidate selection also makes them one of the main protagonists for paving the way for an equal minority representation. Even if a dearth of IO-applicants is likely to be given due to fewer socio-economic resources in the immigrant population, such as educational attainment or income (e.g. Alba et al. 1994; Butterwegge 2010; Diefenbach 2007, 2009; Diehl/Fick 2016; Granato 2003; Granato/Kalter 2001; Kristen 2002; Kristen/Granato 2007; Stanat/Edele 2011), a more pronounced interest in home country politics (e.g. Caballero 2009; Diehl 2002) and

language barriers (e.g. Becker 2011a; Esser 2006a, 2006b, 2008), political parties can counteract by taking positive influence on their chances of coming forward in the candidate selection. As Da Fonseca (2011: 113) rightly pointed out, “[...] if there is a strategic intention to mobilize a new target group by means of candidate nomination, supply-side factors will hardly be an impediment.” Therefore, the question to ask is: If political parties intend to nominate more IO-candidates for election, how can they ensure that more candidates of this category come forward? The answer is: By treating potential nominees of immigrant background preferentially in the candidate selection, political parties can make it easier for representatives of underrepresented groups to come through.

Opening strategies are indicated by two paramount criteria: A preferential treatment is unveiled by systematically lower requirements for nomination imposed on IO-candidates than on their native-born peers and higher levels of party support. By relaxing their selection criteria for aspiring IO-candidates and by providing them with extraordinary party support, political parties can downsize the selectivity of their candidate selection and make it more permeable for representatives of thus far underrepresented groups. The standard selection criteria define the general meritocratic rules of the game that hold for most parliamentary candidates but are in parts suspended if applicants of immigrant background are concerned. In contrast to neutrality, opening emphasizes alternative candidate selection practices besides the standard selection behavior which are targeted at increasing the number of candidates from underrepresented groups. As it is in the hands of political parties to define the selection criteria in the nomination proceedings, it is incumbent on them to define the criteria used for selecting IO-candidates.

Opening is indicative of the parties’ efforts to nominate more IO-candidates, even if they must accept considerable costs. As discussed earlier, the recruitment process serves to screen the applicants’ political qualification to hold a professional political office and master the challenges inherent in it. It is for this reason that lateral entrants who skipped parts of the standard recruitment process are outnumbered in the ranks of legislators (Bailer et al. 2013; Herzog 1975; Lorenz/Micus 2009b). In the case of opening, political parties are willing to suspend parts of their established selection criteria to increase the number of IO-candidates. In the trade-off between inducing an opening of their candidate selection to do away with the underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament and a closure to ensure that the most qualified, experienced and reliable contenders come forward as candidates, political parties give priority to the former. For political parties, opening strategies are enormous concessions as they run the risk of selecting ill-suited candidates that fail to have a share in the parties’ vote and policy maximization.

But why should political parties be inclined to pursue opening strategies? As argued earlier, vote- and policy-seeking are the main objectives driving the parties’ candidate selection (Best

et al. 2011: 171). To boost their electoral support and exploit the entire voter potential, political parties keep an eye out for relevant voter groups. With a share of 9 percent in the German electorate in 2013, IO-voters became an increasingly relevant voter group (Bundeswahlleiter 2013). In the face of considerable demographic changes in the composition of the electorate, political parties are prompted to woo voters of immigrant background (Claro da Fonseca 2011). This can take place through policy programs nursing the preferences of IO-voters in terms of substantive representation or by nominating IO-candidates in terms of descriptive representation. One easily practicable way to establish closer representational ties with IO-citizens without revising the own policy positions is to place more IO-candidates on the ballot paper. At the ballot box, voters must choose between candidates they have little knowledge about. In such low-information settings, the cue theory (Lupia 1994a, 1994b) claims that individuals draw on ready-to-hand information shortcuts, such as party labels or the candidates' descriptive characteristics (Cutler 2002; Lau/Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994a, 1994b; McDermott 1997, 1998; Mueller 1970; Popkin 1994; Stambough/O'Regan 2003).⁷ Consequently, the candidates' descriptive characteristics are selling points political parties use for addressing specific voter groups. Running IO-candidates for election is a way to appeal to voter groups of immigrant background (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Zingher/Farrer 2016). To overcome a low supply of potential IO-candidates and ensure that IO-candidates are placed on the ballot paper, political parties can employ opening measures in their candidate selection.

Opening touches upon the scholarly debate on affirmative action (e.g. Baldez 2006; Dahlerup 2006b; Krook 2009, 2014; Krook/O'Brien 2010; Krook/Zetterberg 2014; Norris 1997c, 2001). Affirmative action refers to measures taken to promote underrepresented groups in their political representation (Bacchi 2006: 32-33). Norris (2001) and Lovenduski (2005) drew a distinction between three forms of affirmative action. First, party actors can adopt rhetorical strategies for committing to an equal representation of thus far underrepresented groups. Rhetorical commitments can be purely symbolic or may herald next steps in eliminating the political underrepresentation of specific groups. Second, affirmative action programs can be implemented in which I situate opening strategies in the candidate selection. Affirmative action programs, such as training courses, mentoring, financial aid and other forms of selective support, seek to remove barriers in the legislative recruitment process. Third, political parties can guarantee an equal representation by defining mandatory quotas (Dahlerup 2006a: 9). Quotas not only promote an equal representation, as the two previous forms of affirmative action, but

⁷ In the literature, there is ample evidence that the candidate's gender (Huddy/Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b; McDermott 1997), race (McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995), occupation (McDermott 2005, 2005) and attractiveness (Banducci et al. 2008) are used as information shortcuts for voting decisions.

guarantee it (Dahlerup 2006a: 19). Krook and Norris (2014) pointed out that in political settings in which no quotas are implemented, alternative affirmative action strategies of the second type need to be investigated, as otherwise attempts at achieving representational parity are overlooked.

In Germany, no quotas for IO-candidates were implemented yet (on ethnic quotas see e.g. Bird 2014; Htun 2004; Krook/O'Brien 2010). Only the SPD agreed upon a 15-percent quota for party members of immigrant background in the national executive board (Medick 2011). This quota, however, does not hold for parliamentary candidates. In BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, a quota for IO-candidates was debated at the state party convention in Berlin in 2015 but no quota was introduced (Zawatka-Gerlach 2015). So far, only gender quotas⁸ were implemented in all party organizations, except for the FDP and CSU (Davidson-Schmich 2006, 2016; Reiser 2014). Against this backdrop, it is all the more important to take alternative measures of affirmative action into account, such as opening efforts in the candidate selection.

After clarifying the assumptions of the opening model, unequivocal indicators are needed which are suggestive of an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates. By building upon the framework established in chapter 3.3, indicators are introduced that point to an opening (see table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Indicators of an opening

Stage of candidate selection
1. Shorter length of party membership
2. Higher probability of encouragement
3. Higher probability of mentoring
4. Lower competition in the candidate selection
5. More party support in the candidate selection
6. Less office experience
7. Less organizational affiliations
8. Lower probability of coming from politics-facilitating professions
9. Less localness in SMDs
Stage of standing for election
1. Higher electoral viability
2. More party support in election campaigning

Source: Author's own illustration.

⁸ BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, SPD and DIE LINKE use 50-percent quotas, whereas the CDU employs a soft one-third quota, provided that enough qualified contenders are available.

Opening at the stage of candidate selection

A minimum length of party membership is generally required before running for legislative office at the state or national level (Best et al. 2011; Edinger 2009: 194; Herzog 1975). Through this, party members prove reliable and loyal, form alliances of supporters and cultivate an intra-party visibility. However, for applicants from underrepresented groups that lack a longtime party involvement, such as IO-citizens who are rather newcomers in party politics (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009; Claro da Fonseca 2011; Diehl 2002; Hunger/Candan 2009; Müssig/Worbs 2012; Santel 2002; Wüst 2011), a longtime party membership can be a high hurdle in the candidate selection. By giving contenders of immigrant background the opportunity to take a faster track to professional politics, political parties can downsize the selectivity of the candidate selection, and, in doing so, facilitate their access to candidatures. To increase their numbers of IO-candidates, political parties may therefore choose to relax the longstanding probation period and nominate IO-candidates earlier in their party membership than native-born candidates.

In most cases, parliamentary candidates were emboldened by other party actors before screwing up their courage and competing for a nomination. By means of encouragement, party actors can unleash office-seeking ambitions of party members who would not strive for elected office in other ways (Allen 2013a; Broockman 2014b; Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox/Lawless 2004, 2010; Lawless/Fox 2005). Accordingly, party actors can approach potential IO-candidates and request them to make a bid for nomination. In the case of opening, IO-candidates are therefore expected to have higher chances of encouragement from other party actors than applies to native-born candidates. By encouragement, party actors can counteract a low supply of self-recruited applicants of immigrant background.

The advice given by a mentor can be helpful in the candidate selection. Mentors, such as well-established office holders, can give practical advice on the preparation of candidatures. For novices, mentors are particularly important as these compensate for their lack of political experience. As more party newcomers are to be found among party members of immigrant background (Hunger/Candan 2009; Müssig/Worbs 2012), their selection chances can be improved by providing them with party mentors. In the case of opening, mentor support is therefore expected to be of higher relevance to the selection of IO-candidates than to the nomination of native-born candidates.

The applicants' chances of getting through the candidate selection are also contingent on the level of competition for nomination. The level of intra-party competition is not independent of political parties, but by dissuading unwelcome applicants from running for election, party leaders can engage in negative recruitment (Niven 2006) to clear the field of contenders in

accordance with their preferences (Reiser 2013: 139). To increase the number of IO-candidates, political parties can put effort into decreasing the number of intra-party challengers that run against aspiring IO-candidates. By sending applicants of immigrant background into less contested races, political parties can improve their selection chances. In the case of opening, IO-candidates are therefore expected to face less competition for nomination than holds for native-born candidates.

When moving further in the framework of recruitment factors, the support of the own party organization was argued to affect the applicants' chances of nomination. While the backing of local party organizations is crucial in coming forward as a candidate in SMDs, the support of the state party leadership can tip the scale on party lists (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Steg 2016; Zeuner 1970). If political parties are keen on improving minority representation, they can provide IO-candidates with extraordinary support in the candidate selection. Consequently, an opening strategy would be disclosed if IO-candidates experience higher levels of party support in the nomination proceedings than holds for other candidates.

Aspiring candidates usually need to go through a long period of political apprenticeship by working their way up along the hierarchy of political offices. Above all, experience in party and local-level office forms an integral part of candidates' career trajectories (Borchert/Golsch 1995; Borchert/Zeiss 2003: 151; Herzog 1975). As political offices are time-consuming and require that party members are deeply anchored in their party organizations so to be entrusted with a political office, the requirement of prior office experience is a high hurdle that needs to be cleared in the candidate selection. To increase the number of IO-candidates, political parties can therefore lower the hurdle by nominating IO-candidates despite less office experience. By letting IO-candidates skip parts of the lengthy route through political positions, political parties can downsize the selectivity of their nomination processes and make them more permeable for contenders of this category. If IO-candidates are equipped with lower levels of office experience than native-born candidates and are less likely to have experience in party or local-level office, opening efforts are indicted.

For political parties, close relationships to collateral organizations in their social environment are eminently important to reaching out to untapped voter groups and stabilizing the electoral support of their traditional voter groups (Allern/Bale 2012; Poguntke 2005a, 2006). Being a member of civil society organizations can therefore prove to be an advantage in the candidate selection. Candidates with numerous ties with civil society organizations are hoped to serve as bridge-builders that help political parties extend their anchorage in the constituency. Given that IO-candidates need less organizational ties than native-born candidates to stand for election, a

preferential treatment in the candidate selection is indicated. For IO-candidates, it is then sufficient to be linked to some organizations, whereas native-born candidates need to show more organizational ties to be picked.

As no standardized pathway to professional politics is prescribed on which aspiring candidates are familiarized with the political institutions, structures and processes and acquire relevant political qualifications, politics-facilitating professions can serve as an environment in which politically relevant qualifications are acquired (Best/Cotta 2000b; Borchert 1999; Cairney 2007; Keating/Cairney 2006; Saalfeld 1997). As a large number of IO-citizens work in the industrial and service sector (Granato 2003; Granato/Kalter 2001), they are presumed to be underrepresented in politics-facilitating professions. If political parties put tremendous effort into achieving an equal presence of IO-candidates in the ranks of their nominees, they could reach out beyond their established recruitment pools and nominate lateral entrants from professions which are not politics-facilitating.

Since the candidate selection in SMDs is the exclusive dominion of district party organizations, localness is usually a prerequisite for district nominations (Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005). But if electoral districts are already spoken for local top dogs, such as well-established incumbents, aspirants from new and so far underrepresented groups, such as IO-citizens, hardly have any chance of being picked due to the strong priority rule for incumbents (Reiser 2014; Zeuner 1970). To that effect, they must wait until incumbents decide to refrain from re-running for election. One strategy for increasing the number of IO-candidates in SMDs is therefore to relax the golden rule of localness. External candidates who run for election in SMDs with which they have no political and biographical ties are usually referred to as parachutists (Pedersen et al. 2007). By parachuting IO-candidates into SMDs, political parties can ensure that they have such candidates nominated and this goes without facing any strong constraints concerning their localness.

Opening at the stage of standing for election

Running for election does not guarantee a seat in parliament. Rather, the candidates' likelihood of being elected depends on the party-determined viability of their nomination. To increase the numerical strength of IO-parliamentarians, political parties can attempt to nominate more IO-candidates as viable nominees – either in SMDs with a realistic chance of coming off as winner or on hopeful list positions. Assuming that IO-candidates run for election with higher electoral prospects than the vast number of native-born candidates, a preferential treatment is indicated.

Election campaigning is the last opportunity for parliamentary candidates to take influence on their electoral prospects before voters make the final decision as to whether candidates will make it into parliament or not (Farrell/Webb 2002). As elaborated earlier, financial and personnel campaign resources are key to vigorous election campaigns. If IO-candidates are equipped with larger campaign teams than native-born candidates and receive more party funding, opening efforts become apparent. By arming IO-candidates with more campaign resources, political parties can back IO-candidates on the campaign trail and improve their electoral prospects.

3.4.2.3 Closure – “*You Must Work Twice as Hard!*”

The closure model is originally rooted in the research on women representation (e.g. Anzia/Berry 2011; Black/Erickson 2000; Black/Erickson 2003; Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fulton 2012; Lawless/Pearson 2008; Milyo/Schosberg 2000). To provide an explanation for the persisting underrepresentation of women, it was claimed that female candidates must earn higher levels of political qualification than their male counterparts to stand for election. While Black and Erickson (2000; 2003) referred to this pattern as a compensation model, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013: 36) spoke of a “double standard” and Milyo and Schosberg (2000: 43) called it a “cream-of-the-crop-effect”. Since voters are biased against female nominees and view them as less capable of holding positions of political power, female candidates must outperform their male counterparts in political experience, skills and qualification to win a seat in parliament. Yet, not only voters were argued to be prejudiced against female candidates. Also party selectorates were claimed to shy away from nominating female candidates as they doubt whether female candidates can appeal to the majority of voters. To compensate for a real or imputed voter bias, female applicants must surpass male contenders to come out on top. This implies that only women of utmost political quality come forward as candidates.

Informed by these arguments, also the selection of IO-candidates can be regarded as hazardous from the parties’ point of view. First, research suggests that at least some segments of voters are prejudiced against IO-candidates (Bieber 2013a; Brouard/Tiberj 2011; Fisher et al. 2015; Stegmaier et al. 2013; Street 2014) and hesitate about balloting for IO-candidates. A variety of possible mechanisms can bring such a relationship into being. It can either result from negative attitudes towards multiculturalism (Terkildsen 1993) or from political views voters impute to IO-candidates, such as a more leftist political profile (McDermott 1998). Other voters might fear that IO-candidates only engage in identity politics on behalf of IO-citizens by advocating their interests and preferences but not those of the broader electorate. In the light of a persisting underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament, voters may also get the impression

that IO-citizens are incapable of holding positions of political power (Mansbridge 1999: 649), making them reluctant to vote for IO-candidates. Still others may not be able to imagine being represented by legislators of immigrant background. Even if no voter bias works against IO-candidates, party selectorates may impute a voter bias, making them hesitant about nominating IO-candidates (Norris/Lovenduski 1995: 107). If political parties are in doubt about voter reactions to IO-candidates, they are better off by adopting highly defensive selection strategies for mitigating electoral costs.

Second, political parties cannot foresee how their established representational groups will react if they launch out into strengthening their ties with IO-voters by nominating more group representatives for election. If political parties make attempts to establish closer ties with new representational groups, such as IO-citizens, their established groups are under stress. In the candidate selection, a contest for nomination between different representational groups takes place which is “nothing less than control of the core of what the party stands for and does” (Ranney 1981: 103). Which representatives are selected reflects in far-reaching ways to which social groups priority is given (Katz 2001). For the established representational groups, newly emerging groups are therefore first and foremost competitors in the struggle for representation and may pose a danger to the achievement of their representational claims (Carnes 2015).

Faced with the perils sketched above, political parties can opt for a risk-averse behavior and employ highly defensive selection strategies towards IO-candidates, reflected in the closure model. Even if applicants of immigrant background have equal political qualifications as their native-born counterparts, party selectorates have reservations when it comes to their nomination. Due to potential objections raised by their established representational groups and a real or imputed voter bias, political parties favor native-born candidates over IO-candidates under otherwise equal merits. To come forward as candidates, contenders of immigrant background therefore need to outperform native-born candidates in their political qualifications and they receive less party support in the candidate selection. The parties’ defensiveness towards aspiring IO-candidates is reflected in a stricter screening of the IO-candidates’ political qualifications (Soininen 2011: 153). In a way, a double standard exists, which is why IO-candidates must work twice as hard to run for election. By a stricter screening, the perceived electoral risk of nominating IO-candidates who have a less predictable voter appeal is mitigated. Moreover, a defensive selection behavior can appease the parties’ established representational groups by demonstrating that they have priority in the candidate selection. Like the opening model, the closure model places emphasis on an alternative selection behavior towards IO-candidates. The standard selection criteria define the general meritocratic rules of the game but these rules are tightened up for IO-candidates. They must surpass these standards and outshine their native-

born counterparts by having more of the political qualifications required to run for election and by receiving less party support in the candidate selection. According to the closure model, those IO-candidates that survive the process of elimination constitute a highly selective sample of the most qualified contenders who could come out on top in the candidate selection. After introducing the key assumptions of the closure model, indicators are needed that are suggestive of a closure vis-à-vis IO-candidates. By building upon the framework established in chapter 3.3, I will therefore introduce indicators which unveil a closure (see table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Indicators of a closure

Stage of candidate selection
1. Longer length party membership
2. Lower probability of encouragement
3. Lower probability of mentoring
4. Higher competition in the candidate selection
5. Less party support in the candidate selection
6. More office experience
7. More organizational affiliations
8. Higher probability of coming from politics-facilitating professions
9. Higher localness in SMDs
Stage of standing for election
1. Lower electoral viability
2. Less party support in election campaigning

Source: Author's own illustration.

Closure at the stage of candidate selection

A minimum length of party membership is required to compete for legislative office at the state or national level (Best et al. 2011; Edinger 2009: 194; Herzog 1975). By a longstanding party engagement, individuals can demonstrate to be loyal to the own party organization and it helps form alliances of supporters, both of which are conducive to being nominated as a parliamentary candidate. On the assumption that political parties make use of stricter screening tests when being faced with aspiring IO-candidates, these must outperform native-born candidates before getting the opportunity to run for election. To prove their political suitability, IO-candidates must outdo their native-born counterparts as regards their length of party membership.

By dint of encouragement, political parties can spark office-seeking ambitions of party members that would not strive for legislative office by themselves (Allen 2013a; Broockman 2014b; Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox/Lawless 2004, 2010; Lawless/Fox 2005). If political parties behave highly defensively towards aspiring IO-candidates, these are less likely than native-born candidates to receive suggestions about running for office. By avoiding asking party members of immigrant background to make a bid for office, the likelihood that party members

of this background aspire to a nomination is reduced. Moreover, encouragement mostly works within existing party networks, which can create barriers to party newcomers, such as IO-citizens, that are not part of these networks yet (Bjarnegård 2015; Niven 2006; Soininen 2011). In the case of closure, IO-candidates are therefore more likely than native-born candidates to be self-recruiters.

Being endorsed by a mentor who can draw on political experience and name recognition within a party organization is a valuable resource in the candidate selection. Mentors can recommend their mentees to the nominating body, help gain access to relevant networks, and give advice on the preparation of their candidacy. In the face of closure, though, IO-candidates are less likely than native-born candidates to be backed by a mentor. As political parties adopt highly defensive selection strategies, party authorities and other office holders that could act as mentors shy away from sponsorship.

Fierce competition for nomination impairs the applicants' chances of being selected (Reiser 2013; Zeuner 1970). Assuming that IO-candidates face higher levels of competition in the selection proceedings than native-born candidates and must battle with more challengers, a closure becomes apparent. In the literature on women recruitment, for example, it was found that female candidates face more opponents in the candidate selection than male candidates due to a higher mobilization against them (Lawless/Pearson 2008; Sanbonmatsu 2006b). Likewise, the nomination of IO-applicants can be thwarted by mobilizing more challengers for races in which applicants of immigrant background aspire to run for office.

The applicants' chances of coming forward as candidates also depend on the intensity of party support. While the support of local party organizations can provide a critical boost in the contenders' chances of being nominated in SMDs, the support of state party leaderships can tip the balance if party list slots are allocated (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). Hesitant attitudes of political parties towards the nomination of IO-candidates are revealed if IO-candidates receive significantly less party support in the candidate selection than native-born candidates. As political parties are reluctant to send IO-candidates in the running for office since their voter appeal is more uncertain, IO-candidates get less party support but must win through by themselves.

The requirement of having worked one's way through lower-level political positions before competing for a professional legislative office at the state or national level serves party gatekeepers to identify diligent and experienced partisans – to this, experience in local-level and party office is most pivotal (Borchert 1999; Borchert/Golsch 1995; Burmeister 1993: 68, 79; Edinger 2009; Golsch 1998; Herzog 1975; Saalfeld 1997). Given that political parties apply stricter screening tests to IO-candidates, they must have more experience in previous office than

native-born candidates. Only those with extraordinary office experience are deemed qualified enough to come forward as candidates. Consequently, evidence on a closure is marshaled if IO-candidates are characterized by higher levels of political office experience than native-born candidates and are more likely to have experience in party or local-level office.

Previous research highlighted the importance that linkages with civil society organizations have for parties' endeavors to mobilize electoral support (Heaney 2010; Lawson 1980; Panebianco 1988: 209; Poguntke 2000; 2005a: 45; 2005b; Winter 2013; Zeuner 1970). This is the reason why aspiring candidates tied to social organizations have higher chances of being selected than aspirants that lack organizational ties. If IO-candidates must undergo a stricter screening, the requirements of organizational linkages can be expected to be elevated for IO-candidates. By doing so, the perceived electoral risk of nominating IO-candidates with a less predictable voter appeal is reduced since they must be backed by more organizational support networks.

Parliamentary candidates come in large numbers from professions which are regarded as politics-facilitating (Allen 2013b; Cairney 2007; Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003; Herzog 1975; Kintz 2014; Saalfeld 1997). For the reason that no standardized apprenticeship for professional politician exists (Borchert/Stolz 2003), politics-facilitating professions can help acquire politically relevant skills and qualifications, provide valuable insights into the political working processes and help make relevant contacts. Assuming that IO-candidates are subjects of bias to the extent that they need more political experience than their native-born counterparts to be deemed qualified enough to stand for election, as put forward in the closure model, this would lead to higher numbers of IO-candidates coming from politics-facilitating professions that provide these skills.

To compete for office in SMDs, having firm local roots in the electoral district is crucial. Local ties are a virtue in the local candidate selection, which is entirely in the hands of district party organizations (Burmeister 1993: 64; Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). External candidates will have a hard time convincing local party selectorates of their political aptitude for entering the nominal race, as they are entirely unknown to the local party selectorate, the local party leadership, the rank-and-file party members and the local constituency. Compared to local heroes, external candidates are less likely to harvest personal votes. They cannot draw upon personal linkages with the local constituency and local name recognition (Arzheimer/Evans 2014; Tavits 2010; Vivyan/Wagner 2015). If political parties perceive IO-candidates as a larger electoral venture than native-born candidates, only contenders with firm local roots that can lure local voters are deemed suitable for nomination. Hence, a closure is indicated if IO-candidates must surpass their native-born

counterparts in local ties. When adopting highly defensive selection strategies, political parties have no reason to reach out and nominate external IO-candidates.

Closure at the stage of standing for election

Political parties predetermine to a great extent the candidates' electoral fates. On the condition that IO-candidates are more likely than native-born candidates to run for election as sacrificial lambs in hopeless races, a closure of the candidate selection becomes evident. Political parties nominate IO-candidates for election but do not grant them equal electoral chances as native-born candidates but rather use them for filling up unwanted seats. In doing so, they avoid the electoral risk associated with the nomination of IO-candidates because these only compete in electoral races which are completely in vain.

Election campaigning is the last opportunity for parliamentary candidates to attract electoral support before voters go to the polls (Farrell/Webb 2002). Financial resources and personal campaign teams are prerequisites for vigorous election campaigns. On the assumption that political parties pursue highly defensive recruitment strategies towards IO-candidates, they hesitate about providing IO-candidates with the same financial and personnel campaign support as they allocate to native-born candidates. Supposing that more IO-candidates are deprived of any electoral chance of winning, as put forward above, political parties also have fewer incentives to provide campaign support for them.

4 Differences in the Parties' Selection Behavior towards Immigrant-Origin Candidates

Beyond the question of how political parties behave towards IO-candidates in their candidate selection proceedings, the question of which contextual settings impact their selection behavior is raised. To be sure, selection processes do not operate in a vacuum but are embedded in contextual settings that affect the selection outcomes. Political parties are rational actors which are not blind to electoral incentive structures but calibrate their selection strategies to the aim of vote maximization. To arrive at a more fine-grained picture of the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, I incorporate context factors that are believed to shape parties' selection behavior. Against the backdrop of the research on minority representation, differences across political parties (4.1), the mode of candidacy (4.2), the type of party selectorate (4.3), the district magnitude of MMDs (4.4), the ethnic concentration in SMDs (4.5), the social deprivation in SMDs (4.6) and anti-immigrant sentiments prevailing in SMDs (4.7) are expected.

4.1 Differences across Political Parties

In the literature on minority representation, center-left parties were argued to be more hospitable to IO-candidates than party organizations on the right of the political spectrum (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Kittilson/Tate 2005; Wüst 2011). Proceeding from this proposition, center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are assumed to be more likely to employ opening strategies for nominating IO-candidates, while political parties placed further on the right of the political spectrum, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP, are expected to adopt neutral or even highly defensive selection strategies.

As a first reason, center-left parties espouse social equality, justice and equal access to institutions and resources for marginalized groups, such as IO-citizens, women and sexual minorities (Caul 1999; Immerzeel et al. 2016; Kittilson/Tate 2004; Matland/Studlar 1996; Reynolds 1999), making an opening of the candidate selection proceedings for IO-candidates more likely as it conforms to their party ideology. Conversely, political parties that are placed on the right of the political spectrum take more critical attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism since they fear for the national cultural identity. They tend to consider immigration as a hazard to the economic well-being of the nation – particularly if low-status immigration is concerned. Indeed, previous studies presented evidence that center-left parties are more likely to advocate the concerns of IO-citizens in parliament (Aydemir/Vliegenthart 2016; Ohlert 2015;

Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld/Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014b) and have larger numbers of IO-parliamentarians (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Wüst 2011, 2014a).

Second, except for repatriates, IO-voters tend to ballot for center-left parties (Bird et al. 2011; Kroh/Tucci 2009; Wüst 2002, 2007). On the one hand, this results from their liberal stances on immigration and multiculturalism (for more details see Ohlert 2015; Tietze 2008). On the other, large numbers of IO-citizens stem from the labor migrant context, are of lower socio-economic status, and, therefore, feel affiliated to center-left parties, which put more emphasis on social redistribution and the elimination of social inequality. Consequently, center-left parties suffer more electoral losses if failing to appeal to IO-citizens by providing for their descriptive representation. As opposed to this, political parties that are placed on the right of the political spectrum are only hit marginally if missing IO-candidates out on their candidate tableaux. In addition, voters of the latter are more opposed to immigrants and multiculturalism. Therefore, they may penalize a stronger inclusion of IO-candidates in the ballot, either by voting for another political party or by abstaining from voting. Consequently, the electoral hazards of immigrant mobilization are higher for political parties on the right of the political spectrum than holds for center-left parties (Claro da Fonseca 2011: 112; Rensmann 2014). Experimental studies found moderate negative effects of foreign sounding names on the likelihood of being elected (Bieber 2013a; Street 2014) and these effects were more pronounced among conservative voters (Street 2014). As political parties placed more on the right of the political spectrum face higher electoral risks when nominating IO-candidates, they are less likely to open their candidate selection but rather embark on defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure. By contrast, center-left parties are more inclined to open up their selection processes to IO-candidates as the risk of suffering electoral losses is low. Their traditional voter groups predominantly take neutral or positive stances on multiculturalism. Conversely, they would take the risk of forfeiting the electoral support of IO-voters when failing to accommodate IO-candidates on their candidate tableaux, because this would seriously damage their image of being open to multiculturalism and IO-citizens.

4.2 Differences across the Mode of Candidacy

Next, I come to a bundle of conditioning factors that are hypothesized to affect the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates independently of their party ideology. In the German Bundestag election and most state elections, mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral systems are employed. The MMP system combines a PR electoral tier with closed party lists in MMDs with a nominal electoral tier with plurality rule in SMDs (Shugart/Wattenberg 2003b).

Consequently, parliamentary candidates can run for election in SMDs, on party lists, or on both electoral tiers (Kaiser 2002; Manow 2016; Massicotte 2011; Massicotte/Blais 1999; Saalfeld 2005; Shugart/Wattenberg 2003a). In the German Bundestag election, for example, half of the regular 598 MPs are elected in SMDs by personal vote. In the 299 SMDs, each voter can cast one nominal vote for a constituency representative. The winner is determined by a first-past-the-post rule, which means that the candidate with most nominal votes comes off as winner. The party's overall seat share, however, depends on the party vote share in the 16 MMDs, formed by the German states. Voters therefore cast a second ballot for closed state party lists which determines the party's overall seat share by the rule of proportionality.⁹ Once the total number of seats was allocated to each political party in each of the states, the SMD seats are subtracted. The remaining seats are filled by the list candidates in the order of their party-determined ballot positions. It is important to mention that in the Bavarian state election, one of the cases I will place focus on in the following, a mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system with open party lists is used (Shugart/Wattenberg 2003a). In this electoral system, the vote share of both electoral tiers is added up to obtain a party's total seat share (Leunig 2012; Massicotte 2003; Trefs 2008).

As widely acknowledged, the electoral ballot structure is key to the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities and women (e.g. Bernauer et al. 2015; Canon 1999; Darcy et al. 1994; Duverger 1955; Engstrom 1987; Fortin-Rittberger/Eder 2013; Fortin-Rittberger/Rittberger 2014; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Kostadinova 2007; Lijphart 1994, 2004; Matland 1993, 1998b, 2006; Matland/Studlar 1996; Matland/Taylor 1997; Moser 2001, 2008; Norris 1997a, 2004, 2006; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule 1981, 1987, 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Rule/Norris 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Salmond 2006; Togeby 2008). It was stated that political parties avoid fielding candidates from marginalized groups in SMDs but tend to nominate candidates who resemble the incumbent native-born legislator (Taagepera 1994). Since political parties can only nominate one candidate in each SMD, they have one single shot at maximizing votes, turning the candidate selection in SMDs into zero-sum games. Political parties thus attempt to select candidates who have the broadest voter appeal and are least likely to run into opposition. In other words, SMDs "[...] create[s] an incentive for party bosses to stand lowest common-denominator candidates in geographical districts; these rarely turn out to be women or minorities" (Reynolds 1999: 555). In addition, a backlash from voters that have reservations about IO-candidates is a likely scenario in SMDs. Candidates are highly visible to

⁹ The proportionality between the parties' vote and seat share is limited by two factors: First, only those political parties are considered in the seat distribution which won 5 percent of all list votes nationwide or three SMDs. Second, if a party wins more SMDs in one state than seats, overhang mandates emerge. To compensate for a distortion, adjustment mandates were introduced in 2013 (for details see Behnke 2012, 2014).

voters due to a candidate-centered ballot structure. Voters that are critical of IO-candidates and cannot imagine being represented by a legislator of immigrant background cannot switch to alternative candidates of the same party, as only one candidate of each political party is up for election. They can only decide to abstain from voting or to support a competing political party.

On party lists, by contrast, political parties can nominate more than one candidate, opening up opportunities for ticket-balancing (Matland 1998a; Norris 2004; Rule 1987). By nominating candidates that represent different socio-structural or political-cultural voter groups, political parties attempt to make a collective voter appeal and woo a preferably wide range of voter segments in order to maximize votes (Hennings/Urbatsch 2015; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Valdini 2012). Moreover, a contest for representation between the different intra-party groups is set off in the candidate selection (Gallagher 1988; Katz 2001). By placing the representatives of different intra-party groups on party lists, political parties try to retain their continuing support and to perpetuate the party unity (Hennl/Kaiser 2008b: 322; Valdini 2012: 741). Notwithstanding IO-candidates on party lists, voters with critical stances on IO-candidates probably ballot for their preferred political party as list candidates compete as teams under the party label, and, therefore, are less visible to voters than holds true for SMD candidates. Hence, IO-candidates are believed to be a benefit to the diversification of party lists without deterring immigration-critical voters.

The electoral incentives that result from the mode of candidacy are expected to flow into the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, as party gatekeepers try to anticipate prospective electoral effects. In the light of the arguments laid down above, political parties are expected to be more inclined to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates when party list slots are allocated. Contrarily, SMD nominations are expected to induce more defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure. Which of the selection strategies applies to dual nominations is an empirically open question for which no specific expectations are put forward. On the one hand, the selection logic of SMDs might prevail as nominations in SMDs precede those on party lists (Roberts 1988: 100). On the other hand, however, nominations in SMDs are a precondition for receiving viable lists slots (Reiser 2014: 59; Zeuner 1970). To safeguard the own district candidates on party lists, party selectorates in SMDs therefore have strong incentives to anticipate the set of selection criteria determining the compilation of party lists (Borchert/Reiser 2010; Reiser 2013: 135-136; Zeuner 1970). In the latter case, the selection logic of party list would triumph.

4.3 Differences across the Type of Party Selectorate

As party selectorates act as the central gatekeepers which decide who passes the door of candidate selection and who bows out, they are expected to affect the selection strategies pursued towards IO-candidates. Among other things, such as centralization or voting procedure, party selectorates differ along the dimension of inclusiveness (Atmor et al. 2011; Bille 2001; Hazan/Rahat 2006b, 2010; Rahat 2009; Rahat/Hazan 2001). In their most inclusive form, party selectorates comprise the entire electorate, followed by party member assemblies, delegate assemblies and in their most exclusive form, party selectorates are only composed of party leaders. Following Hazan und Rahat (2006b: 372) and Rahat et al. (Rahat et al. 2008: 666-667), inclusive party selectorates cause a higher social distortion of candidate pools, while exclusive party selectorates generate more representative candidate tableaux (for effects on policy congruence see Mikulska/Scarrow 2010; Spies/Kaiser 2014). Due to their large size, inclusive party selectorates encounter more difficulties in compiling balanced candidate sets but tend to advantage the dominant social groups:

Smaller selectorates are able to balance the composition of the candidate list (or candidacies in single-member districts) better than larger selectorates. In the latter, candidates from the dominant group can win most of the safe positions [...]. Women minorities and candidates from territorial and other social peripheries will find it more difficult (Hazan/Rahat 2006b: 372).

In Germany, either party member or delegate assemblies are responsible for the candidate selection (Kaack 1969b; Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). At party member assemblies, the party membership has an immediate say in the candidate selection, whereas mid-level party elites are involved in delegate assemblies. In SMDs, party member assemblies are composed of all eligible party members formally belonging to an electoral district, while party member assemblies at the state level are formed by all eligible party members of a state. Delegates, on the contrary, are elected by the party members of the district party organizations and either select the SMD candidates or are sent to the nominating convention at the state level to approve the state party lists. Building upon Hazan and Rahat's argument (2006b: 372; 2010: 112), party delegates that constitute a more exclusive selection context should be more inclined to open up the candidate selection to IO-candidates to generate balanced candidate tableaux, while party member assemblies are assumed to adopt more defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or closure.

First, exclusive party selectorates, such as delegate assemblies, might act more strategically in the candidate selection than inclusive party member assemblies and base their judgement more on what is in the party's collective interest (Hazan/Rahat 2006b; Rahat et al. 2008: 666-667). Since delegates were authorized to decide upon the candidate selection, they might take their responsibility more seriously to nominate candidates through whom representational ties

with hitherto underrepresented voter groups are forged, helpful in tapping new electoral support groups and broadening the party's voter appeal. The participants of party member assemblies, by contrast, are involved in the candidate selection due to their status as party members. They are more strongly led by their personal policy preferences and sympathy for specific contenders, and less prone to strategic considerations (Mikulska/Scarrow 2010: 315). For them, selecting personable candidates with shared policy positions outweighs aspects of voter appeal.

Second, party members usually come to the nominating conventions without fixed candidate preferences. They make their choices in a more spontaneous and fickle manner on the basis of the applicants' performance and application speeches (Reiser 2011: 247-248). In the wake of a more spontaneous decision-making, strategic considerations of how to establish electoral ties with so far underrepresented voter groups to broaden a party' voter appeal might play a minor role in those nomination proceedings that are in the hands of party member assemblies. Conversely, delegates tend to participate in nominating conventions with a preconceived opinion on their preferred candidates. As they do not come to a decision spontaneously but rather give thought to it in advance and are informed about the contenders competing for nomination, strategic considerations of how to strengthen party ties with underrepresented voter groups, such as IO-citizens, are more likely to enter their decisions.

Third, due to their smaller size, delegate assemblies might find it easier to open up the candidate selection to IO-candidates, as negotiation is more straightforward than at large party member assemblies at which manifold unstructured interests meet and come into conflict (Mikulska/Scarrow 2010: 316). The candidate selection is the chief battleground on which various intra-party groups try to put forward their group-related claims for representation. In the case of party member assemblies, the compilation of balanced candidate tableaux is thwarted as numerous persons that advocate very disparate representational claims participate in the candidate selection. If numerous representational claims are involved in the nomination process, it becomes unlikely that representatives of poorly represented groups are selected as other representational groups come in larger numbers. More exclusive selection bodies, such as delegate assemblies, might therefore offer higher selection chances for contenders from underrepresented groups.

4.4 Differences across the District Magnitude of Multi-Member Districts

As compared to SMDs, PR electoral systems were argued to improve the selection chances of IO-candidates by creating incentives for ticket-balancing. The argument, however, suffers from a neglect of intervening factors, such as the district magnitude of MMDs that determines the

proportionality of the electoral system, and, hereby, impacts the chances of representation given to underrepresented groups, such as women or ethnic minorities (e.g. Darcy et al. 1994; Engstrom 1987; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Lijphart 1994; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Norris 2004; Rae 1967; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Salmond 2006; Studlar/Welch 1991; Taagepera 1994; Welch/Studlar 1990). The district magnitude refers to “the number of seats assigned to the district” (Rae 1967: 19-20). It thus determines the maximum number of legislators that can be elected from a certain electoral district into parliament. It also affects the number of candidates running on party lists (Carey/Shugart 1995). At a high district magnitude, political parties were claimed to be more inclined to place candidates from marginalized groups on their party lists than in institutional settings with a low district magnitude. With this well-established argument in mind, political parties are expected to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if MMDs move towards a higher district magnitude, while a more defensive selection behavior in terms of neutrality or even closure is expected at a low district magnitude.

As a first reason, the district magnitude of MMDs determines the extent to which political parties can settle different group-related representation interests on their party lists. When the number of party list slots grows larger, it becomes easier to pursue ticket-balancing by nominating a diverse array of candidates that can appeal to a broad voter spectrum. Contrarily, in MMDs with a limited number of seats to be elected, political parties must set priorities which group-related representation interests are to be considered on party lists. The higher the district magnitude of MMDs, the easier it becomes to open up the candidate selection to IO-candidates, as more room for ticket-balancing and the consideration of so far underrepresented groups is given.

Second, the opportunity costs political parties must bear when placing more IO-candidates on party lists are lower in MMDs of a high district magnitude. At a low district magnitude, an opening strategy for increasing the number of IO-candidates implies that other group representatives must be ousted as the number of list slots is constrained. In such cases, party selectorates might give priority to the representation of their traditional voter groups instead of establishing ties with new voter groups, such as IO-citizens. In MMDs of a high district magnitude, by contrast, political parties can open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates without being forced to neglect their traditional voter groups as enough ballot positions are available.

4.5 Differences across the Level of Ethnic Concentration in Single-Member Districts

PR electoral systems were argued to be conducive to minority representation, whereas SMD races were hypothesized to be to the detriment of underrepresented groups, such as IO-citizens

and women (e.g. Norris 2004; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). However, electoral rules do not affect minority representation independently of their demographic context. To be sure, district demographics shape local voter demands. Party selectorates try to anticipate the electoral consequences of nominating IO-candidates for election in certain demographic settings (Dancygier 2014; Grofman/Handley 1989; Norris 1997b; Valdini 2012). If IO-citizens are densely concentrated in SMDs, party selectorates have strong electoral incentives to nominate IO-candidates so as to mobilize their electoral support (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Togeby 2005; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). Against the conventional wisdom, political parties are therefore expected to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if electoral districts are characterized by a large IO-population. The argument does not hold for MMDs as these consist of larger regional entities. Their demographic composition is more uneven and heterogeneous. Moreover, their large size abrogates the electoral leverage of geographically concentrated groups (Dancygier 2014; Engstrom/McDonald 1981; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008).

Following the conventional wisdom, political parties avoid fielding IO-candidates in SMDs as a limited voter appeal is attributed to them. They rather tend to pick candidates belonging to the majority group (Rule 1987; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). Yet, in places where IO-voters are densely concentrated, the concerns of political parties concerning the electoral appeal of IO-candidates are dispelled (Dancygier 2013; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008). Given a high spatial agglomeration of IO-citizens in SMDs, political parties risk substantial electoral losses when ignoring contenders of immigrant background in the candidate selection and leaving the voter potential of IO-citizens to competing political parties. Consequently, party selectorates have strong electoral incentives to place IO-candidates in SMDs with a high concentration of IO-citizens. In addition, the contact hypothesis suggests that individuals living in areas in which IO-citizens are densely concentrated are more tolerant towards IO-citizens due to inter-ethnic contacts and reduced inter-group prejudices (Allport 1954; Forbes 1997; Hopkins 2010; Jackman/Crane 1986; Kaufmann 2014; Kaufmann/Harris 2015; Newman 2013; Oliver/Mendelberg 2000; Oliver/Wong 2003; Pettigrew/Tropp 2006; Sigelman et al. 1996; Welch/Sigelman 2000).¹⁰ Moreover, individuals adopting hostile stances on immigrants either leave areas in which IO-citizens are in the majority or refuse to move into such areas. As reservations about IO-candidates are less pronounced

¹⁰ For an overview of the relationship between cultural diversity and individual attitudes towards immigrants see Meuleman et al. (2009) and Semyonov et al. (2006). The empirical findings are mixed. Apart from positive effects, also negative effects (e.g. Semyonov et al. 2004; Sides/Citrin 2007) or no effects (Quillian 1995; Sides/Citrin 2007) are found.

in SMDs with a large IO-population, political parties are more inclined to nominate IO-candidates.

For the English municipality council elections from 2002 to 2010, Dancygier (2014) showed that demographics play a role in the candidate selection. Muslim candidates were more likely to run for election in SMDs if the Muslims population was densely concentrated in the ward. The same relationship was disclosed by Trounstine and Valdini (2008) for the US city councils (see also Marschall et al. 2010). SMDs were found to increase the share of Blacks and Latinos in city councils but only on the condition that they were spatially concentrated in the local constituency.

Moreover, it is easier for IO-citizens to make their claims for an equal representation heard if they are spatially concentrated. If they are in the minority, their representational claims will be drowned out by stronger social groups that are present in the electoral district. Those groups which are most engaged with voicing their representational claims are also most successful in having their group representatives nominated. IO-citizens have a greater electoral leverage if they are spatially concentrated. They can join forces in political parties and other social organizations to generate the electoral clout necessary for demanding representational parity.

In the light of the previous reasoning, I expect an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates to be positively associated with the size of the IO-population in SMDs. By contrast, if the share of IO-citizens in SMDs is low, political parties are expected to pursue more defensive strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure, as they prospect for candidates with a broader electoral profile.

4.6 Differences across the Level of Social Deprivation in Single-Member Districts

When being faced with the choice of whether to nominate IO-candidates in SMDs, political parties try to anticipate the most likely voter reactions. In socially deprived SMDs, more voters feel animosities against immigrants (Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2014). The nomination of IO-candidates in socially deprived SMDs can therefore turn into an electoral drawback. Given a potential backlash against IO-candidates, political parties are expected to close their candidate selection to IO-candidates if SMDs are socially deprived, whereas a closure is rather unlikely in well-off SMDs.

Scholars have intensely debated the sources of anti-immigrant sentiments, most notably the impact of perceived economic and cultural threats. When bringing the economic dimension into focus, the opposition to immigrants arises from the fact that immigrants are regarded as con-

tenders in the competition for scarce material resources and as a threat to the own socio-economic status (Borjas 1999; Brader et al. 2008; Branton/Jones 2005; Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2013, 2014; Dancygier/Laitin 2014; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2010; Helbling/Kriesi 2014; Malhotra et al. 2013; Mayda 2006; O'Neil/Tienda 2010; O'Rourke/Sinnott 2006; Quillian 1995; Scheve/Slaughter 2001; Semyonov et al. 2006; Sides/Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). Social groups gain and lose differently from the inflow of immigrants, and, therefore, feel threatened to varying degrees. The burden of immigration in the distribution of social services and resources from the welfare state and in the competition for jobs and wages on the labor market falls more heavily on individuals that are highly dependent on these – that is to say, on economically deprived individuals, such as unemployed or low-wage earners (Schmidt-Catran/Spies 2016). The perceived threat emanating from immigrants intensifies with an increasing competition for welfare resources and jobs that is more pronounced among individuals suffering from economic hardship. For this reason, the view on immigrants taking away jobs from the native population and exploiting social services provided by the state are particularly widespread in economically deprived areas (Hainmueller/Hiscox 2007).

As argued above, the nomination of IO-candidates is an information shortcut political parties employ to strengthen their electoral ties with IO-voters, signal openness to cultural diversity, acknowledge the cultural diversity of the population that is to be represented and mobilize the electoral support of IO-voters (Zingher/Farrer 2016). In economically deprived SMDs, more voters are opposed to immigration and multiculturalism as they fear a shift of social resources and welfare services to the IO-population and worry that their own needs will get a raw deal (Dancygier 2013). The fear that IO-legislators will only advocate the concerns of the IO-population in the distribution of social resources, social services and jobs and will turn their back on the needs of the population at large may let voters shy away from supporting IO-candidates. In places of economic deprivation, the nomination of IO-candidates may therefore result in electoral losses. The problem not only concerns political parties on the right of the political spectrum whose voters are more critical of immigrants but center-left political parties face similar challenges (Alonso/Claro da Fonseca 2011; Bale et al. 2010; Dancygier 2013; Schmidtke 2016). In economically deprived SMDs, left-wing parties that represent low-wage earners must make the decision about whether to nominate IO-candidates to woo IO-voters and demonstrate their openness to cultural diversity or to avoid selecting IO-candidates so as to maintain the electoral support of low-wage earners who often find themselves in fierce competition for social services provided by the state (Dancygier 2013).

Turning to the cultural dimension of the relationship, socially deprived SMDs are characterized by lower educational attainment. Individuals of low education tend to be more prejudiced against immigrants than those of high education. They are more likely to consider immigrants to be threats to the national cultural identity with its inherent values, traditions and social cohesion, whereas individuals of high education generally adopt more tolerant stances (e.g. Bobo/Licari 1989; Coenders/Scheepers 2003; Fuchs et al. 1993; Hagendoorn/Nekuee 1999; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014; Sniderman et al. 2004). As found by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007: 436), individuals equipped with more educational resources are also more likely to be in favor of cultural diversity: "More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole." Cultural and religious prejudices and anti-immigrant sentiments in which immigrants are blamed for social and political conflicts often result from simplifications and generalizations, and, therefore, are more pronounced among individuals who lack educational resources (Coenders/Scheepers 2003). With increasing education, the understanding of the complexities of social reality is improved, which thwarts oversimplifications and generalizations, such as rigid anti-immigrant sentiments. Based on the previous reasoning, political parties are expected to close their candidate selection to IO-candidates if SMDs are socially deprived, whereas a closure is presumed to be unlikely in high-status settings.

4.7 Difference across Anti-Immigrant Sentiments in Single-Member Districts

When deciding whether to nominate IO-candidates in SMDs, political parties take account of anti-immigrant sentiments in the local constituency. If local constituents adopt positive attitudes towards multiculturalism, party selectorates are assumed to be more eager to open up the candidate selection to IO-candidates than applies to SMDs in which anti-immigrant sentiments are strongly pronounced. Against the backdrop of the literature, two indicators are most suggestive of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs: the electoral strength of far-right political parties and the level of urbanity.

The electoral strength of far-right political parties is a striking indicator of the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs. Their major selling point is the opposition to immigration and multiculturalism and a strong insistence on the national cultural identity (Mudde 2007). If far-right political parties made successful inroads into the electoral competition in SMDs by winning substantial percentages of votes, it is indicated that anti-immigrant sentiments prevail

in the local constituency. When being faced with far-right political parties, the moderate political parties can either maintain their positions on multiculturalism to distance themselves from the far right or move closer to mobilize far-right voters (Akkermann 2015; Bale 2003, 2008; Bale et al. 2010). The local presence of far-right parties might prompt the moderate political parties not to nominate IO-candidates in SMDs as they fear to lose votes to the extreme-right (Alonso/Claro da Fonseca 2011; Koopmans/Statham 1999). The moderate political parties are therefore expected to close their candidate selection to IO-candidates if far-right political parties fare well.

Furthermore, the local level of urbanity is associated with critical stances on cultural diversity. In rural settings, individuals have less contact with IO-citizens because multiculturalism is more widespread in urban regions. In urban areas, individuals are therefore more likely to have personal experience with cultural diversity (Schönwälder 2013; Schönwälder/Söhn 2009; Schönwälder/Söhn 2007). According to the contact hypothesis, intergroup contacts can reduce mutual cultural and religious prejudices (Allport 1954). By increasing knowledge about each other, empathy and reduced anxieties, inter-group contacts can diminish mutual prejudices (Kaufmann/Harris 2015; Pettigrew/Tropp 2006). A high exposure to inter-ethnic contacts was therefore found to be associated with positive attitudes towards ethnic and racial minorities (Forbes 1997; Jackman/Crane 1986; O'Neil/Tienda 2010; Sigelman et al. 1996; Welch/Sigelman 2000), even though the causal direction of the relationship remained undetermined. Furthermore, individuals in rural settings are more likely to harbor a cultural conservatism, inducing them to hold more critical attitudes towards multiculturalism. By contrast, urban regions were argued to be characterized by higher levels of modernization, shifting cultural attitudes from traditional materialist values to more liberal post-materialist values, evident in freedom of expression, political participation, individualism, environmental protection, gender equality and a higher tolerance towards immigrants and homosexuals (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart/Baker 2000; Inglehart/Welzel 2005, 2009; Inglehart 1971, 1977, 2008; Norris/Inglehart 2001). Whereas postmaterialists adhere to traditional societal norms and values, postmaterialists are less bound to conservative values, reflected in a higher level of tolerance towards all forms of individualism. The lifestyle of IO-citizens, including religious, linguistic and cultural practices that deviate from those present in the majority population, therefore has a higher chance of being accepted in urban regions.

5 Research Design

In the previous chapters, I elaborated on the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates by bringing together the literature on legislative recruitment and minority representation. The logical follow-up question is how to measure selection behavior in empirical research. Armed with a framework for the further analysis, this chapter therefore dwells on the question of how to measure the selection behavior of political parties. A first section discusses why to focus on Germany (chapter 5.1). Next, the empirical approach taken in the following analysis is outlined (chapter 5.2), followed by a detailed description of the operationalization (chapter 5.3).

5.1 Why Study Germany?

One notorious difficulty that plagues researchers concerned with minority representation is a small number of observations (Bloemraad 2013). Given its federal structure, the German political system provides fertile ground for overcoming the small-N problem. By pooling candidate data collected at the national and state level, a sample size of IO-candidates can be obtained which allows to investigate how political parties behave towards IO-candidates in their candidate selection.

Although legislators can change from the state to the national level and vice versa, their career trajectories do not move in a random direction. In the wake of Schlesinger's (1966) work on US-Congressmen, scholars treated state legislative careers as stepping stones towards the national level. In the unidirectional career model, legislators were envisioned climbing up a territorial hierarchy of power and prestige from the local via the state to the national level (Francis/Kenny 2000). The individuals' impetus towards higher elected office was explained by a greater sphere of political power, more prestige, financial and material incentives (Copeland/Opheim 2011: 145; Francis/Kenny 2000).

Yet, the unilinear career model was developed in the US-context and does not easily travel to the German context (Borchert 2011a). As the German state parliaments have undergone a professionalization since the 1970s, the hierarchical career model was increasingly challenged (Borchert 2011a; Borchert/Stolz 2011; Stolz 2003). Today, the German state legislatures are fully professionalized parliaments with regard to parliamentary allowances, infrastructure, full-time requirements and staff size, except for Bremen and Hamburg, both of which are part-time parliaments (Borchert/Stolz 2011: 210; Borchert/Zeiss 2003; Greß/Huth 1998: 103). The German state parliaments have turned into career arenas in their own right which serve no more as mere stepping stones towards the national level: "While the national level is still considered the

center of power and status, the state and the local level have made headway in recent decades and are considered a real alternative by many career politicians” (Borchert/Stolz 2011: 208).

Borchert and Stolz (2011) found that even though the German federalism provides in theory for a high permeability between the state and national level, state parliaments have turned into career arenas in their own right (see also Borchert 2011a; Borchert/Golsch 1999: 129; Herzog 1982: 94; Zeuner 1970: 106-107). Legislators rather tend to focus on one political level – either the national or the state level – which constitute alternative career fields and do not permanently switch back and forth (Borchert 2011b: 131). In line, Saalfeld (1997: 36) described political careers at the state and national level as “parallel careers of almost equal ‘value’”. Consequently, the selection criteria prevailing in the nomination proceedings at the state and national level widely concur. Therefore, state parliaments became valuable laboratories for gaining insight into legislative recruitment. This is a justification for pooling candidate data collected at the national and state level to achieve an acceptable sample size of IO-candidates.

5.2 Measuring the Parties’ Candidate Selection Behavior

Finding empirical strategies for analyzing the parties’ selection behavior towards IO-candidates is far from being straightforward. Selection rules are not legally defined, and, therefore, hard to identify (Bjarnegård 2015; Marsh/Gallagher 1988). As sketched in chapter 3.4.1, a large part of research concerned with the legislative recruitment of representatives of immigrant background employs qualitative interviews (e.g. Durose et al. 2013; Nergiz 2014; Schmitz/Wüst 2011; Softic 2016; Soininen 2011). Although qualitative interviews provide valuable insights into the IO-candidates’ recruitment experiences, it remains unclear whether the findings reflect generalizable patterns. Moreover, these studies suffer from a lack of reference groups. Thus, it cannot be clarified whether political parties use other selection criteria when nominating IO-candidates or whether the found patterns are shared by all candidates. Other studies, in turn, used quantitative data for ascertaining at what recruitment stage most distortion of minority representation emerges and what institutional or context factors are the main culprits (e.g. Ashe/Stewart 2012; Dancygier 2014; Ruedin 2009, 2013). These studies provide a thorough understanding of how institutional and context factors shape minority representation but the underlying intra-party selection processes remained widely in the dark. Accounting for the drawbacks of quantitative and qualitative approaches, the dissertation integrates individual-level survey data in order to identify broader patterns in the parties’ selection strategies towards IO-candidates with qualitative data to validate the quantitative patterns and unveil underlying mechanisms.

One way of gaining access to the parties' selection behavior is to survey party representatives, such as party selectorates (Bochel/Denver 1983; Norris/Lovenduski 1995; Soininen 2011) or the party leadership. However, the approach comes along with two shortcomings: First, party actors either hesitate about truly unveiling their selection strategies, or, owing to a social desirability, they do not report a closure even if present. Second, a mismatch between the perception of party selectorates or party leaders and the *de facto* employed selection criteria might exist. Therefore, surveying party actors about the parties' selection behavior is only an indirect measurement.

Alternatively, and this is what the dissertation makes use of, candidates' personal recruitment profiles provide a valuable data source to explore the selection behavior of political parties retrospectively. The analysis of the candidates' recruitment profiles does not follow a candidate-centered perspective but is conducted through the lens of political parties. Individual candidate motives are not central to the goal of the dissertation, as the focus is not on career paths envisioned by candidates but on parties' selection behavior. Which political qualifications candidates must have to stand for election and how much party support they receive in the candidate selection mirror the parties' selection behavior in far-reaching ways. As political parties, and, more precisely, their selectorates define the informal rules of the candidate selection, the candidates' recruitment profiles are closely related to their selection practices.

However, comparing the recruitment profiles of successful IO-applicants to those of failed contenders in order to identify the recruitment profiles IO-candidates need to stand for election is ruled out due to lacking data on failed applicants. As only data on selected candidates are available, a constraint on the dependent variable is imposed. A solution is to use the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates as a reference. By comparing the recruitment profiles of IO-candidates to those of native-born candidates, it can be established whether parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates deviates from the one adopted vis-à-vis native-born candidates. As discussed in chapter 3, lateral entrants are in the minority among German legislators (Bailer et al. 2013; Herzog 1975), making the cross-section of native-born candidates a sound reference to assess whether political parties depart from their prevalent selection practices when being faced with IO-candidates.

Against the empirical approach adopted in the dissertation, it could be argued that candidates' recruitment profiles not only reflect the selection behavior of political parties but are also affected by the candidates' political ambition and motivation, both of which are beyond the parties' sphere of influence (Schlesinger 1966), or by the political opportunity structure (Borchert 2011b). However, the emergence of certain patterns across a vast number of recruitment profiles is very likely to be related to the selection behavior of political parties. As political

parties, and, more precisely, their selectorates define the informal rules of the candidate selection, candidates' recruitment profiles are closely linked to the selection practices of political parties. Second, the focus is on factors that lie in the parties' sphere of influence. This approach ensures that candidates' recruitment profiles can provide information on the selection behavior of political parties. For example, candidates might stand for election in SMDs with which they have no previous relationship; either because they are politically ambitious or because the electoral district remained vacant. At the same time, however, local party selectorates must approve their absent local rootedness in the nomination proceedings. Accordingly, the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates mirror not only their individual motivation or the opportunity structure but, to a great extent, also the selection behavior of political parties. Therefore, the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates are a valuable data source to tap into the selection behavior of political parties.

5.2.1 Quantitative Approach

Candidate survey data are the most detailed sources to gain access to the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates (Bailer 2014). The German Candidate Study (GCS), which was initially conducted for the 2002 Bundestag election (Schmitt et al. 2005) and continued for the 2005 (Wüst et al. 2009), 2009 (Rattinger et al. 2012) and 2013 Bundestag elections (Rattinger et al. 2014), provides comprehensive data on candidates' recruitment profiles. To obtain a most recent snapshot, the 2013 GCS is employed. This is key as the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates may have changed over time due to altered electoral incentives stemming from the increasing electoral impact of IO-voters (Claro da Fonseca 2011). In addition, post-election candidate surveys on the occasion of the German state elections in Bavaria and Hesse in 2013 and Saxony in 2014 were conducted (Zittel/Ceyhan 2014).¹¹ The pooled data set provides a sample size of IO-candidates which allows for an analysis of the selection behavior of political parties towards IO-candidates.¹²

The following analyses proceed in three steps: First, descriptive evidence is provided, followed by a multivariate analysis of the statistical relationship, whereas interaction effects are added to the multivariate model in a third step. As different recruitment indicators form the dependent variables in the subsequent analysis, different regression methods are employed, which are introduced at the beginning of each chapter. Apart from the immigrant background,

¹¹ The state-level surveys were conducted at the Chair of Comparative Politics at the Goethe University Frankfurt.

¹² To rule out double observations in the pooled data set, the candidates' socio-demographic characteristics were systematically compared.

which is the independent variable of main interest, it is controlled for confounding factors. The intuition of the modelling strategy is to disclose differences in the candidates' recruitment profiles that are caused by the immigrant origin under otherwise equal conditions. The approach is aimed at disentangling how much variance in the recruitment profiles is explained by the immigrant origin and how much variance is owed to other factors standing behind the relationship. Hence, the goal is not to explain the dependent variable in a y-centered research design (Ganghof 2005) but to capture differences in the candidates' recruitment profiles that are caused by the immigrant origin. Given a limited sample size of IO-candidates, it needs to be looked at patterns in the data, not centering exclusively on statistical significance.

Defining thresholds for determining whether neutrality, opening or closure prevails in the candidate selection is difficult, as they equal seamless continuums. Neutrality is indicated if no strong disparities between the recruitment profiles of native-born and IO-candidates become evident. A closure is indicated if IO-candidates must outperform native-born candidates in their political qualifications and receive less support from their political parties in the candidate selection and beyond. Closure is, however, not dichotomous but can vary in strength. The same holds true for opening in which IO-candidates need less political qualifications than native-born candidates and receive more party support. Like closure, opening is not binary but can be pronounced to a varying degree.

5.2.1.1 German Candidate Study 2013

For the quantitative analysis, I employ the 2013 GCS (Rattinger et al. 2014) which was conducted for the 2013 Bundestag election held on September 22, 2013.¹³ It is part of the GLES, funded by the German National Science Foundation. The GCS contains the responses from parliamentary candidates affiliated with SPD, CDU/CSU, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, FDP, DIE LINKE, PIRATENPARTEI and AFD. To keep the unit non-response rate low, two options for participation were implemented; a postal paper-based participation or an online participation with personal access codes. The survey was conducted between October 16, 2013 and January 10, 2014. After the paper-based questionnaires and the personalized access codes for the online survey had been sent to the respondents on October 16, 2013, further reminders followed on November 7, November 25 and December 5, 2013. Of the 2.776 candidates, 1.137 candidates returned the questionnaire (41 percent) and form a widely representative sample as far as the mode of candidacy, the electoral status, the party affiliation, age and gender are concerned (see

¹³ For details on the election see Mader (2014).

table B.1 in the appendix). The candidates of the PIRATENPARTEI and AFD were discarded. As both political parties are new¹⁴ and have no immediate precursor in the German party system, other than DIE LINKE which is a successor to the PDS, their intra-party recruitment processes are less entrenched yet. The recruitment profiles of their candidates are therefore characterized by a large variance. This makes it difficult to investigate selection strategies tailored to specific candidate groups, such as IO-candidates. After discarding these political parties, survey data on 826 candidates remain (CDU/CSU = 171, SPD = 186, FDP = 143, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN = 170, DIE LINKE = 156). In addition to the individual-level survey data, aggregate data are available that measure the electoral, socio-economic and socio-demographic context of SMDs and MMDs.

5.2.1.2 Candidate Surveys at the State Level

On the occasion of the German state elections in Bavaria, Hesse und Saxony, post-election candidate surveys were conducted (Zittel/Ceyhan 2014). They adopt large parts of the questionnaire of the 2013 GCS. The state elections of Bavaria, Hesse, and Saxony were chosen on a variety of grounds: First, they were the closest to the Bundestag election. While the state election in Bavaria¹⁵ was held on September 15, 2013, the election in Hesse¹⁶ followed on September 22, 2013, and the election in Saxony¹⁷ took place on August 31, 2014. By choosing elections in close proximity to the Bundestag election, a time variance that might impact the selection behavior of political parties towards IO-candidates is ruled out.

Second, the 16 MMDs of the Bundestag election, the seven MMDs of the Bavarian state election, formed by the administrative regions, and the two state-wide MMDs in Hesse and Saxony provide researchers with a valuable variance in the district magnitude to be studied. It allows to inquire how parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates operates under a varying magnitude of MMDs.

Third, empirical evidence from these state elections is particularly suited for an investigation of the assertions set forth above. In common with the Bundestag election, all three state elections operate under a variant of the mixed-member electoral system (see table 5.1). Therefore, they can provide instructive insights into differences in the selection behavior of political parties across the mode of candidacy. However, it is to be mentioned that, in contrast to the other elections, not closed but open party lists are used in Bavaria (Eder/Magin 2008;

¹⁴ The PIRATENPARTEI was founded in September 2006, the AFD in February 2013.

¹⁵ For details on the election see Schultze (2014).

¹⁶ For details on the election see Faas (2014).

¹⁷ For details on the election see Jesse (2015).

Massicotte 2003). Moreover, candidates cannot only be nominated in SMDs but must run on a party list. Furthermore, to obtain the total seat share, not the party vote share is decisive as in MMP systems, employed in the Bundestag and the Hessian and Saxon state elections. But in the Bavarian MMM system, the votes won in the nominal races and the party votes are added (Massicotte 2003; Shugart/Wattenberg 2003a). Despite its particularities, the Bavarian state election is considered comparable enough to address the research question put forward in the dissertation. Even though it uses open party lists, the candidates' initial ballot position can provide valuable insights into the party priorities in the list ranking.

Table 5.1: Electoral system characteristics

Election	Electoral System	Seats in parliament	List form	Number of MMDs	Number of votes	Threshold
Bundestag	MMP	598	closed	16	2	5 percent
Bavaria	MMM	180	open	7	2	5 percent
Hesse	MMP	110	closed	1	2	5 percent
Saxony	MMP	120	closed	1	2	5 percent

Source: Eder/Magin (2008) and Massicotte (2003).

The post-election candidate surveys in Hesse and Bavaria were conducted between December 16, 2013 and April 1, 2014. Candidates affiliated with SPD, CDU/CSU, FREIE WÄHLER, FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, DIE LINKE, PIRATENPARTEI, AFD, ÖDP, NPD and REPUBLIKANER were surveyed. To keep the unit non-response rate low, a postal paper-based participation and an online-survey participation were offered. After the paper-based questionnaires and the personalized access codes for the online survey had been sent to the respondents on December 16, 2013, two further reminders followed on January 17 and February 24, 2014. Of the 597 candidates surveyed in Hesse, 297 returned the survey (49.7 percent). In Bavaria, 599 of the 1.494 contacted candidates responded (40.1 percent). In a second wave, candidates running in the 2014 Saxon state election were surveyed. After the paper-based questionnaires and the personalized access codes for the online survey had been sent to the respondents on November 24, 2014, reminders followed on January 5 and February 9, 2015. Of the 556 candidates surveyed, 240 returned the questionnaire (43.2 percent).

After confining the sample to candidates of SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, responses from 720 candidates remained (CDU/CSU = 151, SPD = 161, FDP = 118, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN = 164, DIE LINKE = 126). The composition of the survey participants widely accords with the baseline of all candidates pertaining to party affiliation, the mode of candidacy, the electoral status, gender and age (see table B.2 in the

appendix). Aggregate data were supplemented that measure the electoral, socio-economic and socio-demographic context of the SMDs and MMDs. The data were provided by the State Statistical Offices, the Federal Statistical Office and the German Federal Employment Agency.

5.2.2 Qualitative Approach

The qualitative approach strives to validate the quantitative patterns by adding personal and contextual information (Coppedge 1999). In the main, the qualitative approach is aimed at (1) validating that the quantitative patterns are truly related to the parties' selection behavior, (2) clarifying how political parties practically implement their selection behavior, (3) unveiling mechanisms lying beneath the quantitative patterns (4) throwing light on what party actors play key roles in the selection of IO-candidates and (5) capturing the IO-candidates' personal experiences in the selection process.

First background information on the nomination of IO-candidates is provided by the candidates' personal and party websites. Most candidates placed short sections on their personal websites describing their political career trajectories, such as their motivation for joining a party organization, their previous office experience and organizational affiliations. In addition, news articles about the IO-candidates' nomination proceedings were accessed via Nexis. Nexis archives news articles of regional, national and international daily newspapers, weekly newspapers and magazines.¹⁸ The full names of the IO-candidates were used as search keywords to download all relevant articles. For those IO-candidates who entered the German Bundestag or one of the state parliaments, the self-written biographies in *Kürschners Volkshandbuch* (2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016) that provide brief information about their political career trajectories were employed.

Second, eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews with IO-candidates were conducted, serving as background information to illustrate, deepen and validate the quantitative findings through the interviewees' personal recruitment experience. The previously gathered information on the candidates' career trajectories served as preparatory material for the interviews. It allowed to ask case-specific questions and contextualize the information given by the interviewees. Due to financial restrictions, interviews could only be realized in Hesse. But since qualitative interviews are aimed at validating the quantitative patterns, geographic restrictions impose no serious limitation to inference. It is more essential instead to generate an information-rich variance by interviewing IO-candidates of different party affiliation, elected and non-

¹⁸ For a full overview of the sources see <http://www.lexisnexis.de/quellen/deutschsprachige-quellen>.

elected candidates, first-time and more experienced candidates, and candidates from different countries of origin. If contact information was available, IO-candidates were contacted by email. Contact information was accessed either through the candidates' personal or their party websites. The initially sent email informed about the planned research project and provided contact information on further appointment arrangements. In case of no response, two further contact attempts were made two weeks after. Non-elected candidates in particular were difficult to contact as their email addresses were no longer in use.

The interviews took 50 to 90 minutes and were all conducted by the same interviewer. They took place between May and October 2016 in different localities, such as parliamentary offices, coffee shops and at the Goethe University Frankfurt. A guideline questionnaire ascertained that all relevant aspects in the candidates' recruitment trajectories were picked up. At the same time, however, the open questions put the interviewees in a position to raise personal issues of concern and gave the interviewer the opportunity to respond to emerging topics or ask explanatory questions. As the qualitative interviews pursued the objective of validating and enriching the quantitative findings, they were oriented towards the framework outlined in chapter 3.

With the consent of all the interviewees, a digital audio recorder was used. It allowed the interviewer to concentrate on the interview without taking notes. Moreover, the researcher could rehear the interview as often as needed for the analysis. The interviews were transcribed verbatim, including all verbal communication. In a later revision, empty phrases, such as repetitions or expletives, were removed so as to focus on the content of provided information. As the interviews were conducted in German, they were transcribed into German to avoid any loss of language-specific expressions. Only quotes that are used to illustrate statistical relationships and mechanisms were translated into English. Linguistic errors, such as a wrong sentence structure, were corrected to avoid a disturbance of reading but without changing the content. For the sake of anonymity, personal information, such as names, political parties or names of places, were removed.

5.3 Operationalization

After describing the research design, this chapter turns to the operationalization of the variables relevant to the empirical analysis, such as the candidates' immigrant origin, the recruitment indicators and the conditioning factors elaborated on in the preceding chapters. Table 5.2 provides a snapshot overview of the relevant variables that will be outlined in further detail in the present chapter.

Table 5.2: Sample description

Dependent variable	Min	Max	N	Mean	SD
Years of party membership	0	58	1.502	16.08	11.57
Encouragement	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	805	0.80	0.40
Competition in SMD	0 (= not/hardly contested)	1 (= somewhat/highly contested)	1.114	0.30	0.46
Competition on party list	0 (= not/hardly contested)	1 (= somewhat/ highly contested)	1.192	0.55	0.50
Support from state party leadership	0 (= not important)	5 (= very important)	688	2.28	1.30
Support from local party chapter	0 (= not important)	5 (= very important)	692	3.70	1.22
Number of political offices	0	5 (= more than 5 offices)	1.546	1.87	1.09
Party office	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.546	0.80	0.40
Local-level office	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.546	0.72	0.45
Number of organizational affiliations	0	6	578	2.08	1.31
(with immigrant organization)					
Number of organizational affiliations	0	6	1.546	1.86	1.24
(without immigrant organization)					
Instrumental occupation	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.436	0.15	0.36
Brokerage occupation	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.436	0.39	0.49
Residence in SMD	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.093	0.84	0.36
Years of local residence in SMD	0	74	908	28.86	17.17
Viable SMD nomination	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.112	0.22	0.42
List margin	-85	42	1.294	-12.29	17.02
% Party funding in campaign expenses	0	1	1.174	0.50	0.35
Size of campaign team (in persons)	0	100	1.190	9.59	12.69
Independent variable	Min	Max	N	Mean	SD
Immigrant origin	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.489	0.07	0.25
Muslim IO-candidate	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.405	0.01	0.10
Christian IO-candidate	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.435	0.03	0.17
Non-European IO-candidate	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.428	0.03	0.16
IO-candidate from Muslim country	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.417	0.02	0.14
European IO-candidate	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.448	0.04	0.20
Political party:					
SPD	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	347		
CDU/CSU	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	322		
FDP	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	261		
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	334		
Die Linke	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	282		
Mode of candidacy:					
SMD nomination	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	234		
Party list nomination	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	431		
Dual nomination	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	881		
MMD: District magnitude	3	66	1.312	33.48	21.42
SMD: Foreigner share (in %)	0.01	0.32	1.115	0.08	0.06
SMD: Unemployment rate (in %)	0.01	0.15	1.108	0.05	0.03
SMD: High school graduates (in %)	0.12	0.65	1.111	0.36	0.09
SMD: Right-wing vote share (in %)	0.00	0.12	1.115	0.02	0.02
SMD: Urbanity (persons per km ²)	38	12.843	1.112	860	1475
Control	Min	Max	N	Mean	SD
Gender	0 (= female)	1 (= male)	1.530	0.68	0.46
Age (in years)	18	89	1.523	47.74	12.01
Education	1 (= no graduation, Hauptschule)	5 (= doctorate)	1.515	3.63	0.94
Incumbent	0 (= no)	1 (= yes)	1.546	0.13	0.33

Note: Min = Minimum, Max = Maximum, SD = standard deviation.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

5.3.1 Immigrant Origin

In the previous research on minority representation, different approaches to operationalizing an immigrant background were adopted, ranging from biographical to visual and name-based approaches (Bloemraad/Schönwälder 2013: 655-657). In line with the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 5), the present volume takes a biographical approach. First-generation immigrants are born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship. The criterion refers to the present-day territory of Germany for those candidates born after 1945 and the territory of the German Reich for those born before 1945 (Wüst 2011: 253). Those candidates born

in a foreign country with foreign citizenship and candidates born in a foreign country to parents of foreign citizenship are operationalized as first-generation immigrants. This twofold strategy proved to be most appropriate as respondents often only provided one of the information needed. Respondents born in the eastern territories of the German Reich that indicated to be born in Poland, Romania, Russia or Czech Republic are excluded due to their German citizenship at birth. Children born in a foreign country with German citizenship to parents born in Germany with German citizenship are not included as first-generation immigrants. For obvious reasons, they enjoy language, legal and cultural advantages. As no detailed information on the duration of their stay abroad is available, a conservative approach to operationalization is taken.

Second-generation immigrants are born in Germany but have a parental experience of immigration. They are either born with foreign citizenship or with German citizenship but have at least one foreign-born parent. Third-generation immigrants are born in Germany with German citizenship but have at least one parent born in Germany as a foreigner. Native-born candidates form the reference group that allows to establish whether political parties deviate from their prevalent selection practices when nominating IO-candidates. Native-born candidates are born in Germany with German citizenship to parents both born in Germany with German citizenship.

Based on these indicators, 99 of the 1.489 candidates in the sample are of immigrant origin (6.65 percent).¹⁹ In the state election of Hesse, 8.4 percent of the parliamentary candidates had an immigrant background. In Bavaria, this applied to 5.9 percent of the candidates. In Saxony, it was 2.7 percent, while it was 7.2 percent at the national level. It should be noted that the sample only includes first- and second-generation immigrants.

5.3.2 Dependent Variables

To explore the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, different recruitment indicators are employed that derive from the framework set forth in chapter 3. To compare the length of the party membership, respondents were asked in which year they joined the party organization. By subtracting the indicated year from the year of election, the length of party membership is obtained. To measure encouragement, respondents were asked whether they applied as candidates after being encouraged by other persons or groups (= 1) or whether it was their own decision (= 0). Unfortunately, the question is only available in the GCS. To measure the level of competition in the candidate selection proceedings, respondents were asked how contested their nomination in SMDs and on party lists was. Due to weakly occupied response categories

¹⁹ In 57 cases, the information was incomplete and thwarted a reliable classification.

for IO-candidates, the 4-point scale is changed into a binary variable (0 = not contested at all/hardly contested; 1 = somewhat contested/highly contested). The party support in the candidate selection was measured by a subjective assessment of the importance of support from the state party leadership and the local party organization in being nominated. Due to weakly occupied response categories pertaining to IO-candidates, the 5-point scale, ranging from “not important at all” (= 1) to “very important” (= 5), is conflated (0 = not important/not very important/indifferent; 1 = important/very important).

When turning to the political office experience, respondents were asked to indicate which of the subsequent offices they held before: local and state party office, national party office, local legislative office, state legislative office, national legislative office, mayor and state executive office. It is important to mention that only those offices flow into the analysis that were incorporated into all candidate surveys. An index that counts the number of prior offices is generated, ranging from 0 (= no office) to 5 (= five or more offices). The offices enter the index equally, although some offices may carry more weight in the candidate selection than others. However, weighting will remain highly arbitrary, which is why weighting is forgone and a more straightforward approach is favored. In addition, binary variables for experience in party office (1 = prior party office; 0 = no prior party office), including local, state and national party positions, and experience in local-level office (1 = prior local-level office; 0 = no prior local-level office), including local party office, local legislative office, and mayor office, are generated because these are integral to legislative careers in Germany, as brought forward in chapter 3.

To measure organizational ties, respondents were asked whether they are member of one of the subsequent organizations: trade union, professional organization, religious organization, environmental organization, human rights organization, sports and leisure club, immigrant organization. An index that counts the number of organizational affiliations is generated. Note that immigrant organizations were only part of the state-level surveys.

As to their occupational background, candidates were asked for their previous profession. To their answers, the classification of Cairney (2007) was applied that draws a distinction between brokerage and instrumental occupations. Instrumental occupations (= 1) evince a clear linkage to politics, such as working for a party organization, MPs or other political office holders, for a political foundation, a trade union, a think-tank, a QUANGO, having indicated a political office as a profession, working as a journalist, press spokesman or in PR, working for an interest group, being a civil servant or employee of a ministry. Brokerage occupations (= 0), in turn, additionally include barristers, solicitors, lecturers, academics, administrative employees and teachers. In ambiguous cases, a conservative approach is taken by classifying a profession not as politics-facilitating. Consequently, the incidence of politics-facilitating professions is

likely to lag behind the factual number. But as IO- and native-born candidates are equally affected, the underestimation creates no problems for the empirical analysis. To measure candidates' local rootedness in SMDs, they were asked to indicate whether they reside in the electoral district in which they ran for office (1 = yes; 0 = no) and if so, since which year. By subtracting the indicated year from the year of election, the length of local residence is obtained.

Researchers come across manifold suggestions of how to model electoral viability in mixed-member electoral systems. With regard to SMDs, the vote margin to the district winner is most widespread (e.g. Abramowitz et al. 2006; Johnston et al. 2002; Zittel/Gschwend 2008). In accordance with this approach, a SMD is defined as viable (= 1) if the nominal vote share was within 10 percent of the winner's vote share in the previous election or if the electoral district was won by the own political party, and non-viable (= 0) if the vote margin to the district winner was larger than 10 percentage points. More complex methods of modelling (e.g. Stoffel 2014) are of little avail here. Political parties have no perfect notion of the electoral viability of SMDs but rather draw on concrete and ready-to-hand information, such as the electoral performance in the previous election.

Turning to the operationalization of the electoral prospects on party lists, it was, among other suggestions, proposed using the number of ballot positions won in the previous election and subtracting a certain number of list positions – for example, one standard deviation (Luhiste 2015). Others used the average number of list slots won in the previous and the recent election (Hennl/Kaiser 2008b). Schmitt and Wüst (2004) created a binary variable that captures whether list slots were sufficiently viable to win a seat in parliament, whereas Manow and Nistor (2009) developed an index that is based on all election results since 1949. Most recently, Stoffel (2014) proposed running probit models in which the candidates' list positions are regressed on their success in entering parliament and using the election probabilities in the further analysis. To take forward our knowledge of how viably political parties nominate IO-candidates, it needs to be modelled which number of ballot positions political parties expect to win. To this end, the list margin provides a fine-grained, nuanced and sound indicator of the candidates' electoral prospects on party lists. To measure the party-determined candidate viability on party lists, the candidates' ballot positions are subtracted from the number of list slots their parties could win in the previous election. The higher the list margin, the more auspicious the electoral prospects of entering parliament.

To compare the financial and personnel campaign support provided by political parties, two indicators are employed. First, respondents were asked what share in their campaign expenses originate from their party organizations. Second, candidates were asked about the size of their

campaign teams. The number of party volunteers in the personal campaign team is indicative of the candidates' personnel party support on the campaign trail.

5.3.3 Conditioning Factors

The line of reasoning in the previous chapters leads to the assumption that, from the parties' point of view, the external differentiation of IO-citizens overshadows their internal differentiation. However, I also believe that there is good reason to assume that parties' selection behavior varies across immigrant subgroups. Within the group of IO-citizens, Muslims and IO-citizens from non-European countries are considered particularly distinct from the German majority population compared to Christians or IO-citizens from European countries. To unmask potential intra-group variances, candidates were asked to indicate whether, among other denominations, they are Muslims (= 1) or Christians (= 1). Moreover, countries of origin that are situated outside of the European borders are defined as non-European (= 1), whereas those within European borders are defined as European (= 1). As not each IO-candidate has indicated a denomination or comes from a predominantly Muslim country but belongs to a Christian minority, I additionally include a variable for Muslim countries (= 1) in which the majority of the population is Islamic.

Center-left parties are claimed to be more conducive to minority representation than political parties placed on the right of the political spectrum. To capture party variances, the candidates' party affiliations are incorporated. Building upon the literature on electoral system incentives, political parties are also argued to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if party list positions are allocated, while more defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure are hypothesized for SMD nominations. The mode of candidacy – nominal, party list or dual – is measured by binary variables. An opening is also expected to be more likely if delegate assemblies are involved, while a more defensive selection behavior in terms of neutrality or closure is hypothesized if party members have an unmediated say in the candidate selection. To distinguish the type of party selectorate, respondents were asked to indicate whether they were selected by a party member assembly (= 1) or a delegate assembly (= 0), separately for SMD and party list nominations. Unfortunately, the party selectorate type is not available for the Bundestag candidates. Moreover, the previous reasoning suggests that political parties become more willing to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if MMDs move towards a larger district magnitude. I therefore include the number of mandates allocated to each of the 25 MMDs and center the district magnitude at its mean.

As put forward earlier, political parties are more likely to open up their candidate selection in SMDs to IO-candidates if IO-citizens are spatially concentrated in the electoral district. No SMD-based data on the share of IO-citizens are available. Therefore, I opted to employ the local foreigner share in 2012 as a proxy.²⁰ Although the foreigner share only pertains to IO-citizens of non-German citizenship who are deprived of voting rights, it turned out to be a solid proxy. On the basis of the 2011 census data, Wüst (2014a) showed that the local foreigner share correlates with the share of IO-citizens at Pearson's $r = 0.92$. For IO-citizens of German citizenship, the correlation is $r = 0.78$.

It was furthermore contended that the social deprivation of SMDs counteracts an opening for IO-candidates. To decapsulate social deprivation, I draw on two distinct indicators that were suggested in the prior research: For the economic dimension, the share of unemployed persons in SMDs having received SGB II or SGB III in 2013 is used. For the cultural dimension, the share of high school graduates (*Fachhochschulreife*, *Hochschulreife*) at the end of the school year 2012/13 in relation to the total number of school graduates is employed.

Lastly, local anti-immigrant sentiments are assumed to affect the selection behavior of political parties towards IO-candidates in SMDs. First, the PR vote share far-right political parties reaped in the election is incorporated, including NPD, REPUBLIKANER, DIE FREIHEIT, DIE RECHTE, PRO DEUTSCHLAND, BUND FÜR GESAMTDEUTSCHLAND and VOLKSABSTIMMUNG. The AFD is omitted as its political orientation was very ambiguous until 2015 (Berbair et al. 2015; Grimm 2015; Lewandowsky et al. 2016; Schmitt-Beck 2014, 2017). Second, the level of urbanity, measured by the number of inhabitants per square kilometer in 2013, is used. All SMD context factors are centered at their mean values.

5.3.4 Controls

To disentangle the effect of the immigrant background from other factors spoiling the relationship, a set of controls will be included in the statistical models. As a bias against female contenders was widely noted in the candidate selection (e.g. Caul 1999; Krook 2010; Kunovich/Paxton 2005; Lovenduski/Norris 1989; Sanbonmatsu 2006b), I control for gender as a confounding factor, measured by a binary variable (1 = male; 0 = female). In addition, age and age squared are included to account for age effects. Young candidates might be disadvantaged in the nomination proceedings because they are considered inexperienced, whereas senior

²⁰ In Bavaria, data are only available at the *Landkreis* level. The same foreigner share is therefore allocated to SMDs belonging to the same *Landkreis*.

candidates might be regarded as too old to cope with the physical and mental burden of conducting election campaigns and holding office. Previous research stressed the significance of educational resources in legislative recruitment (Best et al. 2000; Gaxie/Godmer 2007). Candidates' educational attainment is measured by a categorical variable, ranging from no education or *Hauptschule* (= 1) to doctorate (= 5). To account for the pooled character of the data set, I include election and party fixed effects. They control for remaining idiosyncrasies, such as unequal supply pools of potential IO-candidates, which might impact the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates.

Beyond these basic control variables, which enter all regression models, control variables that are tailored to the recruitment indicators to be analyzed are employed. These control variables are either based on recruitment indicators described in chapter 5.3.2 or if not, will be depicted next. Incumbency (1 = yes; 0 = no) measures whether candidates entered parliament in the preceding legislative term. Incumbents have a high probability of being re-selected (Zeuner 1970) as they enjoy a big electoral advantage at the ballot box (e.g. Bawn 1999; Cox/Katz 1996; Erikson 1971; Gelman/King 1990; Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Mayhew 1974). While incumbency refers to candidates elected to parliament in the previous legislative term, the number of legislative terms adds a quantitative perspective by counting the terms spent in parliament since 1990 for the candidates running in the Bavarian and Saxon state elections, ranging from 0 to 5, since 1991 for the Hessian candidates, ranging from 0 to 6, and since 1994 for the Bundestag candidates, ranging from 0 to 5. On the same lines, the number of prior candidacies that also includes non-successful candidacies is calculated. It measures the individual experience with nomination proceedings and election campaigning, both of which improve the chance of nomination. The amount of party activity records the hours devoted to party activities per week. The more time candidates spend to party activities, the greater their visibility within the party organization and the more reliable they are deemed to be, both of which are beneficial to being nominated. The repeated candidacy in a SMD (1 = yes; 0 = no) measures whether a candidate was nominated in the same electoral district in the previous election but could not win, as this vastly improves the chance of nomination (Kaack 1969b; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). Electoral districts that were vacated by the district winner are defined as vacant (1 = yes; 0 = no) and are usually fiercely fought over (Reiser 2013: 137).

6 Are Immigrant-Origin Candidates Different?

Before moving on to the full-fledged analysis of which candidate selection behavior political parties employ towards IO-candidates, this preliminary chapter sets out for a first reflection on IO- and native-born candidates in comparison. This exercise provides a better intuition about the both candidate groups that take center stage in the analytical part. The background variables explored in the present chapter will also be relevant to the subsequent analysis.

6.1 Socio-Demographic Background

Peering into the candidates' socio-demographic characteristics – more precisely into their age, gender and education that form the basic control variables in the following analysis –, helps to see to what extent IO- and native-born candidates constitute distinct candidate groups.




Figure 6.1.1: Difference in the mean age between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Difference is significant at $p \leq 0.01$ (t-test). $N = 1.483$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 6.1.1 provides a visual inspection of the age distribution in both candidate groups. As revealed by a mean comparison, native-born candidates are 48 years on average, while it is 45 years among IO-candidates. Overall, IO-candidates turn out to be somewhat younger than native-born candidates. The age difference is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Taken as a whole, the age distribution corresponds to the empirical findings of the recruitment literature. From a longitudinal perspective, the mean age of German legislators varies between 46 and 52 years (Best et al. 2001; Best et al. 2000: 185; Saalfeld 1997; Wessels 1997). In the 2013 Bundestag, for example, the mean age was 49.8 years (Höhne/Kintz 2017: 266), while it was only

44.2 years in the German population. In the wake of an increasing professionalization of legislative careers, legislators must undergo a lengthy recruitment process by advancing from lower to higher political positions before being considered capable of competing for public office at the state or national level (Borchert 2003a, 2003b; Fiers/Secker 2007; Saalfeld 1997). This culminates in a poor presence of young rookies. However, a bias against young candidates seems to apply only to native-born candidates but not to IO-candidates whose mean age corresponds to the one of the population. One possible reason is that in the SPD, FDP and CDU/CSU, the average age of legislators is higher than in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE (Bailer et al. 2013: 21-22; Höhne/Kintz 2017: 266). Due to their immigration-friendly positions, more IO-candidates can be expected to run for BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, resulting in an age difference between IO- and native-born candidates. Moreover, with an average age of 35.4 years in 2014, IO-citizens are younger than the native-born population whose average age was 46.8 years (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015).




Figure 6.1.2: Gender difference between native-born and IO-candidates (in percent).
Note: χ^2 -test value is 0.26. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.483$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

As figure 6.1.2 shows, clear gender patterns stand out which are to the detriment of women (see also Bieber 2013a; Davidson-Schmich 2016; Fortin-Rittberger/Eder 2013; Fortin-Rittberger et al. 2016; Höhne/Kintz 2017; Magin 2011), even though, apart from the FDP and CSU, all the political parties under scrutiny have imposed gender quotas (Davidson-Schmich 2006, 2016; Reiser 2014). The gender bias fueled a scholarly debate on its potential sources, ranging from personality differences to traditional role models, discrimination by voters and party selectorates and differences in socio-economic resources (e.g. Baer 1993; Bieber 2013b; Carroll 1994; Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Christmas-Best/Kjar 2007; Dahlerup 2006b; Darcy

et al. 1994; Lawless/Fox 2005; Mateo Diaz 2005; Sanbonmatsu 2006b). In comparison to native-born candidates, women seem to be more underrepresented among IO-candidates. Female candidates make up 32 percent of the native-born candidates but only 26 percent of the IO-candidates. The difference, however, falls short of statistical significance as revealed by the chi-squared test.




Figure 6.1.3: Difference in education between native-born and IO-candidates (in percent).
Note: Fisher's exact test value is 1. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.469$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Educational resources are key to legislative careers as they facilitate the acquisition of rhetorical, analytical and information processing skills, and indicate proficiency (Best 2007; Gaxie/Godmer 2007). Figure 6.1.3 provides a summary of the candidates' highest school-leaving qualification, or, if given, their highest university degree. The majority of candidates hold university degrees, including Bachelor, Master, Magister and Diploma. About one tenth even hold doctoral degrees. Conversely, lower school-leaving qualifications, such as those earned from secondary schools, are poorly represented. From a longitudinal perspective, an academization of parliaments came about, leading to increasing proportions of legislators with university degrees (Best et al. 2001; Best et al. 2000; Gaxie/Godmer 2007; Höhne/Kintz 2017; Saalfeld 1997; Wessels 1997). Yet, an overrepresentation of high education seems to apply equally to IO- and native-born candidates. Both candidate groups tend to be drawn from the highest educational strata of society and no strong imbalances are found. Nonetheless, the weight that educational resources carry for legislative careers might impede IO-citizens more heavily on their way to parliament than the native-born population because, on average, they are equipped with fewer educational resources (Becker 2011b; Diefenbach 2007, 2009; Heath

et al. 2008). If only the most educated come forward as candidates, and IO-citizens are equipped with fewer educational resources, this inevitably leads to their political underrepresentation.

6.2 Immigrant-Origin

Even though political parties are claimed to subordinate the external differentiation of IO-citizens to their internal differentiation, they do not lump together IO-citizens but are aware of their internal heterogeneity. For this reason, the present chapter investigates the different facets of the candidates' immigrant origin in greater depth.




Figure 6.2.1: Country of origin (absolute numbers).
Note: Native-born candidates are excluded. N = 99.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 6.2.1 summarizes the countries from which IO-candidates originate. For first-generation immigrants, it depicts the country of birth, while it describes the parents' country of birth in the case of second-generation immigrants. About one fifth of the IO-candidates ($n = 21$) are born in Turkey or have at least one parent from Turkey. This comes as no surprise, considering the fact that Turkish-origin citizens make up 17.4 percent of the IO-population and constitute the largest national group of immigrants in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). This not only results in a larger number of Turkish-origin applicants in the candidate selection, but by the virtue of their group size and their high level of organization, they can exert considerable pressure on party organizations to nominate Turkish-origin candidates (Schönwälder 2013: 642). Their institutional networks within party organizations or in the close environment of political parties (Blätte 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Cetinkaya 2000; Kücükhüseyin 2002) provide Turkish-origin citizens with a high leverage to claim representation. Furthermore, their size makes them an electorally weighty voter group that is relevant to parties' electoral success. The second largest candidate group originates from Czechoslovakia ($n = 9$), followed by Austria ($n = 6$),

Romania (n = 6), UK (n = 6), Yugoslavia (n = 6) and Italy (n = 5). Interestingly, rather few IO-candidates originate from Southern Europe although many labor migrants came from Italy, Spain and Greece (Thränhardt 2002).




Figure 6.2.2: Difference in religion between native-born and IO-candidates (in percent).
Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.00. The result is significant at $p \leq 0.01$. $N = 1,463$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 6.2.2 shows the distribution of religious affiliations.²¹ Among IO-candidates, Muslims make up a remarkable share with 14 percent, which sets this candidate group apart from native-born candidates. Only 20 percent of the IO-candidates but 37 percent of the native-born candidates are Protestants. Catholics, by contrast, are represented almost equally in both candidate groups, with 29 percent among native-born candidates and 26 percent among IO-candidates. It is chiefly the group of Muslims that distinguishes IO-candidates from autochthonous candidates. The finding, to large parts, echoes the strong presence of Turkish-origin candidates.

²¹ As only one candidate was Jewish, this category was excluded.




Figure 6.2.3: Immigrant generation (in percent).
Note: Native-born candidates are excluded. First-generation immigrants are born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship, second-generation immigrants are born in Germany with at least one parent belonging to the first generation. N = 99.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

As defined earlier, first-generation immigrants are born in a foreign country, whereas second-generation immigrants are born in Germany but have a parental immigrant background (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013: 6). While first-generation immigrants have to cope with the challenges associated with their immigration, such as learning a new language, a legal recognition of their educational and occupational qualifications, acculturation and making new contacts, second-generation immigrants are faced with less structural challenges as they are born and socialized in Germany, even though they seem to encounter cultural identity problems (Esser 1980; Fincke 2009; Hämmig 2010). Due to lower structural thresholds, the majority of IO-candidates can be assumed to be second-generation immigrants. As figure 6.2.3 reveals, second-generation immigrants make up 53 percent of the IO-candidates, while 47 percent are first-generation immigrants. The high share of first-generation immigrants is remarkable as mastering the German language and becoming familiar with the political issues and institutions relevant in the German context are high hurdles that need to be cleared to become active in German party organizations. One explanation for the finding is that immigration that was politically driven increased from the late 1970s onwards for reasons of political prosecution, repression and instability (Green 2004). Those first-generation immigrants that immigrated for political reasons are highly politicized, reflected in a high share of first-generation immigrants in the group of IO-candidates.

6.3 Political Background

Following the previous reasoning, differences in the distribution of IO-candidates across political parties are expected to emerge. Center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are believed to be more hospitable to IO-candidates than political parties which are placed more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP (e.g. Claro da Fonseca 2011; Kittilson/Tate 2005; Wüst 2011).

Table 6.3.1: Party affiliation

	Party affiliation (in percent)	
	No immigrant origin (N = 1.390)	Immigrant origin (N = 99)
SPD	21.9	28.3
CDU/CSU	21.3	16.2
FDP	17.1	15.2
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	22.4	12.1
Die Linke	17.3	28.3

Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.01. The result is significant at $p \leq 0.01$. N = 1.489.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The descriptive results displayed in table 6.3.1 give credit to the assumption. With about 28 percent, almost one third of the IO-candidates are nominated by the SPD. In comparison to native-born candidates, IO-candidates are clearly overrepresented in the SPD – the difference is 6.4 percentage points. An equal share of IO-candidates is running for DIE LINKE – the difference to native-born candidates is 11 percentage points. As mentioned earlier, many IO-citizens are rooted in the labor migrant context, and, therefore, feel affiliated to the center-left parties (Kroh/Tucci 2009; Wüst 2002, 2007).

Conversely, 21 percent of the native-born candidates but only 16 percent of the IO-candidates are nominated by the CDU/CSU. As conservative political parties take more critical stances on immigration and multiculturalism, this finding comes as no surprise. In the FDP, the percentage of IO-candidates widely corresponds to the percentage of native-born candidates with 15 and 17 percent. Contrary to expectations, however, only 12 percent of the IO-candidates are nominated by BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. As multiculturalism and equal rights and opportunities for marginalized groups are core issues of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Ohlert 2015; Probst 2013; Tietze 2008), the finding points to a bias in the survey responses from IO-candidates. For the 2013 Bundestag election, the *Mediendienst Integration* presented evidence that most of the IO-candidates were nominated by BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, followed by DIE LINKE and the SPD (Mediendienst Integration 2013b). However, not the aggregate numbers of IO-candidates but their recruitment profiles are the focal point of the following analysis.

Therefore, the bias presents no problem as long as the recruitment profiles of the IO-candidates being in the sample can provide an unbiased insight into the selection behavior of political parties. To validate this being the case, the qualitative data will prove to be helpful in the subsequent analysis.




Figure 6.3.1: Difference in the mode of candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates (in percent). *Note:* Fisher's exact test value is 0.34. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.489$. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

According to the literature on electoral incentives, political parties shy away from nominating IO-candidates in SMDs as their scope of voter appeal is believed to be limited. On party lists, by contrast, a ticket-balancing logic prevails that is for the benefit of IO-candidates (e.g. Kostadinova 2007; Norris 2004; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). Figure 6.3.1 provides evidence for this assumption. About 16 percent of the native-born candidates but only 10 percent of the IO-candidates are nominated in SMDs. With regard to party lists, no notable difference becomes apparent, but 28 percent of the candidates in both groups are running for election on party lists. Nearly two-thirds of the IO-candidates (62 percent) but only 57 percent of the native-born candidates are nominated dually.

Note, however, that a nomination on a party list is compulsory in the Bavarian state election (Massicotte 2003; Trefs 2008). This electoral rule enforces a stronger dependency of candidates on their regional party organization. When excluding Bavaria to run a check on the robustness of the previous findings, I find that about one fifth of the native-born candidates but only 13 percent of the IO-candidates are nominated in SMDs. Again, no striking group difference becomes evident with respect to party list nominations (23 percent). For dual nominations, virtually the same results as before are obtained: About 65 percent of the IO-candidates and 57

percent of the native-born candidates are running on a dual ticket. Going hand in hand with the literature on electoral system incentives, the descriptive results suggest that political parties tend to avoid fielding IO-candidates only in SMDs. Whether the mode of candidacy conditions not only the number of IO-candidates standing for election but the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates will be addressed more thoroughly in what follows.




Figure 6.3.2: Difference in incumbency between native-born and IO-candidates (in percent).
Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.09. The result is significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.489$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Based on an informal but highly institutionalized rule of German party organizations, incumbents who entered parliament in the previous legislative term are re-selected (Kaack 1969b; Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). Incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage over novices, which dates from their name recognition, visibility within and outside of the party organization, contacts and administrative resources, such as MP offices (e.g. Erikson 1971; Gelman/King 1990; Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Lee 2001; Levitt/Wolfram 1997), making their re-selection highly desirable. Moreover, due to their previous experience in parliament, they are familiar with its working processes and need no long training periods but can continue their legislative work immediately. However, the incumbency advantage turns into a disadvantage for those social groups that are rather new in politics, such as IO-citizens (Schwindt-Bayer 2005). Figure 6.3.2 confirms that, in fact, fewer incumbents are present in the group of IO-candidates. While 13 percent of the native-born candidates are incumbents, this applies to only 8 percent of the IO-candidates. The finding mirrors the numerical underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament in the preceding legislative terms (Wüst 2011). The pattern is further supported when taking a closer look at the number of legislative terms served in parliament and the number of previous candidacies. When comparing the number of legislative terms, a mean

of 0.34 for native-born candidates and a mean of 0.21 for IO-candidates are found, but the group difference fails statistical significance (p-value of t-test: 0.19). Similarly, the mean number of prior candidacies is 0.76 for native-born candidates but only 0.59 for IO-candidates (p-value of t-test: 0.16). The results reflect that IO-citizens made inroads into party politics rather recently.

7 Parties' Selection Behavior at the Stage of Candidate Selection

After providing descriptive insights into the candidate groups that are to be contrasted in the subsequent analysis, the selection practices which are in use towards IO-candidates come to the fore. By building upon the prevalent selection practices, measured by the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates, it will be studied for the whole array of recruitment indicators introduced in chapter 3 how political parties go about selecting IO-candidates.

7.1 Years of Party Membership

One of the most valued properties in the candidate selection is a longstanding track record within the own party organization. This applies to candidates who have a long history of activity within and on behalf of their party organization that is conducive to their political professionalization (Best et al. 2011: 171; Borchert/Golsch 1999: 126-127; Borchert/Stolz 2003: 156-157; Detterbeck 2010: 149; Edinger 2009: 191; Herzog 1975). But for social groups, such as IO-citizens, which are not yet well-integrated into party organizations, party seniority is a high hurdle to be taken in the candidate selection. An opening measure aimed at increasing the number of IO-candidates would therefore be to play wild cards by allowing them to skip the lengthy probation period within party organizations. Yet, if political parties fear electoral downturns caused by the nomination of IO-candidates, they tend to behave highly defensively towards aspiring IO-candidates. To prove their political capability to run for office, IO-candidates would need to outperform their native-born counterparts with regard to party seniority. If neutrality prevails, IO-candidates are party members for a similar time-period as their native-born counterparts.




Figure 7.1.1: Difference in the mean years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Difference is significant at $p \leq 0.01$ (t-test). $N = 845$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.1.1 displays the mean years of party membership at the first candidacy.²² Candidates that received a previous nomination are discarded as no information on their length of party membership at the first candidacy is available. Native-born candidates are party members for about 13 years when being up for election for the first time, while it is only nine years among IO-candidates. Even though IO-candidates take a somewhat faster track to their first candidacy, the descriptive results provide no strong evidence that most of the IO-candidates can skip the toilsome probation period within party organizations. For native-born candidates, a peak emerges at five to 15 years of party membership. After 15 years, the share of first-time candidates steadily decreases. This pattern is deemed plausible because party members who are highly ambitious for a legislative career will attempt to stand for election as early as possible. In contrast to native-born candidates, the peak is below five years when looking at IO-candidates. About 40 percent of the IO-candidates are party members for less than five years when running for election for the very first time.

²² In the CDU, EU citizens can become party members, while IO-citizens with non-EU citizenship can only hold a guest status (CDU 2016c: § 4). In the CSU, citizens of EU states can become party members immediately, while IO-citizens with non-EU citizenship can become party members after three years of legal residence in Germany (CSU 2016: § 3). In the FDP, foreign citizens can join the party after two years of legal residence in Germany (FDP 2016: § 2). In the party statutes of the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, no requirements are prescribed.




Figure 7.1.2: Difference in the mean age at party entry between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Dashed lines represent the mean age. Five-year intervals are displayed. N = 1.444.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.1.2 illustrates at what age candidates joined their party organization. Most of the candidates became party members at the age of 20 to 25 years, which corresponds to previous findings. Patzelt (1999a: 252), for example, found that legislators in West Germany join party organizations at the age of 24 years on average. Similarly, Golsch (1998: 143) referred to a mean age of 25 years for the 1994 German Bundestag. These numbers reflect that most candidates and parliamentarians become party members rather early in their life. For IO- and native-born candidates in comparison, widely similar age patterns become evident. While the mean age is 32 years in the latter group, it is 33 years for IO-candidates. Overall, a peak is found at the age of 20 to 25 years and descending percentages at the age groups over 25 years. But IO-candidates are more equally distributed across the age categories than native-born candidates. Since first-generation immigrants moved to Germany in later life, and, therefore, joined German party organizations at older ages, this pattern comes as no surprise.

In order to establish how the immigrant origin is associated with the length of party membership required to stand for election, multivariate regression models which incorporate potential confounders are estimated. The intuition of the research strategy is to identify how much variance in the candidates' years of party membership at the first candidacy is explained by the immigrant origin under otherwise equal political qualifications. However, throughout the analysis, a parsimonious modelling strategy is to be employed as the number of IO-candidates is constrained. In the appendix, all regression tables are displayed in detail that lie beneath the estimations. In a first step, the bivariate relationship between the immigrant origin and the re-

recruitment indicator under inspection is tested. In a second step, the individual-level control variables and the election and party fixed effects enter the statistical model. The two-step approach is best suited to counteracting a potential over-control that might lead to statistically insignificant effects of the immigrant origin if the statistical mechanisms of the relationship are netted out. If already in the bivariate model no statistically significant effect of the immigrant origin is evident, the non-findings in the full model hardly arise from an over-control but bear witness to no effect emanating from the immigrant background. As a reference, the result of the bivariate model is therefore always displayed.

Previous studies provide little guidance on the control variables which need to be included to unravel the effect of the immigrant origin on the years of party membership at the first candidacy. For the reasons discussed in chapter 5.3.4, socio-demographic background variables are included, more specifically gender (1 = female; 0 = male), age, age squared and education (1 = no graduation/no secondary school graduation; 5 = doctorate). Moreover, indicators of candidates' party engagement that can accelerate legislative careers are included. These are the amount of party activity, the number of prior political offices, the experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1). Candidates with extensive political engagement as a party member and experience in political office are more likely to reach their first nomination on the fast track as they are considered qualified and reliable enough to come forward as nominees at the state or national level (Bailer et al. 2013: 61). Furthermore, I argue that many of the organizational skills needed to build a professional political career, such as the knowledge of how to establish networks or to work on joint projects with others, can be acquired by engaging with civil society organizations. Also, political parties are interested in nominating candidates with extensive organizational ties to link with their social environment and mobilize electoral support (Poguntke 2005b). As organizational linkages are assumed to be conducive to being selected, I control for the number of organizational affiliations candidates are equipped with. Finally, election and party fixed effects are included to account for the pooled character of the data set. The SPD is defined as a reference. Its candidate selection can be expected to follow clear, entrenched patterns due to its high organizational age. Moreover, the Bundestag election is defined as a reference because differences between the recruitment profiles of the Bundestag and state-level candidates are more likely to be given than differences between state-level candidates.

As the length of party membership at the first candidacy is a count variable taking on positive integer values, negative binomial regression models are estimated (Gardner et al. 1995; Greene 1994; Lawless 1987). Given an overdispersion, Poisson regression models turned out to be inappropriate. As I care chiefly about effect sizes and the log count which is yielded by negative binomial regression models is difficult to interpret, average marginal effects (AMEs)

at observed values are presented (Brambor et al. 2006; Hanmer/Kalkan 2013; King et al. 2000). These are calculated by computing how changes in the independent variables are associated with changes in the dependent variable while keeping all other variables constant at their observed values. After calculating the marginal effect for each observation in the sample, the average is taken.




Figure 7.1.3:

Predictors of the years of party membership at the first candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.1 in the appendix. Grey dashed marker displays the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The AMEs displayed in figure 7.1.3 corroborate the previous descriptive findings. Compared to native-born candidates, IO-candidates can take a somewhat faster track to their first candidacy at the state or national level. In the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), the difference in the predicted years of party membership is 4.2 years and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. But it diminishes once the control variables are added to the statistical model and is now only 1.6 years. It discloses that, everything else being equal, IO-candidates reach their first candidacy 1.6 years earlier than native-born candidates. The predicted difference in the full model fails statistical significance, albeit only narrowly (p -value = 0.12). The difference of 1.6 years in the length of party membership emanating from the immigrant origin is not large enough to conclude that IO-candidates are party newcomers by a majority. The finding rather suggests that in individual cases, IO-candidates can skip a lengthy probation period within their

party organization and run for office as party newcomers on a so-called wild card. But for most of them, a longstanding party membership remains a critical requirement for nomination.

Against the expectations enunciated above, the predicted number of years of party membership at the first candidacy is positively associated with the number of prior political offices and previous experience in local-level and party office. Apparently, political office experience does not accelerate political careers but individuals spend more time in alternative political offices before running for election at the state or national level. Strikingly, no marked differences between the elections become evident, making clear that a longstanding party membership is of virtually equal importance for a candidacy at the state and national level. Party seniority is found to be less pronounced in the FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE compared with the SPD. As the former have a smaller membership (Niedermayer 2016) and more of their candidates must run in hopeless races, they face more difficulties in finding party members that are willing to shoulder the burdens of accepting a nomination, which forces them to nominate candidates earlier in their party membership.




Figure 7.1.4: Difference in the years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Next, the conditioning effects of the control variables that measure the political qualifications of parliamentary candidates are explored more thoroughly. I aim to see to what extent the relationship found above holds when varying the parameter values of the control variables. While keeping all control variables constant, the immigrant background is interacted with each indicator of political experience. This approach is suited for a more-in-depth understanding of the selection practices employed towards IO-candidates. It might be possible that newcomer recruitment occurs only if IO-candidates are equipped with other political merits which compensate for their shorter party membership. Or, it is only used towards politically inexperienced IO-candidates, stressing their preferential treatment in the candidate selection. As it is notoriously difficult to interpret interaction effects solely on the basis of regression coefficients, graphical evidence is presented to reveal the conditioning effects.

Figure 7.1.4 plots the AME of the immigrant background on the predicted years of party membership against the control variables introduced earlier. The amount of party activity does not affect in any significant manner how fast IO-candidates reach their first candidacy in comparison to native-born candidates. The small but statistically insignificant gap to the zero line indicates that IO-candidates are party members for a shorter time-period than native-born candidates when standing for election for the first time but this is independent of how many hours per week they devote to party activities. When considering the number of previous political offices, indications of a preferential treatment of IO-candidates over native-born candidates are given. IO-candidates are predicted to reach their first candidacy significantly faster than native-born candidates with equal office experience but only if having above-average experience in office – the difference in predicted years is 5.2 years. Similarly, IO-candidates who gained experience in party and local-level office reach their first candidacy earlier than native-born candidates with equal office experience. Apparently, contingent upon previous office experience, political parties become willing to nominate IO-candidates earlier in their party membership than native-born candidates. One reason is that political parties take a great risk when nominating party newcomers. They lack information on the candidates' political skills and reliability. Political office experience therefore serves as a compensation which fast-tracks the IO-candidates' first nomination by assuring political parties of their reliability and political qualification.

Moreover, IO-candidates seem to reach their first candidacy faster than native-born candidates when being equipped with few organizational ties, although the difference fails statistical significance. Nonetheless, it is indicated that IO-candidates are treated preferentially over native-born candidates even if gathering few organizational support networks behind them. The results suggest that IO-candidates are treated preferentially over native-born candidates as far

as their length of party membership at the first candidacy is concerned but this hinges, to some extent, on previous experience in political office.




Figure 7.1.5:

Difference in the years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.2 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Up to this point, no distinction between different immigrant subgroups was drawn. This approach is in line with the initial argument advancing that, from the parties' point of view, the external differentiation of IO-citizens overshadows their internal differentiation, making the nomination of IO-candidates a way to signal openness to IO-citizens and strengthen party ties with IO-voters. However, there is good reason to assume that political parties do not lump together immigrant subgroups but are aware of their internal differentiation. In cultural and religious terms, some immigrant groups stand out more clearly from the majority population than others (Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Ford 2011). Their nomination therefore sends out a stronger signal that political parties strive after a political integration of IO-citizens and attend to their political representation. Building upon the empirical insights presented in chapter 2.3, Muslim candidates, candidates from non-European countries and from Muslim countries stand out more strongly from the German majority population than IO-candidates of Christian background or from European countries – for instance, in terms of religion, appearance, language and names. Proceeding from these elaborations, the findings presented above run the risk of

failing to capture variances in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates across different immigrant subgroups. Therefore, the initial regression model is re-run but different immigrant subgroups are included as independent variables. The AMEs for each subgroup are plotted alongside the estimate for IO-candidates as a whole that serves as a reference point.

The estimates displayed in figure 7.1.5 confirm the reflections of the previous paragraph. The distance in the predicted years of party membership to native-born candidates is the lowest for IO-candidates from European countries with only 0.71 years. By contrast, Muslim candidates, candidates from non-European and from Muslim countries run for election earlier in their party membership. For Muslim candidates, the difference in predicted years is 1.4, while it is 2.1 for IO-candidates from non-European countries and 2.4 for IO-candidates from Muslim countries. But also for IO-candidates of Christian denomination, a difference of 1.9 years is found. Even though all estimates fail statistical significance due to small group sizes, the findings suggest that political parties do not treat IO-candidates entirely equally. They tend to nominate IO-candidates from culturally more distinct immigrant subgroups earlier in their party membership because these send out stronger signals to voters that political parties attend to the political representation of IO-citizens and are open to multiculturalism. At the same time, however, the weak effects also stress that a minimum length of party membership is indispensable in the candidate selection. It is indicative of the candidates' loyalty to party interests, their political competencies and their familiarity with the own party organization. Unfortunately, the different immigrant subgroups cannot be differentiated throughout the further analysis as the number of observations is too low.

Congruent with the quantitative results, most IO-candidates reported in the qualitative interviews that they did not run for election immediately after joining a party organization but became gradually involved. They described their career trajectories in conformity with the literature on legislative recruitment. Learning how party organizations work, forging intra-party alliances, cultivating a personal reputation and visibility within the party organization, understanding the formal and informal party structures, gaining experience in lower-level and more sheltered positions were pictured as indispensable for competing for a professional legislative office. Against this backdrop, most IO-candidates did not run for election as party newcomers but spent years climbing up the intra-party recruitment ladder by holding lower-level positions and engaging in party activities, such as election campaigning, both of which are instrumental in being nominated:

I participated in the very first meeting to which I was invited. It then was giving and taking: "Don't you want to become a delegate?", "Do you want to join the campaign team?", "Do you want to join the party leadership?" and so on. I assumed everything. I wanted to and the party recognized my interest and needed willing persons (Interview 6).

Owing to a lack of information, we had [...] an entirely wrong idea of how political parties work. [...] we had the idea that we would join a party organization and have all opportunities. It quickly turned out to be wrong (Interview 2).

Most IO-candidates were not asked by other party actors, such as local party chairmen or rank-and-file party members, if they want to join a party organization. Instead, the motivation for joining a party organization had to emanate from the candidates themselves and was not inspired by other party actors. After the personal decision to join a party organization was made, most IO-candidates felt welcome and faced no resentment against their immigrant background:

I always sympathized with [political party]. After naturalization, I could vote and always voted for this party [...]. One day, I said, "Until now you have voted for the political party which – as you think – does the best work. Now you must put your cards on the table and become politically active. Become a party member, support the party not only at the ballot box but as a party member. [...] In my hometown, I called the local party chairman [...] and said, "I am interested." By name, it was obvious that I am no native German. [...] the local party chairman said: "Welcome! Do you want to come to our next meeting?" This happened to take place two weeks later. I went there, it was crowded and I was welcomed very friendly (Interview 7).

Only those IO-candidates who joined party organizations in the early 1980s faced animosity towards their immigrant origin. At that time, IO-citizens were not considered part of the German society (Koopmans 1999; Rensmann 2014; Thränhardt 2002), reflected in a blatant animosity towards party members of immigrant background. Since the year 2000, however, two factors brought about a marked change in the treatment of party members of immigrant background to a greater openness. First, the stances adopted on IO-citizens changed after 1998 when the German government, formed by the SPD and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, for the first time ever referred to Germany as an immigration country. Second, after the citizenship reform in 2000 that reduced the hurdles for naturalization and the acquisition of German citizenship, political parties started realizing the high voting potential lying in IO-voters. This heralded a significant change in the attitudes towards party members of immigrant origin:

I am talking about the 1980s and 90s [...]. Some people said, "If you don't like it [the political situation], you can change it in [country of origin]." Even my own party colleagues said so. I answered, "I am paying membership fees just like you and I decide when to go" (Interview 1).

When turning to the seeds of the personal decision to join a party organization, IO-candidates stressed the importance of the political socialization within the own family, which is in line with the literature (e.g. Gruber 2009: 101; Herzog 1975: 49). However, in contrast to native-born candidates, it was closely associated with the political experience in the country of origin. In the case of IO-candidates coming from autocratic countries, the personal or the parents' experience with political repression or with political or religious prosecution gave rise to their political mobilization. As a second motivation for joining German party organizations, the minority role in Germany was emphasized. Being part of a minority provided IO-candidates with a sense of responsibility to represent IO-citizens in German party organizations:

If you are one of 80 million, you rather come to the situation to say, "Things are going well, why should I engage? I can consume instead of produce." If you are part of a minority [...] you rather come to the point to say, "I participate to ensure that everything goes well" (Interview 2).

If my name was Georg Meier, I would not have been under pressure to join a political party [...]. My immigrant background is the starting point for my political engagement" (Interview 8).

A third reason for joining a party organization was the experience of discrimination. For instance, on the occasion of the CDU signature campaign against dual citizenship in the 1999 Hessian state election, many IO-candidates made the decision to join center-left parties. Through this, they wanted to voice their political protest:

I saw these information stands of the CDU with a petition against dual citizenship. They set the public opinion against immigrants [...]. People went there and asked, "Where can I sign against immigrants?" [...]. This was a horrible experience and then I made the decision [to join party x] (Interview 6).

Fourth, the role model function of IO-legislators was stressed. This finding emphasizes the symbolic value of descriptive representation which can encourage the political involvement of so far underrepresented groups by strengthening their political self-confidence and changing their political self-perception from politically passive to active citizens:

My party engagement was encouraged by political personalities [of immigrant background] [...]. When a Turkish-origin MP entered parliament [...], I recognized that the political party supports not only certain policies but also persons of immigrant background in their political careers (Interview 5).

When I came to Germany, [...] I saw a legislator of immigrant background on television. In this moment, I thought, "It is possible to join a party organization – even for me!" I received German citizenship at a much later date (Interview 8).

All four sources of party engagement that were brought to light by the qualitative interviews are closely related to the immigrant origin. The immigrant background appears to be inherent in the decision to join a party organization. But not in all cases, IO-candidates took the straight way to party organizations. Turkish-origin first-generation immigrants in particular made detours through political organizations that are offshoots of foreign political parties and focus chiefly on homeland politics, such as the *Föderation der Immigrantenvereine aus der Türkei e.V. (GDF)*, the *Föderation der Demokratischen Arbeitervereine (DIDF)*, or the *Föderation der Volksvereine türkischer Sozialdemokraten (HDF)*. After realizing that changing the political situation in their country of origin, but not in the society they live in, does not fit their everyday life, they decided to join a German party organization, as illustrated by the following quote:

The traditional immigrant groups, such as Greeks, Spaniards, Turks and Italians were politically active but homeland-oriented [...]. Our daily lives were not shaped by the political circumstances here [in Germany], but by homeland politics. Let's put it like this: Our feet were here but our heads were in Turkey, Greece or Spain. One day, I decided my head to be where my feet are. It was then that I joined the party youth organization (Interview 1).

Other IO-candidates took a detour through the Councils of Foreigners (Liebau 1999). Although these are publicly criticized for their negligible political impact, they seem to contribute

to a political socialization of IO-citizens and provide them with organizational skills that are also helpful in navigating through party organizations.

The initial period as a party member was a great challenge to most IO-candidates. Understanding how the party structures and processes work and becoming familiar with the language used within party organizations posed a tremendous challenge to them. This is especially true for first-generation immigrants that gained their first political experience in the country of origin where party language, party structure and culture were significantly different from those prevailing in German party organizations. One IO-candidate therefore described the introduction to the party structure and culture given by a longstanding party member as most crucial in not being put off after the very first local party meeting:

There was a man. His job was to explain what will happen to new party members. Without his introduction, I would have gone immediately. He explained that the language will be different, everybody calls each other comrade and suchlike (Interview 8).

As the analysis revealed, most IO-candidates do not run for election as party newcomers but spend years climbing up the intra-party recruitment ladder. However, in individual cases, political parties play so-called wild cards by letting IO-candidates skip the lengthy probation period within party organizations. But newcomer recruitment is employed only if contenders are equipped with resources which make them eminently qualified to establish party ties with IO-voters and enhance the party expertise in immigration-related issues, and no contenders with comparable properties are available in the own membership. Above all, close contact with immigrant organizations, a name recognition and network in the immigration field and expertise in immigration-related issues turned out to be the pivotal resources that can motivate a newcomer recruitment. These resources can be gathered either by volunteer engagement, for example, in a foreigner council or integration committee, or by professional work in the immigration field, for instance, for a social organization, a ministry or a municipal administration.

Apparently, it is not the immigrant background as such but its interplay with other immigration-related properties which can accelerate the first nomination of IO-candidates. Placing IO-candidates with a credible issue ownership in the immigration field on the ballot paper is a way to strengthen party ties with IO-voters by signaling openness to them and a way to signal expertise in immigration-related issues to the broader electorate. Moreover, political parties view IO-candidates' networks in the immigration field as means of mobilizing IO-voters that remained untapped up to now. Consequently, it is not the immigrant background which triggers an opening but its combination with a reputation, expertise and network in the immigration field, which are believed to merge into a strong and credible signal that political parties attend

to the political representation of IO-citizens and acknowledge the cultural diversity of the population they represent. IO-candidates that lack these resources are thought not to emit equally strong signals, which is why they must undergo the standard intra-party recruitment process to stand for election:

Certainly, the immigrant background was an important reason [for my early nomination]. But it was not the only reason. Due to my voluntary work, I have regular contacts with political organizations, religious organizations and other groups that are involved in integration politics. I have a reputation in this field. My party recruited me [...] because I was a strategic benefit due to my networks and contacts and my expertise [...]. The party searched for a known face in the field of integration and migration (Interview 3).

Newcomer recruitment emanates chiefly from the state party leaderships, especially from the party chairmen. The state leadership defines the general electoral course taken in the upcoming election. If the state party leadership places emphasis on migration and integration policy and aspires to signal expertise in this policy area on the one hand, and defines IO-voters as electorally relevant on the other, it prospects for potential IO-candidates that could credibly represent this policy expertise and address IO-voters most effectively. Where necessary, it employs newcomer recruitment if no contender with the wanted profile is available in the own membership. Initial contacts between the state leadership and externally recruited IO-candidates date from previous meetings due to the candidates' political work in the immigration field:

I was called by the state leadership because I had a good rapport with it [due to my previous work in the immigration field] and were asked whether I could imagine supporting the party [in the election]. I took some time for reflection and decided to join the party (Interview 3).

As an explanation of why political parties do not make more use of newcomer recruitment to increase the number of IO-candidates, the qualitative interviews pointed to its perils. Not only native-born party members feel passed over if newcomers of immigrant background are favored at their expense. But also party members of immigrant background feel disregarded if external IO-candidates are preferred to longstanding party members of immigrant background by the virtue of their networks and visibility in the immigration field. For them, it is difficult to understand why an external IO-candidate without any track record of services on behalf of the party organizations is preferred. This predicament is more likely to strain center-left parties in which more IO-citizens are present in the party membership:

[Criticism] emanated mainly from party members who had an immigrant background. Of course, there is an explanation: Generally, you must work your way up and as a lateral entrant, I got to the top immediately. This caused resentment among parts of the party members of immigrant background [...]. I know party members who try to get this position for 30 years but did not get there. And now someone completely new gets the position (Interview 3).

In my political party, we don't have the luxury to say, "We run an external candidate [of immigrant background]!" There are numerous party members [of immigrant background] who aspire to a political career. [...] I am against external candidates who come and simply say, "Here I am" (Interview 1).

Somebody, a migrant, said to me, "Mr. X, I want to go into politics. I want to make a fast career." [...]. This is not possible as many persons wish to come forward within party organizations, there is a conflict of interests (Interview 4).

Moreover, party seniority is a crucial indicator of the contenders' loyalty to party interests and their experience and familiarity with the political realm. Owing to a lack of political experience gained from party engagement, novices are more likely to come to grief running election campaigns and organizing their parliamentary work than longstanding party members:

People [of immigrant background] that are party members for six weeks say, "Everyone knows me [...], why not nominate me?" The answer is: This is not enough. It is not necessary that someone is in the party for years but some basic rules must be considered. One basic rule is that candidates should be known [within the party organization]. We nominated too many candidates we did not know before, simply because they appeared likeable and then we noticed that it does not work. [...] We need to know whether someone is capable and reliable (Interview 8).




Figure 7.1.6:

Difference in the years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.3 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Although evidence is provided that IO-candidates reach their first candidacy somewhat faster than native-born candidates – but only if they are equipped with certain resources, such as close ties with immigrant organizations and expertise in the immigration field –, newcomer recruitment remains the exception rather than the rule. Proceeding from these findings, the question arises of whether the pattern remains stable under different conditions. Any attempt at understanding parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates needs to take into account surrounding circumstances in which candidate selection proceedings are embedded. As argued in chapter 4.1, political parties are not equally keen on running IO-candidates for election but center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more

likely to open up the candidate selection to IO-candidates than political parties which are located more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP. The previous findings therefore run the risk of obscuring differences in the party strategies for nominating IO-candidates.

In figure 7.1.6, the differences between IO- and native-born candidates in their predicted years of party membership at the first candidacy are displayed, separately for each political party. The AMEs are based on interaction terms between the immigrant origin and candidates' party affiliation while keeping the control variables constant. By a visual inspection, it is found that IO-candidates are party members for a markedly shorter time-period than native-born candidates when being listed on the ballot paper of the SPD. The difference is 5.2 years and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. By a difference of 2.9 years, IO-candidates also seem to reach their first candidacy faster in the FDP, but the group difference fails statistical significance. Given the liberal political orientation of the FDP that stresses meritocratic criteria and rejects any form of affirmative action, this pattern comes unexpectedly.

In the other political parties, only weak and statistically insignificant differences emerge between both candidate groups. With regard to the CDU/CSU, the finding corroborates the initial assumption that political parties on the right of the political spectrum refrain from a preferential treatment of IO-candidates as they risk alienating conservative voters and party members. For BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, however, the results come as a surprise. Center-left parties were argued to be more likely to employ opening strategies due to their leftist ideology (Kittilson/Tate 2004) and their strong electoral support from voter groups of immigrant background (Wüst 2002). However, it has to be borne in mind that BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE attracted party members of immigrant background much earlier and in larger numbers than the CDU/CSU and FDP, which started appealing to IO-voters more recently (Claro da Fonseca 2011). Therefore, their pool of party members of immigrant background is probably larger. This makes a preferential treatment less urgent to bypass a low supply of potential IO-candidates and offers an explanation for the counter-intuitive finding. In the light of the previous findings, they would even be in peril of affronting their longstanding party members of immigrant background when nominating party newcomers of immigrant background.




Figure 7.1.7: Difference in the years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.4 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD nomination. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The selection behavior of political parties is expected to vary not only across political parties but also across the mode of the candidacy (e.g. Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). Political parties are not entirely free in their candidate selection but electoral rules shape their choices concerning the candidate selection. In the literature, it was argued that political parties avoid fielding IO-candidates in SMDs as they are believed to have a limited voter appeal. Instead, they tend to select candidates who resemble the average voter by being “white, middle aged, able-bodied, heterosexual and male” (Durose et al. 2013: 258). Party lists, by contrast, are aimed at presenting a diverse candidate tableau to voters which is conducive to broadening the parties’ collective voter appeal. It follows that an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates is more likely to occur if party list slots are allocated, while political parties are expected to employ defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure in SMDs.

The difference between native-born and IO-candidates in their predicted years of party membership at the first candidacy is presented in figure 7.1.7, distinctly for each mode of candidacy. The AMEs are based on interaction terms between the immigrant background and candidates’ mode of candidacy while keeping the control variables constant. IO-candidates running for election only in SMDs are found to be party members for a similar time-period as native-born candidates, indicating that neutral selection practices prevail in SMDs. In contrast to SMDs, IO-candidates are nominated earlier in their party membership when being allocated a

party list position. The difference is 3.8 years and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. As political parties aspire to balance their party lists by selecting diverse sets of group representatives in order to reach out to a preferably wide range of voter groups (Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Valdini 2012), they are inclined to nominate IO-candidates earlier in their party membership to make certain that, despite a low supply, IO-candidates will be named on the party list. Unlike SMDs, party lists allow political parties to nominate more than one group representative. This is why IO-candidates are regarded as a contribution towards the diversification of party lists, conducive to establishing closer electoral ties with IO-voters without being forced to neglect other representational groups. Those IO-candidates that run for election on both electoral tiers are party members for a similar time-period as native-born candidates, indicating neutral selection practices. Apparently, dual nominations are dominated by the selection logic of SMDs. As nominating conventions in SMDs usually precede the allocation of party list slots (Manow/Nistor 2009: 603; Roberts 1988: 100; Zeuner 1970: 149), the finding is not unexpected. Dual candidates must first of all clear the hurdle of being nominated in SMDs before making a bid for nomination on party lists.

Overall, evidence for a conditioning effect of the mode of candidacy is provided. Political parties are more likely to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates when party list slots are allocated. By contrast, widely neutral patterns are evident in SMDs and with regard to dual nominations. Apparently, a party list nomination is the mode of candidacy that is most conducive to accommodating party newcomers of immigrant origin.




Figure 7.1.8:

Difference in the years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.5 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, party delegate assembly. N for SMDs = 209; N for party lists = 304.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

According to Hazan and Rahat (2006b: 372), inclusive party selectorates spawn more distorted candidate selection outcomes than exclusive party selectorates (see also Hazan/Rahat 2010; Rahat et al. 2008). Based on their assumption, it was argued that an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates becomes more likely if delegate assemblies are involved. They form a more exclusive selection context compared to party member assemblies. To come to know whether the type of party selectorate makes any difference in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, interaction terms between the immigrant background and the responsible selectorate type are incorporated into the statistical model while keeping the control variables constant. Figure 7.1.8 presents the AMEs of the immigrant background on the predicted years of party membership at the first candidacy for each selectorate type.²³

Overall, however, only little variance in the selection behavior of political towards IO-candidates is found across the type of party selectorate. The empirical results give little credibility to the assumption that the type of party selectorate impacts the selection strategies pursued towards IO-candidates as regards their length of party membership. It makes virtually no difference in the length of party membership IO-candidates need until running for election for the

²³ Generally, the state party statutes either stipulate a certain selectorate type for the state nominating convention or leave it to the state party leadership to prescribe a selectorate type. In SMDs, it is usually the district party leadership which is entitled to stipulate the selectorate type.

first time whether they are picked by party delegates or rank-and-file party members. One explanation for the finding is that party selectorates often face a low number of contenders at the nominating convention. The reason behind is that informal selection processes take place prior to the nominating convention which curtail the selectorates' influence on the selection outcomes (Reiser 2013; Zeuner 1970). If only one contender is up for selection, the party selectorate type cannot make any difference in the selection behavior towards IO-candidates, but similar selection outcomes are the inevitable consequence. Such informal agreements of party leaders are very likely to be negotiated if party newcomers of immigrant background are recruited purposefully.




Figure 7.1.9: Difference in the years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.6 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. N = 685.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Scholars that devoted attention to electoral system effects on the representation of marginalized groups not only stressed the beneficial effects of PR electoral systems on representational parity but pointed out the importance of the district magnitude of MMDs (e.g. Darcy et al. 1994; Engstrom 1987; Fortin-Rittberger/Rittberger 2014; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Rae 1967; Salmond 2006; Schwindt-Bayer/Mishler 2005; Studlar/Welch 1991). When the number of seats allocated to MMDs increases, nominating committees have more options of balancing the ticket in order to appeal to a wide range of voter groups. What is more, political parties can open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates to make sure that such

candidates are listed without being forced to neglect the representation of other relevant voter groups. From the previous arguments, the expectation is derived that political parties become more inclined to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if MMDs move towards a higher district magnitude.

Figure 7.1.9 plots the AME of the immigrant background on the predicted years of party membership against the district magnitude of MMDs, based on an interaction term between the immigrant variable and the district magnitude of MMDs while keeping the control variables constant. I treat the relationship as a linear process because the model fit is not inferior to other specifications of the relationship. As candidates are nested in MMDs, a two-level random-intercept model is estimated to overcome the risk of inflated standard errors (Gelman/Hill 2007; Hayes 2006; Snijders/Bosker 2012). Multilevel regression models with random intercepts allow intercept estimates to vary across the level-2 units – here MMDs. By allowing for cross-MMD heterogeneity, more valid estimates of the cross-level interaction effect are provided (Snijders/Bosker 2012).²⁴ Previously, a random slope for the immigrant variable was included. But the slope hardly varied across MMDs and did not improve the model fit.

The gap to the zero line confirms what was previously found. IO-candidates reach their first candidacy on party lists somewhat earlier than native-born candidates due to ticket-balancing efforts of political parties. The marginal effects are, however, statistically significant only in parts, which relates to the low case number of IO-candidates in some value ranges. Against all expectation, the years of party membership IO-candidates need until arriving at their first candidacy do not depend on the district magnitude of MMDs. Political parties do not employ more offensive selection strategies towards IO-candidates when the options for ticket-balancing increase. Their selection practices remain largely unaffected by the size of the district magnitude.

This can be explained by the fact that, irrespective of the district magnitude, the space for ticket-balancing is confined. Political parties must meet numerous formal and informal quotas when compiling their party lists. Party lists are pre-structured by regional quotas, gender, social background, party factions and the representational claims voiced by the sociological intra-party groups (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). In the face of myriad representational claims acting on political parties, an increasing district magnitude does not strongly relieve the

²⁴ Note that the estimates of the MMD parameters might be imprecise as only 25 cases at level 2 are available. As Gelman and Hill (2007: 275) argued, multilevel modelling adds little information to one-level models in such cases as it is more difficult to estimate the between-group variation.

pressure to satisfy numerous group-related representation interests. This prevents political parties from employing more offensive selection strategies towards IO-candidates even if a large number of ballot positions are available.




Figure 7.1.10:

Difference in the years of party membership at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.7 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. $N = 527$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Due to their zero-sum character, SMD races were argued to be to the detriment of underrepresented groups, such as women and ethnic minorities. According to this reasoning, political parties prefer nominating candidates who conform to the average voter and run into minimal opposition from local voters (Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). But the argument does not take account of the demographic context of SMDs. In SMDs with a high concentration of IO-citizens, these form the largest voter bloc in the local constituency and define the average voter (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Grofman/Handley 1989; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). Consequently, the spatial concentration of IO-citizens in electoral districts acts as an incentive to nominate IO-candidates

who address IO-voters. Moreover, the political integration of IO-citizens is more of a concern in electoral districts with a large fraction of IO-citizens. One way to signal efforts in this direction is the nomination of IO-candidates. Against this backdrop, political parties are expected to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if SMDs are characterized by a large IO-population. Conversely, they are expected to employ more defensive selection strategies in SMDs of a low ethnic concentration. Here, they prefer candidates who resemble the average native-born voter.

To scrutinize whether the local concentration of IO-citizens affects the selection strategies for nominating IO-candidates in the way as put forth in the previous paragraph, the AME of the immigrant origin on the predicted years of party membership at the first candidacy is plotted against different proportions of foreigners in SMDs. The predictions presented in figure 7.1.10 are all based on cross-level interaction terms between the immigrant background and SMD context variables while keeping the other relevant SMD context variables and the control variables constant. Note that no collinearity issues are encountered. As candidates are nested in SMDs, two-level negative binomial regression models with random intercepts for SMDs are presented (Gelman/Hill 2007; Snijders/Bosker 2012). The random slope for the immigrant variable proved to be inconsequential for the overall model fit and its variance was extremely low.

Contrary to expectations, figure 7.1.10 demonstrates that the marginal effect of the immigrant background remains widely stable across different percentages of foreigners in SMDs. The plotted estimates run nearly parallel to the zero line, indicating that the selection behavior of political parties is not perceivably conditioned by the concentration of IO-citizens in electoral districts. Even in SMDs with a markedly high voting potential of IO-citizens, political parties are not more inclined to recruit rookies of immigrant background to make sure of being able to address IO-voters. Instead, IO-candidates are party members for a similar time-period as native-born candidates when running for election for the first time in SMDs, and this happens to be independent of the local proportion of IO-citizens.

One explanation disclosed by the qualitative interviews is that demographic aspects do not play the most important role in the candidate selection proceedings of SMDs. Party newcomers are usually fielded in SMDs that remained vacant to avoid putting local contenders and party members off. Consequently, the strategic calculus of recruiting party newcomers of immigrant background for SMDs that exhibit a large IO-population is outweighed by other considerations, such as the vacancy of SMDs. If vacant SMDs are characterized by a high proportion of IO-citizens, this is regarded as a lucky circumstance, but demographic considerations flow into the selection decision only at a second stage. Another reason why no effect change emerges is that the supply of longstanding party members of immigrant background is probably larger in SMDs

that are characterized by a high proportion of IO-citizens. If political parties face enough potential IO-candidates among their rank-and-file party members, they are not obliged to fall back on newcomer recruitment.

To make the decision as to whether IO-candidates should be nominated in SMDs, political parties attempt to anticipate how likely local voters are to spurn IO-candidates under the given socio-economic conditions. In socially deprived SMDs, prejudices against immigrants are more pronounced than in well-off electoral districts (Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2014; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014). In the face of a potential backlash against IO-candidates, political parties are expected to close their candidate selection to IO-candidates if local settings stand out due to a high social deprivation.

Differently than anticipated, figure 7.1.10 reveals that political parties do not close their candidate selection to IO-candidates if electoral districts move towards a higher unemployment rate, which captures the economic dimension of social deprivation. The marginal effects are weak and statistically insignificant throughout, disclosing that the unemployment rate has no influence on the selection behavior of political parties when it comes to the nomination of IO-candidates. When turning to the proportion of high school graduates, which is indicative of the cultural dimension of social deprivation, I find that an opening for IO-candidates becomes more likely when electoral districts move towards higher educational levels. If the educational level is low, IO-candidates are party members for a similar time-period as native-born candidates at their first nomination. Once the share of high school graduates rises to 15 percentage points above average, IO-candidates are predicted to run for election five years earlier than native-born candidates. Overall, however, the social deprivation of SMDs does not exert strong influence on the parties' selection behavior vis-à-vis IO-candidates. One obvious reason is that political parties not only close their candidate selection if they fear to forfeit votes by the nomination of IO-candidates. But they make clear at earlier recruitment stages that aspirants of immigrant background will not come forward as candidates. Those IO-candidates that made their way through the candidate selection despite hostile demographic conditions are a highly selective sample that faced no closure.

When taking the decision as to whether to nominate IO-candidates in SMDs, political parties pay attention to the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in the local constituency. If substantial fractions of the local constituents take positive attitudes towards multiculturalism, an opening is more likely than in SMDs where anti-immigrant sentiments are strongly pronounced, as the risk of electoral losses is high. While no notable effect emanates from the electoral strength of far-right political parties, the difference in the predicted years of party membership between IO- and native-born candidates is weak in rural areas with only two years but

increases to six years in highly urban SMDs. Although the marginal effect is statistically insignificant, the nomination of party newcomers of immigrant origin seems to be more likely in urban settings where multiculturalism is integral to daily life. The presumption that tolerance towards multiculturalism is more pronounced in urban settings, making the selection processes of political parties more open to IO-candidates, is also confirmed by the qualitative interviews:

I had a party colleague who said, "I grew up in a city. My whole life I grew up with Ali." And his wife said, "I come from a small village. I met Ali for the first time when I moved to the city at the age of 30." Of course, this plays a decisive role [in the candidate selection] (Interview 2).

Moreover, political parties come under mounting pressure to respond to the heterogeneous composition of urban electorates. Their established recruitment processes are not capable of capturing the diversity of urban constituents but tend to reproduce the incumbent candidate types. Therefore, it is considered necessary to depart from the established recruitment process by playing more wild cards. Otherwise, political parties fail to mirror the diverse composition of urban electoral markets and lose their ties with urban constituents:

In large cities, political parties have no electoral prospects if they cannot address the lifestyle of the population which is diverse (Interview 1).

I think, political parties are self-absorbed; they have their established circles and networks. The allegation of parallel structures applies not only to IO-citizens but to party organizations as well (Interview 5).

7.2 Encouragement

With encouragement, office-seeking ambitions of party members can be sparked that would not strive for legislative office on their own initiative. In the case of opening, IO-candidates have a higher chance of encouragement than native-born candidates. By asking potential IO-candidates to make a bid for nomination, party actors can counteract a low supply of self-recruited IO-candidates. However, if political parties behave highly defensively towards IO-candidates, they are less likely than native-born candidates to be encouraged. In the case of neutrality, by contrast, no strong disparity in the chance of encouragement emerges. In the GCS, respondents were asked whether running for nomination was their own decision or whether it aroused out of encouragement from other persons or groups. Consequently, the detailed sources of encouragement remain vague and need to be fathomed further through the qualitative interviews.




Figure 7.2.1: Difference in encouragement to run for election between native-born and IO-candidates. *Note:* Fisher's exact test value is 0.603. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.01$. $N = 780$. *Source:* GCS 2013.

As figure 7.2.1 reveals, one fifth of the candidates are self-starters that made the decision to run for nomination entirely by themselves. The majority, conversely, threw their hats into the ring after others had asked them to make a bid for nomination, which is line with previous findings (e.g. Allen/Cutts 2017; Broockman 2014b; Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox/Lawless 2010; Lawless/Fox 2005, 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006a). The results suggest that the decision to strive for a candidacy is not made individually in most cases but is affected by social impulses. This gives a competitive edge to those individuals that are deeply embedded in social networks. When comparing IO- to native-born candidates, a difference of 3 percentage points is found. Somewhat fewer IO-candidates are encouraged in their ambition to run for office. But the group difference is weak and statistically insignificant, as revealed by Fisher's exact test. Although political parties can try to shape their candidate pools by mobilizing certain individuals to make a bid for office (Broockman 2014b), they do not seem to use encouragement as a targeted measure to increase the passel of IO-candidates.

To disentangle the degree to which the immigrant origin affects the chance of encouragement, binary logistic regression models are presented, in which I control for potential confounders. The modelling strategy is aimed at capturing how much variance in the individual chance of encouragement is explained by the immigrant origin under otherwise equal political qualifications. As binary logistic regression models are non-linear, their logit coefficients do not give information about the effect size of the predictors (Ai/Norton 2003; Berry et al. 2010; Brambor et al. 2006; Buis 2010; Hosmer 2013; Long/Freese; Norton et al. 2004; Pampel 2001). Therefore, I present AMEs at observed values which facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of the results (Hanmer/Kalkan 2013; King et al. 2000; Verlinda 2006).

For the reasons discussed earlier, I control for socio-demographic background variables. Furthermore, I expect that incumbents (= 1) have a higher chance of encouragement. Due to their name recognition, media coverage, reputation earned through implemented policy projects and their networks, incumbents have an electoral edge over novices (Erikson 1971; Gelman/King 1990; Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Lee 2001; Levitt/Wolfram 1997), which makes their re-selection tempting for political parties. Moreover, incumbents are familiar with the working processes of parliament which enables them to continue their legislative work right away. For the same reason, encouragement is expected to become more likely when the number of legislative terms spent in parliament increases. The longer candidates had a seat in parliament, the more of the political resources making their re-selection attractive could be gained. But also the candidates' number of previous candidacies, the years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of prior political offices and experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1) are expected to affect encouragement. Longstanding, highly experienced and extensively networked party members are more likely to be considered qualified enough to compete for office (Allen 2013a; Niven 2006). In addition, they have more of the party contacts from which encouragement can originate. The number of organizational affiliations is included because political parties use candidates' linkages with civil society organizations for stabilizing their electoral support, making the nomination of candidates with numerous organizational affiliations electorally promising. Finally, party fixed effects account for remaining idiosyncrasies, such as different party patterns regarding the use of encouragement.




Figure 7.2.2:

Predictors of encouragement to run for election.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.8 in the appendix. Grey dashed marker displays the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 731.

Source: GCS 2013.

Figure 7.2.2 demonstrates that the AME of the immigrant background on the chance of encouragement is markedly small. The marginal effect suggests that the immigrant background is no decisive factor that significantly affects the likelihood of encouragement, net of other influences. The estimate size of the marginal effect is only 3 percentage points and fails statistical significance. Even in the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), no noteworthy and statistically significant effect of the immigrant origin becomes evident. In other words, no systematic difference between IO- and native-born candidates exists as regards their chance of encouragement. As already suggested by the descriptive statistics, encouragement plays an important role in the recruitment of both candidate groups, irrespective of being of immigrant origin or not.

Also with regard to most control variables, no statistically significant effects become evident. Male candidates are 11 percentage points less likely than female candidates to be emboldened by others. The finding sides with the research on women recruitment (Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013; Sanbonmatsu 2006b). While men tend to be self-recruiters who have the self-confidence to enter the electoral race of their own accord, women are more dependent on external impulses to make a bid for nomination. Candidates of the FDP have a 13 percentage points lower probability than SPD candidates of being encouraged. The finding is

consonant with the party's liberal ideology that gives weight to the notion of personal responsibility. But also candidates of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN are less likely to be asked to run for election by a gap of 15 percentage points.




Figure 7.2.3: Difference in encouragement to run for election between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 731.

Source: GCS 2013.

The fact that no effect of the immigrant background is found underlines the necessity of fitting regression models that are more sensitive to underlying variances. Therefore, I take a closer look at the conditioning effects of the control variables that capture the candidates' political qualifications. While controlling for the other confounding variables, the AME of the immigrant background is plotted against different values of each control variable, based on interactions between the immigrant variable and each control factor. The intuition behind is that the previous analysis might have masked differences in the chance of encouragement which are contingent on the level of political experience. It is possible that encouragement occurs only if

IO-candidates are equipped with a minimum degree of political experience and party integration, or, vice versa, encouragement happens only to party newcomers of immigrant background, which would corroborate their preferential treatment over native-born candidates. However, the weak and statistically insignificant changes in the marginal effects, plotted in figure 7.2.3, further support the previous finding that the immigrant background does not affect the probability of encouragement, and this happens to be independent of the candidates' political experience. Regardless of their political qualifications, IO-candidates have no significantly higher or lower chance than native-born candidates of getting encouragement. Apparently, encouragement is no specific measure taken to increase the number of IO-candidates but is integral to candidate emergence more generally. Notwithstanding, it is still possible that political parties make use of encouragement only under certain conditions. This issue will be tackled in greater detail in what follows.




Figure 7.2.4:

Difference in encouragement to run for election between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.9 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD.

Source: GCS 2013.

In the preceding analysis, IO-candidates were amalgamated into one group. This empirical approach results from the argument that, from the parties' point of view, the external differentiation of IO-citizens overlies their internal differentiation, making IO-candidates means of group representation to forge closer electoral ties with IO-citizens and demonstrate openness to

cultural diversity. But what is also true is that cultural and religious differences set some immigrant groups more clearly apart from the German majority population than others (Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Ford 2011; Mäs et al. 2005). Their nominations are therefore particularly strong signals that political parties are devoted to the political representation of IO-citizens, make attempts at integrating them and acknowledge the cultural diversity of the population. To unveil differences in the use of encouragement between immigrant subgroups, the initial regression model is re-run but with different subsets of IO-candidates (see figure 7.2.4).

While coming from a European country or being of Christian denomination make no difference in the chance of encouragement compared with native-born candidates, the other estimates point in a negative direction. Muslim candidates, IO-candidates from non-European and from Muslim countries are less likely than native-born candidates to be encouraged to compete for office. For Muslim candidates, the chance of encouragement is 27 percentage points lower, while is 16 percentage points for candidates from non-European countries and 19 percentage points for candidates from Muslim countries. Despite large differences, the AMEs fail statistical significance due to the small number of observations in the subsets of IO-candidates. Notwithstanding, the findings clearly suggest that candidates from culturally more distinct immigrant subgroups are less likely to experience encouragement to enter the nomination contest. Consequently, they must be self-recruiters to a greater extent who strive after legislative office as a result of their political ambition and self-confidence. This provides one piece of the puzzle as to why IO-citizens of such background are underrepresented in parliament. By asking more party members of Muslim background or from non-European countries to run for office, their likelihood of making a bid for office could be increased.

Evidently, encouragement is not adopted as a targeted measure to increase the number of IO-candidates. Instead, encouragement seems to be part of the candidate emergence process in general. In party-centered recruitment systems, such as the German one, being asked by other party actors to run for election is integral to being nominated. In line with the quantitative results, most interviewees received encouragement from other party actors but did not relate these requests to their immigrant background. Running for nomination at the own request without being asked by other party actors was reported to be a clear evidence of a lack of intra-party support networks, which curtails the contenders' chance of nomination. For being encouraged, intra-party visibility is required, earned through previous political positions or other party activities, such as being a canvasser. Only on these conditions, aspirants come to be known to potential recruiters who can embolden their ambition of office-seeking.

However, encouragement turned out not to happen without any previous indications of political ambition (see also Allen/Cutts 2017). Approaching other party actors and signaling the

own ambition of running for office on the one hand, and being backed in these plans on the other, is key to candidate emergence. Therefore, encouragement widely reproduces the patterns of self-recruitment and is no effective remedy for a low supply of IO-applicants. Party members of immigrant background still need the self-confidence and political ambition that make them step out and signal their political aspirations. If they lack political aspirations, which probably holds true for so far underrepresented groups, they are unlikely to be encouraged. Only if signaling was suspended as a condition of encouragement, political parties can spur party members from underrepresented groups to seek office that otherwise would not do so.

In the run-up to the selection proceedings, party members that are keen on being nominated must signal their political aspirations to other party actors. By doing so, they herald their application for nomination. Most interviewees started addressing other party members and the district party leadership about two years before the election took place. After declaring their political ambition, aspirants need to wait for feedback. This helps assess whether they have enough intra-party support and are considered qualified to run for election. Being too pushy by ignoring a negative feedback is disapproved and leads in most cases to a failure in the candidate selection:

Generally, you toss your hat into the ring by saying, "I would like to run for office." There are cases in which candidates are asked whether they would be interested. But generally, you must signal your interest in the run-up (Interview 4).

I previously decided whether it is possible for me. [...] then I signaled to certain positions, "Yes, I can image [running for election], why not?" or, "If you don't want to continue, I could do it" and so on. Then you must wait until someone says, "It would be great if you do it. Would you do it?" and then you can simply say, "Yes, of course." [In my case] It was the district party chairman (Interview 2).

There was a time when I was asked whether I could imagine [standing for election], but I rejected [...]. Then a thought came to my mind: "If more persons of immigrant background should go into politics, persons that are willing to do so are needed." Always demanding, "More [persons of immigrant background] into politics!" but if you are asked saying, "No [...]!", and stay in the comfort zone is not possible. I screwed up my courage and said, "I want to stand for election!" and then I started calling persons to probe [...] whether there is a chance or not. Of course, you ask your district party by saying, "I would like to become a candidate, what do you think, would you support my candidacy?" You ask other party members – "Could you imagine supporting me, what should I consider?" You simply talk to the people you know. And then you must act strategically; who is the party chairman, who are the other persons that aspire an office? You also talk to them. Simply probing the situation, let's put it like this (Interview 5).

All interviewees mentioned other party actors, such as rank-and-file party members, or higher-ranking party actors, such as the district or sub-district party leadership, as the chief sources of encouragement. By contrast, the private social environment plays a minor role because only party actors can provide a realistic and honest feedback on the individual chance of being selected. The private environment is consulted before signaling takes place to obtain the approval of the own family. Election campaigning and office-holding are time-consuming and at the expense of private life.

In individual cases, IO-candidates were approached about running for election without signaling their political ambition; either because candidacies remained open and party organizations came under pressure to reach out to potential candidates or, as described in the previous chapter, party newcomers were encouraged to enter the contest for nomination due to a network, visibility and expertise in the immigration field, from which political parties hoped to benefit electorally:

Due to my honorary offices [in the immigration field], I was not affiliated to any political party [...] to keep the doors open for negotiation and cooperation [...]. Because of my volunteer work, I was approached by different state party representatives (Interview 3).

The proposal came from the local party leadership [...]. I was approached and asked whether I would do it [...]. The idea was not mine, but I was approached and asked (Interview 6).




Figure 7.2.5:

Difference in encouragement to run for election between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 2 in table A.10 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 0), no (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 731.

Source: GCS 2013.

For the reasons discussed in chapter 4.1, party-specific patterns might underlie the previous findings that remained masked so far. Center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more likely to encourage IO-candidates to enter the contest for nomination than political parties that are placed more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP (Kittilson/Tate 2004). To assess whether political parties follow similar recruitment patterns or whether the effect of the immigrant origin on the chance of encouragement varies from party to party, I incorporate interactions between the immigrant origin

and candidates' party affiliation while keeping the control variables constant. Since in non-linear regression models, statistically significant product terms are neither necessary nor sufficient for meaningful interaction effects (Ai/Norton 2003; Berry et al. 2010; Brambor et al. 2006; Jaccard 2001; Norton et al. 2004), AMEs at observed values are presented in figure 7.2.5.

The results run counter to the expectations put forward above. No statistically significant effect of the immigrant background emerges in any of the political parties under inspection. Whereas IO-candidates in the party DIE LINKE are 8 percentage points more likely than native-born candidates to be encouraged, the marginal effects point in a negative direction in the CDU/CSU and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, while no notable effect arises in the SPD and FDP. The small effect sizes that fail statistical significance demonstrate that, regardless of the political party, IO-candidates have a chance of encouragement that is widely similar to the one of native-born candidates. The estimates corroborate the previous finding that being asked to run for election is inherent in the candidate recruitment process and does not mark specific political parties in their recruitment behavior towards IO-candidates.




Figure 7.2.6: Difference in encouragement to run for election between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 2 in table A.11 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD, SMD nomination. N = 731.

Source: GCS 2013.

Aside from party differences, scholars invoked the importance of the electoral ballot structure for minority representation. Whereas PR electoral systems are considered to be conducive

to the descriptive representation of marginalized groups, majoritarian electoral systems are argued to produce the opposite effect (e.g. Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000). From this debate, the expectation arises that political parties avoid nominating IO-candidates in SMDs, but encourage IO-candidates to run on party lists in order to diversify the party ticket and reach out to IO-voters. The AMEs in figure 7.2.6 are based on interactions between the immigrant background and the mode of candidacy while controlling for confounding factors.

Against all expectation, a negative estimate for party list nominations is observed. By a gap of 21 percentage points, which loses out on statistical significance, IO-candidates have a lower probability of being encouraged than native-born candidates. By contrast, no significant effects become evident for SMD and dual nominations, indicating widely neutral selection patterns. The results reveal that dual nominations are widely contingent on the selection logic of SMDs. As mentioned earlier, this pattern is plausible because district nominations precede those on party lists (Manow 2012: 55; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). Contrary to the expectations derived from the literature on electoral system incentives, IO-candidates are not more likely to be encouraged in office-seeking if party list slots are allocated, although political parties face significant electoral incentives to diversify their party ticket for the sake of maximizing votes.




Figure 7.2.7: Difference in encouragement to run for election between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.12 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. N = 607.

Source: GCS 2013.

One possible reason for the puzzling finding on the mode of candidacy is that the analysis suffers from a neglect of intervening factors that shape the electoral incentives to encourage potential IO-candidates in their idea of running for elected office.²⁵ The existing research on electoral system effects stressed the impact of the district magnitude of MMDs on the proportionality of electoral systems (Engstrom 1987; Matland 1993, 1998b; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Ordeshook/Shvetsova 1994; Rae 1967; Studlar/Welch 1991; Welch/Studlar 1990). However, the district magnitude has a bearing not only on the proportionality of electoral systems but also on the electoral incentive structure guiding the candidate selection. A high district magnitude leads to more options for ticket-balancing on party lists, which creates incentives to nominate IO-candidates to strengthen the parties' electoral ties with IO-voters. These thoughts culminate in the expectation that political parties are more likely to encourage IO-candidates in office-seeking if the district magnitude of MMDs increases.

To test whether the AME of the immigrant background on the chance of encouragement is affected by the district magnitude of MMDs, a cross-level interaction between both is incorporated into the previous statistical model. The predictions are based on a two-level binary logistic regression model with a random slope for the immigrant variable which can vary from MMD to MMD and random intercepts for MMDs. Although the number of MMDs is limited with 16 cases, Maas and Hox (2005) showed in a simulation study that the regression coefficients, the variance components and the standard errors are estimated correctly and that only the standard errors of the variance at level 2 are erroneously underestimated.

A glance at figure 7.2.7 discloses that the empirical pattern vetoes the theoretical expectation. The marginal effect of the immigrant background is widely unaffected by the district magnitude of MMDs and remains statistically insignificant throughout. The initial assumption that political parties become more inclined to encourage IO-candidates in their office-seeking if the district magnitude increases to diversify their party tickets is clearly rejected. As a first explanation, parties' space for ticket-balancing remains confined, irrespective of a low or high district magnitude, as a multitude of formal and informal quotas must be met (Mintzel 1980; Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). This limits the scope left for encouraging more IO-candidates to run on party lists. Second, party selectorates might opt to nominate other additional group representatives in place of more IO-candidates when the district magnitude increases to

²⁵ As the type of party selectorate was not surveyed in the GCS, it is skipped.

broaden the parties' voter appeal, explaining a lack of effect change (for a similar argument on women see Hennings/Urbatsch 2015).




Figure 7.2.8: Difference in encouragement to run for election between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.13 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 557.

Source: GCS 2013.

Owing to their zero-sum logic, SMD races were argued to obstruct an equal representation of marginalized groups, but prompt political parties to pick the “lowest-common denominator candidates” (Reynolds 1999: 555) that resemble the incumbent representatives (Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). However, in SMDs with a high spatial concentration of IO-citizens, these form the largest voter bloc in the local constituency (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2003, 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). These demographic conditions therefore create incentives to nominate IO-candidates in order to address IO-voters. In this vein, Bird (2003: 14) suggested that SMDs are conducive to

minority representation “if their geographic concentration coincides with constituency boundaries”. In the light of these considerations, IO-candidates' chance of encouragement is expected to be positively associated with the proportion of IO-citizens in SMDs.

To explore the relationship, a two-level binary logistic regression model with random intercepts for SMDs is presented (Gelman/Hill 2007; Nezlek 2008; Snijders/Bosker 2012). The random slope for the immigrant variable is discarded as its variance is nearly zero and does not ameliorate the model fit. A cross-level interaction is estimated between the immigrant background and the foreigner share in SMDs while keeping the other SMD context factors and the control variables constant. Note that no collinearity issues are faced. All plots in figure 7.2.8 visualize the results of two-level regression models that follow the logic previously depicted.

As the first plot of figure 7.2.8 reveals, IO-candidates are found to be somewhat more likely to be asked to run for election compared with native-born candidates as long as the foreigner share is low. However, in opposition to the theoretical expectation, the relationship goes into reverse once the proportion of foreigners increases. At a foreigner share of 20 percentage points above average, IO-candidates are 23 percentage points less likely to be encouraged than native-born candidates. It is important to mention, however, that the marginal effects fail statistical significance throughout. Notwithstanding, the assumption that IO-candidates are more likely to be encouraged in their office-seeking ambitions if IO-voters are spatially concentrated must be rejected. The results rather suggest that encouragement becomes obsolete in electoral districts with a high proportion of IO-citizens. In all likelihood, local demographics are reflected in the local membership. Political parties probably face a sufficient number of potential IO-candidates that aspire to run for election (Schönwälder et al. 2001), which makes encouragement dispensable.

Against the backdrop of the literature on social deprivation that was reviewed earlier, it is assumed that more voters harbor prejudices against immigrants in socially deprived SMDs (e.g. Borjas 1999; Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2013, 2014; Dancygier/Laitin 2014; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2010; Helbling/Kriesi 2014; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke/Sinnott 2006; Scheve/Slaughter 2001; Sides/Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). As electoral downturns loom when nominating IO-candidates in socially deprived SMDs, I hypothesize that political parties refrain from asking party members of immigrant background to run for election in such settings. However, the plotted estimates paint another picture. Both the local level of unemployment and the educational level bring about no marked change in the AME of the immigrant origin on the chance of encouragement. Evidently, IO-candidates' probability of encouragement is no function of the degree to which electoral districts are socially deprived, but IO-candidates have identical chances of encouragement as native-born candidates.

As to local anti-immigrant sentiments, I argued that political parties are more likely to encourage IO-candidates to reach for office if constituents in SMDs are well-disposed to multiculturalism, as the risk of electoral losses is mitigated. Vice versa, political parties are expected to refrain from encouragement if local constituents take a strong stance against multiculturalism. Contrary to expectations, however, IO-candidates are found to be more likely to be encouraged compared with native-born candidates once far-right political parties gain in electoral strength. At a right-wing vote share of 2 percentage points above average, IO-candidates have a probability of encouragement which exceeds the probability of native-born candidates by 22 percentage points – the effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. The presence of far-right political parties seems to prompt the moderate political parties to distance themselves from anti-immigrant sentiments and to admit the cultural diversity of the society by encouraging IO-candidates to compete for a seat in parliament. This is in line with the findings of Wauters et al. (2016) who showed that local party organizations pay more attention to minority interests instead of adopting anti-immigrant views if the local vote share of far-right political parties increases.

As a second indicator of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs, the degree of urbanity is used, measured by the population density of SMDs. Individuals residing in rural areas were argued to feel greater levels of animosity against multiculturalism than individuals in urban settings. They are less familiar with cultural and religious pluralism and exhibit lower levels of modernization. But contrary to expectations, it is found that IO-candidates become less likely to be encouraged in their office-seeking ambitions if SMDs turn urban, although the marginal effects fall short of statistical significance. At the highest density value, IO-candidates have a probability of encouragement which is 42 percentage points lower than the one predicted for native-born candidates. One possible reason for the unexpected result is that the number of potential IO-candidates is higher in urban SMDs where IO-citizens are more densely concentrated (Schönwalder/Söhn 2009). Political parties are therefore less dependent on encouragement if intending to nominate IO-candidates. Second, constituents in urban SMDs are more heterogeneous than in rural areas. Consequently, political parties are faced with conflicting claims for representation that might prevent them from recruiting IO-candidates highly offensively.

7.3 Mentoring

The support of a party mentor is highly conducive to the individual chance of nomination. Although no quantitative data on mentors are available, the face-to-face interviews can provide illuminating insights into the role that party mentors play in the nomination of IO-candidates.

Interviewees stressed that no mentoring programs for party members of immigrant background are implemented yet. Mentoring programs – if existing – are geared chiefly to young and female party members whose greater presence in the ranks of office holders is prioritized. Therefore, it is first and foremost IO-candidates' personal responsibility to organize mentor support. No IO-candidate gave the impression that mentor support played another role in their nomination than in the nomination of any other contender. Mentors backed them by advice about strategically important steps in the run-up to the candidate selection. Moreover, they provided crucial information about the informal rules and routines prevailing within party organizations and prevented aspiring candidates from violating these principles – for example, to which party actors the own political aspiration needs to be signaled. IO-candidates also stressed the mentors' psychological and emotional importance in strengthening the own perseverance in the lengthy recruitment process. Furthermore, mentors are equipped with intra-party visibility and name recognition. Their advocacy is therefore eminently important to demonstrating to have the intra-party support required to be nominated. Empirically, mentoring thus can take various forms, ranging from having a politically experienced person whom to ask practical questions to public advocacy, information on the informal party rules, routines and structures, advice on the application speech at the nominating convention and access to important party networks:

[The mentor] said that my speech [at the nominating convention] should not exceed five minutes, that I should present myself and refer to one political topic [...]. A member of the district party leadership [...] proofread my speech manuscript (Interview 6).

You can ask questions in a protected room by saying, "I have the feeling that a certain person will not agree with my candidacy, how can I find out, how can I protect, how can I react?" Or, "How do I give a speech, what is important?" [...]. But the mentor did not call others and said, "This is a good person, support this person!" It was rather about questions I had and with which I could go to someone who is familiar with the business and who is trustworthy (Interview 5).

[Mentoring works through] a) advice, b) advocacy, c) investment of time. You meet, talk about things, introduce these persons into certain networks by saying, "Look here, I brought this person. He or she is good and together we support this person." You introduce someone into existing networks, existing structures, [...] you pull someone on his or her way and make sure that this person will develop fast (Interview 2).

The central importance of mentor support in the candidate selection was emphasized by the experience of one IO-candidate who lacked a mentor. Getting advice from an experienced mentor would have protected the contender from a strategic lapse at the nominating convention:

I thought, I would get someone from the party [...]. But I did everything on my own. There was no mentor or rhetorical training, that didn't exist. I didn't imagine it would be like this. I wrote the speeches on my own and I chose the topics myself (Interview 4).

At the state nominating convention, the lack of a mentor turned into a severe drawback. Candidates from the same region are usually not nominated in close succession but the party list is divided into distinct regions. One candidate from a region receives a list slot in the first

part of the party list, while the second candidate from the same region is listed in the next part and so forth. By this procedure, a balanced representation of the different regions is guaranteed, which helps maintain the party unity. Due to a lack of political experience, the IO-candidate accepted a ballot position in the secondary part of the party list in an informal agreement with the other contenders. The result was that the IO-candidate slipped down to a non-viable list position. The advice from an experienced mentor would have prevented the contender from this strategic lapse:

I simply lacked the experience how nomination proceedings look like. At the nominating convention, it was proposed [...] not nominating [another contender] but me on the upper list position [...]. I was too good-natured and waived [...]. Today, I would make a different decision [...] I did not have the necessary knowledge (Interview 4).

Mentoring for party newcomers of immigrant background takes place chiefly top-down. As the state party leadership is the key actor to reach out to external IO-candidates, it is the state party leadership which usually provides them with advice. But this happens only if IO-candidates are equipped with certain resources which make them eminently qualified to strengthen party ties with IO-citizens on the one hand, and to improve the expertise of a political party in immigration-related issues on the other, and no contenders with equal assets are available in the own membership (see chapter 7.1). Conversely, IO-candidates that are deeply anchored in the party organization receive mentorship chiefly from the party leadership at the district or sub-district level where they were politically active or from other experienced office holders in the electoral district, such as current or former legislators. As opposed to externally recruited IO-candidates, they find mentors through their party networks, resulting from their previous party activities at the local level. What is more, those IO-candidates that worked as parliamentary assistants to legislators often find mentors in these former or current office holders. The finding reveals that politics-facilitating professions can give a competitive edge in the candidate selection by providing aspirants with relevant party contacts.

Beyond informal mentoring that is initiated by mentors and mentees themselves, institutionalized mentoring programs that are implemented by the party organizations exist. As mentioned, mentoring programs for party members of immigrant background are rare. So far, only the state-level working group "Migration and Diversity" of the SPD in Berlin implemented a nine-month mentoring program for party members of immigrant background. In a structured framework, mentoring programs attempt to establish contacts between mentees and politically experienced mentors, provide training on relevant issues, provide party networks and allow for an exchange of experience.

Some IO-candidates were strong proponents of mentoring programs for party members of immigrant background. Such programs were considered helpful to guide party members of immigrant background through the exhausting recruitment process and encourage them not to resign. Many party members of immigrant background have a wrong idea of the intra-party recruitment process when joining a party organization. This is particularly true for first-generation immigrants that obtained their political socialization in a foreign country where the party culture and structure significantly differ from those prevailing in German party organizations. Therefore, many IO-citizens have false expectations when joining German party organizations. They are not familiar with the *Ochsentour* but envision running for office immediately and feel disappointed if their expectations are not met. Such difficulties could be mitigated, at least to some extent, by mentoring programs in which participants are introduced to the party structure and culture:

We need protected space where people can exchange their personal experience and disenchantments but also their achievements, where they learn to understand the party organization and where they find support networks, so that persons [of immigrant background] do not give up half way through, because they feel left alone (Interview 5).

Party organizations in [country of origin] are very different to those in Western European countries. Discussions are different. If you start doing politics like this, you will fail after some months because it is not accepted here. The party culture is decisive. With a discussion culture as in [country of origin], you won't get very far [in German political parties]. An introduction to the German party culture would be helpful (Interview 4).

As reported in the qualitative interviews, attempts at implementing mentoring programs for IO-citizens were made in most center-left political parties. These attempts emanated chiefly from the intra-party working groups on migration. However, they were in vain so far due to lacking financial support from the state or national party organization:

We tried to implement a mentoring program for immigrants. But in the end, it came to nothing. The financial budget was lacking. You need money for mentoring programs (Interview 8).

Compared to young and female party members, party members of immigrant background do not have the intra-party leverage to enforce the implementation of mentoring programs because they are only few. Women and young party members form larger intra-party groups that are equipped with a higher mobilization potential.

7.4 Level of Competition in the Candidate Selection

The chance of nomination depends, among other things, on the degree to which nomination proceedings are contested. On the condition that political parties behave highly offensively towards IO-candidates, they could attempt to reduce the number of intra-party competitors to which IO-candidates are exposed to improve their chance of nomination. By contrast, a higher

mobilization against aspiring IO-candidates in comparison to native-born candidates would be indicative of a closure. In the case of neutrality, in turn, IO-candidates would face similar levels of intra-party competition as native-born candidates. The question of which pattern empirically holds true, is tackled in the present chapter.




Figure 7.4.1: Difference in the level of competition in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates. *Note:* Fisher's exact test value is 0.10. The result is significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1,078$. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

In the run-up to the nominating conventions in SMDs, contenders tour through the local party chapters of the district party organizations and introduce themselves and their political positions in 15 to 30 minute speeches to the local party members and answer their questions. If party member assemblies decide who will vie for office, these tours are aimed at introducing the contenders to the local membership to mobilize their support. Assuming that delegate assemblies decide, these tours help delegates fathom the preferences of the local party membership. In some cases, party members are even asked for indicative non-binding votes that flow into the decision taken by the delegates. The district tours are either organized by the district party organization or each local party chapter invites the contenders by itself. If contenders realize that they lack the intra-party support required to be nominated or are unable to shoulder the time, physical and mental burden coming along with the nomination process, they usually revoke their applications during these tours. Only towards the end, the number of contenders that will compete for nomination at the official nominating convention becomes clear. If electoral districts embrace more than one district party organization, the candidate selection is often organized multi-stage. Each district party organization selects its favored candidate before the candidates of each district party organization compete at the joint nominating convention.

Figure 7.4.1 provides a descriptive summary of the level of competition faced in the nomination proceedings in SMDs. Although the measurement is based on subjective perceptions, I believe that candidates have a widely realistic and comparable sense of the degree of competition as it is an issue of intra-party discussion. Following from the previous insights, however, the numbers only refer to competitors at the official nominating convention and might therefore underrate the overall level of competition (see also Reiser 2011: 251; Reiser 2013: 138). Interestingly, most of the candidates face no competitor in the nomination process. This corresponds to Reiser's findings (2011: 250) on the 2009 Bundestag election in which 77 percent of the nomination proceedings in SMDs were uncontested. The finding suggests that the local candidate selection is, at least to some extent, orchestrated by a circle of local party leaders that clear the field of competitors according to their preferences and deprive the formal selectorate of its influence on the selection outcome (Kaack 1969b; Zeuner 1970). Focusing on the difference between IO- and native-born candidates, fewer IO-candidates are running in uncontested nomination proceedings – the difference is 9 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.1 level, as demonstrated by Fisher's exact test. More IO-candidates, on the contrary, face highly contested selection proceedings – the difference to native-born candidates is 5 percentage points. Compared to native-born candidates, IO-candidates face a higher level of competition in SMDs, pointing to a stronger mobilization against them.




Figure 7.4.2: Difference in the level of competition on party lists between native-born and IO-candidates. *Note:* Fisher's exact test value is 0.45. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.158$. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

In most cases, committees, often formed by members of the state party leadership, prepare the proposals for the party list ranking. This facilitates the complex approval process (Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 546) in which myriads of representational

claims need to be balanced (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). However, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN employs chiefly open proceedings. But even if proposals for the list ranking are on hand, this does not mean that competition is ruled out. At the nominating convention, contenders proposed for lower ballot positions can still challenge applicants for higher list slots or any other attendee can opt to challenge a certain nominee.

Figure 7.4.2 provides a descriptive summary of the level of competition for party list nominations. Most strikingly, the overall level of competition is fiercer than in SMDs. While only 19 percent of the native-born candidates and 24 percent of the IO-candidates are faced with highly contested selection proceedings in SMDs, 37 percent of the candidates are exposed to highly contested selection proceedings on party lists. First, the constituency of MMDs is larger which might result in a higher number of contenders competing for party list nominations. Second, as only SPD and CDU/CSU have realistic prospects of winning nominal races, viable party list nominations are virtually the only way to parliament in the FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, reflected in a higher competition for party list nominations.²⁶ By a difference of 3 percentage points, somewhat more IO-candidates are entirely uncontested compared to native-born candidates. Overall, however, the differences between both candidate groups are weak and fail statistical significance, as indicated by Fisher's exact test. Accordingly, descriptive evidence for a stronger mobilization against IO-candidates in SMDs is provided, whereas widely neutral patterns become evident on party lists.

But descriptive statistics are insufficient to determine the extent to which the immigrant background relates to the level of intra-party competition. To explore how the probability of running in contested nomination proceedings depends on the immigrant background under otherwise equal conditions, binary logistic regression models are estimated. To have enough IO-candidates in each category, the answer options "somewhat contested" and "highly contested" are conflated, measuring a high competition (= 1), and "hardly contested" and "not contested at all" are merged, measuring a low competition (= 0).

Previous studies provide little guidance on the control variables which need to be included to tap into the level of competition for nomination. For the reasons discussed at the beginning, I will control for socio-demographic background variables. Moreover, ample evidence was provided that incumbents (= 1) face fewer competitors in the candidate selection, regardless of the mode of election (e.g. Reiser 2013: 134; Steg 2016: 85, 90; Zeuner 1970: 39, 91). As incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage over novices (Erikson 1971; Gelman/King 1990;

²⁶ In the Saxon state election, Leipzig 2 was won by DIE LINKE. In the Bundestag election, Berlin-Treptow-Köpenick, Berlin-Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Berlin-Pankow and Berlin-Lichtenberg were won by DIE LINKE. Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg-Prenzlauer Berg Ost was won by BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN.

Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Lee 2001; Levitt/Wolfram 1997), their re-selection is virtually guaranteed which makes it a desperate endeavor to challenge incumbents. It follows that the level of competition declines further when the number of terms served in parliament increases. Through this, more of the political resources that make incumbents' re-selection attractive can be acquired. But I will also control for indicators of candidates' political experience which make them predestined to run for election, such as the number of previous candidacies, the years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of political offices, experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1) and the number of organizational affiliations. Longstanding, highly experienced and extensively networked candidates probably find more acceptance within their party organizations, which diminishes the likelihood of a counter-mobilization at the nominating convention. Moreover, potential challengers might not see much chance of defeating contenders with many of these political assets, and, therefore, prescind from challenging them. With regard to SMDs, I will also control for the local residence in the electoral district (= 1) because external candidates are more likely to witness contestation. In the literature, having stood for election in the same SMD in the previous election (= 1) but having failed to be elected was argued to reduce competition, whereas open candidacies (= 1) in which the previously elected legislator no longer runs for election were claimed to be highly contested (Reiser 2013: 137; Steg 2016: 132; Zeuner 1970). Furthermore, it was shown that electorally viable nominations are more contested than unpromising races (Reiser 2013: 143-144; Zeuner 1970: 35). Remember that SMD nominations are viable (= 1) if the vote distance to the district winner was 10 percentage points or less in the previous election or if the electoral district was won by the own political party and non-viable otherwise. With regard to party list nominations, a candidate's list slot was subtracted from the number of list slots a political party could win in the previous election. A distance of more than three positions to the last won ballot position is defined as non-viable and viable (= 1) otherwise. To account for the pooled character of the data set, election and party fixed effects are included.




Figure 7.4.3:

Predictors of the competition for nomination.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.14 in the appendix. Grey dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, non-viable list position. N for SMDs = 962; N for party lists = 1.076.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

As I take interest in the predictors' effect size, AMEs at observed values are reported in figure 7.4.3, based on binary logistic regression models. In line with the descriptive findings, it is visible that IO-candidates are more likely than native-born candidates to be contested in the nomination proceedings of SMDs – the difference in probability is 10 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.01 level, net of other confounding variables. In the bivariate model (grey dashed square), the difference is 13 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The multivariate results encourage the previous descriptive finding that IO-candidates are more likely to face rivalry when aspiring to run for election in SMDs compared with native-born candidates. Despite a comprehensive control of confounding factors, a markedly positive effect of the immigrant origin on the probability of being contested becomes evident. Consequently, IO-candidates are more likely to witness a counter-mobilization, meaning that they

must prevail against more challengers to come forward as nominees in SMDs. The finding is in line with the electoral system literature (e.g. Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000) which puts forward the argument that candidate selection proceedings in SMDs equal zero-sum games, being to the detriment of underrepresented groups. Instead, they give an advantage to candidates that resemble the average – male and native-born – voter. To prevent aspiring IO-candidates from coming forward as candidates, a higher mobilization against them seems to occur in the local party chapters. Where IO-candidates compete in SMD races, they had to prevail against a larger number of contestants.

When turning to the control variables, some interesting observations are made. Male candidates are found to have a 6 percentage points lower probability of being contested than female candidates. The effect corroborates the zero-sum logic of SMDs that obstructs the nomination of candidates from underrepresented groups. This applies not only to IO-candidates but also to women. By a difference of 17 percentage points, incumbents are less likely to face contestants than applies to novices or candidates who failed to enter parliament in the previous election. The finding results from an informal but highly institutionalized rule of German party organizations which stipulates that incumbents are not challenged (Reiser 2013: 134; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 550; Zeuner 1970). As long as incumbents are not criticized for their services rendered to the electoral district, they remain unchallenged (Zeuner 1970: 93). But even if faced with scorching criticism, incumbents are often re-selected as they are allocated more promising list positions than novices, which can guarantee the representation of electoral districts in parliament if these cannot be directly won (Reiser 2013: 135-136). Organizational affiliations prove to be a factor which leads to a shrinkage of the number of competitors. Well-networked candidates that are tied to various civil society organizations face fewer competitors because they have a high mobilization potential at the ballot box, making them the pick of the bunch. It is a unique selling point in the candidate selection that is not possessed by many others. In support of the expectation put forward above, viable SMDs are more likely to be contested than hopeless electoral districts by a gap of 16 percentage points. Running for election in a promising SMD race is nearly equivalent to competing for a seat in parliament, leading to a higher number of contenders that struggle for nomination.

Candidates that re-run for election in SMDs they failed to win in the previous election are 16 percentage points less likely to be contested. Thus, not only an incumbency advantage but also an advantage of holding a candidacy exists. Candidates in vacant SMDs, on the contrary, are more likely to run against opponents – the difference in probability to non-vacant SMDs is 20 percentage points. When office holders withdraw, a unique and rare window of opportunity

for aspiring candidates opens as the priority rule for incumbents is so predominant in the candidate selection, explaining the high level of contestation. The party fixed effects reveal that candidates of the FDP, BÜNDNIS/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE are less likely to face contestation in the nomination proceedings of SMDs compared to candidates of the SPD and CDU/CSU. As mentioned, only the latter have real prospects of winning nominal races, giving rise to a higher intra-party competition for nomination (Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 548). For the smaller political parties, it is harder to find contenders that are willing to carry the burden of nomination by spending a vast amount of time on the campaign trail without reaping the rewards in terms of a mandate.

In line with the quantitative results that suggested a somewhat higher intra-party mobilization against contenders of immigrant background in SMDs, one IO-candidate reported in the qualitative interviews that prior to the nominating convention challengers were mobilized with the aim of thwarting the IO-candidates' nomination. But the reason put forth was not the immigrant background itself but the fact that the contender was a party newcomer who was recruited outside of the party organization due to expertise and networks in the immigration field, acquired by a longstanding volunteer engagement in this policy field. The candidate received strong backing from the state and district party leadership. Other longstanding party members that thought to be next in line to run for election felt ignored, leading to a higher mobilization against the party newcomer. The example points to the intra-party conflicts which can result from offensive strategies for nominating IO-candidates. Consequently, one of the mechanisms that can give rise to a higher competition in SMDs faced by IO-candidates is a preferential treatment:

There was the district nominating convention [...]. In the run-up, it was tried to prevent my being nominated. [...] state-wide it was tried to take influence on my district party organization (Interview 3).

But even though a counter-mobilization occurred, the state and district party leadership did not try to convince contenders to withdraw but rather approached the party selectorate. They made their candidate priority very clear to the party selectorate by making a well-grounded recommendation and by calling members of the nominating body to advocate their preferred candidate. To be sure, these endeavors often have the effect that challengers withdraw as they see no chance of selection. But although both the state and district party leadership had a strong candidate preference, their top-down influence did not go so far that they tried to curtail the intra-party competition by asking contenders to revoke their applications in order to ensure that their preferred candidate is selected, even though this is not ruled out in each and every case (Reiser 2011: 255). While for the state party leadership, the reason was that it has no legal

access to the candidate selection in SMDs which is the exclusive domain of district party organizations (Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 546; Zeuner 1970), the district party leadership was found to be reluctant to strongly encroach upon the SMD candidate selection. Although in some cases, district party leaderships request contenders to revoke their applications to clear the field of contenders to the benefit of their preferred candidates, such attempts come along with imminent perils. Undermining the principle of intra-party democracy by trying to convince contenders to revoke their applications is likely to provoke a backlash from the local party membership. To punish strong top-down interventions, local party members that form the selectorate might support rival contenders on purpose, making the candidate selection less predictable for the district party leadership. This can turn into a drawback to their favored candidate:

There have been opponents. [...] In public debates, we competed and then it was voted. In no way, it was tried [...] to prevent others from competing for nomination just because the party leadership wanted me to enter parliament. It was a democratic election (Interview 3).

A case which occurred in the context of the 2013 Bundestag election and which underpins that a preferential treatment can trigger a counter-mobilization is the nomination of the CDU candidate Cemile Giousouf in the electoral district *Hagen-Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis I*. Although Giousouf had little office experience and joined the CDU only in 2009, she succeeded in running for election in the named electoral district which exhibits a large IO-population (Fröhlingsdorf/Gezer 2013). Armin Laschet, chairman of the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia, strongly supported her nomination as he strived to open up the CDU to IO-citizens to tap their electoral support; conservative Muslims in particular were intended to be addressed. Since Giousouf is a Muslima whose parents belong to a Turkish minority in Greece, her nomination was envisaged sending out a signal to Muslim voters and IO-voters more generally that the CDU acknowledges the cultural diversity of the population and attends to their political representation, being helpful in getting rid of its reputation for being skeptical of immigrants.

Although Giousouf was active in the CDU Aachen, she was intended to be nominated in the electoral district *Hagen-Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis I* after the candidacy had been declared open and a finding commission at the district level had failed to find a suitable candidate. The district party leadership approached the state party leadership about proposing a potential candidate. The state leadership recommended Giousouf who, at that time, worked for the State Ministry of Labor, Integration and Social Affairs. Despite her backing from the district party leadership that considered her nomination to be a promising option for challenging the incumbent party SPD through addressing IO-voters, the discontent of the local party membership grew (Richter 2013). Parts of them felt ignored when seeing that an external and inexperienced candidate

without any services on behalf of the district party organization was planned to run for election for purely strategic reasons. The resentment led to the emergence of a locally anchored and experienced challenger. However, Giousouf succeeded in winning the district nomination with 53 of 79 delegate votes after she had toured through the local party chapters to mobilize enough intra-party support (Frigelj 2013b). Also in this case, it was not the immigrant background which has evoked a counter-mobilization but the fact that Giousouf was a party newcomer who was strongly backed by the state and district party leadership.

It is important to mention, however, that in other cases, a mobilization against IO-candidates in SMDs did not occur as frankly as described above. Aspirations of party members of immigrant background for office were not openly criticized but a higher competition than usual became evident at the nominating convention. One IO-candidate, for example, reported being the only incumbent that ran against challengers. Under these circumstances, the reasons for a higher counter-mobilization remained ambiguous:

An open counter-mobilization is difficult. It is unwise to mobilize against a candidate who made no mistake. Then, it would become obvious that someone pursues other interests, and, therefore, discredits a person [...]. I think, there have been some conversations in the back room to impede my candidacy. [...] I was the only incumbent [...] who had competitors (Interview 5).

The example of Cemile Giousouf points to a second mechanism which can trigger a mobilization against IO-candidates. Criticism emanated not only from parts of the local membership in the electoral district but from the Women's Union, an auxiliary organization of the CDU that represents female party members. The Women's Union turned against a preferential treatment of a female candidate without previous experience in office at the expense of other longstanding female party members who wait for a nomination for years. If district and state party leaderships start treating IO-candidates preferentially in the candidate selection as they attempt to strengthen party ties with IO-citizens, this seriously endangers the supremacy of other representational group, such as the Women's Union. Supposing that new representational groups, such as IO-citizens, are considered relevant and are intended to be addressed by means of group representation, the established representational groups must fear to make concessions in the candidate selection. The increasing importance of new representational groups can therefore lead to a counter-mobilization that emanates from the established representational groups which try to defend their claims for representation. In SMDs where only one seat is up for selection, the competition between different representational groups for nomination is more pronounced than on party lists:

If you are talking to the federal party leadership by saying, "Look, we need more candidates of immigrant background", they say, "Yes, great, we need more candidates of immigrant background" [...]. At the local level, it is said, "You want more candidates of immigrant background, but it is complicated. Now also immigrants want candidacies. But the districts are already allocated. How can we reconcile all relevant groups?" (Interview 2).

In most cases, the higher level of competition for SMD nominations faced by IO-candidates is not caused by anti-immigrant sentiments prevailing in the local party membership, although it is not ruled out in each and every case. Instead, it is triggered chiefly by the factor that the established representational groups perceive IO-citizens as new competitors in the contest for nomination. If party members of immigrant background aspire to run for election in SMDs, the more established groups try to defend their claims for representation by fielding own contenders:

It is not said, “[We don’t want you] Because you are an immigrant.” But you are a competitor. It is the same story as with women. If there were no gender quotas, they would never have succeeded. Because every woman was a competitor for a man. And every immigrant is a competitor for other party members (Interview 1).

I never had the feeling that I am not welcome in my party or that it is said, “What is the immigrant doing here?” I never had such feelings. That some people became envious [...] and said, “I am in this party for 25 years, I am no legislator and now an immigrant comes”, this happened but it is normal. But I never experienced any immigrant-specific discrimination (Interview 7).

When turning to the level of competition for party list nominations, also displayed in figure 7.4.3, a contrary picture to SMD nomination proceedings is painted. In comparison to native-born candidates, IO-candidates are 9 percentage points less likely to run in contested nomination proceedings. The marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level, net of other relevant factors which might distort the statistical relationship. In the bivariate model (grey dashed triangle), the difference in probability is 6 percentage points but achieves no statistical significance. Apparently, party lists give IO-candidates higher chances of making a successful bid for nomination than applies to SMDs in which IO-candidates are more likely to be challenged. In contrast to SMDs, party lists offer more flexible options for ticket-balancing as numerous group representatives can be accommodated (e.g. Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000). This makes IO-candidates instrumental in diversifying party lists to reach out to a broad range of voter groups without acting as a strong deterrent to voters. Moreover, in SMDs in which only one seat is up for selection, the emergence of new representational groups, such as IO-citizens, sharply increases the competition for representation. Party lists, by contrast, allow political parties to accommodate the representatives of numerous groups, mitigating the level of competition faced by IO-candidates.

The control variables provide some further instructive insights. Female candidates are less likely than male candidates to face competitors when aspiring to win a party list nomination. The finding corroborates the ticket-balancing efforts of political parties on party lists (Hennl/Kaiser 2008b), which apply not only to IO-candidates but also to female candidates. Moreover, except for FDP and CSU, all political parties imposed gender quotas on their party lists (Davidson-Schmich 2016; Reiser 2014). This implies that male contenders being in the

majority cannot apply for list positions that are reserved for women, resulting in a lower likelihood of female contenders being contested. By a gap of 6 percentage points, incumbents are less likely to be contested, but the effect is less pronounced than in SMDs. Evidently, the informal rule according to which incumbents are not challenged applies more to SMD nominations than to party list nominations. Contenders placed on promising list positions have a 27 percentage points higher probability of being faced with competitors than those on unpromising list slots. As promising list places come close to being tickets to parliament, the finding comes as no surprise. Competing for a viable ballot position is nearly tantamount to vying for a seat in parliament. Compared with the SPD, intra-party competition for list nominations turns out to be higher for candidates of the FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE. The reason behind is that party list nominations are the only way into parliament in the latter political parties that have small chances of winning nominal races.

In line with the quantitative results, some IO-candidates regarded their immigrant background as an advantageous factor when it comes to the allocation of party list positions – this applies chiefly to female IO-candidates that benefit greatly from gender quotas. Candidates that meet multiple sought-after attributes at once have good chances of being nominated without facing any challengers. The number of potential contestants with identical traits is very limited. Such candidates allow political parties to cover various representational aspects at once while the saved list positions can be allocated to candidates with other traits, organizational affiliations or expertise so as to broaden the scope of voter mobilization:

I meet all criteria which are advantageous; I am female, I am a mother and I am a migrant [...]. These criteria are all given in my case (Interview 6).

It was a mixture of different aspects. I was born in Germany. I know how to articulate. I think, I was no candidate who was selected just because nobody else was found. I think, I was a convincing candidate due to my previous political work and qualification. In addition, [I am] female, so the gender quota was met and I have an immigrant background. Three labels were bundled in one [person] (Interview 5).




Figure 7.4.4: Difference in the competition for nomination between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables. *Note:* The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, non-viable list position. N for SMDs = 962; N for party lists = 1.076. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Next, I will explore more thoroughly the conditioning effects of the control variables to grasp how the probability of IO-candidates being contested relates to their political qualifications and conditions of nomination.²⁷ Based on interaction terms, figure 7.4.4 plots the AMEs of the immigrant variable against different values of the control variables while holding the other control variables constant. By a visual inspection, it becomes clear that the control variables do not crucially affect the level of competition IO-candidates face in SMDs. Most marginal effects remain statistically insignificant and unaltered. In SMDs, for instance, it makes no difference whether IO-candidates are incumbents or not, but they are somewhat more likely to be challenged compared to native-born candidates. On party lists, by contrast, the previous finding of a lower competition to which IO-candidates are exposed is somewhat reinforced if they are incumbents. The same relationship is observed when considering the previous number of leg-

²⁷ No marginal effect of the vacancy of SMDs could be estimated due to the small number of IO-candidates in vacant SMDs.

islative terms served and the number of organizational affiliations, indicating a weak preferential treatment over native-born candidates with equal qualifications. Irrespective of the electoral viability of SMDs, IO-candidates are somewhat more likely than native-born candidates to run in contested selection proceedings. On party lists, by contrast, their lower likelihood of being challenged declines further if competing for viable list positions, indicating that the immigrant background can be an advantage to remain uncontested at the list nominating convention even if a promising ballot position is concerned. Overall, the level of competition in SMDs is not crucially affected by the IO-candidates' political experience or conditions of nomination, whereas on party lists, their lower baseline probability of being contested is in parts slightly reinforced. The main thrust of the results mirrors the previous finding that party lists are more conducive to the nomination of IO-candidates than SMDs, as far as the competition for nomination is concerned.




Figure 7.4.5:

Difference in the competition for nomination between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.15 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, non-viable list position.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Although I argued that the external differentiation of IO-citizens overrides their internal differentiation, making IO-candidates useful means of addressing IO-voters from the parties'

point of view, political parties are aware of their religious and national heterogeneity. Some immigrant groups, such as Muslims or those from non-European countries, stand out more clearly from the German majority population than others (Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Ford 2011; Mäs et al. 2005). Their nomination therefore sends out a particularly strong signal that political parties are open to IO-citizens. To assess variances in the selection behavior of political parties across immigrant subgroups, I run the initial regression model but include different subsets of IO-candidates. The AMEs of the different subgroups are reported in figure 7.4.5.

Compared with IO-candidates as a whole, the estimates for Muslim candidates, candidates from non-European and from Muslim countries are more pronounced when focusing on the competition in SMDs. While the probability of IO-candidates running in contested selection proceedings in SMDs exceeds that of native-born candidates by 10 percentage points on average, it is 44 percentage points for Muslim candidates (p -value = 0.003), 28 percentage points for candidates from non-European countries (p -value = 0.007) and 31 percentage points for candidates from Muslim countries (p -value = 0.007). By contrast, no statistically significant effect is found for IO-candidates from European countries. The earlier finding that IO-candidates must hold out against a larger number of competitors in SMDs than native-born candidates applies more to immigrant subgroups that clearly differ from the majority population. On party lists, by contrast, no strong imbalances between the different immigrant subgroups are evident. The previous finding that, compared to native-born candidates, IO-candidates are less likely to run in contested nomination proceedings if party list nominations are concerned holds true to a comparable extent for all immigrant subgroups.

The results fit the assumption that political parties avoid fielding representatives of marginalized groups to which a narrow voter appeal is ascribed in SMDs (Norris 2004; Rule 1987). These objections to IO-candidates are particularly raised if these differ more notably from the majority population. Parts of the local constituents cannot imagine being represented by a Muslim parliamentarian as this has not yet become a common occurrence. Therefore, Muslim candidates are feared to act as a deterrent to voters. On party lists, by contrast, no evidence for such reservations is found since political parties target a diversification of party lists to reach out to a wide range of voter groups. Moreover, voters that harbor prejudices against IO-candidates are unlikely to be deterred if IO-candidates make it on a party list since candidates run for election under the party label.




Figure 7.4.6:

Difference in the competition for nomination between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.16 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, non-viable list position. N for SMDs = 962; N for party lists = 1.076.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

For the reasons discussed in chapter 4.1, political parties are, in all likelihood, not equally enthusiastic about nominating IO-candidates for election. Center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more likely to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates than political parties located further on the right of the political spectrum, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP. To probe more deeply into potential party differences that remained hidden in the previous analysis, figure 7.4.6 displays the effect of the immigrant origin on the likelihood of being challenged for each political party. The AMEs are based on interactions between the immigrant variable and candidates' party affiliation while keeping the control variables constant.

The results yielded by the interaction terms question the initial assumption. IO-candidates of the SPD that compete for a nomination in SMDs have a higher probability of facing competitors than native-born candidates – the difference is 29 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Also in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, IO-candidates have a 30 percentage points higher probability of being contested. For the other political parties, however, no strong differences are evident between IO- and native-born candidates. The empirical results contradict the assumption that center-left parties are more inclined to open up their candidate

selection to IO-candidates by keeping the number of challengers low. As a first explanation for this unexpected outcome, SPD and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN are traditionally more open to IO-citizens (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Wüst 2016; Wüst 2011). Their membership of immigrant background probably exceeds that of the FDP and CDU/CSU. In some cases, this can result in a higher competition for nomination between aspiring IO-candidates:

If five immigrants strive for a nomination, they must compete by saying, "Not this one but me!" In my party, this is not the case [...]. There are too few. This makes it easier. On the one hand, you have fewer people who support you by saying, "I have to support this person since he/she has the same background." On the other hand, you do not have the competition issue (Interview 2).

Second, at least for the SPD, a greater usage of newcomer recruitment towards IO-candidates was found in chapter 7.1. As described above, longstanding party members often feel ignored if party newcomers of immigrant background are favored, giving rise to a higher counter-mobilization. With regard to party list nominations, by contrast, no significant effects emerge in any of the political parties under scrutiny. The results support the notion that SMD nominations constitute higher hurdles IO-candidates must clear to run for election than holds true for party list nominations as regards the number of challengers that must be trumped.




Figure 7.4.7:

Difference in the competition for nomination between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.17 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Saxon state election, SPD, non-viable list position, party delegate assembly. N for SMDs = 408; N for party lists = 497.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

But not only were political parties argued to make a difference to the selection of IO-candidates but also the inclusiveness of party selectorates (Hazan/Rahat 2006b: 372; 2010; Rahat et al. 2008: 666-667). More inclusive party selectorates tend to produce higher distortions of the selection outcomes than more exclusive selection contexts. Based on this reasoning, I expect an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates to be more likely if delegate assemblies are involved in the selection of candidates than holds true for party member assemblies. Figure 7.4.7 visualizes the effect of the immigrant background on the probability of running in contested selection proceedings, separately for each type of party selectorate. The AMEs are predicted on interactions between the immigrant variable and the selectorate type.

In SMDs, IO-candidates are 11 percentage points more likely than native-born candidates to be challenged, but the effect is statistically not significant as indicated by the large confidence interval that intersects the zero line. However, the pattern only applies to selection proceedings in which delegates are involved, while no remarkable group difference emerges for party member assemblies. Contrary to expectations, an opening for IO-candidates is not more likely if party delegates are the decision-makers in the selection of parliamentary candidates in SMDs. But when turning to party list nominations, a deviant pattern arises. IO-candidates have a lower probability than native-born candidates of running in contested selection proceedings if being nominated by delegates – the difference is 25 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. For party member assemblies, by contrast, no significant effect of the immigrant background is found.

As to party list nominations, delegate assemblies seem to form the selection context that conduces most to an uncontested nomination of IO-candidates. What are the main reasons for the found pattern? As delegates are formally tasked with the compilation of party lists by the membership of the district party organizations, they might take their responsibility more seriously to nominate candidates through which political parties can strengthen their electoral ties with underrepresented groups to broaden their voter appeal. Against this backdrop, delegate assemblies might be more prone to follow the strategically balanced list proposals submitted by the list committees, whereas more contestation prevails at party member assemblies. While at delegate assemblies, the list ranking is widely settled from the beginning, the outcome is more uncertain at party member assemblies.

At party member assemblies, it is also more difficult for the state party leadership to accommodate widely unknown party newcomers of immigrant background if considered crucial for electoral reasons. It is likely to provoke a backlash in terms of rival candidacies of longstanding party members who feel ignored in the candidate selection. At large party member assem-

blies, every person on the floor can turn into a challenger, while the circle of potential challengers is smaller at delegate assemblies due to their smaller size. What is more, since the names of the delegates are known prior to the nominating convention, the party leadership can try to build coalitions to ensure that IO-candidates remain uncontested. Such efforts are impeded if party member assemblies decide, as the party leadership is left in the dark about who will eventually participate in the nominating convention.

Moreover, myriad representational interests are in competition with one another at large party member assemblies (Mikulska/Scarow 2010: 316). As argued earlier, the candidate selection is the chief venue for the different intra-party groups to enforce their group-related representation interests (Katz 2001). If numerous claims for representation are involved in the candidate selection, it is highly improbable that the nomination of candidates from underrepresented groups, such as IO-candidates, goes without contestation. Other groups will supposedly challenge them to defend their claims for representation.




Figure 7.4.8:

Difference in the competition for nomination between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.18 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, unpromising list position, MMD district magnitude at its mean. N = 1.076.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Not only were party list nominations as such claimed to be conducive to minority representation but scholars argued that political parties become more prone to nominate candidates from underrepresented groups once the district magnitude of MMDs grows larger (Engstrom 1987;

Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Matland/Studlar 1996; Rae 1967; Studlar/Welch 1991). At a high district magnitude, political parties can meet their formal and informal quotas but still enough ballot positions remain to consider representational groups that gained in importance more recently, such as IO-citizens. Therefore, I hypothesize that IO-candidates become more likely to run in uncontested selection proceedings if the district magnitude of MMDs increases. First, political parties take a stronger interest in nominating IO-candidates if a larger number of party list slots is up for selection because these contribute to parties' ticket-balancing efforts. Second, a mobilization against IO-candidates becomes less likely since political parties can cater to different representational claims in the candidate selection.

To test the proposition set out above, the AME of the immigrant background on the probability of being challenged in the allocation of party list positions is plotted against the district magnitude of MMDs (see figure 7.4.8). Since candidates are nested in MMDs, a two-level binary logistic regression model is the method of choice to treat the data adequately (Gelman/Hill 2007; Hayes 2006; Snijders/Bosker 2012). The model includes a random slope for the immigrant variable that is allowed to vary across MMDs and random intercepts for MMDs to account more properly for the cross-level interaction between the immigrant variable and the district magnitude of MMDs.

First of all, it is noticed that no MMD-specific effects exist, as indicated by the small parameter of the random intercept. Also the random slope for the immigrant variable does not significantly differ between MMDs. At a low district magnitude of 30 seats below average, IO-candidates have an 18 percentage points lower probability of running against competitors than native-born candidates – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Against expectations, however, the effect of the immigrant background vanishes once the district magnitude increases. In other words, IO-candidates are less likely than native-born candidates to face competition for nomination on party lists if the district magnitude is low, whereas no group difference is noticed at a high district magnitude.

As a first explanation, political parties might compile their party lists more carefully if their options for ticket-balancing are confined. To ensure that IO-candidates make it on the party lists to reach out to IO-voters and demonstrate the parties' acknowledgement of multiculturalism as part of the society they represent, the party leaderships might be more engaged in curtail the number of competitors. Second, nominating conventions of large MMDs are less controllable for the party leaderships. Larger numbers of nominees on lower and unwinnable ballot positions wait to challenge contenders proposed for higher list slots. Nominating IO-candidates without any contestation therefore turns less likely if MMDs grow larger.




Figure 7.4.9: Difference in the competition for nomination between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.19 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 953.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Based on their zero-sum logic, SMDs are viewed as being stacked against the nomination of candidates from underrepresented groups (e.g. Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). However, demographic aspects are entirely absent from the argument. If IO-citizens are in the majority in SMDs, political parties face strong electoral incentives to nominate IO-candidates to appeal to IO-voters (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Grofman/Handley 1989; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). To make sure of being able to field IO-candidates in SMDs in which IO-voters make up a large proportion of the local constituency, political parties are expected to be more engaged in keeping the number of intra-party competitors in the candidate selection low.

In the first panel of figure 7.4.9, the AME of the immigrant origin on the probability of running in contested SMD selection proceedings is plotted against the share of foreigners in SMDs while keeping the control variables and the other relevant SMD context factors constant. No collinearity issues are encountered. All predictions in figure 7.4.9 result from two-level binary logistic regression models with random intercepts for SMDs and random slopes for the immigrant variable that can vary from SMD to SMD.

Zooming in on the local ethnic concentration, no significant effect of the immigrant background is found up to a foreigner share of 4 percentage points above average. This pattern alters considerably as soon as the foreigner share increases. At a foreigner share of 22 percentage points above average, IO-candidates are 27 percentage points more likely than native-born candidates to be contested – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. What emerges from the finding is that, against expectations, IO-candidates become more likely to come upon a competitive nomination situation if the local IO-population grows larger. First, in electoral districts in which IO-citizens make up a substantial part of the local constituency, the number of contenders of immigrant background is probably higher than in electoral districts with only few IO-citizens, as demographics are reflected in the membership. This might force aspiring IO-candidates into competing one another in the candidate selection. The previous analysis pointed to a second mechanism that might lie beneath the found pattern if the local supply of aspiring IO-candidates is low. If no local party member of immigrant background qualified to compete for office is available, party leaderships sometimes choose to recruit party newcomers of immigrant background for SMDs with a high spatial concentration of IO-citizens. But such strategic undertakings can feed the discontent of the local party membership that feels ignored in the appointment of district candidates, giving rise to a counter-mobilization. While the first mechanism applies to SMDs in which the number of local contenders of immigrant background is high, the second pertains to SMDs in which no local IO-candidate is available.

When being faced with the decision as to who should be nominated in SMDs, political parties are believed to ponder to what extent local voters will oppose IO-candidates at the ballot box. In socially deprived SMDs, captured by the local unemployment rate and the share of high school graduates, more voters harbor prejudices against immigrants than in prosperous SMDs (Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2014; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014; Mayda 2006). Therefore, political parties are incentivized to close their candidate selection to IO-candidates if SMDs move towards a higher social deprivation. Surprisingly, as displayed in the second panel of figure 7.4.9, the marginal effect of the immigrant background is in no way impacted by the local unemployment rate. The assumption that aspiring IO-candidates are tried to be prevented from running for election by a higher counter-mobilization if the economic situation in SMDs is bleak must be rejected. Virtually the same pattern emerges for the local share of high school graduates, displayed in the third panel. In either case, the marginal effects of the immigrant background remain widely unaffected by the context factors. Apparently, it is not the local level of social deprivation which matters for the intra-party mobilization against IO-candidates.

Lastly, the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs, measured by the local right-wing vote share and the degree of urbanity, is expected to impact the selection practices employed towards IO-candidates. If the local constituency adopts markedly negative attitudes towards multiculturalism, these stances might turn local voters against IO-candidates, meaning that political parties must fear electoral losses when nominating IO-candidates. This makes a mobilization against aspiring IO-candidates at the local nominating convention likely to prevent them from coming forward as candidates. Contrary to expectations, however, the probability of IO-candidates facing competitors at the local nominating convention declines once the vote share of far-right political parties grows larger and aligns to that of native-born candidates. But the marginal effect of the immigrant background fails statistical significance throughout. One likely reason is that the moderate political parties do not vie for far-right voters, and, therefore, remain widely unaffected. Moreover, the range of far-right votes might not be large enough to bring about a notable reaction of the moderate political parties.

As a second indicator to tap into local anti-immigrant sentiments, the population density is employed. In rural areas, individuals harbor greater levels of cultural conservatism than in urban settings, making them more critical of multiculturalism. Different from expectations, however, the likelihood of IO-candidates competing for nomination with other party members exceeds that of native-born candidates if the population density in SMDs grows bigger. In highly urban SMDs, their probability of being contested is 50 percentage points higher but fails statistical significance, albeit only narrowly. One possible explanation for the pattern resulting from insights provided by the qualitative interviews is that representational claims are more heterogeneous in urban SMDs. This is because social structures in urban settings are more complex and multifarious. Consequently, IO-candidates might face more competitors as other groups try to keep them out of the race for seats.

7.5 Party Support in the Candidate Selection Process

In getting on a party list, the support of the state party leadership is of particular importance, while district party organizations pull the strings in the candidate selection of SMDs (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Wessels 1997; Zeuner 1970). If political parties pursue an opening strategy, they could provide aspiring IO-candidates with extraordinary party support in the candidate selection to improve their chance of nomination. A closure, in turn, would be indicated if political parties are reluctant to provide IO-candidates with a comparable amount of party support as native-born candidates. Neutrality is evident in an equal amount of party support lent to IO- and native-born candidates. Before delving into a careful

analysis of the importance of party support in the candidate selection, it is important to note that party support was only measured at the state-level.




Figure 7.5.1: Difference in the importance of support from state party leaderships in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates.

Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.38. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 664$.
Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.5.1 shows the extent to which the support provided by state party leaderships is considered crucial to being nominated. The measurement rests on subjective perceptions of the importance of party support in coming forward as a candidate. For more than 60 percent of the candidates, the support of state party leaderships is not or not very crucial to being nominated as a candidate. Only one fifth of the candidates regard the support of state party leaderships as decisive or even very decisive. As opposed to native-born candidates, somewhat more IO-candidates consider the support of state party leaderships irrelevant to their nomination. About 61 percent of the native-born candidates compared with 67 percent of the IO-candidates view the support of state party leaderships as not or not very important. At the same time, somewhat more IO-candidates consider the support of state party leaderships important or very important by a gap of 4 percentage points (23 vs. 19 percent). Overall, the descriptive results draw a mixed picture of the importance of being backed by state party leaderships for the nomination of IO-candidates. The difference to native-born candidates is weak and statistically insignificant, as shown by Fisher's exact test.




Figure 7.5.2: Difference in the importance of support from local party chapters in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.32. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 668$.
Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.5.2 complements the previous findings by adding empirical evidence for the importance of support provided by local party chapters in successfully coming through the candidate selection. Compared to the support of state party leaderships, markedly more candidates consider the support of local party organizations important or very important in being selected. The finding lays stress on the crucial role local party organizations play in the candidate selection – most notably in SMDs but also on party lists (Zeuner 1970: 59). About 17 percent of the native-born candidates compared with 21 percent of the IO-candidates view the support of local party organizations as not or not very important for the own nomination. At the same time, however, 65 percent of the native-born candidates attribute a high or very high importance to local party chapters but only 50 percent of the IO-candidates. The descriptive results hint that local party organizations are more hesitant about providing party support for aspiring IO-candidates. Yet, the differences fail statistical significance as disclosed by the Fisher's exact test, and, therefore, need to be studied more carefully in a multivariate framework.

Due to a limited number of IO-candidates, the answer options “important” and “very important” are conflated, measuring a high importance of party support (= 1) and 0 otherwise. To gauge to which extent the immigrant background is correlated with the importance of party support in being selected and disentangle the effect of the immigrant background from other confounders standing behind the relationship, binary logistic regression models are run. As logistic regression models are non-linear, their coefficients are not indicative of effect sizes (Ai/Norton 2003; Berry et al. 2010; Brambor et al. 2006; Buis 2010; Hosmer 2013; Long/Freese; Norton et al. 2004; Pampel 2001). I therefore provide AMEs at observed values (Hanmer/Kalkan 2013; Verlinda 2006).

To fathom to what extent the immigrant background impacts the importance of party support in the candidate selection, I need to control for confounding factors to not erroneously attribute a difference to the fact of having an immigrant background although it dates from factors in which IO-candidates are particularly well- or poorly positioned. As before, socio-demographic background variables are included. Moreover, by the virtue of their name recognition, incumbents (= 1) are armed with an electoral advantage (Erikson 1971; Gelman/King 1990; Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Lee 2001; Levitt/Wolfram 1997), which makes their re-selection desirable for political parties and is assumed to be reflected in more party support. The relationship is probably reinforced by the number of legislative terms served. More of the political resources can be acquired that equip incumbents with an electoral advantage. But also the number of prior candidacies, the years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of previous political offices and experience in local-level and party office, all of which indicate political competence and experience, are assumed to shape party support. Longstanding, extensively networked and highly experienced candidates are more likely to be regarded as capable of standing for election and they have larger support networks within the own party organization.²⁸ As candidates that are affiliated with various civil society organizations are instrumental in linking political parties with social organizations and mobilizing their electoral support, I will also control for the candidates' number of organizational affiliations. Furthermore, the mode of candidacy might shape the patterns of party support. The support of state party leaderships that organize the state party conventions and are involved in the elaboration of drafts of the list ranking is a decisive factor in the nomination on party lists, whereas the support of the own district party organization is key to running for election in SMDs (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005). To account for the pooled character of the data set, election and party fixed effects are included.

²⁸ I previously included the local residence in SMDs because locals might get more local party support. As it has no significant effect but diminishes the number of observations, it is omitted.




Figure 7.5.3:

Predictors of the importance of party support in the candidate selection.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.20 and A.21 in the appendix. Grey dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N for state party leadership support = 631; N for local party chapter support = 635.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.5.3 shows the AMEs of the predictors that are hypothesized to impact the amount of party support offered in the candidate selection. In conformity with the descriptive results, no notable effect of the immigrant background on the importance placed on the support of state party leaderships is observed. Even in the bivariate model (grey dashed square), no statistically significant effect of the immigrant origin emerges, substantiating that no strong disparity between IO- and native-born candidates exists as regards state leadership support. In other words, IO-candidates attach no greater or smaller importance to the support of state party leaderships in being nominated than native-born candidates.

If I relate the results to the insights provided by the qualitative interviews, it is found that state party leaderships only back IO-candidates in very exceptional cases. This happens only if IO-candidates are considered eminently qualified to establish closer party ties with IO-voters and improve the parties' expertise in immigration-related issues by having certain sought-after

resources, such as close contacts to immigrant organizations, but are not yet sufficiently anchored in the own party organization to come out on top in the candidate selection. To compensate for their lack of intra-party support networks and improve their chance of coming through the candidate selection, state party leaderships can choose to provide them with support in the nomination proceedings. At nominating conventions that approve party lists, it is comparatively easy for state party leaderships to endorse IO-candidates. As in most cases, state party leaderships engage in the development of proposals for the list ranking and organize the nominating convention at the state level (Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 546), they can try to accommodate IO-candidates on ballot positions and motivate their candidate preference towards the party selectorate. Conversely, they are more careful not to barge in the candidate selection proceedings of SMDs which are the exclusive dominion of district party organizations. In SMDs, the support of the district party leadership on the one hand, and of the local rank-and-file party members that form the selectorate on the other, are most key to being nominated. Even if IO-candidates are strongly backed by state party leaderships, they require the support of district party organizations to run for election in SMDs.

In no case – neither on party lists nor in SMDs –, the support of state party leaderships went so far that they obliged party selectorates to vote for their favored contenders. State party leaderships have no legal means to coerce party selectorates into voting in line with their candidate priorities. The support of state party leaderships rather assumes the shape of recommendation and endorsement. The party leaderships can make their candidate preferences clear at the nominating conventions by stressing the contenders' political qualities and contribution to the parties' line-up in the forthcoming election, for instance their importance in addressing IO-voters and in signaling openness to multiculturalism. But they cannot compel party selectorates to follow their candidate priorities, although their recommendations are without doubt influential factors in the candidate selection outcomes. An exaggerated intrusion is regarded as a suspension of intra-party democracy, making a mobilization against the favored contenders a likely scenario. Moreover, if the support of state party leaderships goes too far, candidates – if elected – run the risk of finding less acceptance from party colleagues. It seriously handicaps their work in parliament if they are regarded as being gifted with mandates instead of having earned the office by diligence and merit:

My start was facilitated by the state party leadership which said, "We want this candidate!" Therefore, I was welcome with open arms at the local and state level. But this does not mean that I could skip the democratic process within the party organization. There were elections for candidacies [...]. I had to overcome the normal hurdles that must be overcome within political parties. But it was very benevolent from the beginning (Interview 3).

[The state party leader] served as an advocate at the nominating convention and motivated it [my nomination]. This showed me that I was intended to be nominated [...] due to my competence, networks and work [in the immigration field] [...]. [The state party leadership] would never dared to say, "I want you to vote for this candidate." It was only said that it would be strategically important for the overall arrangement of the party and this certainly has some weight (Interview 3).

Also the control variables in figure 7.5.3 yield some interesting results. Compared with female nominees, male candidates have a lower probability of regarding the support of state party leaderships as important for their nomination. On this evidence, state party leaderships target carefully balanced party tickets to address a possibly wide range of voter segments. On these grounds, they seem to lend more support to female applicants that are still underrepresented in parliament (Fortin-Rittberger/Eder 2013; Fortin-Rittberger et al. 2016; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Kaiser/Hennl 2008; Magin 2011). Moreover, state party leaderships must ascertain that the parties' gender quotas imposed on party lists are met. Contrary to expectations, the support of state party leaderships is less important for incumbents. As their re-selection is virtually guaranteed (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970) and they already established personal support networks within the own party organization, they are less dependent on the support of state party leaderships. Compared to SMD nominations, the support of state party leaderships is significantly more important for candidates running on party lists or holding dual nominations. The finding reflects that state party leaderships can exert influence on the allocation of party list nominations, whereas nominations for nominal races are incumbent upon district party organizations (Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). Compared to the Saxon state election, the support of state party leaderships plays a minor role in Hesse and Bavaria. The interference of state party leaderships in the candidate selection of SMDs is a more common phenomenon in East Germany than in West Germany, reflected in the empirical results (Reiser 2011: 251). Interestingly, the support of state party leaderships appears to be more important for candidates of the CDU/CSU, FDP and DIE LINKE compared to SPD candidates, but less weighty in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. The latter is a strong proponent of non-hierarchical party structures which leads to a lower importance of support provided by state party leaderships.

The question arises whether neutral patterns in the selection of IO-candidates are confirmed when attending to the support provided by local party organizations. A closer examination of the AMEs, also displayed in figure 7.5.3, reveals that IO-candidates have a lower probability of attaching any importance to the support of local party organizations compared to native-born candidates – the gap is 12 percentage points. Even though the marginal effect narrowly fails statistical significance (p -value = 0.15), and, therefore, is tainted with some statistical uncertainty, IO-candidates seem to find it more difficult to cultivate a local support base than their native-born peers.

In the qualitative interviews, local party support was pictured as having the support of the rank-and-file party membership of the electoral district that forms the nominating body and having the support of the local party leadership that organizes the candidate selection in SMDs and can make recommendations to the selectorate. Having the full backing of the district party organization is of utmost importance in competing for a mandate in SMDs. The previous finding that IO-candidates view the support of local party organizations as less important for their nominations therefore hints at a strong handicap to IO-candidates, explaining why fewer IO-candidates enter parliament via SMDs. Yet, having the backing of the local party organization not only is essential in the nomination proceedings of SMDs but also carries weight in the allocation of party list slots. The proposal for the list ranking is developed in close agreement with the district party organizations. It is likely to be rejected if it fails to reflect the regional balance of power within state party organizations (Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 546). Moreover, either the party membership of the district party organizations or delegates, legitimized by the party members of the district party organizations, compose the selectorate at the state level. Contenders that fail to be backed by the district party organization to which they are affiliated are indicated to lack the support required on the campaign trail, letting dwindle their selectorate votes.

As evidenced by the empirical results, local party organizations are more reluctant to support IO-candidates in the selection proceedings than applies to state party leaderships which treat IO- and native-bon candidates widely equally. The pattern corresponds to previous findings which showed that local party levels are more closed to candidates from underrepresented groups than higher party layers. State and national party leaderships are more likely to realize the necessity of increasing minority representation and of creating openings for underrepresented groups to respond to social changes in the population (Caul 1999; Kittilson/Tate 2005). They are responsible for the strategic positioning of party organizations, and, in this function, keep a wary eye on recent social shifts at the electoral markets, whereas district party organizations keep chiefly an eye on the local sphere (Durose et al. 2013; Soininen 2011). Some IO-candidates therefore experienced initial reluctance on the part of their district party organizations when proclaiming their ambition of running for office. But hesitation volatilized after IO-candidates came out on top in the local candidate selection:

My district party was rather pessimistic [...]. After three, four weeks, a party member of the local party organization came to me and said, "You are doing well in the local party. People are talking about you." Then I felt accepted as a candidate (Interview 4).

I toured through the local party chapters and introduced myself. Some of them said, "It is not necessary. We already know whom to vote for." There were some in which I was not allowed to introduce myself because they could not imagine voting for me (Interview 1).

The reservations expressed about the nomination of IO-candidates spring chiefly from the anticipation of a backlash from local voters (see also Durose et al. 2013: 256). Local party organizations are in fear that the nomination of IO-candidates jeopardizes their electoral success as local voters are believed to not yet be ready for IO-representatives:

[The voter] does not know me as a person and decides differently [from the party]. The voter has only parts of the information and one part is the name. The name can be a criterion for exclusion (Interview 2).

[Within the party organization] It is feared that if a person of immigrant background runs for political office, the party will lose votes because of the background. We are talking about latent discrimination which still prevails in society (Interview 4).

The concerns about electoral losses are not completely unfounded and stem from negative incidents. Most IO-candidates experienced discrimination on the campaign trail. Although these were individual incidents, they serve as indicators of local voter attitudes towards IO-candidates and flow into future candidate selection proceedings by suggesting not to nominate IO-candidates:

One of the local party chapters [in my electoral district] said to me one or two weeks before [the election took place], "Let's campaign in front of the bakery." [...] My party colleagues were very shocked when someone came and insulted me due to my immigrant background [...]. But this happens (Interview 4).

I think my nominal votes were downsized by my name. From the party votes in the electoral district, I could see that the results were fantastic for my political party [...]. I suppose that the nominal votes would have been higher with another name (Interview 2).

When turning to the control variables, also displayed in figure 7.5.3, male candidates are found to have a lower probability of attaching importance to local party support for being nominated compared to female candidates – the gap is 9 percentage points. Apparently, male nominees are more likely to come forward as candidates without any strong party support, whereas female contenders hinge more on local party support to win a nomination (Carroll/Sanbonmatsu 2013: 53). To the degree that women are less likely to envision themselves running for office, they need party support to step forward. In comparison to SMD candidates, the support of local party organizations is less important for contenders competing for party list slots. The finding reflects that the candidate selection in SMDs is incumbent on district party organizations, whereas party lists are more under the control of state party leaderships (Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005). Compared with the SPD candidates, the support of local party organizations is more crucial in the CDU/CSU, but of minor importance in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. One explanation is that the latter is to a lesser extent locally anchored, particularly in rural areas. This is related not least to the fact that candidates of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN hardly have any chance of coming out on top of nominal races.




Figure 7.5.4: Difference in the importance of party support in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.
Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N for state party leadership support = 631; N for local party chapter support = 635.
Source: state-level candidate surveys.

In a next step, I will give a closer inspection to the control variables which capture candidates' political qualifications to bring to light whether they shape the amount of party support provided for IO-candidates (see figure 7.5.4). Under the inclusion of all previously introduced control variables, interactions are computed between the immigrant origin and each control variable. Note that for incumbency, only marginal effects on the importance of local party support are presented due to a small number of incumbents of immigrant origin who viewed the support of state party leaderships as important. For the same reason, no effect plot for the experience in local-level office is provided.

While local party organizations are reluctant to support IO-candidates to the same extent as native-born candidates in their nominations, indicated by the small negative gap to the zero line in all effect plots, the difference vanishes once the number of legislative terms served in parliament increases, disclosing that IO-candidates must outperform native-born candidates to have equal chances of being backed. Once IO-candidates made it into parliament, the reluctance of

local party organizations is overcome. Virtually the same relationship is observed for the number of previous candidacies, the years of party membership, the number of political offices and organizational affiliations, although it is only weakly pronounced and statistically insignificant for the most part. Where IO-candidates have an equal probability as native-born candidates of regarding the support of local party organizations as important for their nominations, this is because they are armed with political experience that mitigates their electoral disadvantage of being from a minority group. While, at least in part, local party organizations must be convinced of the IO-candidates' political qualifications, state party leaderships support IO-candidates to a similar degree as native-born nominees, regardless of their political experience. The findings confirm that, while neutral selection practices are employed by state party leaderships, a tendency towards closure prevails in local party organizations. This unearths one mechanism that underlies the recurrent finding that fewer IO-candidates enter parliament via SMDs (Wüst 2014a).




Figure 7.5.5:

Difference in the importance of party support in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.22 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

The previously found patterns referred to IO-candidates as a whole. Yet, certain immigrant subgroups, such as Muslims or those from non-European countries, stand out more clearly from

the majority population than others (Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Fietkau 2016; Ford 2011). Therefore, their nomination sends out a stronger signal that political parties are open to IO-citizens, pay attention to their political representation and accept the cultural diversity of the population that is to be represented. To inspect potential variances in the parties' selection behavior across immigrant subgroups, AMEs from five identical regression models that are run on different subsets of IO-candidates are presented in figure 7.5.5.

For IO-candidates from European countries and of Christian denomination, no notable effects are observed on the importance of support provided by state party leaderships, whereas candidates from Muslim countries are 13 percentage points more likely than native-born candidates to regard the support of state party leaderships as important to coming forward. Yet, the AME fails statistical significance due to a small number of observations for candidates from Muslim countries. Nonetheless, the results provide evidence that state party leaderships become somewhat more bent on getting behind IO-candidates if these are believed to send out striking signals to IO-voters – and to the Muslim population in particular – that their political representation is taken seriously. As state party leaderships define the electoral course state party organizations will take in the upcoming election, they prospect for untapped voter potentials and develop electoral strategies for exploiting these. This is why they are more inclined to support the nominations of those IO-candidates that are thought to be most effective in signaling that political parties are open to IO-citizens and in mobilizing the electoral support of IO-voters.

When turning to the importance attached to the support of local party organizations, a reversed pattern comes to the fore. By a gap of 12 percentage points, IO-candidates have a lower probability of placing importance on the support of local party organizations compared to native-born candidates, whereas it is even 20 percentage points for Muslim candidates. Local party organizations become more reluctant to get behind IO-candidates if these differ markedly from the majority population. The pattern corresponds to the earlier finding on the electoral concerns raised by local party organizations. As Muslim candidates differ more visibly from the majority population in terms of name, appearance and denomination, it is feared that they arouse opposition from local voters, impairing the parties' electoral success. While state party leaderships become more inclined to support IO-candidates if these deviate from the majority population to send out more striking signals to the public that the party organization is open to IO-citizens and to multiculturalism more generally, local party organizations react in the opposite way. However, the estimates for candidates from non-European and Muslim countries for the support of local party organizations are widely comparable to those of IO-candidates as a whole.




Figure 7.5.6:

Difference in the importance of party support in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.23 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N for state party leadership support = 622; N for local party chapter support = 635.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Moreover, I argued in line with the literature that political parties themselves matter in shaping parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates (Kittilson/Tate 2005). Based on their higher dependence on the electoral support of IO-voters and their egalitarian ideologies, center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are expected to be more likely to support IO-candidates in their nominations, whereas political parties that are placed more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the FDP and CDU/CSU, pursue more defensive selection strategies. To unveil party differences, figure 7.5.6 displays the AMEs of the immigrant origin on the probability of regarding party support as important for the own nomination, separately for each political party. The predictions are based on interactions between the immigrant variable and candidates' party affiliation while keeping the control variables constant. Note that no IO-candidate of the FDP and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN placed importance on the support of state party leaderships.

In the SPD and DIE LINKE, IO-candidates are somewhat more likely than native-born candidates to view the support of state party leaderships as crucial in being chosen, but the effects fail statistical significance. In the CDU/CSU, by contrast, no noteworthy effect emerges but the support of state party leaderships seems to be equally important for IO- and native-born

candidates. Overall, the estimates point in the expected direction, giving emphasis to the proposition that the state party leaderships of center-left parties are somewhat more likely to support IO-candidates in their nominations than those of political parties which are placed more on the right of the political spectrum, such as CDU/CSU. But it is important to note that the effect of the immigrant background is markedly weak and falls short of statistical significance.

When looking at the support of local party organizations, the marginal effects point in a negative direction in all political parties, apart from the CDU/CSU for which no notable effect is observed. The results corroborate that local party organizations are more reluctant to provide IO-candidates with party support as these are believed to have a more limited voter appeal than native-born candidates – this applies to all political parties except for CDU/CSU which is surprising. However, the marginal effects are statistically insignificant throughout. Therefore, they are associated with a high level of statistical uncertainty and should be treated with caution.




Figure 7.5.7: Difference in the importance of party support in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.24 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N for state party leadership support = 631; N for local party chapter support = 632.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

According to the literature on electoral system incentives (e.g. Matland/Studlar 1996; Norris 1997a; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Schmidt 2008), political parties avoid nominating IO-candidates in SMDs, which are believed not to be won by candi-

dates from underrepresented groups with a markedly narrow voter profile. Party lists, by contrast, offer more flexible options for ticket-balancing. By incorporating IO-candidates, parties' electoral outreach can be broadened. It follows that political parties tend to support IO-candidates in their nominations if party list slots are allocated, while more defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure are adopted in the nomination proceedings of SMDs. To disclose how the AME of the immigrant background is affected by the mode of candidacy, interactions are computed between the immigrant variable and the mode of candidacy and visualized in figure 7.5.7.

A closer examination of the interaction effect reveals that, compared with native-born candidates, IO-candidates have a higher probability of attaching importance to the support of state party leaderships in being nominated in SMDs – the difference in probability is 51 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level, but based on a small number of IO-candidates nominated only in SMDs, the effect is to be treated with caution. On party lists, a reversed pattern is observed. IO-candidates have a lower probability of considering the support of state party leaderships to be a decisive factor in their nomination – the difference is 16 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. For dual nominations that apply to most of the candidates, no significant effect emerges.

Contrary to expectations, the support of state party leaderships plays a more important role in SMDs, even though the candidate selection in SMDs is the dominion of district party organizations and leaves little room for interference of state party leaderships (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005). The result reflects individual cases in which SMDs remained vacant and district party organizations asked state party leaderships for a candidate recommendation. Surprisingly, state party leaderships do not provide IO-candidates that aspire to run for election only on a party list with extraordinary support although they organize the state party conventions, and, therefore, have possibilities to do so. One explanation is that an exaggerated support for IO-candidates makes a mobilization against the leaderships' preferred contenders a likely scenario at the nominating convention as other contenders feel disadvantaged. Yet, more importantly, those IO-candidates that are backed by the party leadership are probably safeguarded by dual nominations, for which a neutral pattern became evident.

Of those IO-candidates that only compete for elected office in SMDs, not any considers the support of local party organizations irrelevant to their nomination. Due to complete separation in the data, no marginal effect is presented. The finding underscores how important it is to have the support of district and sub-district party chapters to run for office in SMDs (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). The probability of IO-candidates placing importance on the support of local party organizations is 20 and 14 percentage points lower than

the probability estimated for native-born candidates when being nominated on a party list or running on a dual ticket. However, the estimates narrowly fail statistical significance. Notwithstanding, the results suggest that IO-candidates face more difficulties in establishing a local alliance of supporters than native-born candidates, being a major drawback in the candidate selection. It is of vital importance that candidates are fully backed by their own district party organizations which can exert pressure on the list committees to place their candidates on viable list positions (Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005: 546).




Figure 7.5.8:

Difference in the importance of party support in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.25 and A.26 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, party delegate assembly. N for state party leadership support = 413; N for local party chapter support = 509.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Not only is the mode of candidacy critical to descriptive representation but also the inclusiveness of party selectorates that are tasked with the nomination of candidates, and, therefore, pull the strings in the candidate selection (Hazan/Rahat 2006b: 372; Rahat et al. 2008). The thrust of research claimed that inclusive party selectorates, such as party member assemblies, produce a stronger descriptive bias in the selection outcomes than more exclusive party selectorates, such as delegate assemblies. Accordingly, party support might be more easily imparted to IO-candidates if delegate assemblies decide on the candidate selection. To investigate

whether the nominating body makes any difference to the importance IO-candidates attach to party support in being nominated, interactions between the immigrant variable and the selectorate type are incorporated into the initial statistical model while keeping all control variables constant (see figure 7.5.8).

When turning to the support of state party leaderships, IO-candidates are found to be more likely than native-born candidates to regard their support as important in being nominated but only on the condition that delegates have a say in the candidate selection of SMDs. The gap in probability is 39 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. By contrast, no significant effect emanates from the immigrant background if party member assemblies decide on the selection of parliamentary candidates. Apparently, state party leaderships are better placed to provide support for IO-candidates in the SMD nomination proceedings if these are in the hands of delegate assemblies. The first reason being that delegate assemblies are smaller than party member assemblies, making it easier for state party leaderships to approach party gatekeepers and recommend aspiring IO-candidates by stressing their contribution to the positioning of the party organization in the forthcoming election. Second, since the names of the delegates are known prior to the nominating convention, state party leaderships can engage in coalition building by approaching district party leaderships and recommending their preferred contenders and asking the district party leaders to recommend the contenders to the delegates. Such efforts are thwarted if party member assemblies form the selection context. The district party leadership is left in the dark about who will show up at the nominating convention. Third, delegate assemblies might be more prone to follow recommendations of state party leaders, provided that they meet with the approval of the district party leaders (Zeuner 1970: 56). While delegates consider candidate recommendations necessary for an optimal positioning of the party organization in the upcoming election, party member assemblies tend to view them as illegitimate top-down interventions in their sphere of influence.

When moving on to party list nominations, IO-candidates are found to have a comparable probability as native-born candidates of viewing the support of state party leaders as relevant to their selection, regardless of the selectorate type. Surprisingly, state party leaderships do not use the opportunity to endorse the nomination of IO-candidates on party lists although they organize the state nominating conventions, and, therefore, have options of doing so. However, as discussed earlier, an exaggerated support can make other applicants and their supporters feel disadvantaged, making a mobilization against the leaderships' preferred candidate likely. To maintain the highly fragile party peace, an overstated support is avoided.

When delving into the importance placed on the support of local party organizations in SMDs, no notable effect of the immigrant background is evident if delegate assemblies are

responsible for choosing a candidate. But supposing that party members decide who is to be nominated for election, IO-candidates are found to be less likely than native-born candidates to view the support of local party organizations as important for their nomination – the gap in probability is 14 percentage points but fails statistical significance. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence to state that the reluctance of local party organizations to endorse IO-candidates in their nomination comes to light only if local rank-and-file party members form the nominating body. They might reflect the reluctance of local voters to ballot for IO-candidates more strongly than delegates as they are more representative of the local constituency.

When turning to party list nominations, IO-candidates are found to be less likely than native-born candidates to attach importance to the support of local party organizations in coming forward as a candidate, but the marginal effects are statistically insignificant. The pattern is valid, regardless of the type of party selectorate.




Figure 7.5.9:

Difference in the importance of party support in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.27 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. N for state party leadership support = 557; N for local party chapter support = 561.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

By creating incentives to balance the party ticket, PR electoral systems were argued to foster the representation of marginalized groups (e.g. Matland/Studlar 1996; Norris 1997a; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Schmidt 2008). This argument, however, does

not appreciate interactions with other institutional variables that shape the incentive structure for ticket-balancing. From the literature on electoral system incentives, it can be inferred that PR electoral systems become even more propitious for the nomination of IO-candidates once the district magnitude of MMDs grows larger (e.g. Engstrom 1987; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Matland/Studlar 1996; Rae 1967; Studlar/Welch 1991). To ensure that IO-candidates who can make for a further diversification of the party ticket obtain a ballot position, political parties should become more inclined to support IO-candidates in their nomination if the district magnitude of MMDs increases. To explore the conditioning effect of the district magnitude, an interaction between the immigrant variable and the district magnitude of MMDs is factored into the statistical model while keeping the control variables constant. At the state level, only nine MMDs (Bavaria: 7, Saxony: 1, Hesse: 1) are given. As multilevel modelling is ruled out, binary logistic regression models with fixed effects for MMDs are run.

In figure 7.5.9, graphical evidence for the conditioning effect of the district magnitude on the AME of the immigrant background is presented. IO-candidates have a similar likelihood as native-born candidates of perceiving the support of state party leaderships as important in being nominated, whereas they have a markedly lower probability if turning to the support of local party organizations. But contrary to expectations, the marginal effects of the immigrant variable are not affected by the district magnitude of MMDs. This is to say that the amount of party support provided for IO-candidates is entirely independent of the options for ticket-balancing. One reason, mentioned earlier, is that the space for ticket-balancing remains confined because a multitude of formal and informal quotas must be met (Mintzel 1980; Reiser 2014; Zeuner 1970), cutting the leeway to boost IO-candidates' presence on party lists. Yet another reason is that political parties tend to support other group representatives, not only IO-candidates, if the number of list slots grows bigger in order to broaden the parties' voter appeal (see also Hennings/Urbatsch 2015). Lastly, only nine MMDs are available at the state level. The limited variance in the district magnitude might be an explanation why no effect changes are found.




Figure 7.5.10: Difference in the importance of party support in the candidate selection between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.28 and A.29 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding in binary: not important (= 0), important (= 1). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N for state party leadership support = 417; N for local party chapter support = 417.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Owing to their zero-sum logic, SMDs were claimed to impair the selection chances of contenders from underrepresented groups. However, the assumption is not independent of the socio-demographic context of SMDs (Dancygier 2014; Trounstine/Valdini 2008). In SMDs that are characterized by a markedly high proportion of IO-citizens, political parties face strong electoral incentives to support IO-candidates in their nomination to tap the electoral support of IO-voters. To test the assertion, an interaction term between the immigrant variable and the foreigner share of SMDs is incorporated into the statistical model while keeping the control variables and the other relevant SMD context factors constant. Note that no collinearity problems arise. All graphs presented in figure 7.5.10 result from multilevel regression models. The predictions rest on two-level binary logistic models with random intercepts for SMDs. I opted to leave the random slope for the immigrant variable out as its variance across SMDs is decidedly low and does not improve the model fit.

Contrary to expectations, however, the effect of the immigrant background on the importance attached to the support of state party leaderships remains unaffected by the foreigner share in SMDs. Thus, the spatial concentration of IO-citizens does not generate electoral incentives that prompt state party leaderships to provide extraordinary support for IO-candidates. As the candidate selection in SMDs is chiefly the domain of district party organizations, the finding comes as little surprise. When shifting the focus onto the support provided by local party organizations, IO-candidates are found to have a 23 percentage points lower probability than native-born candidates of viewing the local party support as important for their nomination if the local foreigner share is 6 percentage points below average. Yet, along with an increasing proportion of foreigners, their probability exceeds the one of native-born candidates by 14 percentage points. Although the effects are statistically insignificant, the pattern points in the hypothesized direction. In the face of a low foreigner share, local party organizations are reluctant to support IO-candidates in their nomination as they are believed to have a limited voter appeal. But once the proportion of IO-citizens in SMDs increases, they become more inclined to support the nomination of IO-candidates in order to tap the electoral support of IO-voters that form a large and highly visible voter segment in the local constituency.

To arrive at the decision as to who should emerge as a candidate in SMDs, political parties try to anticipate voter reactions. In socially deprived SMDs, measured by the unemployment rate and the share of high school graduates, more voters harbor prejudices against immigrants (e.g. Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2014; Facchini/Mayda 2006; Mayda 2006), making a loss of votes a likely consequence of the nomination of IO-candidates. With regard to unemployment, it can be seen that, at a low unemployment rate of 2 percentage points below average, IO-candidates have a higher probability than native-born candidates of viewing the support of state party leaderships as relevant to their nomination – the difference is 34 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. However, once the unemployment rate increases, the effect turns into zero. As expected, state party leaderships desist from supporting IO-candidates if the economic deprivation of SMDs grows larger. A widely similar pattern becomes evident for the support of local party organizations. At the lowest unemployment rate, no notable effect of the immigrant variable is found. But IO-candidates have a 40 percentage points lower probability of being supported once the unemployment rate is 4 percentage points above average – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. To the extent that local constituencies are economically deprived and more voters bear resentment against immigrants, both the state party leaderships and local party organizations become less eager to support IO-candidates in their selection because their nomination might cost votes.

A closer inspection of the share of high school graduates in SMDs reveals that the effect plot contradicts the expectation put forward in the previous paragraph. IO-candidates have a higher probability than native-born candidates of viewing the support of state party leaderships as vital to their nomination if the share of high school graduates is 15 percentage points below average – the difference is 34 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.1 level. However, once the proportion of high school graduates grows larger, the marginal effect turns into zero. A similar pattern is observed for the support of local party organizations. While at a low educational level, no notable effect emanates from the immigrant variable, IO-candidates have a 19 percentage points lower probability of viewing local party support as important if the proportion of high school graduates is 15 percentage points above average, although the effect is statistically insignificant. One explanation for the puzzling result is that the indicator is inappropriate to tap into the cultural dimension of social deprivation. Admittedly, it blurs electoral district borders since school graduates might have visited schools in neighboring districts. Yet another reason is that educational attainment is less manifest than unemployment or the spatial concentration of IO-citizens, making it less relevant to the selection behavior of political parties.

Finally, political parties are believed to pay attention to the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs, measured by the local far-right vote share and the degree of urbanity. If local constituents adopt critical attitudes towards multiculturalism, political parties must reckon with electoral losses when nominating IO-candidates, making them hesitant about providing support in the nomination proceedings. At a low right-wing vote share in SMDs, which is 2 percentage points below average, IO-candidates are 28 percentage points more likely than native-born candidates to consider the support of state party leaderships relevant to their nomination. Yet, the effect fails statistical significance. With an electoral strengthening of far-right parties, the effect of the immigrant background turns into zero. The pattern, even though weakly pronounced, corresponds to the expectations outlined above. A similar pattern can be observed when throwing a glance at the support of local party organizations. At a low far-right vote share, no notable effect of the immigrant background is evident, whereas IO-candidates are less likely than native-born candidates to view the support of local party organizations as crucial at the highest values of the far-right vote share. The gap in probability is 27 percentage points but fails statistical significance. Nonetheless, the pattern follows the expectation that political parties lower their support for the nomination of IO-candidates once anti-immigrant sentiments grow stronger.

But it is not just the electoral strength of far-right political parties that leads to a closure of the nomination proceedings if party members of immigrant background make a bid for office. A greater level of cultural conservatism was also claimed to prevail in rural settings where

cultural diversity is no integral part of daily life (Schönwalder/Söhn 2009), making more voters critical of multiculturalism. Yet, the effect plot shows no remarkable changes in the marginal effects that are triggered by the population density of SMDs. Apparently, it is not the urbanity of SMDs that impacts the parties' openness to IO-candidates when it comes to party support.

Overall, the SMD context factors make a bigger impact on the support provided by local party organizations than on the support lent by state party leaderships. The first reason is that local party organizations are more familiar with the socio-demographic and socio-economic realities of their electoral districts. Second, local party organizations have the monopoly on the candidate selection in SMDs, curtailing the possibilities of intrusion for state party leaderships.

7.6 Political Office Experience

Previous experience in political office – especially in party and local-level positions – serves as an acid test to assess the applicants' qualification to master higher-level positions. However, previous experience in office, which is time-consuming and hard to gain, forms a high hurdle in the candidate selection – especially for groups that are rather new in party politics. On the assumption that political parties open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates, they could diminish office requirements to improve IO-candidates' chances of being proposed for election. By contrast, a highly defensive selection behavior would be evident in higher office requirements for IO-candidates, so that these must surpass their native-born peers to run for election. In the case of neutrality, no difference between native-born and IO-candidates in office experience is observed. Which pattern emerges in the data, is addressed in the present chapter.




Figure 7.6.1: Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates.

Note: Mean values are indicated by the dashed lines. Difference is significant at $p \leq 0.01$ (t-test). $N = 864$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To capture candidates' experience in office, a count index of the positions held is generated. It is based on the subsequent political offices: local and state party office, national party office, local legislative office, state legislative office, national legislative office, mayor and state executive office. As weighting is highly arbitrary, I opted to count the number of political offices more straightforwardly with equal weight. To investigate the level of office experience when running for election for the first time, all candidates are discarded that are re-running for election. As presented in figure 7.6.1, the maximum number of offices held at the first candidacy are three offices. A marginal, albeit statistically significant difference of 0.35 in the mean number of offices is found between IO- and native-born candidates. Evidently, IO-candidates have somewhat less office experience when standing for election for the first time. In fact, about 80 percent of the IO-candidates held either no or one single previous office but only 51 percent of the native-born candidates. The descriptive results suggest that political parties somewhat diminish their office requirements for IO-candidates. But whether this dates from their immigrant background or from other factors, must be clarified in a multivariate analysis.




Figure 7.6.2: Difference in the type of political office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.020 for party office, 0.027 for legislative office and 0.066 for executive office. The results are significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 865$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To break down the type of political office, I group the positions held into party, legislative and executive office.²⁹ As shown in figure 7.6.2, most of the candidates held party office, followed by legislative office, whereas experience in executive office is rare. About 78 percent of the native-born candidates but only 64 percent of the IO-candidates held previous party positions. The result hints that more IO-candidates can skip the toilsome recruitment trajectory through party office that is otherwise integral to legislative careers (Borchert/Zeiss 2003: 151-152). Moreover, 52 percent of the native-born candidates but only 38 percent of the IO-candidates came into legislative office. Executive office is least prevalent, either because it forms an alternative career arena or constitutes the peak of political careers. Only 5 percent of the native-born candidates and no IO-candidate have experience in executive office.

²⁹ Party office includes local, state and national party office. Legislative office includes local, state and national legislative office. Executive office includes mayor and state executive office.




Figure 7.6.3:

Difference in the level of political office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates.

Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.099 for local-level, 1.0 for state-level and 1.0 for national-level office. The results are significant at $p \leq 0.1$ for local-level office. $N = 865$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To break down the level of political office, they are grouped into local-, state- and national-level office.³⁰ Whereas local-level office is integral to legislative careers (Herzog 1975), which is clearly reflected in figure 7.6.3, experience in state- and national-level office is rather exceptional. The run for local-level office constitutes the main entrance into legislative careers at higher level and serves as a training ground to acquire the professional qualifications and resources needed for higher-level office. Existing evidence foregrounds the relevance of experience in local politics to staging a candidacy at higher level (Borchert/Zeiss 2003; Detterbeck 2010, 2011b; Gruber 2009; Herzog 1975; Rebenstorf 1995). The hard work at the grassroots level is crucial in making one's name among the local rank-and-file party members, establishing a local power base, cultivating name recognition and proving the own reliability by accepting less prestigious and mostly unpaid positions as a service to the own party organization. However, the findings suggest that IO-candidates need less experience in local-level office than their native-born counterparts to contest for a seat in parliament. While 56 percent of the IO-candidates held a local-level office, this applies to 67 percent of the native-born candidates. Evidently, parts of the IO-candidates can skip the lengthy recruitment trajectory through local-level office. With regard to experience in state- and national-level office, by contrast, no remarkable differences are observed between IO- and native-born candidates.

³⁰ Local office includes local party office, local legislative office, and mayor office. State office includes state party office, state legislative office and state executive office. National office includes national legislative office and national party office.

To unravel to what extent the immigrant origin is correlated with the level of office experience at the first candidacy, net of other underlying factors, multivariate regression models are run. Because the dependent variable is a count that takes on non-negative integer values, OLS regression models are inappropriate. Instead, I will run Poisson regression models with robust standard errors to control for a potential violation of underlying assumptions (Cameron/Trivedi 1986; Coxe et al. 2009; Gardner et al. 1995; Gelman/Hill 2007; Lawless 1987). As before, I will control for socio-demographic background variables. Since the number of years spent in a party organization and the time devoted to party activities are expected to impact the number of positions held at the first candidacy, these are included. With increasing party seniority and time engaging with party activities, office experience is assumed to grow larger. Moreover, political parties might release candidates from the probation period in previous political office if these can compensate for it by membership in social organizations that can serve as alternative training grounds to acquire organizational skills, such as how to cooperate and coordinate with others. In addition, candidates linked to civil society organizations are instrumental in parties' linkage efforts, turning them into highly sought-after contenders. Finally, election and party fixed effects account for the pooled data set. As the coefficients of Poisson regression models report the logs of expected counts which are hard to interpret, AMEs at the observed values are presented that facilitate a more intuitive reading of the results (Cameron/Trivedi 2010: 576).




Figure 7.6.4:

Predictors of the number of political offices at the first candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Grey dashed marker displays the coefficient from the bivariate model. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.30 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.6.4 displays the AMEs at observed values for each predictor of the number of political offices held at the first nomination at the state or national level. The multivariate analysis confirms that IO-candidates need somewhat less experience in political office than native-born candidates to make a first bid for office, even under the control of confounding factors. On average, they are predicted to have 0.18 fewer previous offices – the difference is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. In the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), the immigrant origin is associated with 0.35 fewer previous positions – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. All in all, the finding points to a markedly weak preferential treatment of IO-candidates over native-born candidates. Although there is no information on the length of time served in office, it is known from the analysis of the years of party membership that IO-candidates are party members for a shorter time-period than native-born candidates at the first candidacy. Combining the two findings, IO-candidates appear to take a somewhat faster track to their first candidacy via fewer previous positions and in shorter time.

Beyond this relationship of main interest, I find that each unit increase in education is associated with more office experience, indicating that education plays a crucial role in being entrusted with political office. Apparently, highly educated individuals are perceived as more capable of mastering the tasks entailed in office-holding. As expected, party seniority and the

amount of party activity are both accompanied by more previous political positions. Longstanding and highly active party members not only are more likely to strive after political office but also to be entrusted with such. Against expectation, the membership in social organizations does not compensate for office experience. Instead, a higher number of organizational ties is associated with more experience in political office. Both characterize socially active and highly involved individuals, explaining the positive relationship. Compared to the Bundestag candidates, those in Hesse are predicted to have more office experience, whereas no statistically significant effects emerge for Bavaria and Saxony. The results emphasize that state-level candidates are not less professionalized than Bundestag candidates as regards previous office experience (see also Borchert/Stolz 2011; Saalfeld 1997). Although it fails statistical significance, the estimate for Bavaria points in a negative direction. In Bavaria, the number of candidates is much larger compared to Hesse and Saxony. As more candidates willing to run for election are needed, political parties are obliged to also nominate candidates with less previous office experience. In comparison to the SPD candidates, those of the FDP have less experience in political office, whereas those of the CDU/CSU are armed with more office experience. The reason behind is that smaller political parties, such as the FDP, face greater difficulties finding enough candidates willing to take the burden of nomination, such as conducting election campaigns. They have not only smaller supply pools but also lower prospects of winning the mandate.




Figure 7.6.5:

Predictors of experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.31 in the appendix. Grey dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Most candidates at the state or national level began their foray into legislative careers with experience in local-level and party office, both of which form crucial training grounds where professional skills and qualifications for higher-level positions are acquired and where loyalty to party interests can be proven (Borchert/Golsch 1995; Borchert/Zeiss 2003; Herzog 1975, 1990; Rebenstorf 1991). The weight of experience in local-level and party office was also stressed by the descriptive results. Against this backdrop, the focus of the further analysis is shifted onto experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1) to unveil whether IO-candidates take different routes to their first candidacy than native-born candidates. As the dependent variables are binary, AMEs at observed values yielded by binary logistic regression models are presented (Long/Freese 2001).

Figure 7.6.5 demonstrates that IO-candidates are less likely than native-born candidates to have gained previous experience in party office. But the difference in probability is weak with 8 percentage points and fails statistical significance, albeit only narrowly (p -value = 0.15). In the bivariate model (grey dashed square), the difference is 11 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.1 level. Although, compared to native-born candidates, IO-candidates are more

likely to run for election without proving their reliability and political qualifications in party office, the weak marginal effect also stresses that most of the IO-candidates cannot skip the trajectory through party office. This comes as little surprise because experience in party office plays a crucial part in proving reliability, diligence and loyalty to the own party organization, helps establish intra-party support networks, cultivate name recognition within the party organization and is instrumental in acquiring professional political skills, such as how to build coalitions, negotiate and find compromises, and a familiarity with the party organization (Borchert/Golsch 1999; Zeuner 1970: 103-104).

Turning to the control variables, higher educational attainment is found to be positively related to experience in party office, confirming the earlier finding that high education is conducive to being entrusted with office. In line with the previous findings, candidates being longstanding and highly active party members and joining a number of civil society organizations have a higher probability of experience in party office. These factors characterize individuals that strongly dedicate themselves to social activities, increasing their probability of having engaged in party positions.

What role does the experience in local-level office play in the career trajectories of IO-candidates? In the bivariate model (grey dashed triangle), IO-candidates are predicted to be less likely than native-born candidates to have experience in local-level office. The gap is 9.6 percentage points but statistically not different from zero. The effect vanishes when introducing the control variables outlined above. These factors being equal, IO- and native-born candidates no longer differ in their probability of having held local-level office – the difference is 3 percentage points and statistically not different from zero. The reason for the widely equal importance of local-level positions in the career trajectories of IO- and native-born candidates is that the local level is the point of departure for most legislative careers. The initial socialization into a party organization usually sprouts at this level (Herzog 1975). Furthermore, the professionalization literature envisions the political personnel following a vertical career trajectory from local-level to higher-level office (Best et al. 2011; Borchert 2003a; Borchert/Zeiss 2003; Detterbeck 2010, 2011b; Edinger 2009; Herzog 1975). The local level therefore serves as a training ground to qualify individuals for higher-level positions. What is more, the hard work at the grassroots level is eminently important for making one's name among the rank-and-file party members and cultivate a personal support network:

I started in the foreigner councils [...]. It took a while until I joined the party organization. I started at the local level where I enrolled in the party organization and took part in the party meetings (Interview 4).

When the focus is shifted onto the control variables, state-level candidates are found to be more likely to have experience in local-level office than holds for the Bundestag candidates.

The finding underscores that state-level candidates are no longer inferior to the Bundestag candidates as respects the probation in lower-level office. In comparison to the SPD candidates, local-level positions are less prevalent in DIE LINKE, reflecting that the latter is to a lesser extent locally anchored. This might relate to the party's newness in the party system.

The results provide empirical evidence that IO-candidates need somewhat less office experience compared to native-born candidates to vie for a mandate at the state or national level. But the difference is rather weak, making clear that skipping the probation period in previous political office is far from being a rule. Only on rare occasions, IO-candidates can run for election without gaining experience in previous office. In line with the findings in chapter 7.1, office requirements are suspended only if IO-candidates are considered eminently qualified to tie political parties to IO-voters and improve the party expertise in immigration-related issues by having access to much sought-after resources, such as close contacts to immigrant organizations and high expertise in immigration-related issues, which are difficult to tap by the established pool of candidates. As carved out before, it is not the immigration origin itself which leads to an opening but its interaction with other migration-related resources that are not available in the parties' entrenched candidate pools but force party leaderships to reach out for candidates with little or no previous office experience. However, a preferential treatment of inexperienced IO-candidates also turned out to be a chancy undertaking that comes at a price. Party members who rendered services to the own party organization by holding prior political offices, including also those of immigrant background, feel ignored in the candidate selection, inflaming their anger:

Generally, you must work your way up. This starts with hard election campaigns, putting up posters, do what has to be done in a party. You must pass through these stages one by one [...]. It is very hard work [...]. In my case, this has been churned up [by the party leadership]. I think rightly because it is not enough to climb up step for step within a party organization. It is also important to involve the social environment. [...] In part, it worked out, but on the other hand, it has evoked dissatisfaction within the party. Those who work towards elected offices since centuries complained (Interview 3).

However, a lack of office experience must be caught up later. The compensation takes place prior to the candidate selection to improve the personal chance of selection by increasing the own intra-party visibility and acceptance. Party positions on the district, sub-district or state party executive boards in particular are much sought-after, since they are most instrumental in establishing a party network and cultivating a name recognition within the party organization. The compensation period in the run-up to the candidate selection is a serious time challenge. Those contenders concerned must juggle their jobs and honorary offices outside of the party organization that yielded them a preferential treatment with political office:

It was an intensive period of two years. It [the nomination] did not fall into my lap. This was just the start. Then you must not only defend your reputation within the party organization but you must be ten times better than the others. Not because I have an immigrant background but because I am the favored candidate of the party leadership. [...] The real problem was that I had no time to participate in all party boards and committees, to work in these and to make myself known within the party. [...] It was a time challenge because I had my job and my honorary offices [outside of the party] (Interview 3).

Although the quantitative results suggest that IO-candidates have somewhat less office experience than native-born candidates when competing for a state or national mandate for the first time, some IO-candidates felt as if they had come under stricter scrutiny in their earlier offices than holds for native-born party members. Language proficiencies in particular seem to be important criteria for assessing IO-candidates' ability to master higher-level candidacies. Communicating with voters, writing and delivering speeches or writing press releases are central tasks coming along with a candidacy at the state or national level:

What is true is that some things are expected more perfect from persons of immigrant background than from others who are from the party stable, who are active in the electoral district for years, who are locally rooted. If you have another standing, because you are not locally rooted and don't have a large group which supports you, then you must win through by yourself [...]. I think, it is checked whether a person speaks German very well and if there is an accent, it is regarded as a problem. Persons from rural areas use dialects, speak no standard German. But this is regional and accepted (Interview 5).

100 percent is not enough, you must give 110, 120 percent to have the same chance. Because in many aspects, it is more obvious to take someone [a candidate] without immigrant background than someone of immigrant background (Interview 2).

In many cases, IO-candidates were faced with disparaging remarks about their political inexperience. According to these comments, they were not yet prepared for higher-level positions but should gain further experience at lower political levels. In the interviews, IO-candidates outed these remarks as tactics chiefly employed to exclude party members of immigrant background from the contest for legislative seats. The immigrant origin played no notable role until party members of immigrant background strived after professional offices that are scarce and hard-fought. Suddenly, their immigrant origin turned into an "immigrant foreground", as put by some interviewees. By highlighting the "otherness" (Jensen 2011) of aspirants of immigrant background and stressing their political viridity, it was tried to keep them out of the competition for professional mandates:

In politics, it is worked with mechanisms. [...] you are confronted with some alleged deficits to kick you out of the race. In the case of persons of immigrant background, it is often the immigrant background which is considered to be a deficit, while it is something different in other cases [...]. In the past, women were excluded because they were women and it was said, "We do not think you are capable yet, you must care for your children." Now, it is said, "We do not think you are capable yet, your language abilities are not impeccable and you cannot make it." It is simply an instrument that can be used against you [...]. As long as you hold a volunteer local-level office which is not about professionalism, full-time office and financial benefits, it is relatively relaxed [...]. But if parliamentary allowances play a role, fighting starts and it becomes harder to get in [...]. Air becomes thinner, the higher you get. The competition is fierce and the mechanisms for kicking others out become harder (Interview 5).

If you are following, you are welcome. But when you want to lead, they say, "Hold on!" Because then you turn into a competitor. Suddenly, reasons are put forward why it is not possible [to run for election] (Interview 1).

At volunteer level, immigrants are welcome within the party, but then [at professional level] infighting with native-born party members starts (Interview 4).




Figure 7.6.6:

Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

After noticing some weakly pronounced differences in the office experience between IO- and native-born candidates, the conditioning effects of the politics-related control variables are to be closer looked at. The AMEs of the immigrant background, displayed in figure 7.6.6, are based on interaction terms between the immigrant variable and the control variables while keeping the other control variables constant. A preferential treatment might be employed only if IO-candidates can compensate for a lack of office experience by other merits. Or, vice versa, a preferential treatment only occurs to party newcomers of immigrant background. However, none of the control variables conditions the effect of the immigrant origin on the predicted number of political offices. IO-candidates are predicted to have somewhat less office experience than native-born candidates, indicated by the negative gap to the zero line that is statistically significant only partially. But the marginal effects are not visibly conditioned by other political merits, such as the years of party membership, the amount of party activity or the number of organizational ties. In other words, the finding of a weak preferential treatment of IO-candidates persists, notwithstanding of other confounding factors.




Figure 7.6.7: Difference in the experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

In a like manner, no change in the effect of the immigrant origin on the likelihood of having earlier experience in party and local-level office is observed (see figure 7.6.7). The result corroborates the earlier finding that most of the IO-candidates cannot skip party and local-level positions which serve as acid tests to assess the applicants' political qualifications to hold higher-level positions. A lacking office experience is not compensated by other properties, such as a high party activity rate. It is only through the years of party membership that a compensation for a lack of experience in party office occurs. If their length of party membership exceeds the average, IO-candidates become significantly less likely than native-born candidates to have experience in party office. At a party membership that is five years above average, the difference in probability is 28 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. As the length of party membership is a key indicator of candidates' reliability and commitment and is important in making one's name within a party organization, it can, at least to some extent, compensate for a lack of experience in party office that provides similar political resources.




Figure 7.6.8:

Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in table A.32 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

So far, I ignored the internal heterogeneity of IO-candidates by conflating them. To account for differences in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates that are subject to the belonging to different immigrant subgroups, the Poisson regression model of figure 7.6.4 is re-run but different subsets of IO-candidates are included (see figure 7.6.8). Compared to native-born candidates, both being from a European country and of Christian denomination make the weakest difference to the predicted number of offices held at the first candidacy. For either group, no statistically significant effect is found. By contrast, Muslim candidates are predicted to have less office experience than native-born candidates – the difference in the predicted number of positions held is 0.52 and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. For candidates from non-European and Muslim countries, the predicted difference is somewhat weaker with 0.32 and 0.34 but both statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The findings reflect that a preferential treatment of IO-candidates is more likely to occur to contenders from culturally more distinct immigrant subgroups. This can be interpreted as saying that such candidates are considered more qualified – due to their visible immigrant background – to convey the message to voters that political parties care for the political representation of IO-citizens and accept multiculturalism, making their nomination electorally relevant. What is more, Muslims are regarded as the group which struggles most with a social and political integration. The nomination of Muslim candidates is therefore intended to demonstrate equal political opportunities for Muslims to encourage their political participation and acknowledge their affiliation to the German society.




Figure 7.6.9:

Difference in the experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in tables A.33 and A.34 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The finding reported in the previous section is buttressed when bringing the experience in party and local-level office in. The AMEs for the different subsets of IO-candidates are presented in figure 7.6.9, separately for experience in party and local-level office. Compared with native-born candidates, being from a European country or of Christian denomination again make the weakest impact on previous office experience. No statistically significant effects are found, indicating that no strong discrepancy between IO- and native-born candidates is present. By contrast, Muslim candidates and IO-candidates from Muslim and non-European countries have a significantly lower probability than native-born-candidates of having attained a local-level or party position in the past. For Muslim candidates, for example, the difference in probability is 36 percentage points for previous experience in party office (p -value = 0.019) and 21 percent for experience in local-level office (p -value = 0.151). The results give further support to the previous conclusion that political parties become more inclined to reduce their office requirements if facing immigrant subgroups which differ markedly from the majority population. Their nominations can send out striking signals to the public that political parties stick up for the political representation of IO-citizens and are open to them, which is intended to be evidenced by the nomination of IO-candidates.




Figure 7.6.10:

Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.35 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The pressure to nominate IO-candidates for election is not uniform across all political parties but is inherently linked to the stakes political parties have in voter groups of immigrant background (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Kittilson/Tate 2004; Wüst 2011). Center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are therefore more likely to treat IO-candidates preferentially in the candidate selection than political parties somewhat further on the right, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP. To put the proposition to test, interaction terms between the immigrant background and candidates' party affiliation are incorporated into the statistical model and their AMEs plotted in figure 7.6.10.

Interestingly, in all political parties under scrutiny, the marginal effects point in a negative direction. Thus, IO-candidates need less prior experience in office than native-born candidates to be listed on a ballot paper. The strongest effect is observed for DIE LINKE with a gap of 0.25 predicted offices on average. But, as for all political parties under scrutiny, it fails statistical significance due to the small number of observations for IO-candidates. The initial assumption that center-left parties are more likely to lower their office requirements for IO-candidates than political parties that are situated further on the right of the political spectrum must be rejected. In all political parties, endeavors to reduce office requirements are observed. However, the statistically insignificant estimates also make clear that a preferential treatment only occurs to individual IO-candidates with access to certain sought-after resources like close linkages

with immigrant organizations that are hoped to help political parties establish closer electoral ties with IO-voters and tap their electoral support.




Figure 7.6.11:

Difference in the experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.36 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The question arises as to whether the pattern remains equally valid when the focus is shifted onto the candidates' earlier experience in party and local-level office. From figure 7.6.11, it appears that, compared with native-born candidates, IO-candidates of the SPD and DIE LINKE are more likely to skip party positions. In the SPD, the gap in probability is 21 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.1 level. In DIE LINKE, the difference is somewhat weaker with 14 percentage points and fails statistical significance. In the other political parties, however, no notable effects of the immigrant background become visible. When turning to past experience in local-level office, in no political party, any notable effect of the immigrant variable is observed. The result substantiates the earlier finding that local-level positions form integral parts of legislative careers at the state and national level (Borchert/Zeiss 2003; Herzog 1975). Owing to their paramountcy, experience in local-level office is equally important for IO- and native-born candidates and this happens to be the case in all party organizations coming under scrutiny.




Figure 7.6.12: Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.37 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD nomination. $N = 813$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The mode of candidacy is another pivotal factor which defines the institutional incentive structure in which nominations are embedded. As argued earlier, political parties are incentivized to prevent IO-candidates from entering the electoral contest for SMD nominations, whereas political parties try to compile carefully balanced party lists with the aim of reaching out to a broad spectrum of voters, making IO-candidates a welcome contribution (e.g. Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). Along this line of reasoning, an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates becomes more likely if party list slots are allocated, whereas a more defensive selection behavior in terms of neutrality or even closure is expected to prevail in SMDs. The AME of the immigrant background on the predicted number of political offices is presented in figure 7.6.12, broken down by the mode of candidacy. The predictions are based on interaction terms between the immigrant variable and the mode of candidacy.

The empirical results run contrary to the expectations outlined above. The yielded predictions suggest that IO-candidates come forward as candidates despite lower levels of office experience than native-born candidates, but this is valid for each mode of candidacy. While in SMDs, IO-candidates are predicted to have attained 0.27 fewer positions than native-born candidates, it is 0.14 for list-only candidates and 0.18 for dual candidates. Overall, the effect sizes are markedly small and fail statistical significance. For SMD nominations in particular, the

confidence interval is strikingly large due to a small number of first-time IO-candidates competing for office only in SMDs. Undoubtedly, the mode of candidacy is no decisive factor which impacts parties' proclivity towards opening or closure in terms of office requirements.




Figure 7.6.13: Difference in the experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.38 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD nomination. N = 813.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

When moving on to the prior experience in party and local-level office, displayed in figure 7.6.13, the previous finding gains further support. The results suggest that the mode of candidacy is no pivotal factor in conditioning the office requirements imposed on aspiring IO-candidates. Experience in party and local-level office is integral to IO-candidates' career trajectories, helpful in getting the chance of running for a seat in parliament, irrespective of how candidates stand for election. Candidates that lack experience in party or local-level positions face difficulties in being picked by the party gatekeepers. They have not proven their political ability to master political office, have not rendered service to the own party organization to demonstrate commitment and are less likely to have established support networks within the party organization, all of which are decisive factors in the decision as to who should vie for office.




Figure 7.6.14:

Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.39 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, party delegate assembly. N for SMD = 209; N for party list = 304.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

The inclusiveness of party selectorates that are tasked with choosing parliamentary candidates from the pool of applicants is a further crucial factor in the descriptive representativeness of candidate tableaux (Hazan/Rahat 2006b: 372; 2010; Rahat et al. 2008: 666-667). More inclusive party selectorates were claimed to produce a higher distortion, whereas more exclusive party selectorates tend to generate more balanced selection outcomes. The proposition leads to the expectation that an opening of the nomination proceedings for IO-candidates is more likely if the gatekeeper is a delegate assembly and not a party member assemblies. To bring to light whether the type of party selectorate makes a difference to the selection strategies vis-à-vis IO-candidates, interaction terms between the immigrant origin and the selectorate type are included (see figure 7.6.14). Since information about the party selectorate type is only available at the state level, the number of observations shrinks, because of which the results should be treated with caution.

The results fit the theoretical expectation put forth above. In SMDs, IO-candidates are predicted to have less office experience than native-born candidates but only if faced with delegates – the difference is 0.61 offices and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Yet, a deviant picture is painted if the nominating body is made up of rank-and-file party members. No notable effect of the immigrant background emerges if party member assemblies are tasked with the nomination of parliamentary candidates. The same is observed when looking at party list nominations.

IO-candidates picked by delegates have a lower predicted level of office experience than native-born candidates by a difference of 0.36 offices that is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. Again, no notable effect is found if party member assemblies form the gatekeepers of the candidate selection. The results lead me to conclude that delegate assemblies are more conducive to a preferential treatment of IO-candidates than party member assemblies as far as office requirements are concerned.

There is a plethora of possible explanations for the pattern laid open by the previous analysis. First, the impulse to nominate IO-candidates with no or little prior office experience emanates chiefly from higher party levels, such as the state and district party leaderships that intend to establish closer electoral ties with IO-citizens by the nomination of IO-candidates. Delegate assemblies are smaller than party member assemblies, which makes it easier for the party leaderships to approach individual party gatekeepers and advocate their favored candidates by highlighting the contenders' qualities which compensate for a lack of office experience. Second, since the names of the delegates are known prior to the nominating convention, the party leaderships can engage in coalition building by endorsing their preferred contenders and offering rewards for support. At party member assemblies, party leaderships do not know who will show up at the nominating convention. Third, delegate assemblies are presumed to be more controllable by party leaderships. Their selection decisions are regarded as more predictable than those of party member assemblies which tend to be more uninformed about the contenders competing for nomination and decide more impulsively along the applicants' performance at the nominating convention (Reiser 2011: 247). Fourth, delegate assemblies are more prone to follow recommendations of party leaderships, whereas party member assemblies tend to perceive them as attempts at trimming their influence (Zeuner 1970: 56). At party member assemblies, a backlash against preferentially treated IO-applicants with little office experience is therefore more likely than at delegate assemblies, explaining their drop-out of the candidate selection.




Figure 7.6.15:

Difference in the experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.40 and A.41 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, party delegate assembly. N for SMD = 209; N for party list = 304.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Another crucial facet of office experience is the type and level of positions held (see figure 7.6.15). In SMDs, IO-candidates are found to have a significantly lower probability than native-born candidates of having attained a party office, given that delegates carry out the candidate selection, whereas no notable effect is apparent if party member assemblies make the decision about the candidate selection. More precisely, the gap is 61 percentage points and achieves a statistical significance at a 0.05 level. However, when turning to party list nominations, no notable effect of the immigrant background is found, irrespective of the type of party selectorate that picks nominees.

Which is the pattern that emerges for experience in local-level office? For SMDs, no marginal effects are presented because all IO-candidates selected by delegate assemblies have previous experience in local-level office. Regarding party list nominations, no notable effect of the immigrant background is observed, regardless of the type of party selectorate. An explanation for why a conditioning effect in SMDs but not on party lists emerges is that nominating assemblies in MMDs are much larger than those in SMDs, irrespective of whether it is a party member or a delegate assembly. If numerous persons attend the nominating convention, being selected

despite a lack of previous office experience poses a big challenge. Contenders are not armed with the visibility and personal support networks needed for nomination. At large and anonymous nominating conventions, attendees are not acquainted with each contender but employ information cues to come to a decision, such as applicants' office experience and name recognition.




Figure 7.6.16: Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.42 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. N = 685.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The absent positive effect of party list nominations on parties' propensity for opening, disclosed in the preceding analysis, might be owed to a neglect of other intervening factors, such as the district magnitude of MMDs. As the district magnitude of MMDs grows larger, political parties should become more inclined to nominate candidates from underrepresented groups (Engstrom 1987; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Matland/Studlar 1996; Rae 1967; Studlar/Welch 1991). This nurtures the expectation that political parties feel more disposed to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates once the district magnitude increases to diversify their party lists, instrumental in reaching out to different voter segments. As candidates are nested in MMDs, a two-level regression model with random intercepts for MMDs is most appropriate to minimize the risk of inflated standard errors (Gelman/Hill 2007). Note that the random slope for the immigrant variable is discarded. It does not improve the model fit and has a negligible variance. The predictions displayed in figure 7.6.16 are based on a cross-level interaction term between the immigrant variable and the district magnitude of

MMDs while keeping the other control variables constant. By a visual inspection, the expectation put forth above is clearly refuted. The gap to the zero line shows that IO-candidates are predicted to have less office experience than native-born candidates when competing for the first time on a party list. But the pattern is not strongly conditioned by the number of seats allocated to MMDs. Getting back to the argument put forward earlier, one reason might be that, irrespective of the district magnitude, the room for ticket-balancing remains strongly confined by the plethora of formal and informal quotas for group representation political parties must cope with (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970).




Figure 7.6.17: Difference in the experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.
Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.43 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. N = 685.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

By the same token, the district magnitude of MMDs does not bring about a change in the IO-candidates' probability of having experience in local-level office (see figure 7.6.17). Experience in local-level office forms a virtually indispensable component of legislative careers from which the political business is learned from scratch and which cannot be skipped by IO-candidates, regardless of how many list slots are to be allocated. However, when turning to party office, it is observed that the predictions point in the expected direction. IO-candidates become more likely to run for election without any prior experience in party office once the district magnitude of MMDs is on the rise. While at a low district magnitude of 30 seats below average, IO-candidates are just as likely as native-born candidates to have previous experience in party

office, they have a much lower probability at a high district magnitude of 30 seats above average – the difference in probability is 24 percentage points and achieves statistical significance at a 0.05 level. Consequently, while the overall level of IO-candidates' office experience and their experience in local-level office either remain unaffected by the district magnitude of MMDs, party office seems to become more dispensable for IO-candidates.




Figure 7.6.18: Difference in the number of political offices at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in table A.44 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 527.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Contrary to the assumption that SMDs are harmful to the representation of marginalized groups (e.g. Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994), I claimed, siding with other scholars, that political parties have strong electoral incentives to nominate IO-candidates in SMDs with a large IO-population in order to address IO-voters (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). To ensure that in SMDs with a large IO-population IO-candidates are fielded, party gatekeepers are expected to become more inclined to reduce office requirements in the candidate selection. Since candidates are nested in SMDs and cross-level interaction effects between the immigrant background

and SMD context variables are estimated, the predictions plotted in figure 7.6.18 rest on two-level Poisson regression models with random intercepts for SMDs and random slopes for the immigrant variable that can vary across SMDs (Snijders/Bosker 2012). All panels of figure 7.6.18 visualize results of multilevel regression models based on this logic. No collinearity issues emerge.

The empirical result for the spatial concentration of IO-citizens in SMDs, displayed in the first panel of figure 7.6.18, falls short of the expectation outlined above. The AME of the immigrant variable on the predicted number of offices held at the first candidacy is in no way shifted by the local foreigner share, which is indicative of the local concentration of IO-citizens. Apparently, a large IO-population in SMDs does not impact parties' proclivity towards an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates. The main reason is, as carved out by the qualitative interviews, that a preferential treatment of IO-candidates to bypass a low supply of such contenders becomes less urgent in SMDs with a markedly large IO-population. Under these demographic conditions, the supply of potential IO-candidates is, in most of the cases, sufficiently large because demographics are echoed in the local party membership.

Departing from the literature on social deprivation, it is furthermore expected that more voters in socially deprived SMDs harbor prejudices against immigrants (e.g. Brader et al. 2008; Branton/Jones 2005; Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2013, 2014; Dancygier/Laitin 2014; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2010; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke/Sinnott 2006; Scheve/Slaughter 2001; Sides/Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). Because an electoral decline looms if nominating IO-candidates in low-status settings, party selectorates are expected to abstain from a preferential treatment of aspiring IO-candidates as the social deprivation of SMDs increases. As before, the share of unemployed persons in SMDs is employed to capture the level of economic deprivation, while the cultural dimension is measured by the share of high school graduates. As the second effect plot discloses, the AME of the immigrant background on the predicted number of political offices does not change across different levels of unemployment. From this, it can unequivocally be concluded that the economic deprivation of SMDs does not affect the selection strategies employed towards IO-candidates as far as office experience is concerned.

When turning to the local share of high school graduates, the effect plot clearly refutes the expectation set forth above. At a low share of high school graduates, which is 15 percentage points below average, IO-candidates are predicted to have 0.48 fewer previous offices than native-born candidates and the difference is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. However, at the highest value that is 15 percentage points above average, they are predicted to have 0.21 more offices, even though the effect forfeited statistical significance. The results reveal that,

against my expectations, a higher educational level does not induce an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates.

Lastly, political parties should pay heed to the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs, measured by the local far-right vote share and the degree of urbanity. If local voters adopt hostile attitudes towards multiculturalism, political parties must reckon with electoral losses resulting from the nomination of IO-candidates, making a closure more likely to keep aspirants of immigrant background out of the electoral contest. But contrary to the expectations, the effect of the immigrant variable on the predicted number of positions held remains largely unaffected by the electoral strength of far-right political parties. One possible reason is that the moderate political parties do not vie for votes from right-wing voters, and, therefore, remain unswayed. Also, a preferential treatment of IO-candidates is not more likely in urban SMDs in which cultural diversity is an inherent part of daily life (Schönwalder/Söhn 2009). One explanation is that also in urban SMDs, the supply of potential IO-candidates is large enough (Schönwälder 2013: 641), making a preferential treatment simply unnecessary.




Figure 7.6.19: Difference in the experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.45 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 527.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Moving on to the question of whether the same patterns are observed for the experience in party and local-level office, I find, as shown in figure 7.6.19, that the probability of IO-candidates having experience in party and local-level office is widely similar to the one of native-born candidates. The pattern does not change in any notable way once the proportion of foreigners in SMDs increases, which is consistent with the previous finding. Given a large number of IO-citizens, the supply of potential IO-candidates is presumably higher which means that political parties are not under pressure to fall back on a preferential treatment if intending to nominate IO-candidates for election. In line with the previous results, neither the unemployment rate nor the share of high school graduates arouse any notable effect changes. Apparently, the degree to which electoral districts are socially deprived does not affect the selection strategies adopted towards IO-candidates with regard to office experience.

Finally, I examine the conditioning effects resulting from anti-immigrant sentiments prevailing in SMDs. For the vote share of far-right political parties, I find that the likelihood of IO-candidates having experience in local-level office exceeds that of native-born candidates as anti-immigrant sentiments gain in strength. At the lowest vote share of far-right political parties, which is 2 percentage points below average, IO-candidates are less likely than native-born candidates to have previous experience in local-level office – the difference is 16 percentage points but statistically not different from zero. At a far-right vote share of 6 percentage points above average, their probability exceeds that of native-born candidates by 31 percentage points – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. The predictions point in the anticipated direction; party selectorates become more hesitant about nominating IO-candidates when far-right political parties fare well in the electoral district. Therefore, IO-candidates must outgun their native-born counterparts in local-level office experience which proves their local anchorage, required to appeal to local voters. By contrast, no such effect changes are observed for experience in party office. Apparently, it is really about proving the own local political anchorage which ensures that IO-candidates can mobilize local constituents. As to the level of urbanity, some effect changes can be noticed, but these remain statistically insignificant throughout. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that urbanity does not affect the selection strategies political parties employ towards aspiring IO-candidates as respects office experience.

7.7 Organizational Affiliations

Being armed with close affiliations to civil society organizations is of paramount importance in coming forward as a candidate. Candidates' linkages with social organizations are key components of the efforts of political parties at a collective voter mobilization (Allern/Bale 2012;

Poguntke 2005b, 2006). Supposing that political parties pursue an opening of their nomination proceedings for IO-candidates, they could diminish the requirements of organizational ties to scale down the selectivity of their selection proceedings. By contrast, an elevation of the requirements for IO-candidates would be observed if closure is given. Through this, the perceived electoral risk arising from the nomination of IO-candidates is, to some extent, mitigated as they must gather more organizational support networks around them to end up on a ballot paper. Neutrality would be indicated if IO-candidates need similar levels of organizational membership as native-born candidates.




Figure 7.7.1: Difference in organizational membership between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Fisher's exact test value for the difference between native-born and IO-candidates is 0.380 for trade unions, 0.008 for professional organizations, 0.635 for religious organizations, 0.038 for environmental organizations, 0.216 for human rights organizations, 0.528 for sports and leisure clubs and 0.000 for immigrant organizations. $N = 1,489$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.7.1 provides a first sketch of the candidates' membership in civil society organizations. It is important to note that immigrant organizations are only included in the state-level surveys. Overall, membership in sport and leisure clubs, and, by a clear margin, in trade unions are most common. When contrasting IO-candidates with native-born candidates, trade union members are found to be overrepresented among IO-candidates by a difference of 4.5 percentage points. The result reflects that many IO-candidates are anchored in the labor migrant context

(Bade 2000; Thränhardt 2002). A multitude of immigrants moved to Germany as industrial workers; these and their relatives joined trade unions over time to be politically represented (Dancygier 2010; Öztürk 2002; Thränhardt 2002; Treibel 2008).

Conversely, membership in professional and environmental organizations are less common among IO-candidates. Instead, membership in human rights and immigrant organizations are overrepresented among IO-candidates. In fact, the most dramatic difference relates to immigrant organizations. More precisely, about 44 percent of the IO-candidates but only 7 percent of the native-born candidates are members of immigrant organizations. Immigrant organizations subsume religious, political, cultural and leisure time organizations, which attend to the representation of IO-citizens in public life, allow them to maintain their cultural capital from the country of origin and to produce new social capital (for details see Pries 2010). On the one hand, immigrant organizations are crucial in advocating the interests of IO-citizens in public, and on these grounds, tend to be overrepresented among IO-candidates who take a personal interest in these issues. On the other hand, IO-candidates may link with immigrant organizations on purpose to become bridge builders between party organizations and immigrant groups. This behavior can evolve from an intrinsic motivation or is extrinsically driven because IO-candidates with close linkages with immigrant organizations have a higher chance of selection, provided that political parties attach importance to closer electoral ties with IO-citizens. The prevalence of membership in human rights organizations among IO-candidates can be comprehended by their political socialization. Revisiting the findings presented in chapter 7.1, the personal or parental experience of political repression in the country of origin was one of the major occasions for joining German party organizations. The experience of human rights abuses gives rise to a political mobilization, which is not only confined to party membership but is also reflected in membership in human rights organizations.




Figure 7.7.2:

Difference in the number of organizational membership between native-born and IO-candidates.

Note: Dashed lines represent the mean. The upper panels are based on the GCS and the state-level surveys and include trade unions, professional, religious, environmental and human rights organizations and sports and leisure clubs. The lower panels are based on the state-level surveys and additionally include immigrant organizations. Difference is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$ (t-test). $N = 1,489$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Candidates armed with a large number of organizational affiliations in different realms are much sought-after because they are hoped to yield electoral support at the ballot box. To obtain the number of organizational membership candidates are equipped with, count indices are generated that range from 0 to 6 in the full candidate sample and from 0 to 7 in the state-level candidate sample in which immigrant organizations are additionally included. All organizational memberships enter the index with equal weight, although some organizations might play a more pivotal role in the candidate selection than others; for example, because they correspond more tightly to the representational profile of political parties, or have a larger membership. However, weighting would be highly arbitrary, for which reason all memberships are counted equally. In a more straightforward manner, I claim that political parties prospect for candidates who are affiliated to different social organizations to link with different voter groups. While the upper panels of figure 7.7.2 count the membership in trade unions, professional associations, religious organizations, environmental organizations, human rights organizations and sport and leisure time clubs, the lower panels are based on the state-level surveys and additionally include immigrant organizations.

Most of the candidates are found to be members of one or two types of social organizations. As revealed by the upper panels, IO-candidates are members of a similar number of social or-

ganization types as native-born candidates (1.7 vs. 1.9). However, once immigrant organizations are included, the number of organizational affiliations of IO-candidates slightly exceeds that of native-born candidates. Native-born candidates have a mean value of 1.8 memberships, whereas it is 2.1 among IO-candidates, but the difference narrowly fails statistical significance (t-test value: 0.107). The results stress the relevance immigrant organizations have to IO-candidates. At the same time, however, they make clear that being a member of immigrant organizations is not enough to run for election, but IO-candidates must also be linked with other social organizations. Linkages with immigrant organizations do not fully compensate for organizational affiliations in other realms.

To establish to what extent the immigrant background has an independent effect, net of other underlying factors, on the number of organizational affiliations required to come forward as a candidate, multivariate regression models are presented. Because the dependent variable is a count that takes on positive integer values, Poisson regression models with robust standard errors are estimated since neither overdispersion nor zero inflation are given (Coxe et al. 2009; Gardner et al. 1995; Greene 1994). For the reasons discussed earlier, I will control for socio-demographic background variables. Moreover, incumbents (= 1) are expected to be equipped with more organizational affiliations. By linking with incumbent legislators, social organizations attempt to exert influence on the policy-making process in parliament (Allern/Bale 2012). The relationship is probably reinforced by the number of terms served in parliament. With more parliamentary experience and larger coalitions, legislators become more effective in policy making, which makes them promising addressees of social organizations. But also the previous political experience, measured by the number of prior candidacies, the years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of prior political offices, experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1), is assumed to affect how extensively candidates must be linked to social organizations to vie for a mandate. In the case of longstanding and politically experienced party members, the requirement of organizational affiliations might be lowered since they have other qualities that compensate for a lack of organizational affiliations, such as large personal support networks within the party organization or valuable political experience. As political parties endeavor to include different organizational groups on their party lists to reach out to a preferably wide range of voter groups (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970), organizational linkages are believed to be more instrumental in attaining a list placement than in being nominated in SMDs. Therefore, I will control for the mode of candidacy. Lastly, election and party fixed effects enter the statistical model to account for the pooled data set




Figure 7.7.3:

Predictors of the number of organizational affiliations.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.46 in the appendix. Grey dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SMD nomination, SPD, Bundestag election/Saxon state election. N without immigrant organization = 1.391; N with immigrant organization = 649.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

As coefficients given by Poisson regression models report the logs of expected counts, which are notoriously difficult to interpret, AMEs at observed values are presented in figure 7.7.3 (Cameron/Trivedi 2010: 576). When the focus is on the full candidate sample without immigrant organizations, IO-candidates are predicted to have 0.19 fewer organizational affiliations than their native-born counterparts. Consequently, the effect of the immigrant background on the predicted number of organizational affiliations is small and statistically not different from zero. Even in the bivariate model (grey dashed square), no significant effect of the immigrant origin is observed. The results suggest that IO-candidates must meet requirements which are widely similar to those imposed on native-born candidates, indicating neutrality in the candidate selection as far as organizational linkages are concerned.

When moving on to the state-level surveys and including immigrant organizations, a slightly different picture is drawn. IO-candidates are predicted to have 0.33 more organizational memberships than native-born candidates, but the effect emanating from the immigrant background achieves no statistical significance (p -value = 0.17). A similar result is provided by the bivariate model (grey dashed triangle). Notwithstanding, the results point to the relevance of immigrant organizations to IO-candidates. It is obvious that political parties use the nomination of IO-candidates for linking with immigrant organizations, and, by doing so, tapping new organizational support networks and voter segments. At the same time, it is evident from the results that being a member of immigrant organizations is not enough to contest a seat in parliament but IO-candidates must also be linked with organizations in other realms. Linkages with immigrant organizations do not compensate for other organizational affiliations but rather add to these.

Some interesting observations are made with respect to the control variables. Male candidates are found to slightly outperform female candidates where organizational affiliations are concerned. The finding suggests that female candidates can run for a mandate despite being armed with fewer organizational affiliations. This might relate to efforts political parties put into recruiting enough women to meet their gender quotas. Moreover, higher educational attainment seems to come along with more organizational linkages. Highly educated individuals are said to have more of the resources required to join social organizations (Verba et al. 2002). Compared to the Bundestag candidates, contenders at the state level are predicted to have fewer organizational linkages, apart from those in Bavaria. Social organizations might be keener on linking with Bundestag candidates, as it is hoped for more attention of national politics to issues that are important to them. In comparison to candidates of the SPD, all other candidates are predicted to have fewer organizational linkages, bringing to light strong linkage aspirations of the SPD that seems to be well-networked through their parliamentary candidates.

The insights gained from the qualitative interviews are consistent with the results presented above. The qualitative interviews underscored the importance attached to organizational affiliations in running for election. At the nominating conventions, the number of organizational affiliations are important selling points of aspiring candidates. Political parties use the number of organizational support networks as yardsticks against which to assess the contenders' mobilization power at the ballot box. Aspiring candidates therefore mention their organizational linkages when presenting themselves at the nominating conventions. Some organizations even prepare support writings, in which they confirm their support for a specific contender.

In the foregoing analysis, close linkages with immigrant organizations were identified as one driving force which can trigger an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates by

shortening the probation period until reaching the first candidacy. As discussed before, the immigrant origin as a stand-alone characteristic does not induce an opening in most cases but its conjunction with other migration-related resources, such as close linkages with immigrant organizations. Such linkages are thought to boost IO-candidates' ability to establish electoral ties with IO-citizens and mobilize their electoral support on the one hand, and to carry the organizations' expertise and positions in the immigration field into party organizations on the other, helpful in developing party positions in this policy field.

For IO-candidates, the incentives arising out of the relationship described above turned out to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they face strong incentives to present themselves as experts on migration and immigration policy that can credibly represent the parties' expertise in immigration issues and as bridge-builders to the immigrant community, who can convey party messages more effectively to IO-voters than any other candidate. In conjunction with their immigrant origin, migration-related merits, such as linkages with immigrant organizations, can equip IO-candidates with a strong issue ownership in this policy field. Some IO-candidates reported that their close linkages with immigrant organizations were conducive to their nomination because the party leadership regarded immigration as a highly salient issue in the upcoming election and prospected for potential IO-candidates with a credible issue ownership in this policy field. As no alternative contenders with equal qualities were available in the party membership, their strong issue ownership in the field of immigration turned into a career accelerator. Linkages with immigrant organizations therefore provide aspirants of immigrant background with a unique selling point that can turn into a boost in the candidate selection if no alternative contenders with similar organizational ties are available.

To place emphasis on their broker role, some IO-candidates mentioned their linkages with immigrant organizations in their application speech at the nominating convention or even made their broker role a key issue of their speech. They felt pigeonholed as cultural brokers by both party organizations and IO-citizens anyway, and, therefore, opted to accept this role and take advantage of it. From the immigrant population, understanding, empathy and shared experience in the German society are ascribed to IO-candidates. They are thought to represent their interests more authentically and credibly than applies to native-born candidates: "Outside of the party, some think, 'This is one of us', and place their trust in you" (Interview 5). But also fellow party members ascribe the role of experts on immigration policy to IO-candidates, owing to their demographic background: "I knew, I did not want to work on this topic. But still, party colleagues were calling me and asked, 'What do you think about the Burka debate?'" (Interview 8). Others reported that they were pushed towards the broker role and resigned after a while: "A fellow party member said, 'Don't wear this immigrant shirt!' [...] I said, 'Why? 30 years,

the party has tailored this role to me even though I refused. When I take it off now, do you think they will believe it?" (Interview 1).

On the other hand, though, IO-candidates fear to be reduced to the role of cultural brokers and fall into the trap of being perceived as token migrants. Being perceived as a party expert in immigration issues but not in the major policy fields, such as finance, economy, defense or infrastructure, can turn into a glass ceiling that keeps party members of immigrant background from rising beyond a certain level of the political hierarchy. Parts of the IO-candidates therefore decided not to assume the broker role and the position of immigration experts. They emphasized that the immigrant background does not automatically translate into expertise in immigration issues, even though political parties seem to insinuate such a relationship. To surmount the marker of serving as brokers to the immigrant community and of being experts to be consulted on immigration issues, most IO-candidates not only establish linkages with immigrant organizations but either add other organizational affiliations to these or even consciously avoid linking with immigrant organizations:

I did this consciously; I did not want to be hustled into the role of a token migrant. This can happen in political parties. If they have a person who is concerned with the [immigration] topic, other persons do not feel responsible for dealing with this topic but think they can deal with the more important topics (Interview 6).

I tried to establish links with Muslim, Turkish, Moroccan, Russian, Croatian organizations. I tried to forge links with the whole immigrant spectrum in my electoral district. But I also tried to establish links with non-migrant associations to not make anyone think I only represent immigrants (Interview 5).




Figure 7.7.4: Difference in the number of organizational affiliations between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SMD nomination, SPD, Bundestag election/Saxon state election. N without immigrant organization = 1.391; N with immigrant organization = 649.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

After finding weak differences between IO- and native-born candidates in their number of organizational memberships, I will take a closer look at the conditioning effects of the control variables to tap into underlying variances. A preferential treatment might occur only if IO-candidates can compensate for their lack of organizational membership by other political merits. Or, vice versa, a preferential treatment only happens to party newcomers of immigrant background that lack not only organizational affiliations but other political credentials either. Figure 7.7.4 inspects the conditioning effects of those control variables which capture candidates' political qualifications. The AMEs result from interaction terms between the immigrant variable and each control variable while holding the other control factors constant. In fact, for most of the control variables, no strong and statistically significant changes in the effects of the immigrant background are observed. Only for the number of legislative terms served, the number of prior candidacies, the amount of party activity and the number of previous political offices, a decline into a negative range of values becomes evident, even though the predictions remain statistically insignificant for the most part. Nonetheless, the results suggest that IO-candidates

scoring well in these factors are more likely to be treated preferentially. Political parties thus tend to reduce their requirements of organizational affiliations for IO-candidates, given that they can compensate for a lack of organizational linkages by other political qualifications.




Figure 7.7.5:

Difference in the number of organizational affiliations between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in table A.47 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party of office, SMD nomination, SPD, Bundestag election/Saxon state election.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Despite finding only weak differences in the number of organizational affiliations between IO- and native-born candidates, it is still possible that underlying variances remained masked. Missing from the previous analysis is the question of whether variances in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates exist that are contingent upon their geographic and cultural distance from the majority society. To take account of variances across different subsets of IO-candidates, the previous regression model is re-run but different subsets of IO-candidates are incorporated into the statistical model (see figure 7.7.5).

When comparing the predicted number of organizational affiliations in the full sample without immigrant organizations, IO-candidates from European countries are predicted to be armed with fewer organizational affiliations compared to native-born candidates. The predicted difference is 0.29 affiliations and statistically significant at a 0.1 level. For Muslim candidates,

candidates from non-European and Muslim countries, no statistically significant effects emerge. If the state-level surveys are employed that factor immigrant organizations into the dependent variable, the pattern of predictions undergoes a marked change. Muslim candidates and IO-candidates from Muslim countries are predicted to have more organizational affiliations than native-born candidates. To be precise, 1.08 more organizational affiliations are predicted for Muslim candidates, while 1.00 more organizational affiliations are estimated for IO-candidates from Muslim countries – both AMEs achieve a statistical significance at a 0.05 level.

Apparently, the earlier observation that the membership in immigrant organizations rather adds to linkages with other organizations than to compensate for them holds true to a greater extent for Muslim candidates and IO-candidates from Muslim countries. Since they differ more clearly from the majority population, they are more likely to be ascribed to the role of brokers to the immigrant population – particularly to the Muslim population – and the status of immigration experts. Therefore, they face great incentives to present themselves as brokers by being linked with immigrant organizations as this boosts their selection chances. But they also come under pressure to complement their linkages with immigrant organizations by other affiliations to get rid of the exclusive marker of being immigration experts, which can turn into a glass ceiling as to their further legislative career.




Figure 7.7.6:

Difference in the number of organizational affiliations between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.48 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SMD nomination, SPD, Bundestag election/Saxon state election. N without immigrant organization = 1.391; N with immigrant organization = 649.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

But it is not only about immigrant subgroups whether the requirements of organizational affiliations are eased or elevated. In fact, political parties themselves matter a great deal. Political parties are not likewise enthusiastic about sending IO-candidates into the electoral contest (Kittilson/Tate 2005). Based on their stake in voter groups of immigrant background and their leftist party profiles, center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more likely to scale down their selection criteria applied to IO-candidates than political parties that are situated more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the FDP and CDU/CSU. To unveil party differences, interactions between the immigrant variable and candidates' party affiliation are included while keeping the control variables constant. Their AMEs are displayed in figure 7.7.6.

In the full sample that leaves immigrant organizations out, no significant effect of the immigrant background is observed when being listed on the ballot paper of the SPD and CDU/CSU. By contrast, IO-candidates fall below the number of organizational ties predicted for native-born candidates when running for the FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE. It seems as if the latter demand somewhat fewer organizational affiliations of aspiring IO-candidates. But once immigrant organizations are included, a marked change in the predictions is noticed. No statistically significant effect of the immigrant background is present any longer, indicating that – different from the earlier surmise – immigrant organizations compensate for lacking linkages with other social organizations in most political parties. Only in the SPD, IO-candidates are predicted to have 1.30 more organizational memberships than native-born candidates – the effect is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. While neutrality prevails in the candidate selection of the other political parties as far as organizational linkages are concerned, this does not hold for the SPD, in which immigrant organizations rather add to the organizational linkages in other realms, and, by implication, scale up the requirements of organizational affiliations. As found above, candidates of the SPD are more strongly linked to civil society organizations compared to the parliamentary candidates of the other political parties. Because organizational linkages are of higher importance in the SPD, ties with immigrant organizations seem to be extra assets that add to organizational linkages in other realms rather than compensating for them.




Figure 7.7.7: Difference in the number of organizational affiliations between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.49 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SMD nomination, SPD, Bundestag election/Saxon state election. N without immigrant organization = 1.391; N with immigrant organization = 649.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Previous research pointed to the impact of the ballot structure on representational parity. More to the point, PR electoral systems were presented as being more conducive to a balanced descriptive representation than majoritarian electoral systems (e.g. Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000). Following from the conventional wisdom, political parties are expected to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if party list positions are allocated to make sure that candidates of this category are placed to reach out to IO-voters, whereas more defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure are anticipated in SMDs. The predictions displayed in figure 7.7.7 rest on interaction terms between the immigrant variable and the mode of candidacy while keeping the control variables constant.

When centering on the full sample that omits immigrant organizations, the strongest effect of the immigrant background is found in SMDs. Surprisingly, IO-candidates are predicted to have 0.70 fewer organizational affiliations than native-born candidates – the AME achieves statistical significance at a 0.05 level. But due to the small number of IO-candidates only competing for office in SMDs, the confidence interval is strikingly large and the marginal effect should be treated with some grain of salt. A glance at party list and dual nominations reveals that no significant effect arises from the immigrant background for these modes of candidacy.

The results clearly refute the expectation that political parties are more inclined to reduce their requirements of organizational affiliations for IO-candidates if party list slots are allocated. One explanation for this unforeseen finding is that political parties strive to include a wide range of organizational interests on their party lists to exhaust the maximum of electoral support (Borchert/Zeiss 2003; Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). Therefore, it might be easier to diminish the organizational requirements imposed on SMD nominations than those imposed on party list nominations.

Moving on to the state-level surveys that incorporate immigrant organizations, the statistically significant effect emanating from the immigrant variable in SMDs is no longer present. As the sample is downsized, the confidence intervals turned larger and the estimate forfeited statistical confidence. Since the predictions for party list and dual nominations both point in a positive direction but fail statistical significance, it can only be surmised that organizational support networks are of greater importance if IO-candidates intend to run for election on a party list or aim for a dual nomination. In these cases, linkages with immigrant organizations do not compensate for other organizational ties but rather add to these. A possible explanation is, as argued above, that including different organizational interests on party lists is of paramount importance for the electoral performance of political parties in different voter segments and helps win the support of the diverse sets of grassroots party members that must give their approval to the party list proposal at the nominating convention (Mintzel 1980).




Figure 7.7.8:

Difference in the number of organizational affiliations between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in models 2 in table A.50 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, Saxon state election, SPD, party delegate assembly. N for SMD = 420; N for party list = 525.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

As party selectorates are engaged in the nomination of parliamentary candidates, the type of party selectorate presumably impacts the selection outcomes. In the literature, greatest stress was laid on the inclusiveness of nominating bodies (Hazan/Rahat 2006b: 372; Rahat et al. 2008: 666-667). Inclusive party selectorates are assumed to lead to stronger distortions of the selection outcomes than exclusive party selectorates. Against the backdrop of this assumption, an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates is a more likely upshot if delegates are involved in the nomination proceedings in place of party members. To delve into the conditioning effect evolving from the nominating body, a visual inspection of the interaction between the immigrant background and the party selectorate type is provided in figure 7.7.8, net of other confounding factors. Because information on the party selectorate type is only available in the state-level surveys, the dependent variable includes immigrant organizations.

To come straight to the point, no notable effect of the immigrant background is identified, pointing to a neutral selection behavior towards IO-candidates. Only in SMDs, IO-candidates are predicted to have more organizational affiliations compared with native-born candidates. However, only on the condition that they are selected by party delegates, while no noteworthy

effect emerges when party member assemblies are tasked with the candidate selection. IO-candidates are predicted to have 0.88 more organizational affiliations compared to native-born candidates and the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level.

One reasonable explanation for the pattern is that delegate assemblies form more professionalized selection contexts than party member assemblies and on these grounds, pay more attention to the contenders' voter appeal. As IO-candidates are feared to act as a deterrent to local voters in SMDs (Reynolds 2006; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Taagepera 1994), delegates might insist on extensive organizational affiliations which can serve as vote-mobilizers. Consequently, IO-candidates must outperform their native-born counterparts to guarantee a broad voter mobilization. Conversely, party member assemblies are more spontaneous in their formation of opinion and are driven chiefly by the performance applicants deliver at the nominating convention (Reiser 2011: 247). Strategic thoughts concerning the voter appeal of contenders therefore play a minor role in the nomination decisions of party member assemblies.




Figure 7.7.9:

Difference in the number of organizational affiliations between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.51 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SPD, Bundestag election/Saxon state election. N without immigrant organization = 1.189; N with immigrant organization = 574.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

As suggested by scholars concerned with electoral system effects, political parties' proclivity for placing candidates from underrepresented groups on party lists is reinforced by the district magnitude of MMDs (Engstrom 1987; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Matland/Studlar 1996; Rae 1967; Shugart 1994; Studlar/Welch 1991). A high district magnitude is theorized to boost the incentives to engage in ticket-balancing to address the broadest possible spectrum of voters. Congruent with this body of literature, I expect that the likelihood of opening is positively related to the district magnitude of MMDs. To gauge how the district magnitude of MMDs affects the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, a cross-level interaction term between the immigrant origin and the district magnitude of MMDs is computed. The AMEs result from a two-level Poisson regression model with random intercepts for MMDs and a random slope for the immigrant variable. When drawing on the state-level surveys to include immigrant organizations, I estimate regression models that include fixed effects for MMDs, because only nine MMDs are given at level 2.

Figure 7.7.9 visualizes the interaction effect between the immigrant variable and the district magnitude of MMDs. When drawing on the full sample that neglects immigrant organizations, no notable effect of the immigrant background on the predicted number of organizational affiliations is observed as long as the district magnitude is in a low range. At a high district magnitude of 30 seats above average, in contrast, IO-candidates are predicted to have 0.34 fewer organizational affiliations than native-born candidates, but the effect is statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, the predictions conform to the proposition that political parties become more willing to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if a large number of ballot positions are to be allocated, but the effect change is weakly pronounced.

When employing the state-level surveys and including immigrant organizations, the pattern described above disappears. IO-candidates do not diverge in any statistically significant manner from the number of organizational affiliations predicted for native-born candidates, and this pattern is unaffected by the district magnitude of MMDs. Taken together, the results suggest that immigrant organizations compensate for a declining organizational membership of IO-candidates in other areas at a high district magnitude, which also means they gain in importance. One possible reason is that on lengthy party lists that contain numerous nominees, IO-candidates need close linkages with immigrant organizations to achieve the signaling effect political parties intend to achieve by their nomination. Yet another reason is that not one but several IO-candidates compete for office on lengthy party lists. Therefore, having an immigrant origin as a stand-alone characteristic is not enough to obtain a viable nomination, but IO-candidates must vie with one another for the most credible issue ownership in the immigration field, resulting in a higher relevance of immigrant organizations as support networks.




Figure 7.7.10: Difference in the number of organizational affiliations between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in table A.52 and A.53 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SPD, Bundestag election/Saxon state election, SMD context factors at their mean. N without immigrant organization = 991; N with immigrant organization = 424.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Following the dominant reasoning in the literature, SMD races put underrepresented groups at a disadvantage in the candidate selection (e.g. Norris 2004; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1987; Rule 1994b). But electoral system rules do not operate independently of their socio-demographic context (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). In SMDs in which the size of the IO-population is large, political parties face strong incentives to field IO-candidates in order to strengthen party ties with IO-voters and mobilize their electoral support. To make sure of being able to field IO-candidates in SMDs with a large IO-population, I expect that political parties become more likely to reduce their requirements of organizational affiliations for aspiring IO-candidates.

To test the assumption outlined above, I estimate a cross-level interaction between the immigrant origin and the foreigner share of SMDs, based on a two-level Poisson regression model with random intercepts for SMDs, all control variables and the other SMD context factors being constant. Note that no collinearity issues arise. A random slope for the immigrant variable is

waived because it is virtually zero and does not improve the model fit. All graphs presented in figure 7.7.10 visualize results of multilevel regression models based on this logic. Upon closer visual inspection of the first panel, I find that the AME of the immigrant origin on the predicted number of organizational affiliations remains widely stable across the share of foreigners in SMDs. The predictions run parallel to the zero line, indicating that parties' selection strategies towards IO-candidates pertaining to their organizational affiliations are in no way tied to the local size of the IO-population.

But it is not only the size of the IO-population in SMDs that was argued to matter for an opening but the severity of social deprivation. In deprived SMDs, measured by the local unemployment rate and the share of high school graduates, more voters harbor prejudices against immigrants than applies to well-off areas (e.g. Hainmueller/Hiscox 2007, 2010; Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014; Iyengar et al. 2013; Malhotra et al. 2013; Mayda 2006; Quillian 1995). Consequently, I expect that political parties become more reluctant to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates if SMDs move towards a higher social deprivation. By only picking IO-candidates with numerous organizational ties, the perceived electoral risk of nominating IO-candidates with a less predictable voter appeal is reduced. IO-applicants that come forward as candidates must be backed by more organizational support networks. Contrary to expectations, however, there are no remarkable shifts in the marginal effects across different values of the local unemployment rate. Virtually the same pattern is observed with regard to the cultural dimension of social deprivation, measured by the educational level of SMDs. Although IO-candidates are predicted to have 0.72 (p-value = 0.007) and 0.55 (p-value = 0.178) fewer organizational memberships without and with immigrant organizations than native-born candidates if the share of high school graduates is 20 percentage points above average, the effect changes are notably weakly pronounced. The results suggest that the local social deprivation is no decisive factor in inducing an opening of parties' candidate selection for IO-candidates as regards their organizational affiliations.

Finally, political parties are expected to bear the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs in mind when nominating IO-candidates, measured by the local far-right vote share and the degree of urbanity. Given that local voters adopt hostile attitudes towards multiculturalism, political parties must, to some extent, be prepared for electoral losses caused by the nomination of IO-candidates. To mitigate the electoral uncertainty which is ascribed to IO-candidates, these must be armed with more organizational support networks to enter the electoral arena than holds true for native-born candidates. By a visual inspection, it becomes clear that the effect of the immigrant background is in no way linked to the electoral strength of far-right

political parties in SMDs. As argued earlier, one possible explanation is that the moderate political parties do not compete for votes from right-wing voters, and, therefore, are not visibly affected by the electoral performance of far-right parties.

From all SMD context factors under scrutiny, the strongest effect change is induced by the local level of urbanity. In highly urban SMDs, IO-candidates are predicted to be equipped with 0.94 fewer organizational memberships than native-born candidates if the full sample without immigrant organizations is employed, but the marginal effect fails statistical significance. When drawing on the state-level surveys that include immigrant organizations, IO-candidates are even predicted to be equipped with 1.30 fewer organizational memberships in highly urban SMDs – the effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The predictions fit the expectation that an opening is a more likely upshot in urban settings. Owing to more liberal attitudes towards multiculturalism and daily encounters with IO-citizens that can reduce mutual prejudices (e.g. Allport 1954; Pettigrew/Tropp 2006; Weins 2011), no grave losses of votes must be feared when fielding IO-candidates in highly urban SMDs. To ensure that the diverse composition of the urban population is not missed out on the candidate tableau, which can lead to a disconnect in the party-citizen linkage, an opening is more probable in urban contexts to also nominate candidates that deviate from the incumbent candidate types, such as IO-candidates.

The efforts political parties put into forging closer representational ties with IO-citizens are not only laid open by the fact that a multitude of IO-candidates have linkages with immigrant organizations and serve as bridge builders. But it is also corroborated by the number of immigrant organizations with close affiliations to political parties, or ancillary organizations integrated into party organizations which place focus on immigration. Either type of organization helps political parties gauge the political preferences of IO-citizens and cater for their needs and interests to tap their electoral support. Furthermore, they can serve as political alliances for aspiring IO-candidates in the candidate selection. Following Blätte (2014b), three types of party-affiliated immigrant organizations can be distinguished: First of all, offshoots of foreign political parties exist that turned into collateral organizations of German political parties. They are fully autonomous and have neither formal ties with German party organizations nor formal access to their decision-making bodies, but are only affiliated by an overlapping membership and shared policy positions. For the main part, these are organizations of Turkish-origin immigrants that are located in the political center-left spectrum.³¹ By way of example, the *Föderation*

³¹ In the right and religious spectrum, *Milli Görüş* exists that has its origins in the Turkish Islamist political parties of Necmettin Erbakan. *Milli Görüş* could not establish ties with German political parties. The same holds true for the nationalist organization *Föderation der Türkisch-Demokratischen Idealistenvereine in Europa (ADÜTDF, Avrupa Demokratik-Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu)*, which is closely linked with the nationalist Turkish party *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)*.

der Immigrantenvereine aus der Türkei e.V. (*GDF, Göcmen Dernekleri Federasyonu*) is connected to the political party DIE LINKE (Blätte 2014a, 2015; Cetinkaya 2000: 99-100; Kücükhüseyin 2002: 40). Another example is the *Föderation der Demokratischen Arbeitervereine (DIDF, Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu)*, founded in 1980 as a confederation of Turkish and Kurdish labor organizations, which is likewise tied to DIE LINKE (Blätte 2014b: 98; Cetinkaya 2000: 99; Kücükhüseyin 2002: 36). Sevim Dağdelen, legislator of DIE LINKE in the German Bundestag since 2005, is chairwoman of the *DIDF* since 2003. A further example is the *Föderation der Volksvereine türkischer Sozialdemokraten (HDF, Sosyaldemokrat Halk Dernekleri Federasyonu)* which is an offshoot of the Turkish People's Party (*CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) and closely linked to the SPD (Blätte 2015). Turgut Yüksel, legislator of the SPD in the Hessian state parliament since 2013, is member of the executive board of the *HDF*.

Second, ethnically homogenous immigrant organizations exist that are initiated by the political parties themselves (Blätte 2014b: 99). In the party BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN for instance, Cem Özdemir and Ozan Ceyhun brought *Yesiller* into being in 1992, which served the purpose of mobilizing Turkish-origin immigrants as party members and offering them a party platform. *Yesiller* was no sectoral organization of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN recognized in the party statute. Therefore, it had no formal participation rights within the party organization. Due to growing tensions between Turks and Kurds, *Yesiller* became inactive after 1994 (Roßner 2014: 70-71). Another example is the *Liberale Türkisch-Deutsche Vereinigung (LTD)*, which is an affiliated organization of the FDP, founded for Turkish-origin immigrants in 1993. Although being a member of the FDP is not required to join the *LTD*, it is explicitly supported, as written in the organizational statute of the *LTD*. Like *Yesiller*, *LTD* is no sectoral organization of the FDP. Therefore, it has no right to speak at party conventions, to table motions or send delegates to party conferences (Blätte 2015: 232). In the CDU, no national party-affiliated immigrant organization but state-level organizations exist that are unique to states with a markedly large IO-population, such as Berlin, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg or Bremen. Like *Yesiller* and *LTD*, they focus on Turkish-origin immigrants (Kücükhüseyin 2002: 37). In Berlin, the *Deutsch-Türkische Union (DTU)* exists since 1996, in North Rhine-Westphalia, the *Deutsch-Türkisches Forum (DTF)* was initiated in 1997, in Hamburg, a *Deutsch-Türkische Interessengemeinschaft* exists, and in Bremen, the *Deutsch-Türkisches Forum (DTF)* is in place.

Third, ethnically heterogeneous immigrant organizations exist that are initiated by German party organizations (Blätte 2015: 232). In 1994, Cem Özdemir and Ozan Ceyhun founded *ImmiGrün*. To avoid the problems encountered with *Yesiller*, *ImmiGrün* was more inclusive and focused on heterogeneous immigrant groups (N.N. 1996). *ImmiGrün* was formally autonomous but identified with the political aims of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, as written in its statute.

A party membership was welcome, though not required. In 1999, *ImmiGrün* was accepted as an auxiliary organization of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (*Nebenorganisation mit Beratungsstatus*) (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 1999) and was henceforth entitled to table motions. *ImmiGrün* was, without question, conducive to the political careers of Cem Özdemir, who was the first Turkish-origin legislator of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN in the German Bundestag in 1994, and of Ozan Ceyhun, who entered the EU Parliament in 1999, by increasing their intra- and extra-party visibility. Since 2004, however, *ImmiGrün* is inactive and the executive board no longer in office. Moreover, the *Liberales Forum Vielfalt (LFV)* was founded in 2013, chaired by Serkan Tören, legislator of the FDP in the German Bundestag from 2009 to 2013 (FDP 2013). Like the *LTD*, the *LFV* is no formally recognized sub-organization of the FDP, meaning that a party membership is not required to join the *LFV*. The main motivation leading to the establishment of a further party-affiliated immigrant organization in the context of the FDP was to extend the focus beyond the representation of Turkish-origin immigrants in order to also appeal to immigrants of other national background (Kammholz 2013).

Beyond affiliated organizations, such as those illustrated above, ancillary organizations exist that are situated within party organizations and place focus on immigration policy. In most cases, they are chaired by party members of immigrant background. They constitute party-created sub-organizations that intend to reflect the intra-party heterogeneity of the grassroots party members, bundle together expertise in specific topics, develop party positions on specific issues, hone the representational profiles of political parties and are supposed to represent and pre-structure the sectional interests of the manifold sociological groups that exist within party organizations, such as women, LGBTs, youth, IO-citizens, employees, employers and suchlike, before they enter the intra-party decision-making process (Köllner/Basedau 2006; Spier 2015; Trefs 2007). On the one hand, political parties are eager to create numerous ancillary organizations which reflect the heterogenous composition of their voters and party members, provided that these are in line with their policy positions, so as to maximize votes and safeguard the party unity (Poguntke 2002). On the other hand, however, ancillary organizations need a financial budget provided by the federal and state party organizations, which curtails the number of ancillary organizations that can be brought into being. Therefore, the examination of ancillary organizations can yield valuable clues about the party priorities given to the representation of individual groups.

In the SPD, a working group on migration and diversity (*Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Migration und Vielfalt*) was instigated in 2013 at the behest of Turgut Yüksel, member of the 2013 Hessian state parliament. He used the approval given to a working group on LGTBs at the federal party convention as an opportunity to demand a working group for IO-citizens (SPD

2011). So far, only so-called working circles (*Arbeitskreise*) on migration and diversity were established. Compared to working circles, working groups have a much larger intra-party leverage since they are entitled to table motions, speak at party conventions, send delegates to party conventions and receive a financial budget (SPD 2014a).

In the CDU, an intra-party network on integration (*Netzwerk Integration*) was founded in 2013. At the national level, it is chaired by Cemile Giousouf, who has a mandate in the German Bundestag since 2013. In addition, a network exists that focuses on repatriates (*Netzwerk Aussiedler*). It is chaired by Heinrich Zertik, who is the first repatriate in the German Bundestag (Vates 2013). The network reflects the party's strong representational focus on repatriates from post-Soviet countries (Blätte 2014a, 2015), which sets the CDU clearly apart from the other political parties. The high importance of repatriates for the CDU is also mirrored in the *Ost- und Mitteldeutsche Vereinigung (OMV)* that focuses not only on repatriates but also on expellees from the former German territories, who have by definition no immigrant background. But in contrast to the *OMV*, both the *Netzwerk Integration* and the *Netzwerk Aussiedler* are not acknowledged ancillary organizations (*Vereinigung/Sonderorganisation*) but expert committees (*Bundesfachausschuss*) that can be consulted by the federal party leadership. They are established by the party's general secretary at the beginning of each legislative term (CDU 2016a). The *OMV*, on the contrary, is an acknowledged and permanent ancillary organization. Its executive board is entitled to table motions, its chairman is advisory member of the party executive and it can send one representative to the federal committee (Trefs 2007).

In BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, a working group on migration and flight (*Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Migration & Flucht*) exists whose spokesman at the national level was Omid Nouripour between 2002 and 2010, legislator of the German Bundestag since 2006. It is formally acknowledged in the national party statute, granting the right to table motions and speak at party conventions. Moreover, it fulfills an advisory function for the federal party leadership and has an own financial budget (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2015).

Also in the political party DIE LINKE, a working group on migration, integration and antiracism (*Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Migration, Integration und Antirassismus*) exists since 2012 (DIE LINKE 2015). As it is officially acknowledged in the party statute, it can send delegates to party conventions and obtains a financial budget.

In the CSU, a working group on migration and integration (*Arbeitskreis Migration und Integration*) was established in 2015, indicating a rather late acknowledgement of the significance these topic fields assume in culturally diverse societies, such as the German one. It forms an expert committee that deals with migration-related issues, but it has no formal rights within the party organization. All political parties under inspection, apart from the FDP, established

ancillary organizations on immigration, which underlines the importance attached to IO-citizens as a representational group and to immigration and integration as policy fields. But as shown, their intra-party leverage varies greatly, being the lowest in the CDU and CSU due to their limited formal rights.

Even though most party organizations established ancillary organizations which focus on immigration and could serve as intra-party support networks to back aspiring IO-candidates in the candidate selection, the qualitative interviews questioned their significance for the nomination of IO-candidates. Their leverage in the nomination proceedings is not comparable to the political clout of the more established ancillary organizations, such as the *Mittelstands- und Wirtschaftsvereinigung (MIT)* in the CDU, its Youth Organization *Junge Union Deutschlands (JU)*, the *Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA)* and the *Frauen Union (FU)*, or, in the case of the SPD, the Youth Organization *Jungsozialistinnen und Jungsozialisten (Jusos)*, the women organization *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Frauen (ASF)*, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Juristinnen und Juristen (ASJ)* and the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Arbeitnehmerfragen (AfA)*, which can lay claims to viable nominations for their members (Gruber 2009: 142-147). In none of the party organizations under scrutiny, informal selection rules are stipulated that grant the intra-party organizations on immigration a certain number of nominations. They could not yet establish a political clout which would allow them to lay claims to a certain number of nominations. Instead, they are regarded chiefly as expert committees on immigration:

We said that the network wants some of its members sent to parliament. But then someone [of immigrant background] from outside of the network was nominated (Interview 4).

All party members who deal with the topic [immigration] are organized [in the intra-party network on immigration]. It is a platform for exchange, an intra-party platform to take influence on migration and integration policy outside of the parliamentary work (Interview 3).

Although no nominations are granted to the intra-party networks on immigration, it is noticed that many of their chairmen were competing for a seat in parliament. Cemile Giousouf, for example, is chairwoman of the CDU network since 2011 and succeeded in running on list position 25 in North-Rhine Westphalia. The reason was that the state party leadership prospected for a candidate who could credibly represent the policy field of immigration and could signal an opening of the CDU for IO-voters. Hence, ancillary organizations on immigration can increase the intra-party visibility and name recognition of aspiring IO-candidates, especially if leading positions are held, and, hereby, foster their chances of being picked:

Through intra-party organizations on immigration, we can attract attention. If we are strong and work diligently, we can extend our influence within the party organization (Interview 1).

In being nominated, it was helpful that I have founded a working group on migration in my district party organization and chaired it (Interview 4).

In addition, the membership in such ancillary organizations not only increases the name recognition within party organizations but highlights the own issue ownership in the immigration field if having chosen to focus on this policy area. Hence, it can improve the own chance of nomination if political parties wish to have immigration experts in parliament. Consequently, the decision to join an ancillary organization on immigration is not only driven by the IO-candidates' thematic interest but involves strategic considerations of whether they intend to develop an issue ownership in this policy field or not. Some IO-candidates therefore joined ancillary organizations on immigration to highlight their expertise and issue ownership in the immigration field, whereas others steered clear of them to get rid of the exclusive marker of being brokers to the immigrant community and immigration experts.

Also immigrant organizations placed outside of party organizations lack the leverage necessary for laying claims to candidacies, even though they often suppose to have this political clout. Therefore, IO-candidates who are closely affiliated to immigrant organizations are often faced with false expectations. Immigrant organizations can help IO-candidates underscore their issue ownership in the immigration field and can serve as organizational support networks. This can be an asset in the candidate selection if political parties intend to position themselves in this policy field and tap voter groups of immigrant background, but immigrant organizations cannot call for candidacies. The leverage of immigrant organizations does not unfold in the candidate selection in the first place but on the campaign trail by organizing events to which IO-candidates are invited or by recommending their members to vote for the respective candidate:

[...] many organizations in the immigration field overvalue their role because they are not familiar with party organizations and don't know how it works to come forward as a candidate. If you succeed in obtaining a promising list slot, then support is provided in the election campaign; for example, they drive people to the polling station or organize events. This occurs but only after succeeding in receiving a promising list slot. It is not like in the U.S. where Hispanics or other groups have influence on political parties and can position their candidates. In Germany, it is not like this. Immigrant organizations do not have this power because they are not familiar with the party structures. But they think, they have this power and demand that political parties field their candidates. But this is too clumsy, it does not work (Interview 5).

Beyond party-affiliated or intra-party organizations on immigration, an extra-party network of Turkish-origin office holders at the national, state and local level (*Netzwerk türkeistämmiger Mandatsträger*) was established in 2004 with financial support from the *Körber Stiftung*. It provides a platform for exchanging personal political experiences and for developing positions on integration. In the interviews, IO-candidates involved in the network appreciated the exchange with other office holders of Turkish background and the provision of contacts but made clear that the network did not impact their nomination. It has neither the ambition nor the legal possibility for horning in on the candidate selection proceedings of political parties:

It is a platform for exchanging positions. [...] We need protected room outside of party organizations where people can exchange their political experiences, their disappointments and successes and where the party system can be understood so that persons do not resign as they feel left alone. [...] This is what the network can do. But writing to the party leaderships and saying, "We expect that you viably field Turkish-origin contenders!" – I am not sure whether this is a good way (Interview 5).

The previous conspectus made clear that IO-citizens of Turkish background are markedly well organized, resulting in their high representation among parliamentary candidates. The importance attached to representational groups hinges not only on their factual size but also depends on their organizational degree. In the case of highly cohesive and well organized immigrant groups, such as Turkish-origin citizens, political parties have more reason to hope that Turkish-origin candidates can yield electoral support. The pressure Turkish organizations exert on party organizations becomes more tangible when focusing on the *German-Turkish Association (Deutsch-Türkische Gemeinde)*. In the run-up to the 2009 Bundestag election, the organization recommended Turkish-origin voters to only vote for those political parties which placed Turkish-origin candidates on their party lists (N.N. 2009a, 2009b). In the recent past, however, it has broadened its representational focus by claiming viable ballot positions not only for Turkish-origin candidates but for all IO-candidates (Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland 2016).

7.8 Politics-Facilitating Professions

Many parliamentarians previously worked in professions which are regarded as politics-facilitating (e.g. Cairney 2007; Edinger 2009; Höhne/Kintz 2017; Kintz 2014; Saalfeld 1997). Assuming that political parties attempt to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates, they could recruit more lateral entrants from professions which do not fall into these typical recruitment fields. By going beyond their established recruitment pools, they can recruit a larger number of IO-candidates. In the case of closure, on the contrary, IO-candidates need more political experience than native-born candidates to stand for election, which is reflected in a larger number of IO-candidates from politics-facilitating professions where these qualifications can be acquired. Supposing that neutrality prevails, no difference in the occupational background of IO- and native-born candidates becomes evident.




Figure 7.8.1: Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates. *Note:* Fisher's exact test value is 0.88 for instrumental occupations and 0.66 for brokerage occupations. The results are not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.388$. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.8.1 provides a first overview of the number of parliamentary candidates coming from politics-facilitating professions. While instrumental occupations are situated in the political realm, such as working for a party organization, for MPs or other political office holders, for a political foundation, a trade union, and suchlike, brokerage occupations are politics-enabling and additionally include barristers, solicitors, lecturers, academics, and teachers. With regard to instrumental occupations, there is no statistically significant difference between IO-candidates and their native-born peers. In fact, about 15 percent of the candidates in both groups worked in professions which are situated in the political realm. When turning to brokerage occupations, it is found that nearly half of all candidates have worked in such professions. The result conforms to earlier findings that showed that brokerage occupations, such as civil servants, teachers, advocates and notaries, are strongly overrepresented in the German Bundestag with 40 to 45 percent. They offer a high job security, financial security and flexibility over time (Bailer et al. 2013: 26-27; Deutsch/Schüttemeyer 2003; Edinger 2009; Patzelt 1999a; Saalfeld 1997; Wessels 1997). More and more, parliaments turn into closed shops by spawning legislators who resemble each other in their occupational background but differ from the occupational structure of the population (Best/Cotta 2000b; Best et al. 2001; Beyme 1992, 1995; Borchert 1999; Borchert/Golsch 1995; Golsch 1998; Rebenstorf 1995). Brokerage occupations constitute the main route to parliament, whereas professions which are not politics-enabling, such as farmers, merchants, mechanics, housekeepers or workers, are clearly outnumbered (Bailer et al. 2013). About 42 percent of the IO-candidates compared with 39 percent of the native-born

candidates worked in brokerage occupations. The weak difference between both candidate groups fails statistical significance and suggests that the candidate selection works widely neutrally towards IO-candidates when it comes to the contenders' occupational background.

In order to assess whether neutral selection patterns persist after taking account of other relevant factors, binary logistic regression models are estimated. To shed light on the effect size of the predictors and make them comparable, I provide AMEs at observed values (Hanmer/Kalkan 2013; Verlinda 2006). To disentangle the effect of the immigrant background from other factors standing behind the relationship, I control for socio-demographic background variables. Moreover, incumbents (= 1) are expected to be more likely to come from politics-facilitating professions that provide them with the qualifications and resources necessary for winning a seat in parliament in the previous legislative term. This is reinforced by the number of legislative terms served in parliament, the reason being that politics-facilitating professions might improve the chance of remaining in parliament. Furthermore, it is controlled for a variety of additional indicators of candidates' aptitude for competing for office: the number of prior candidacies, the years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of prior political offices and experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1). On the one hand, politically active and experienced individuals might have a higher probability of coming from politics-facilitating professions as these grant a better compatibility with a party engagement. On the other hand, however, an inverse relationship might emerge. A high party involvement can compensate for political qualifications and resources that are otherwise acquired by politics-facilitating professions. Furthermore, I include the candidates' number of organizational affiliations as these constitute alternative training grounds to politics-facilitating professions for acquiring and honing organizational skills. To make allowance for the pooled nature of the data set, party and election fixed effects are included.




Figure 7.8.2:

Predictors of politics-facilitating professions.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.54 in the appendix. Grey dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1.302. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

In support of the descriptive results, the immigrant origin has no statistically significant effect on the probability of coming from instrumental or brokerage occupations (see figure 7.8.2). Even in the bivariate models (grey dashed square and triangle), no statistically significant relationship is found. Evidently, political parties select IO-candidates from widely similar recruitment pools as native-born candidates when it comes to their occupational background, which corresponds to neutral selection practices. To find a route into politics, IO-candidates must thus conform to the occupational structure of native-born candidates. This can be a high hurdle in the nomination proceedings; fewer IO-citizens presumably work in instrumental or brokerage occupations but rather in the industrial or service sector (Granato 2003). The qualitative interviews underscored the strategic advantages arising from instrumental occupations. The party contacts made in the jobs – especially if having worked for parliamentarians or party organizations – help candidates gain in intra-party visibility, make one's name in the party organization and get in touch with influential party actors. Therefore, instrumental professions can give a competitive edge in the candidate selection by providing aspiring candidates with mentors. Those IO-candidates that have worked as assistants of legislators were often backed

by these former or current office holders. They also emphasized the importance of having learnt from the MPs' political work, successes, and failures, making them familiar with the political rules, actors, institutions and work routines:

I worked for different MPs to whom I had trust and could come with questions [about the nomination proceedings] (Interview 5).

There were MPs I worked for and who taught me what to avoid [in a political career]. [...] I simply observed how they did it (Interview 8).

For IO-candidates who previously worked in instrumental professions, the establishment of relevant party contacts and the gain in experience with the political work routines were by-products of their jobs. By contrast, IO-candidates working outside of the political sphere had to establish party contacts in their free time. For the latter, the compatibility of their profession outside of the political sphere through which they make their living with a time-consuming party engagement is one of the main challenges in the legislative recruitment process.

When moving on to an inspection of the control variables, male candidates appear to be more likely to have worked in politics-facilitating professions than women. The result mirrors the persisting dominance of men in politics-facilitating professions. With higher educational attainment, the probability of having worked in politics-facilitating professions increases. With regard to brokerage occupations in particular, the estimate points to such a relationship. This is no surprise as teachers, academics or solicitors require university degrees. Consistent with the expectations, candidates with more experience in political office are more likely to come from instrumental or brokerage occupations. Apparently, these professions allow a better compatibility of unpaid political office with a paid occupation needed to make a living. Compared to the SPD candidates, those of FDP and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN are less likely to come from politics-facilitating professions. Because they have smaller recruitment pools and are less likely to be successful in their electoral bid, they are more dependent on contenders from outside of politics-facilitating professions that are willing to campaign on behalf of the party organization without reaping any electoral rewards in terms of mandates. Conversely, the competition for nomination is fiercer in the large political parties, resulting in more contenders from politics-enabling professions. Moreover, the recruitment trajectories of the large party organizations are more professionalized than those of the smaller political parties. Politics-facilitating professions therefore form a part of the political training in which relevant skills, such as rhetorical, strategic or organizational abilities, are honed.




Figure 7.8.3: Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables. *Note:* The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1.302. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Next, I explore how the control variables shape IO-candidates' probability of coming from politics-facilitating professions. By doing so, a more nuanced understanding of the relationship underlying the results presented above is achieved. It is conceivable that IO-candidates from non-instrumental or non-brokerage occupations are nominated only on the condition that they are equipped with other political qualifications which compensate for the skills that are otherwise acquired in politics-facilitating professions. Or, vice versa, it only applies to externally recruited IO-candidates who lack political experience. Figure 7.8.3 reports the changes in the IO-candidates' probability of coming from politics-facilitating professions across different simulated scenarios. The AMEs are based on interaction terms between the immigrant variable and each control variable while holding the other control variables constant. By a visual inspection, it is revealed that the likelihood of IO-candidates being recruited from politics-facilitating professions is in no way affected by their political experience. Because the estimates remain largely unchanged and fail statistical significance for the most part, I conclude that it does not depend on the IO-candidates' political experience whether they run for election as lateral entrants from

non-instrumental or non-brokerage occupations. The pattern of neutrality persists, notwithstanding the IO-candidates' political experience.




Figure 7.8.4:

Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.55 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Despite neutral patterns, the previous analysis might have clouded underlying variances. Therefore, the next sections investigate more thoroughly the extent to which the conditioning factors impact parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates. Thus far, IO-candidates were bunched together. Even though I advanced the argument that the external differentiation of IO-citizens beats their internal differentiation, making IO-candidates electoral means of strengthening party ties with IO-citizens, political parties are not blind to their religious and national heterogeneity. Therefore, I turn attention to testing for variances in their selection behavior towards IO-candidates across different subsets of IO-candidates. To do so, figure 7.8.4 displays the AMEs for each subset of IO-candidates alongside the marginal effect for IO-candidates as a whole, which serves as a reference.

As no Muslim candidate has worked in an instrumental profession, no estimate is provided. For the other immigrant subgroups, no statistically significant effects become evident. Belonging to different immigrant subgroups does not affect how political parties go about selecting IO-candidates. Only for Muslim candidates, it is observed that political parties are more likely to reach out beyond their established recruitment pools and recruit contenders from non-brokerage occupations. But although the likelihood of Muslim candidates having worked in brokerage occupations is 15 percentage points lower than the probability of native-born candidates, the effect is statistically not different from zero. The number of Muslim candidates is only 15, leading to large confidence intervals and a high statistical uncertainty.

This said, the result nevertheless prompts the conclusion that political parties are more likely to reach out beyond their entrenched recruitment pools and nominate lateral entrants from non-brokerage occupations if the nomination of Muslim candidates is concerned. For one, their candidacy is a striking signal to IO-citizens that political parties do their utmost to open up to IO-citizens and are hospitable to cultural diversity. Second, the number of Muslim candidates from brokerage occupations is presumably lower than applies to other immigrant subgroups. This harkens back to their poorer integration into the labor market, lower educational attainment and more low-status workers (Granato 2003; Granato/Kalter 2001; Haug et al. 2009; Kristen/Granato 2007). Third, political parties might believe that a shared Muslim denomination which sets Muslim citizens clearly apart from the majority population creates a strong bond of mutual identification and social cohesion within the Muslim population. As regards cohesive immigrant groups, political parties might ascribe a higher electoral mobilization power to group representatives, making the nomination of Muslim candidates particularly auspicious. Fourth, Muslims face growing islamophobia in most Western countries, including Germany (e.g. Adida et al. 2013; Creighton/Jamal 2015; Green 2015; Helbling 2012; Peucker/Akbarzadeh 2014; Sides/Gross 2013; Stolz 2006; Strabac et al. 2014; Strabac/Listhaug 2008). Over and above, it is contended that Muslims struggle with a structural integration in terms of education and income (e.g. Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007; Haug et al. 2009; Sauer 2007) and in part show higher levels of extreme religious attitudes (Koopmans 2015). Others found that Muslim immigrants adopt more critical stances on gender equality and sexual liberalization (e.g. Diehl et al. 2009; Doerschler/Irving Jackson 2012; Norris/Inglehart 2012). To showcase endeavors to integrate Muslims both politically and socially and provide role models, political parties might be more inclined to open up their candidate selection to Muslim candidates.




Figure 7.8.5:

Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.56 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N for instrumental occupation = 1.082; N for brokerage occupation = 1.302.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

What else could shape parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates? Doubtlessly, political parties themselves matter. In the light of their high electoral support from voter groups of immigrant background and their egalitarian party ideologies (Kittilson/Tate 2005), center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more likely to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates than political parties situated somewhat more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the FDP and CDU/CSU. To lay bare differences between political parties, figure 7.8.5 displays predictions resulting from interactions between the immigrant background and party affiliations. It should be mentioned that no IO-candidate of the FDP has worked in an instrumental occupation, which is why no estimates are displayed. The empirical results clearly repudiate the expectations put forward above. In no political party, a statistically significant effect emanates from the immigrant background. In other words, political parties do not matter for the selection behavior of political parties as far as the contenders' occupational background is concerned. Neutrality applies to all political parties under scrutiny without any exception. Center-left parties are thus not more likely to reach

out beyond their established recruitment pools to field IO-candidates than applies to political parties situated more on the right of the political spectrum. However, the underlying mechanisms might differ fundamentally. While center-left parties might have enough potential IO-candidates in their established recruitment pools, and, therefore, pursue no opening, political parties on the right of the political spectrum might consciously decide against an opening for IO-candidates. Whether these mechanisms fully account for the lack of differences across political parties cannot be conclusively clarified here but needs further investigation.




Figure 7.8.6: Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.57 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, party list nomination/SMD nomination. $N = 1,113$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The ballot structure forms a decisive component of the institutional context in which candidate selection proceedings are embedded (e.g. Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000). In SMDs, the strategic calculus stipulates that candidates are put up who resemble the average native-born voter. On party lists, on the contrary, party selectorates strive to compile a diverse set of candidates to go after the broadest potential spectrum of voters. This implies that political parties are more likely to open up their candidate

selection and run lateral entrants of immigrant background if party list slots are allocated to reach out to IO-voters, whereas a more defensive selection strategy in terms of neutrality or closure is assumed to prevail in SMDs. Figure 7.8.6 visualizes the interaction between the immigrant background and the mode of candidacy while keeping the control variables constant. As no IO-candidate who was only nominated in a SMD has worked in an instrumental occupation, no estimate is provided. Along the lines of the previous results, the pattern of neutrality persists widely unaffected by the mode of candidacy. By a visual inspection, it becomes clear that the mode of candidacy is no decisive factor in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates if the focus is on the occupational background of parliamentary candidates. Far from what I have argued, IO- and native-born candidates have an equal likelihood of coming from politics-facilitating professions, irrespective of whether they run in a nominal race, on a party list or on both electoral tiers.




Figure 7.8.7:

Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate on party lists.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.58 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, party delegate assembly. N = 517.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

The inclusiveness of nominating bodies entrusted with the nomination of parliamentary candidates was emphasized as a further crucial factor in the descriptive accuracy of selection outcomes (Hazan/Rahat 2006b: 372; Rahat et al. 2008: 666-667). Inclusive party selectorates,

such as party member assemblies, are claimed to produce a higher misrepresentation than more exclusive party selectorates, such as delegate assemblies. Along this proposition, I argued that an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates becomes more likely if delegate assemblies form the party selectorate. To clarify whether the type of party selectorate truly tips the balance of the parties' selection behavior vis-à-vis IO-candidates, the immigrant origin is interacted with the selectorate type responsible for the nomination, all other things being equal. It is important to note that no AMEs for nomination proceedings in SMDs are provided, as no IO-candidate fielded in SMDs worked in politics-facilitating professions.

Moving on to the results in figure 7.8.7, only little variance in the selection behavior towards IO-candidates is observed that dates from the type of party selectorate. Although in line with expectations, the estimates point in a negative direction for delegate assemblies and in a positive direction for party member assemblies, being evidence of a higher probability of opening in the case of delegates, they are weak and statistically indistinguishable from zero. I can therefore only venture the guess that delegate assemblies are somewhat more likely to open up the candidate selection to IO-candidates than holds true for nomination proceedings where the party membership pulls the strings in the candidate selection.




Figure 7.8.8: Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates across the district magnitude of MMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.59 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. N = 1.113.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Scholars dealing with electoral system effects not only claimed that PR electoral systems conduce to an equal representation of marginalized groups but brought the district magnitude of MMDs into play (Darcy et al. 1994; Engstrom 1987; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Matland 1993, 1998b; Matland/Dwight Brown 1992; Rae 1967; Studlar/Welch 1991; Welch/Studlar 1990). The higher the number of seats per electoral district, the greater the opportunities and incentives political parties face to balance their party lists. Against this backdrop, I expect that political parties become more likely to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates by nominating lateral entrants from non-instrumental and non-brokerage occupations if MMDs move towards a higher district magnitude. Since candidates are nested in MMDs, the most appropriate way of treating the data properly is performing a two-level binary logistic regression model with random intercepts for MMDs. No random slope for the immigrant variable is specified because its variance is virtually zero. In figure 7.8.8, the AME of the immigrant origin is plotted against different values of the district magnitude, all else being equal.

No notable and statistically significant change in the AME of the immigrant origin on the probability of coming from brokerage occupations is observed – the effect plot remains unaltered throughout different values of the district magnitude. Irrespective of the number of ballot positions to be filled, IO-candidates have a likelihood of being recruited from brokerage occupations which is widely comparable to the one of their native-born counterparts. However, when turning to instrumental occupations, the estimate points in the anticipated direction, revealing electoral dynamics emanating from the district magnitude. While at a district magnitude of 30 seats below average, IO-candidates have a 16 percentage points higher probability than native-born candidates of having worked in instrumental occupations, indicating a closure, it turns into a 7 percentage points lower probability at a high district magnitude of 30 seats above average – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level.

Despite a small effect size, it is evident in the result that political parties become more inclined to nominate IO-candidates from non-instrumental occupations when more opportunities to balance the ticket arise. First, to make sure that also IO-candidates are listed that can appeal to IO-voters, political parties are more willing to reach out beyond their entrenched recruitment pools and recruit lateral entrants of immigrant background so as to bypass a low supply of potential IO-candidates. Second, the intra-party race for nomination is dampened by an increasing number of ballot positions to be allocated. Under these conditions, it becomes easier to accommodate IO-candidates from professions outside of the political field. Conversely, only IO-candidates with considerable professional skills in the political field and large party networks, acquired and honed by instrumental occupations, have a chance of winning through in the nomination proceedings if fierce intra-party competition for nomination is given.




Figure 7.8.9: Difference in politics-facilitating professions between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.60 and A.61 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. $N = 912$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The thrust of research sides with the assumption that the candidate selection in SMDs is detrimental to the descriptive representation of underrepresented groups. Qualifying the conventional wisdom, scholars countered the argument by asserting that political parties face strong electoral incentives to nominate IO-candidates if electoral districts host a large IO-population (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; 2012; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). To ensure that IO-candidates can be fielded who address the large constituency of immigrant background, political parties are expected to put more effort into opening their candidate selection to IO-candidates once the proportion of IO-citizens grows larger.

To gauge whether it is the case that the size of the IO-population in SMDs conditions the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, an interaction term between the immigrant origin and the share of foreigners in SMDs is included into the statistical model while keeping the control variables and the other relevant SMD context factors constant. Given a hierarchical structure of the data, I run a two-level binary logistic regression model with random intercepts for SMDs. Due to a markedly low variance, the random slope for the immigrant variable is

discarded. All panels displayed in figure 7.8.9 visualize results of multilevel regression models predicated on this logic.

The effect plot is in clear opposition to the intuition outlined above. The probability of IO-candidates coming from instrumental or brokerage occupations is in no way affected by the foreigner share in SMDs. For what reason does no effect change emerge? In SMDs that exhibit a low number of IO-citizens, political parties are not incentivized to nominate IO-candidates but are bent on selecting native-born contenders who are believed to reach out to a broader voter spectrum and evoke less opposition. Thus, observing no endeavors to reach out to lateral entrants of immigrant background is highly plausible as long as the spatial concentration of IO-citizens is low. Conversely, political parties are incentivized to field IO-candidates in SMDs with a large IO-population. But as the number of party members of immigrant background in the district party organizations presumably is higher, political parties are to a lesser extent compelled to reach out to lateral entrants, explaining why an effect change fails to appear.

When deciding whether to nominate IO-candidates in SMDs, political parties must ponder how likely it is that local voters will repudiate IO-candidates at the ballot box. They only nominate IO-candidates in electoral districts where their immigrant background is not thought to backfire. In socially deprived SMDs, measured by the local unemployment rate and the share of high school graduates, more voters harbor prejudices against immigrants than in well-off electoral districts (e.g. Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2014; Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014; Mayda 2006), making the nomination of IO-candidates a risky undertaking and suggesting a closure. However, no striking effect changes neither for the unemployment rate nor for the educational level are observed in the effect plots. One obvious reason pointing to a shortcoming of the available data is that political parties not only close their nomination proceedings if having to fear that IO-candidates will cost them votes but make clear at earlier recruitment stages that aspirants from immigrant groups will not come forward as candidates. Consequently, IO-candidates coming out on top in the candidate selection despite a social deprivation are a selective sample that suffered no closure, while those who experienced a closure drop out.

Lastly, political parties are expected to make allowance for the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs, measured by the local far-right vote share and the degree of urbanity. Supposing that a local constituency takes hostile attitudes towards multiculturalism, political parties must brace themselves for electoral losses if nominating IO-candidates for election, making a closure likely. However, when turning to the electoral strength of far-right political parties in SMDs, an opposite pattern emerges. With regard to brokerage occupations, no effect changes become visible, whereas IO-candidates are less likely than native-born candidates to come from instrumental occupations once the vote share of far-right political parties exceeds

the average. In SMDs with a right-wing vote share of 2 percentage points below average, IO-candidates are 26 percentage points more likely than native-born candidates to come from instrumental professions. Yet, in SMDs with a right-wing vote share of 4 percentage points above average, IO-candidates have a 27 percentage points lower probability, which is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Instead of inducing political parties to close their candidate selection to IO-candidates when right-wing parties fare well, an opposite effect emerges. One possible reason is that the presence of right-wing parties encourages the moderate political parties to showcase their commitment to multiculturalism, helpful in distancing themselves from the far right. With regard to urbanity, which is the last effect plot, no noteworthy effect change is observed. This doubtlessly means that an opening for IO-candidates is no matter of urbanity as far as the candidates' occupational background is concerned.

7.9 Localness in Single-Member Districts

The majority of candidates vying for office in SMDs are locals (Burmeister 1993: 65; Tavits 2010; Zeuner 1970: 99). In the literature, localness is distinguished along two dimensions (Gschwend/Zittel 2016; Tavits 2010). While the first dimension refers to political localness in the electoral district, capturing whether candidates have experience in local-level office, the second dimension relates to biographical localness and grasps whether candidates are born and grown up in the electoral district where they run for election and still reside there. In chapter 7.6, I contrasted the previous local-level office experience of IO-candidates with the one of their native-born counterparts, but no striking mismatch arose. Yet, it is important to mention that experience in local-level office must not be gained in the electoral districts where candidates compete for a seat in parliament. Even though it seems plausible since these positions provide them with resources, such as local name recognition and party contacts, that are conducive to being nominated, the survey question does not rule out that experience in local-level office was gained in another electoral district. With the previous findings in mind, the present chapter dedicates to the candidates' biographical localness but supplements information on candidates' local-level office experience in the electoral district provided by the qualitative interviews. Contrary to Tavits (2010), who defines biographical localness as the birth in the electoral district, I will focus on the candidates' local residence and their length of residence in the electoral district since first-generation immigrants cannot be born in the electoral district by definition.

Supposing that political parties strive for an opening of their candidate selection for IO-candidates, they could relax the requirement of localness and parachute IO-candidates into suitable SMDs to increase their numbers. A closure, in turn, would be indicated if IO-candidates need to be locally rooted to a greater extent than native-born candidates. If political parties ascribe a high electoral risk to IO-candidates, only locally anchored IO-candidates are considered qualified to run for office without acting as a deterrent to local voters. Assuming that local voters have second thoughts about being properly represented by legislators of immigrant background, a local rootedness can dispel their doubts as it becomes more likely that IO-candidates can and will act as local servants in parliament. If the empirical results reveal that IO-candidates do not diverge from native-born candidates in their localness, neutrality is indicated.




Figure 7.9.1:

Difference in the local residence in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates. *Note:* Fisher's exact test value is 0.170. The result is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.057$. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 7.9.1 presents a descriptive summary of the candidates' local residence in the electoral district where they compete for election. In conformity with the literature, most candidates are found to live in the electoral district where they stand for election (Burmeister 1993: 65; Pedersen et al. 2007; Tavits 2010; Zeuner 1970: 91-100). On the one hand, the candidate selection in SMDs is the dominion of district party organizations and more specifically, of their nominating bodies, making a local name recognition and local support networks in the district party organization indispensable for being nominated. These resources can be acquired most effectively by a residence in the electoral district and the investment of time and energy in constituency work. On the other hand, localness provides party selectorates with information about the contenders' familiarity and identification with the local needs and preferences and

indicates how likely it is that they will advocate these in parliament. About 85 percent of the native-born candidates but only 78 percent of the IO-candidates live in the electoral district where they run for election. Even though a remarkable gap of 7 percentage points emerges, it achieves no statistical significance as IO-candidates are clearly outnumbered. The findings insinuate that parachuting occurs somewhat more often to IO-candidates. But for all that, localness appears to be a highly prevalent condition in the candidate selection of SMDs, which can hardly be circumvented.




Figure 7.9.2: Difference in the mean years of local residence in SMDs at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Difference is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$ (t-test). $N = 473$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

In view of the previous results, it could be objected that candidates moved into the electoral district where they intend to compete for office in the run-up to the election, distorting the findings on the candidates' local rootedness. To integrate a qualitative dimension of local rootedness, information on the candidates' years of local residence in the electoral district is provided in figure 7.9.2. To do so, all candidates that live outside of the electoral district where they run for election are discarded. As no information on the nominees' years of local residence at the first candidacy is available, the sample is furthermore confined to first-time candidates. Native-born candidates reside in the electoral district for 26 years on average compared with 22 years among IO-candidates before being nominated for the first time. Despite a notable gap of four years, the difference fails statistical significance. But for all that, further hints are given that parachuting occurs somewhat more often to IO-candidates.

To step beyond descriptive analysis and fathom how the immigrant origin is associated with the probability of being a local under otherwise equal conditions, multivariate regression models are run. To create equal conditions, I control for socio-demographic background variables.

Over and above socio-demographic variables, candidates who ran for office in the electoral district in the previous election (= 1) are more likely to be locals as they would, in all likelihood, have moved into the electoral district at this particular time. Moreover, the chance of running for election in the electoral district where candidates live is assumed to be increased by their social and political involvement. It provides the name recognition among the local party members, the selectorate and voters necessary for being entrusted with a nomination. Therefore, I control for the years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of prior political offices, experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1) and the number of organizational affiliations. Also, the electoral viability of SMD nominations – measured by a binary variable – is included. Political parties might parachute candidates into electoral districts only if these are in vain and there is little to lose from the nomination of external candidates. Remember that SMDs are viable (= 1) if the vote distance to the district winner was 10 percentage points or less in the previous election or if they were won by the own political party, and non-viable (= 0) otherwise. What is more, the vacancy of SMDs (= 1) is included. Political parties might make use of parachuting to fill open candidacies. SMDs are vacant if the previously elected legislator does not re-run for office (Reiser 2013: 134). Although it cannot be ruled out that the incumbent legislator did not vacate the electoral district but was defeated by the current candidate, this information is used as a proxy for want of alternative measures. In the wake of a strong priority rule for incumbents in the candidate selection of German party organizations (Reiser 2013; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970), I surmise that these are vacant SMDs in most cases. To account for the pooled character of the data set, election and party fixed effects enter the statistical model.




Figure 7.9.3: Predictors of the local rootedness in SMDs.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models and negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.62 in the appendix. Grey dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding of the local residence in SMD is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). Dependent variable coding of the years of local residence is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. N for local residence in SMD = 981; N for years of local residence in SMD = 440.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To begin with, the local residence in the electoral district where candidates enter the nominal race takes center stage. Since candidates' local residence is measured by a dichotomous variable, binary logistic regression models are run. To grasp the effect size of the predictors, AMEs at observed values are presented (Hanmer/Kalkan 2013; King et al. 2000; Verlinda 2006). As can be deduced from figure 7.9.3, the previous descriptive findings receive support from the multivariate analysis. Although, all else being equal, IO-candidates are 4 percentage points less likely than native-born candidates to be locals, the marginal effect fails statistical significance. Even in the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), no statistically significant effect of the immigrant origin becomes evident. Parachuting thus occurs somewhat more often to IO-candidates, but otherwise being a local is a major requirement for a nomination in SMDs

that can hardly be circumvented. In other words, parachuting IO-candidates into SMDs to increase the number of candidates falling into this category is no predominant selection strategy pursued by political parties.

Among the control variables, some other notable effects are found. What appears from the findings is that parachuting becomes 4 percentage points more likely with each one-unit increase in education. Doctorates that indicate proficiency are important vote-earning attributes in SMDs (Schneider/Tepe 2011), making a local rootedness less mandatory. Moreover, candidates who re-run for election in SMDs have a 7 percentage points higher probability of being locals – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The finding is plausible as candidates falling into this category moved to the electoral district at the previous election at the latest. Moreover, candidates with previous experience in local-level office are 13 percentage points more likely to be locals – the marginal effect achieves statistical significance at a 0.01 level. The finding calls attention to the significance of political localness in the candidate selection of SMDs. Only local top dogs that are politically and biographically rooted are entrusted with a nomination.

As hypothesized, political parties are less apt to employ parachuting if SMDs are promising. For one thing, more contenders are poised to run for election in viable SMDs, as found in chapter 7.4. Provided that enough local contenders strive for a nomination, parachuting becomes dispensable. For another thing, local rootedness is a crucial vote-earning attribute in SMDs (e.g. Arzheimer/Evans 2012, 2014; Tavits 2010). Therefore, political parties avoid taking the risk of parachuting in promising SMDs. For the same reason, candidates competing for a seat in vacant SMDs have an 11 percentage points higher probability of being locals. Political parties tend to nominate locals as successors to candidates who came first in the nominal race in the previous election but abstain from re-selection. Compared to the Bundestag candidates, those in Saxony have a 12 percentage points lower probability of being locals, whereas no significant effects are found for the other state elections. Due to a smaller party membership in the Saxon party organizations (Niedermayer 2016), the number of locally rooted contenders might be low in some electoral districts, which is why parachuting gains in importance.

I move on to the candidates' length of local residence in the electoral districts, being the second indicator of local rootedness. Because the number of years is a count variable that proves to be over-dispersed, negative binomial regression models are run (Gardner et al. 1995; Greene 1994; Lawless 1987). To tap into the effect size of the predictors, AMEs at observed values are presented (Hanmer/Kalkan 2013; King et al. 2000). As appears from the lower panel of figure 7.9.3, the immigrant origin has no statistically significant effect on the years of local residence in the electoral district – the predicted difference to native-born candidates is only one year. To

get straight to the point, the length of local residence does not provide strong evidence of parachuting strategies employed towards IO-candidates. Even in the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), no statistically significant effect emerges from the immigrant background – the difference is four years but statistically not different from zero (p -value = 0.203). Regardless of having an immigrant origin or not, being a local is the chief trajectory to SMD nominations. First and foremost, the candidate selection in SMDs is in the hands of local nominating bodies that are composed of the rank-and-file party members of the electoral district or delegates elected by the party members of the sub-district party chapters. Being backed by the local membership and the district party leadership is therefore crucial in being nominated in SMDs. Second, localness provides party selectorates with information on the candidates' familiarity with the local needs and preferences and indicates how eager they are to serve local concerns once elected to parliament.

Beyond this relationship of main interest, male candidates are found to have a longer predicted residence time in SMDs than true holds for female nominees. Either, more parachuting of female candidates takes place as a manifestation of ticket-balancing efforts of political parties or, women more often move to their partners than vice versa, resulting in a systematically longer residence time among men (see e.g. Bielby/Bielby 1992). Higher education is associated with a shorter residence time in SMDs, corroborating the previous finding that education increases the likelihood of parachuting. Furthermore, candidates with previous experience in local-level office are predicted to live 7.7 more years in the electoral district before running for office at the state or national level. These candidates might be more heavily engaged in local politics and indicate aspirations for state or national legislative careers later (Bailer et al. 2013: 70). Compared to the SPD candidates, those of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE have a shorter predicted residence time. As both political parties have little prospects of winning nominal races, finding locally rooted contenders that are willing to campaign on behalf of the party organization might pose a bigger challenge to them and leads to earlier nominations.

There is unambiguous evidence to suggest that neither in the candidates' local residence nor in their length of local residence sharp disparities between IO- and native-born candidates exist. Being locally rooted forms the main pathway to candidacies in SMDs – irrespective of having an immigrant background or not. In the interviews, running for election in the electoral district where candidates are locally rooted was presented as an automatic mechanism. It results from the fact that most candidates started their party activities in the district and sub-district party organizations of the municipalities where they live (see also Golsch 1998; Gruber 2009: 149-150; Herzog 1975; Zeuner 1970: 93-95). The apprenticeship in local-level office, often

labeled as the school of politics (Herzog 1975: 85), the probation in a small compass, the immediate encounters with the local constituency and coping with practical local problems are important pre-stages that prepare aspirants for higher-level office and place them on probation to demonstrate their political qualification and commitment to the own party organization. As such, local politics is home to a large number of potential candidates for higher office. After climbing the career ladder within the own district party organization – the district and sub-district chairman positions in particular are eminently key to cultivating name recognition, establishing contacts and alliances within the district party organization –, running for office at the state or national level can be the next career move.

Entering nominal races as external candidates is the exception rather than the rule. Personal linkages with the district party organization, including its rank-and-file party members and the local party leadership, and a local name recognition among the local constituents are pivotal resources in the local candidate selection, which can only be tapped by the presence and hard work at the grassroots level. Running for office in electoral districts where candidates live for years comes with the great advantage of having certain resources, such as a local visibility, personal linkages with the local constituency and familiarity with the local needs of the electoral district, gained in private life by membership in local sports clubs or other associations, by job or by having visited a local school:

I grew up in the district [...] where I have been socially active since my childhood; school, sports and so forth. Because I live there, it is automatically my district (Interview 4).

If you run for election, your place of residence is automatically your electoral district. This is my local reference [...]. I live there and this is the electoral district I care for. I was in the county council, in the city council, I was active in local politics (Interview 5).

You run for election where you live. There are of course exceptions. It is no rule, but it is better if you run for election where you live. [...] I am active there and I am rooted in the local structures (Interview 1).

I am sure that many of the votes I won were not due to my knowledge or experience but because voters simply said, "I encounter this candidate every second week. The candidate is in my sports club, at the football field, at the barrel-tapping ceremony, at the morning pint!" (Interview 7).

Although parachuting is no prevalent selection strategy pursued towards IO-candidates, it occasionally occurs. IO-candidates are sometimes parachuted into electoral districts if their home districts are pledged to other longstanding local party members. Provided that the state party leaderships insist on their nomination for electoral reasons, parachuting is the only viable option for nomination. However, parachuting crucially hinges on the consent granted by the district and sub-district party leaderships, which organize the local candidate selection. Usually, parachuting only occurs in vacant SMDs where no local party member indicated political aspirations (see also Zeuner 1970: 66). The reason behind is that attempts of local party leaderships at nominating external candidates by ignoring locally rooted aspirants provoke a backlash from

the local nominating bodies and the rank-and-file party members. Such undertakings are therefore likely to come to grief. Either a fierce backlash from the local party selectorate is sparked that demonstrates its disapproval by supporting locally rooted contenders with a track record of services on behalf of the district party organization. Or, a backlash from the local party members is ignited, resulting in a higher number of local competitors who challenge the external contender. But even if parachuting succeeds, the grassroots party members might feel ignored if an external candidate is favored in the nomination proceedings. It is chiefly the local party membership which runs the local election campaigns, with party members donating their time and energy to campaign activities. Such being the case, it is essential that candidates running for office in SMDs enjoy the full backing of the local rank-and-file party members.

To that effect, parachuting only occurs in electoral districts which remained vacant. If no local contender is available, it is incumbent on the district party leadership to work harder at finding a local contender, bring an external candidate into play or to take the opportunity to make an own bid for nomination. If failing to find a potential candidate, the local party leadership can also appoint a finding committee, mostly composed of party actors from the district party organization, such as recent or former legislators and members of the district party leadership, which is responsible for prospecting for qualified contenders inside and outside of the electoral district. But even in vacant SMDs, the planned nomination of an external IO-candidate can lead local party members to step forward as challengers, as shown by the example of Cemile Giousouf (see chapter 7.4) and by the following case:

I live in district A [name of the electoral district], but this district was already promised to someone else. To a person who has worked towards a nomination for 30 years. If I had contested this seat, I would have destroyed a party structure which grew over the course of decades [...]. In district B, however, no party member indicated aspirations when the district party leadership started dealing with the question of who could run for election [...]. It was worked hard to implement me in the electoral district. When my application was official, rival candidates suddenly appeared (Interview 3).

Another example that illustrates the pitfalls tied to parachuting is Charles M. Huber's nomination, a Senegalese-German television actor nominated by the CDU in the electoral district *Darmstadt* in the 2013 Bundestag election. After Huber could not run for the CSU in the electoral district *München-Ost* where he was born and residing, because another contender was already planned to follow the incumbent legislator after retirement, a finding commission of the CDU district party organization Darmstadt approached him. The former candidate, Andreas Storm, who had a seat in the German Bundestag from 1994 to 2009, failed to be elected in 2009 and switched as a state secretary to Saarland. Consequently, the candidacy was open. The CDU hoped to benefit from Huber's celebrity status (on celebrity politics see Street 2012; Wolf 2011) to outplay the incumbent candidate of the SPD, Brigitte Zypries, who has won the electoral district since 2005. Although Huber succeeded in the local candidate selection with 89.3 percent

of the delegate votes and no local contender challenged him, he complained about a lack of campaign support provided by the local party members (N.N. 2013a, 2013b). Eventually, Huber lost the nominal race with a vote margin of 1.4 percentage points, but entered the Bundestag on position 19 of the state party list. In 2014, however, the district party leadership ceased any further cooperation after criticizing Huber for his rare presence in the electoral district and for neglecting district issues (N.N. 2014). Even if parachuting succeeds, it can create thorny problems with election campaigning and legislative work. No naturally grown and firm relationship with the district party organization and its leadership exists that would provide parachuted parliamentarians with a strong party backing even in situations of conflict. What is more, parachuted candidates have no personal attachment to local issues, which can impede a sustainable relationship of representation.

More often than not, the idea of parachuting IO-candidates into electoral districts is instigated by state party leaderships. Parachuting is mostly employed if potential IO-candidates are considered eminently qualified to forge closer electoral links with IO-voters and hone the party expertise in immigration-related issues but are not sufficiently anchored in the own district party organization to win out over locally rooted aspirants or if the district is already spoken for by other local party members. However, parachuting presupposes the consent of the district party organization – most crucially, the approval of the district and sub-district party leadership is needed. The candidate selection in SMDs is in the hands of district party organizations and their nominating bodies (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer/Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). Therefore, state party leaderships have no formal access to the local candidate selection that would allow them to oblige district party organizations to abide by their candidate preference. Local party members, the local party selectorate and the district party leadership would feel ignored if the state party leadership intervenes in the local candidate selection by dictating who is to be nominated, making a backlash very likely. Against this backdrop, district party leaderships must usually declare electoral districts vacant, which opens an opportunity window for the state party leaderships to propose potential candidates or the district party leaderships task a finding committee to which state party leaderships can propose their favored contenders. But if the aspirant favored by the state party leadership enjoys no support from the district party leadership and from the local nominating body, parachuting is ruled out.

Even though parachuted IO-candidates are released from the hard work at the grassroots level in the run-up to the candidate selection, it needs to be compensated as fast as can be. The electoral advantages of a local rootedness, depicted above, do not apply to parachuted candidates and must be made up in the run-up to the election. With the support of the district party leadership, parachuted candidates are systematically implemented in the electoral district. For

this purpose, they are expected to aspire to local party or elected office, to join local social organizations, participate in local party assemblies and acquainting oneself with local voters:

For me, it was difficult to mingle with people. It would have been easier to run for election in my electoral district [where I live]. I would not have gone onto the streets so often. This made work more difficult. It was a huge investment of time and effort, with long tours through the district and with a lot of appointments which would have been unnecessary in my home district (Interview 3).




Figure 7.9.4: Difference in the local residence in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables. *Note:* The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 982.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

After finding that parachuting is the exception rather than the rule and only happens under specific conditions, I will go on with the question of how the control variables condition the effect of the immigrant background on localness. The previous analysis which ignored potential interaction effects might have overlooked a more complex, nuanced relationship between the immigrant background and the probability of parachuting. IO-candidates might be parachuted only if they are equipped with other political qualifications that countervail their lack of local rootedness. Or, vice versa, parachuting only happens to party newcomers of immigrant background that have no political experience at all. Hence, I introduce interaction terms between the immigrant background and each control variable while keeping everything else constant. No

estimate for vacancy is displayed because the number of IO-candidates in vacant electoral districts was markedly low.

As appears from figure 7.9.4, most control variables bring about no notable effect changes. The results corroborate a widely neutral selection behavior towards IO-candidates. This happens to be independent of their political qualifications and conditions of nomination. However, as indicated by a negative gap to the zero line, party newcomers of immigrant background have a lower probability of being locals than holds for native-born candidates with an equal length of party membership. The predicted difference is 16 percentage points but fails statistical significance, albeit only narrowly (p -value = 0.105). Similar patterns become apparent with regard to the party activity rate, the number of political offices and the experience in party office. Even though statistically insignificant for the most part, the results point to individual incidents of parachuting which involve party newcomers of immigrant background. As party newcomers are not sufficiently anchored in their district party organizations to prevail over locally rooted competitors but must wait their turn, parachuting them into vacant electoral districts is one option to go for if their nomination is considered important for strategic reasons.




Figure 7.9.5: Difference in the years of local residence in SMDs at the first candidacy between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. $N = 440$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

When turning to the length of local residence at the first candidacy and addressing the question of how it is conditioned by the control variables, some interesting effect changes emanate from figure 7.9.5. Once the length of party membership exceeds the average by ten years, IO-candidates are predicted to live for a shorter time in their electoral districts than applies to native-born candidates – the difference is seven years but fails statistical significance (p -value = 0.225). One explanation is that first-generation immigrants who moved to Germany later in life but joined a party organization comparatively early cause the effect. Moreover, IO-candidates have a lower predicted length of local residence when having no previous experience in party office – the difference is six years but statistically insignificant (p -value = 0.291). In all probability, this points to individual cases of parachuting in which inexperienced IO-candidates run for election despite lacking office experience. It should also be mentioned that IO-candidates have a shorter predicted residence time than native-born candidates if electorally viable SMDs are concerned. But the effect of 9 years is not statistically meaningful (p -value = 0.334). Nonetheless, the result suggests that parachuting occurs chiefly in electorally viable SMDs where candidates are in real contention for a seat in parliament. As delineated above, parachuting happens mainly to IO-candidates that are equipped with certain sought-after resources which make their nomination instrumental in addressing IO-voters and improving the party expertise in immigration-related issues. Since political parties intend to benefit from candidates' expertise not only at the ballot box but in their legislative work, this pattern is deemed plausible. However, the marginal effects fail statistical significance throughout and produce large confidence intervals. Therefore, they must be treated with caution.




Figure 7.9.6:

Difference in the local rootedness in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models and negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.63 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding of the local residence in SMD is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). Dependent variable coding of the years of local residence is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, (no repeated candidacy in SMD), mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

After finding neutral selection patterns in a cross-section, I will address the question of whether the finding holds true for all immigrant groups in equal measure. In terms of religion and culture, some IO-candidates are more distinct from the majority population than others (Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Ford 2011; Hainmueller/Hangartner 2013), endowing them with a stronger signaling effect that indicates party efforts to represent IO-citizens. Therefore, variances in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates are expected which are shaped by their geographic and cultural distance from the majority society. To test the assumption, I run five identical regression models on different subsets of IO-candidates and display the AMEs in figure 7.9.6, including also the reference effect for IO-candidates as a whole.

As the immigrant subgroups contain a low number of observations, the produced confidence intervals are strikingly large. The predictions clearly refute the assumption made about variances across immigrant subgroups. Irrespective of their geographic and religious distance from the majority population, no stronger opening or closure of the nomination proceedings is witnessed. To a similar extent as their native-born counterparts, IO-candidates are locally rooted

in the electoral districts where they make a bid for office, regardless of the immigrant subgroup to which they belong.




Figure 7.9.7: Difference in the local rootedness in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models and negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.64 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding of the local residence in SMD is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). Dependent variable coding of the years of local residence is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, (no repeated candidacy in SMD), mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. N for local residence in SMD = 982; N for years of local residence in SMD = 440.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Which other factors might engender variances in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates as regards their local rootedness? Owing to their stake in voter groups of immigrant background and their inclusive party ideologies (Kittilson/Tate 2005), center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more likely to open up their candidate selection to IO-candidates by employing parachuting measures than political parties placed somewhat more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the FDP and CDU/CSU. To see if political parties follow similar lines or diverge concerning parachuting, the immigrant origin is interacted with candidates' party affiliation, everything else being equal.

The AMEs presented in figure 7.9.7 point in the expected directions. While IO-candidates have a lower probability than native-born candidates of being locals in the SPD (-6 percentage

points), BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (-12 percentage points) and DIE LINKE (-8 percentage points), a reversed picture is painted for the CDU/CSU (+11 percentage points) and FDP (+4 percentage points). But it is important to emphasize that all estimates fail statistical significance. When the length of local residence at the first candidacy comes into play, the patterns are less conclusive. Only for BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, a negative effect of the immigrant background on the years of length residence becomes evident. The marginal effect is nine years but fails statistical significance (p -value = 0.162). Overall, center-left parties appear to be somewhat more likely to parachute IO-candidates into SMDs. But for the reasons discussed earlier, parachuting is the exception rather than the rule, though.




Figure 7.9.8:

Difference in the local residence in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.65 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Saxon state election, SPD. $N = 415$.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Party selectorates are the decisive gatekeepers whose approval is mandatory for nomination (Bille 2001; Hazan/Rahat 2006a, 2006b, 2010; Katz 2001; Rahat 2007). According to Hazan und Rahat (2006b: 372), inclusive party selectorates are inferior to exclusive party selectorates as regards the descriptive representativeness of selection outcomes (see also Rahat et al. 2008). Based on their assumption, I claimed that an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates becomes more likely if delegate assemblies act as the gatekeepers of the candidate selec-

tion and not party member assemblies. To test whether the party selectorate type makes a difference to the parties' selection behavior vis-à-vis IO-candidates, the immigrant origin is interacted with the responsible selectorate type, everything else being equal. As the number of first-time candidates who live in the electoral district where they stand for election shrinks further once the selection body is incorporated, the length of local residence is omitted.

As shown in figure 7.9.8, IO-candidates have a somewhat lower probability than native-born candidates of being locals, which is a sign of occasional cases of parachuting. But the lack of statistical significance and the small effect sizes also underscore the scarcity of such incidents. Moreover, either selectorate type has similar propensities to approve parachuting attempts. One explanation is that the party selectorate is not the main gate external IO-candidates must get through to run for election in SMDs. First of all, the consent of the district party leadership which tips the scales when it comes to parachuting is required. Therefore, it is not a question of the formal selection body but of the district party leadership.




Figure 7.9.9: Difference in the local residence in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.66 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 973.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Given their zero-sum logic, SMDs were argued to impinge upon the representation of marginalized groups (e.g. Canon 1999; Rule 1986; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Togeby 2005; Tremblay 2012). However, the rationale erroneously misses out the socio-demographic structure of SMDs which can alter the electoral incentives that prevail in the local candidate selection. In electoral districts which host a large IO-population, political parties are strongly encouraged to field IO-candidates so as to lure IO-voters (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016) and to demonstrate commitment to multiculturalism. To make sure that they can nominate IO-candidates despite a low supply of contenders from immigrant groups, political parties could make use of parachuting. In order to test for a conditioning effect resulting from the size of the local IO-population, an interaction term between the immigrant background and the foreigner share in SMDs is incorporated into the statistical model while keeping the control variables and the other relevant SMD context factors constant. No collinearity issues emerge. Bearing in mind the hierarchical structure of the data, a two-level logistic regression model with random intercepts for SMDs are run (Gelman/Hill 2007). No random slope for the immigrant variable is specified. Its variance is close to zero and not conducive to the overall model fit. All panels of figure 7.9.9 visualize predictions from multilevel regression models based on the logic just described.

Different from what was expected, the effect plot in the first panel that displays the AME of the immigrant background on the local residence against the foreigner share in SMDs points in a positive direction. In other words, IO-candidates become more likely to be locals than holds true for native-born candidates if electoral districts move towards a larger spatial concentration of IO-citizens. At the lowest foreigner share of 6 percentage points below average, IO-candidates are 12 percentage points less likely to be locals. But the relationship inverts once the foreigner share increases. At the highest foreigner share, which is 22 percentage points above average, IO-candidates are 26 percentage points more likely to be locals – the marginal effect achieves statistical significance at a 0.05 level. The assumption that political parties make more use of parachuting when the electoral clout of IO-voters increases is clearly declined by the empirical data. As a first reason, more locals of immigrant background are engaged in district party organizations if SMDs are characterized by a high proportion of IO-citizens, as demographics are, at least to some extent, reflected in the local rank-and-file membership. Therefore, political parties do not hinge on parachuting if SMDs are characterized by a high ethnic concentration. Second, the qualitative interviews suggested that political parties do not parachute IO-candidates into electoral districts at all costs. Rather, they prospect for vacant SMDs to avoid a backlash from the local nominating body and the local party members. If vacant

SMDs host a large IO-population, it is considered to be a fortunate circumstance. But this strategic consideration follows only after open candidacies were found:

The socio-demographic context of the district was irrelevant. It was simply a matter of finding a district for me without leaving blood on the carpet. [...] There was another possible district, but there were two aspirants who [...] work towards a mandate for decades. This district was the option [...] that avoided most conflict [within the party organization] (Interview 3).

Scholars of social deprivation described socially deprived individuals as taking more critical stances against immigrants than those with a high standard of living and education (e.g. Branton/Jones 2005; Dancygier 2013; Dancygier/Donnelly 2013, 2014; Dancygier/Laitin 2014; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2010; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke/Sinnott 2006; Scheve/Slaughter 2001; Sides/Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). Along these lines of reasoning, political parties should abstain from parachuting IO-candidates into SMDs if electoral districts move towards a higher social deprivation, as an electoral backfire is looming. As before, the economic dimension of social deprivation is measured by the percentage of unemployed people, whereas the cultural dimension is captured by the local share of high school graduates.

When drawing attention to the unemployment rate in SMDs, the overall trend fits the aforementioned expectation. Political parties become more likely to forgo parachuting once the share of unemployed constituents is on the rise. At the lowest unemployment rate, which is 4 percentage points below average, IO-candidates have an 8 percentage points lower probability than native-born candidates of being locals. At the highest value of unemployment, which is 6 percentage points above average, they have an 8 percentage points higher probability. But the effect change is weakly pronounced and the AME remains statistically insignificant throughout. In a like manner, the effect of the immigrant origin points in the anticipated direction if plotted against the share of high school graduates. Once electoral districts move towards a higher educational level, IO-candidates become more likely to be parachuted. But the estimates must be treated with some grain of salt due to weakly pronounced effect changes and a high statistical uncertainty.

A further factor which merits attention is the incidence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs. Provided that local constituents are positively disposed to multiculturalism, political parties are expected to become more amenable to parachuting as the risk of suffering electoral losses from the nomination of IO-candidates is reduced. As a first indicator of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs, the vote share of far-right political parties is utilized. The cross-level interaction between the immigrant background and the number of votes casted for right-wing political parties falls short of the expectation put forth above. Surprisingly, IO-candidates become more likely to be parachuted if far-right political parties fare well in the electoral district.

However, because the estimates only indicate small effect sizes and are statistically insignificant, they need to be treated with some reservation.

The level of urbanity forms the second indicator of the strength of anti-immigrant sentiments prevailing in SMDs. Voters in rural settings are less familiar with multiculturalism and exhibit greater levels of cultural conservatism than metropolitan voters. Thus, political parties have less to fear from parachuting IO-candidates into urban SMDs. Surprisingly, however, IO-candidates become more likely to be locals as electoral districts move towards a higher population density. In highly urban settings, the probability of IO-candidates being locals exceeds that of native-born candidates by 25 percentage points – the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. Although I want to avoid too extensive speculation, one possible explanation for the closure tendency relates to a higher supply of aspiring IO-candidates in urban SMDs (Schönwälder 2013; Schönwälder et al. 2001). This can, in some cases, lead to a fierce competition between party members of immigrant background for who can run for office. By implication, political parties are less in need of parachuting if intending to nominate candidates of this category. Parachuting external IO-candidates into SMDs is even exceedingly hazardous if enough locally rooted party members wait to run for election. Both native-born party members and party members of immigrant background would feel ignored, which can impair the latter's party engagement and reinforces their political underrepresentation.




Figure 7.9.10: Difference in the years of local residence in SMDs between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.67 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 436.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To finalize, I will investigate how the SMD context factors act on the candidates' predicted years of local residence before running for election for the first time. The AMEs of the immigrant background, graphed in figure 7.9.10, echo the empirical patterns found above and militate in favor of the validity of the previous findings. Only with regard to the share of high school graduates in SMDs, a deviant picture is drawn. The initial assumption that IO-candidates are more likely to be parachuted if SMDs move towards a higher educational level is not confirmed when using the length of local residence as a dependent variable, but the reverse seems to be true. One explanation for the inconsistent finding is that the indicator blurs electoral district borders as graduates might have visited schools in neighboring electoral districts. Therefore, the measurement is not sufficiently selective to capture district-based stances on multiculturalism. Second, the educational level is less striking than other SMD context factors, such as unemployment or the size of the IO-population, and, therefore, operates less consistently. Third, the qualitative interviews laid open that demographic considerations are second to the vacancy

of SMDs as to whether parachuting is employed or waived. As parachuting is more about vacancy than about a strategic calculus pertaining to demographic considerations, inconsistent patterns emerge.

8 Parties' Selection Behavior at the Stage of Standing for Election

After prevailing in the candidate selection, contenders compete for a seat in parliament. Even though voters act as the pivotal gatekeepers of parliament, the parties' influence on the electoral fortune of parliamentary candidates reaches out to this recruitment stage. First of all, the question takes center stage of how viable candidates' bid for office is (chapter 8.1). Second, the amount of party support which candidates receive on the campaign trail merits attention (chapter 8.2).

8.1 Electoral Viability

Coming through the candidate selection does not guarantee a seat in parliament. The nominees' electoral fate is widely pre-shaped by the electoral viability of their nomination. By opening up the candidate selection to IO-candidates and sending them into electorally promising races, political parties can increase their presence in parliament. Assuming that the empirical results reveal that IO-candidates have lower electoral prospects than their native-born counterparts, a closure is indicated. In the case of neutrality, no marked difference in the electoral chances of IO- and native-born candidates would emerge. This chapter sets out to investigate the candidates' viability in SMDs before proceeding towards their electoral prospects on party lists.




Figure 8.1.1: Difference in the electoral viability of SMD nominations between native-born and IO-candidates.

Note: Fisher's exact test value is 0.09. The result is significant at $p \leq 0.1$. $N = 1.073$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To scrutinize the electoral viability of SMD nominations, a dichotomous variable is generated, taking on the value of 1 if the parties' nominal vote share was within 10 percentage points of the winner's vote share in the previous election or if the electoral district was won by the own political party, and 0 otherwise.³² Figure 8.1.1 compares the share of IO- and native-born candidates that are nominated in viable SMDs. As evident in the graph, the share of IO-candidates running for election in viable SMDs does not equal the share of native-born candidates. About 15.5 percent of the IO-candidates but 23.1 percent of the native-born candidates hold viable SMD nominations – the difference is statistically significant, as indicated by Fisher's exact test. There is evidence to suggest that a closure of the parties' candidate selection takes place as regards the allocation of viable electoral districts. However, at this point, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether the finding relates to the immigrant background or to other confounding factors behind the relationship, such as a lack of political experience.

To fathom the degree to which the immigrant origin has an independent effect on the probability of running in viable SMDs, binary logistic regression models are presented, in which I control for potential confounders. As logistic regression models are non-linear and employ maximum-likelihood estimation, their coefficients give no information about effect sizes. To obtain the effect size of the predictors and make them comparable, AMEs at observed values are provided (Hanmer/Kalkan 2013; Hosmer 2013; Long/Freese 2001; Verlinda 2006). The candidates of the FDP are discarded as none of them was running for election in a viable SMD as defined above. For the reasons discussed earlier, I control for socio-demographic background variables. What is more, incumbency (= 1) is incorporated into the statistical model. District winners generally re-run for election in the electoral district by which they entered parliament in the previous election (Reiser 2013: 134-135; Roberts 1988: 102-103; Steg 2016; Zeuner 1970). I also control for indicators of the candidates' political qualification to run for office, such as the length of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of political offices, experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1) and the number of organizational affiliations. Politically experienced and well-networked individuals that are highly engaged in party activities are believed to have a higher chance of running in promising and much sought-after electoral districts. They have a greater intra-party visibility, political experience and larger support networks, all of which are required to win the local contest for nomination. Building upon the insights provided by the previous chapter, political parties tend to nominate locally rooted candidates in viable electoral districts, as their local name recognition and personal linkages with the local constituency conduce to personal vote-seeking (Tavits 2010). Therefore, the local

³² To check the robustness of the reported results, the analysis was re-conducted with the vote margin to the district winner or the first loser and the estimates pointed in the same direction as in the analysis presented in what follows.

residence in the electoral district (= 1) is incorporated. Finally, election and party fixed effects enter the statistical model, accounting for the pooled character of the data set.




Figure 8.1.2:

Predictors of the electoral viability of SMD nominations.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.68 in the appendix. Grey dashed marker displays the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: viable (= 1), non-viable (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local resident in SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 799.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The results of the multivariate analysis, presented in figure 8.1.2, underpin my initial impression of the statistical relationship. By a gap of 6 percentage points, which is statistically significant at a 0.1 level, IO-candidates have a lower probability than native-born candidates of being placed in viable SMDs. In the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), the difference in probability is even 8 percentage points but fails statistical significance. This is to say that the immigrant origin deprives candidates at least somewhat of their chance of running in electorally viable SMDs. One explanation relates to the party variance underlying the found pattern. Those political parties with the best record in the descriptive representation of IO-citizens, which are BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE (Mediendienst Integration 2013a; Wüst 2011), only have few electorally viable SMD nominations at hand, but win most of their seats on the list tier.

Second, the empirical result corresponds to the expectation advanced in the literature on electoral system incentives, which was cited before (e.g. Kostadinova 2007; Matland 1993;

Matland/Taylor 1997; Norris 2004; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). According to this line of reasoning, political parties avoid fielding candidates from underrepresented groups in SMDs, but tend to nominate candidates who resemble the incumbent legislator. The latter are believed to lure a wider range of voter segments and encounter less opposition from local voters. Against this backdrop, political parties tend to let IO-candidates come forward as candidates in non-viable SMDs. In doing so, they can demonstrate that they are open to multiculturalism, but take no risk of losing votes crucial to their success or failure in the electoral district:

[...] the immigrant background [...] plays a minor role for political parties. But this changes once elections approach because then the voter comes into play. The party says, "This is our member. He/she is part of the whole and there is a solidarity." But the voter looks at it [the immigrant background] differently. [...] Voters do not know me and use other criteria to choose candidates. Voters have only parts of the information and one part is the name. This is a criterion for exclusion for some voters [...]. In SMDs, only one candidate runs for each political party and voters cannot switch to another candidate of the same political party (Interview 2).

In SMDs, each political party can send one candidate whose name is printed on the ballot paper into the electoral race. In low-information settings, in which voters only have few pieces of information about the contenders to be elected, the candidates' names are decisive information cues besides their party affiliation (Lupia 1994a, 1994b; Matson/Fine 2006; McDermott 1998). The electoral risk ascribed to IO-candidates is bigger than the one associated with native-born candidates. Their foreign sounding names are thought to act as a deterrent to voters who cannot imagine being represented by a legislator of immigrant background (see also Thrasher et al. 2015). In SMDs, voters cannot vote for alternative candidates of their favored political party, but must either abstain from voting or vote for a competing political party. Even if the voter effects illustrated above might be exaggerated, as IO-candidates usually run for political parties for which discriminating voters would not have voted anyway (Street 2014), the anticipation of a potential backlash prevents political parties from nominating IO-candidates in highly promising SMDs as they fear that their electoral success is at stake.

Beyond this relationship of main interest, some additional revealing observations are made. Incumbents are found to be 6 percentage points more likely to run for office in electorally viable SMDs than non-incumbents. Contenders who succeeded in winning the nominal race in the preceding election are usually re-selected in the same electoral district, which is evident in the empirical results. Moreover, the chance of standing for election in a winnable SMD improves with an increasing number of years spent in a party organization and more experience in political office. Being a longstanding and experienced party member pays off when it comes to the allocation of viable SMDs, in which only the most experienced party members are nominated. The reason is that amateurish election campaigns could seriously jeopardize the candidates' chance of election. Surprisingly, previous experience in party office has a negative effect on

the chance of running for election in viable SMDs, while experience in local-level office shows no effect at all. One explanation is that party and local-level office experience is not the most crucial factor in being allocated a viable SMD but in being nominated at all. Those candidates who are nominated despite having no experience in party office are rather exceptional cases that might be equipped with other assets, such as being local heroes. Furthermore, local residents are 5 percentage points more likely to run in viable SMDs than external candidates. Local anchorage is a pivotal vote-earning attribute in SMDs (Arzheimer/Evans 2014; Tavits 2010). In electorally viable SMDs, political parties are therefore less willing to nominate external candidates who could threaten their electoral success. Not surprisingly, candidates of the CDU/CSU are more likely to run in viably SMDs than those of the SPD, while the opposite holds true for BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE. The results reflect that the CDU and CSU are particularly successful in winning nominal races, whereas the latter win most of their seats in parliament via party lists. It is important to emphasize that only eleven IO-candidates were nominated in viable SMDs. Due to a low number of observations, no reliable estimates of the interaction effects can be provided. Therefore, it is opted to shift the focus onto party list nominations.




Figure 8.1.3: Difference in the list margin between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: Difference is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$ (t-test). $N = 1,244$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

In mixed-member electoral systems, promising ballot positions provide a second pathway to parliament. In closed party list settings, as given in the German Bundestag election, the Hessian and Saxon state elections, the party-determined list position determines the candidates' electoral fortune in far-reaching ways by pre-shaping the choices given to voters. But also in

preference voting systems, as employed in Bavaria, the initial ballot position which is party-determined crucially impacts the candidates' electoral prospects (Brockington 2003; Faas/Schoen 2006). Candidates seated low can hardly win enough preference votes to make it into parliament. The party-determined viability on party lists is therefore indicative of the effort political parties put into increasing the presence of IO-parliamentarians. To measure candidates' viability on party lists, their ballot positions in the recent election are subtracted from the last ballot position their political parties could win in the previous election. The higher the list margin, the higher the priority given to a specific contender in the list ranking.

The distribution of the candidates' list ranking is presented in figure 8.1.3. IO-candidates are found to have an average list margin of -10, whereas it is -12 among native-born candidates. The descriptive results unveil that most of the candidates run for election on ballot positions which have a large margin to the last won ballot position in the previous election. But there is evidence to suggest that IO-candidates rank somewhat higher on party lists than their native-born counterparts. However, the descriptive evidence only gives weak indications of an opening because the difference in the list margin between IO- and native-born candidates is small and achieves no statistical significance.

To step beyond descriptive analysis and take forward our knowledge of how the immigrant background affects the ballot positions of IO-candidates, I fit ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with robust standard errors due to heteroscedasticity. As previously, I control for socio-demographic background variables. In the allocation of the top list slots, political parties favor incumbents (= 1) over newcomers (Borchert/Reiser 2010; Kaack 1969a: 78; Reiser 2014: 59; Zeuner 1970). Incumbents – due to their great name recognition and political track record – can rely on an electoral advantage at the ballot box (e.g. Erikson 1971; Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Levitt/Wolfram 1997; Zaller 1998). By fielding incumbents on the top list positions, such as the first five that are highly visible to voters, political parties can attempt to boost their vote share. Since the effect is expected to be reinforced by the number of terms served in parliament, the number of previous terms spent in parliament is added (Burmeister 1993: 70-71). As political parties prospect for candidates with experience on the campaign trail, party selectorates might also reward the number of prior candidacies with a higher ballot position. Moreover, it is integral to parties' screening processes that newcomers must accept non-viable list positions and prove their willingness to serve party interests before being rewarded with more viable ballot positions (Reiser 2014: 59).

Furthermore, it is believed that the chance of being placed on a viable ballot position is increased by the degree of party involvement. To minimize the risk of nominating renegade and

unqualified contenders on viable list positions, aspiring candidates must prove themselves reliable and qualified by being party members for years, spending time and energy engaging with party activities and having experience in political office. In order to account for these confounders, the candidates' years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of prior political offices and the experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1) are included. Another variable that is likely to affect the electoral viability of party list nominations is the candidates' number of organizational affiliations. Well-networked candidates that are affiliated with various civil society organizations have a greater mobilization impact at the ballot box. Previous studies furthermore suggested that SMD candidates – most notably those in hopeless electoral districts – who ask for a list placement are listed on higher ballot positions to safeguard these candidates (Reiser 2014: 59; Zeuner 1970: 149). To control for the effect, a binary variable is created, taking on 1 if SMDs are non-viable, as defined at the outset of the present chapter, and 0 if they are viable or candidates only run on a party list. Finally, state and party fixed effects are introduced to take account of remaining idiosyncrasies in the pooled data set.




Figure 8.1.4:

Predictors of the list margin on party lists.

Note: The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.69 in the appendix. Grey dashed marker displays the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is metric. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1.173.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 8.1.4 reports the OLS regression coefficients of the variables that are assumed to predict candidates' list margin. All relevant variables being equal, the immigrant origin is associated with a higher list margin, indicating a weak preferential treatment. The difference to native-born candidates is 3.2 list positions and statistically significant at a 0.05 level.³³ While IO-candidates were found to be disadvantaged in the allocation of viable SMD nominations, political parties seem to treat them preferentially in the allocation of ballot positions. The result is also evident in the fact that more IO-legislators are elected into parliament via party lists (Wüst 2014a). The finding corresponds to the expectation put forward in the literature on electoral system incentives (e.g. Canon 1999; Darcy et al. 1994; Fortin-Rittberger/Eder 2013; Fortin-Rittberger/Rittberger 2014; Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Kostadinova 2007; Matland/Studlar 1996; Norris 2004; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). Compared to SMDs, party lists offer more flexible options for ticket-balancing. By including candidates from all relevant social groups, political parties attempt to attain a broad voter appeal and maximize their electoral support. To address IO-voters by signaling openness to them, political parties and most notably their state party leaderships attempt to place IO-candidates on visible and viable list positions. Some IO-candidates therefore considered their immigrant background helpful in running on a viable ballot position. It provides them with a unique selling point in the nomination proceedings:

I was placed on list slot x by the state party leadership. It was rather uncommon that a non-incumbent was proposed for this list slot at the very first election [...]. In the nomination proceedings, it played a role that a migrant is on the list because we must take care that we have a good mixture on the party list. That we have enough men, women, young persons, elderly, housewives, academics, workers, butchers. It is tried to have a good mixture on the party list which reflects the composition of the party members (Interview 7).

IO-candidates also stressed that meeting several sought-after traits at once, such as having an immigrant origin and being female, can turn into a boost in the party list ranking as a double quota is fulfilled. Political parties are under strong pressure to meet numerous representational claims on their party lists. For this very reason, candidates that meet several sought-after criteria at once are particularly welcome as more list slots for other group representatives remain.

Bearing in mind the positive effect of the immigrant background on the party list placement, we must look at the negative effect in SMDs in a different light. The earlier finding according to which IO-candidates are more likely to run in non-viable SMDs than native-born candidates might reflect a strategic calculus of the district party organizations, stemming from contamination effects across both electoral tiers. The nominating bodies in SMDs anticipate the selection

³³ As the list margin does not directly capture the electoral viability of list slots, the robustness of the findings was re-checked. To this end, a binary variable was generated, which takes on 1 (= viable) if the margin to the last won list position in the previous election was three positions or smaller or the list slot was won and 0 (= non-viable) otherwise. In doing so, the robustness of the results was confirmed.

logic prevailing on party lists – this is all the more valid if the electoral district cannot be directly won (Borchert/Reiser 2010; Zeuner 1970: 149). In non-viable SMDs, selectorates might be more eager to nominate IO-candidates, as they assume that IO-candidates will be allocated to higher list slots. This can guarantee the representation of the electoral district in parliament.

The compilation of party lists is a highly complex process of balancing different representational claims. It is in most cases pre-structured by the state party leadership,³⁴ by specific committees, such as a committee of eleven persons in the CDU Hesse,³⁵ or by sub-state party organizations, such as the *Bezirksverbände*³⁶ in the SPD. Except for gender quotas, the representational claims relate chiefly to informal rules that are not laid down in the party statutes (Reiser 2014). The first principle of representation refers to regional representation (Kaack 1969a: 158-159; Mintzel 1980; Zeuner 1970: 158-167). In large state party organizations, party list slots are first of all allocated to regions, either along the number of party members or the electoral strength of regional party organizations, to guarantee a fair regional representation in parliament and smooth intra-party conflicts out. At regional party conventions, each of the party branches select preliminary nominees for those list slots allotted to them. After the regional nominating conventions approved their party list proposals, the list proposals are merged. In most cases, however, the top list positions that are most visible to voters remain in the hands of the state party leadership. Usually, prominent politicians or candidates with specific policy profiles which highlight the party profile are slated for the top ballot positions. At the state nominating convention, the regional list proposals and the proposal submitted by the state party leadership are merged and need the approval of the responsible nominating body. It is important to mention, though, that the empirical variance in the nomination proceedings is exceedingly large. In other cases, the state list proposal is put to vote directly, either because a state committee or the state party leadership compiles the entire list proposal or because the list approval is a completely open process.

The contenders have the right to present themselves and their political positions to the nominating body. By secret ballot, it is then voted on each ballot position in a descending order.³⁷ However, anyone from the floor interested in a specific list slot can stand up, present him- or herself to the nominating assembly and face its ballot. Defeated applicants can still challenge contenders proposed for lower list positions. Although party lists are not in each and every case

³⁴ The statute of the SPD, for example, stipulates that the list ranking must be in accordance with the preferences of the state executive (SPD 2014a: § 12). The CDU Saxony stipulates that the state executive develops the proposal for the list ranking (CDU 2016b: § 26).

³⁵ Five persons are selected by the state party leadership and the six *Bezirksverbände* select one delegate each (CDU 2014: § 53).

³⁶ The SPD Hesse stipulates that the state executive submits a proposal to the delegate assembly which must be in accordance with the two *Bezirksverbände* North and South (SPD 2014b).

³⁷ With the consent of the party selectorate and the contenders, the lower list positions are usually balloted in blocks.

approved as proposed, crucial votes are rather rare. In the run-up to the candidate selection, it is tried to anticipate the range of relevant intra-party interests to guarantee an undisturbed selection process. In addition to regional quotas, higher ballot positions are allocated to incumbents and SMD candidates – especially to those placed in non-viable SMDs (Kaack 1969a; Reiser 2014; Zeuner 1970). Moreover, gender quotas (Davidson-Schmich 2016) and the representational claims of the sociological groups that have joint forces within party organizations, reflected in the ancillary organizations (Köllner/Basedau 2006; Trefs 2007), must be met:

You make a list for 130 persons but you have 6000 party members. The compilation of party lists is a very ungrateful work; you cannot satisfy everyone. If you nominate someone on slot ten, it is said, “Why not slot five?” (Interview 7).

In the face of a large number of representational claims that need to be met, the compilation of party lists is an intricate balancing process. The compilation of party lists is a matter of utmost importance. It helps mobilize the electoral support of a possibly wide range of voter segments, maintain the party unity and avoid crucial votes that would disturb the list ranking. At the same time, however, a limited number of list slots are only available, forcing political parties into giving priorities. Against this backdrop, the nomination of IO-candidates on higher list slots reveals strong endeavors of political parties to strengthen their ties with IO-citizens and signal openness to them.

The impetus for placing IO-candidates on higher list positions emanates chiefly from the state party leaderships. Usually, they define the strategic course state party organizations will pursue in the forthcoming election and keep an eye on the voter groups that are to be exploited (Detterbeck 2012). If they define IO-voters as relevant and immigration and integration as salient policy fields in which they intend to signal expertise and awareness, they can try to propose IO-candidates for viable ballot positions and motivate their candidate preference at the nominating convention by emphasizing the contenders' contribution to the strategic positioning of the party organization. To illustrate the strategic intention which stands behind the nomination of IO-candidates on viable ballot positions, some concrete examples are provided. In the 2013 state election in Hesse, one of the top list slots of the SPD – position five – was allocated to Corrado Di Benedetto with 268 votes in favor and 35 votes against. Di Benedetto was born in Italy and joined the SPD only in 2011. Nonetheless, the state party leadership proposed him for a viable list slot (Hartmann 2013). Through his engagement in the executive board of the Hessian Council of Foreigners, his networks and expertise in the immigration field, Di Benedetto was intended to highlight the party's focus on integration- and migration-related issues and to enrich the party's expertise in this policy field. In a related fashion, Ismail Tipi, born in Turkey and member of the CDU since 1999, was running on the non-viable list slot 67 in the 2009 state

election in Hesse. He failed to enter parliament but succeeded as a replacement candidate in the electoral district *Offenbach Land II* in 2010. In parliament, he developed a strong issue ownership on integration, migration and religious extremism. He became chairman of the CDU state committee on integration and migration, party spokesman on integration and joined the parliamentary committee on social affairs and integration. In the 2013 election, he suddenly moved up to list position ten. The state party leadership set out to field an IO-candidate with expertise in integration and religious extremism because these issues were deemed to be salient in the forthcoming election (Stang 2013). Moreover, the nomination of an IO-candidate on a visible ballot position was instrumental in getting rid of the public image of being hostile towards immigrants and multiculturalism. However, strategic endeavors to place IO-candidates on higher list slots are closely tied to moving other group representatives further down on party lists, which can create resentment:

I was surprised when I heard that I was proposed for the viable list slot x by the state party leadership [...]. It was a clear signal of how important the topic integration and migration is. It created some resentment. There were some persons who planned to challenge me. But they revoked their applications at the state party convention (Interview 3).

The example of Cemile Giousouf further illustrates the grievances caused by the strategic nomination of IO-candidates on viable list positions. In the run-up to the 2013 Bundestag election, Giousouf was proposed for the promising list slot 25 on the state party list in North Rhine-Westphalia although she had little office experience and joined the CDU only in 2009. The state party leadership of North Rhine-Westphalia supported her nomination as it strived after a strategic opening of the CDU for IO-citizens that make up a large proportion of the state population. But the fact that the state leadership has moved a representative of the Women Union further down on the party list in order to field a politically inexperienced IO-candidate on a viable list position provoked fierce criticism from the Women Union (Frigelj 2013c; Hüwel/Stenzel 2013). At the state nominating convention, Giousouf therefore faced a challenger from the Women Union (Frigelj 2013a). After the state party chairman had made a plea at the state nominating convention in which he stressed the strategic importance of Giousouf's nomination, she won 66.3 percent of the delegate votes (Hüwel 2013). Against this backdrop, IO-candidates' higher list margin is all the more striking and indicates endeavors to nominate IO-candidates on higher ballot positions despite potential intra-party conflicts that result from a preferential treatment.

When turning to the control variables in figure 8.1.4, it is noticed that male candidates have a negative predicted list margin as compared to female nominees – the difference is 3.5 list positions and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The result is consistent with Hennl and Kaisers' findings (2008a, 2008b), who show that party selectorates use party lists for meeting

the imposed gender quotas. Interestingly, high educational attainment goes hand in hand with a higher list margin. With each unit increase in education, candidates climb up the party lists by 1.10 list positions – the effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The outcome might be explained by the skills coming along with higher education. Highly educated candidates might be more eloquent, making them attractive candidates to woo voters, and they might perform better at the nominating conventions, yielding them higher list positions. Incumbency does not emerge as a salient predictor of a higher placement on party lists as its effect is widely absorbed by the number of terms spent in parliament. With each term served in parliament, the list margin increases by 3.5 list slots, the effect being statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Furthermore, each previous candidacy increases the list margin by 1.5 list slots. Apparently, it is integral to parties' screening processes that newcomers must accept lower list positions to prove their commitment to party interests before they are rewarded with higher ballot positions.

Not surprisingly, the list margin is also increased by the amount of time devoted to party activities and the number of political offices held. Those contenders extensively engaging in party activities have a greater name recognition within the own party organization, larger party alliances and they mastered the probation in previous office, making them viable aspirants. Moreover, candidates who run for election in hopeless SMDs are found to run on higher ballot positions than dual candidates with viable SMD nominations or candidates only placed on party lists. The gap is 6.9 list slots and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. On the one hand, the priority rule for non-viable SMD candidates guarantees the representation of the electoral districts in parliament, so that even those districts are represented which cannot be directly won. On the other, it creates incentives to enter nominal races even if these are in vain. Candidates' local presence in the electoral districts and their campaign activities at the grassroots level can crucially boost parties' PR vote share (Ferrara/Herron 2005; Ferrara et al. 2005; Manow 2011). The priority rule can therefore induce candidates to bear the burden of nomination in hopeless districts and run motivated election campaigns. The more the principle is pronounced, the more influence district party organizations exert on the party list ranking at the state level.




Figure 8.1.5:

Difference in the list margin between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is metric. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1.173.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To set up a more sensitive regression model that inspects in greater detail on which conditions IO-candidates run on higher ballot positions than native-born candidates, interactions between the immigrant origin and each control variable are incorporated, everything else being equal. As evident in figure 8.1.5, IO-candidates are more likely to run on higher list positions than native-born candidates despite a lack of political experience. If, for example, focusing on party newcomers and candidates without experience in local-level or party office, IO-candidates have a higher list margin than native-born candidates with equal qualifications, being a clear indication of a preferential treatment. As regards incumbency, the amount of party activity and the number of organizational affiliations, the gap in the list margin even widens with more of these political qualifications. In the case of other factors, such as the number of previous political offices, experience in local-level and party office, nearly no effect changes are observed. With regard to the number of prior candidacies and the years of party membership, the list margin of both candidate groups converges as native-born candidates move up on party lists with increasing political experience and then achieve a similar list margin as IO-candidates.

Overall, the effect plots confirm that IO-candidates are treated preferentially in the allocation of ballot positions, even if lacking political experience. They can skip parts of the probation period within political parties to run on higher ballot positions. The reason is that political parties use their nominations as strategic means of expressing their openness to IO-citizens and a recognition of multiculturalism as an integral part of the society they represent. Because the candidate tableau reflects what a party stands for (Katz 2001: 278), the nomination of IO-candidates can influence the party's face in the public as regards its stance on cultural diversity and the degree to which specific constituencies, such as IO-voters, feel affiliated with a party.




Figure 8.1.6:

Difference in the list margin between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in table A.70 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is metric. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

After finding that, on average, IO-candidates run on higher ballot positions than native-born candidates, it is scrutinized whether the effect hinges on the fact to which immigrant subgroup a candidate belongs. Instead of employing a lumping category for IO-candidates, I set up more sensitive regression models which make allowance for different subsets of IO-candidates. Placing IO-candidates that stand out from the majority population in cultural or religious terms, such as Muslims or IO-candidates from non-European countries, on higher and more visible

ballot positions, sends a more striking message to the public that political parties are open to IO-citizens and to multiculturalism more generally.

As visualized in figure 8.1.6, Muslim candidates and candidates from Muslim countries run on higher ballot positions than native-born candidates with a list margin of 7.6 (p-value = 0.04) and 5.7 (p-value = 0.04). Among IO-candidates from European countries, it is 3.0 (p-value = 0.14), among those of Christian denomination, it is 1.7 (p-value = 0.49) and among those from non-European countries, it is 3.0 (p-value = 0.14). Political parties appear to treat all IO-candidates preferentially in the allocation of ballot positions, but the relationship is much more pronounced if Muslim candidates and IO-candidates from Muslim countries are concerned. For one, by the viable placement of IO-candidates who differ markedly from the majority population, political parties can commit themselves to paying attention to the political representation of IO-citizens, giving them equal political opportunities and acknowledging the cultural diversity of the population that is to be represented. For two, the social and political integration of Muslims is considered particularly difficult in the public eye. Their denomination which deviates from the one of the majority population, differences in cultural values and a growing islamophobia (Esposito/Kalin 2011; Ford 2011; Green 2015; Helbling 2012) give rise to a social and political marginalization of Muslims. Placing IO-candidates of Muslim background on higher list positions therefore equals a political commitment to incorporating Muslims more strongly into the political decision-making process and acknowledging their belonging to the German society.




Figure 8.1.7:

Difference in the list margin between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.71 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is metric. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1.173.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Which other factors might be at work producing variances in the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates? One assumption of high currency in the literature is that center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more likely to support IO-candidates' viable placement on party lists than political parties further on the right of the political spectrum, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP (e.g. Kittilson/Tate 2005; Koopmans/Statham 2000a; Saggar 2000). In order to tease out underlying party dynamics, interactions between the immigrant origin and candidates' party affiliation are estimated and their results displayed in figure 8.1.7, all other variables being equal.

On a closer inspection, the strongest differences in the list margin between IO- and native-born candidates become evident in the SPD and CDU/CSU. In the SPD, IO-candidates run 4.6 positions higher on party lists than native-born candidates. The effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. In the CDU/CSU, the effect is 4.9 list slots but fails statistical significance (p-value = 0.36). By contrast, no strong differences between IO- and native-born candidates emerge in the FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, giving support to neutrality. Bringing together the results, the initial assumption that center-left parties are more inclined to place IO-candidates on promising ballot positions is rejected. In fact, SPD and CDU/CSU

treat IO-candidates preferentially in the allocation of list slots to establish or intensify representational ties with IO-voters, or, in the case of the CDU/CSU, to get rid of the image of being hostile towards multiculturalism. The major reason why no effect of the immigrant background is found in the FDP relates to the party's liberal ideology, opposing any measures of affirmative action. In the case of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, the explanation lies in the party's supply pool. In party comparison, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN performs best as regards the descriptive representation of IO-citizens (Mediendienst Integration 2013a; Wüst 2011, 2014a). Consequently, this party comes under lower pressure to place IO-candidates on higher list positions to counteract their underrepresentation in the own ranks of legislators. In the interviews, IO-candidates of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN indeed stated that a full integration of IO-citizens into the party organization has taken place. This is why a preferential treatment and special networks, such as *ImmiGrün*, are considered widely dispensable by now.




Figure 8.1.8:

Difference in the list margin between native-born and IO-candidates across the type of party selectorate.

Note: The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in table A.72 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is metric. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N = 511.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

The selection of parliamentary candidates falls to parties' nominating bodies (Atmor et al. 2011; Hazan/Rahat 2006b; Rahat 2007). As posited by Hazan und Rahat (2006b: 372), more inclusive party selectorates are less successful in balancing the composition of party lists, because they tend to nominate candidates from the dominant social groups (see also Rahat et al.

2008). Based on this argument, I expect that an opening of the parties' candidate selection for IO-candidates is more likely if delegate assemblies are involved in place of party member assemblies. To inspect how the party selectorate type shapes the list margin with which IO-candidates compete for a seat in parliament, interactions between the immigrant background and the responsible party selectorate type are incorporated into the statistical model while keeping the control variables constant.

Figure 8.1.8 visualizes the effect of the immigrant background on the list margin for either type of party selectorate. Both party delegates and party member assemblies appear to place IO-candidates on more viable list positions compared to their native-born peers. However, in support of my expectation, the list margin is markedly larger if the candidate selection is incumbent on delegates. With regard to delegate assemblies, the list margin is 5.9 and statistically significant at a 0.05 level, whereas it is only 2.4 in the case of party member assemblies and statistically insignificant (p -value = 0.60). Note, however, that the number of list candidates selected by party member assemblies is much smaller than the number of contenders picked by delegate assemblies, which is why a larger confidence interval is yielded.

The results demonstrate that IO-candidates' likelihood of being placed as viable nominees relates to the type of party selectorate. A first explanation for the markedly positive effect of delegate assemblies is that these act more deliberately than party member assemblies. They tend to come to their decisions in the run-up to the nominating conventions, whereas party member assemblies reach their decisions more spontaneously and in a more fickle manner, depending on the applicants' performance at the nominating conventions (Reiser 2011: 247). Party delegates are mandated by the membership of the district party organizations. Against this backdrop, they may define their roles more as strategic decision makers that must compile balanced party lists to woo the maximum number of possible voters and preserve the party unity. Party member assemblies, by contrast, are less open to strategic arguments of ticket-balancing:

I think, it [the immigrant background] was a label which was a decisive factor for a great many [...]. For some, it became easier to nominate me. Those who select strategically. But at party member assemblies, you cannot manipulate 600, 700 persons and implement strategic thinking. You must win the selectorate over with your political performance (Interview 5).

Second, the main impetus for ticket-balancing emanates from higher party ranks, such as state party leaderships that bear responsibility for the strategic positioning of the party organizations in the forthcoming election and keep an eye on recent developments of the electoral market. For them, it is easier to place IO-candidates on viable ballot positions if delegate assemblies are tasked with the candidate selection. For one, delegate assemblies are smaller than party member assemblies and the names of the mandated delegates are announced in advance, which makes it easier for state party leaderships to approach them and recommend aspiring IO-

candidates. And what is more, delegate assemblies are more poised to follow the recommendations of higher party ranks as they consider them necessary for an optimal positioning of the party organization in the upcoming election (Zeuner 1970: 56).³⁸

8.2 Election Campaign Activities

Election campaigns are the very last opportunity for parliamentary candidates to improve their electoral prospects. From an organizational angle, both financial and personnel party support are indispensable in conducting committed election campaigns. Since no fixed allocation formulas exist which stipulate who gets what in the distribution of financial and personnel campaign resources, political parties have some leeway in this regard. An opening is indicated if IO-candidates are equipped with larger campaign teams and get more campaign funding from their party organizations than native-born contenders. In the case of closure, by contrast, political parties would hesitate about providing IO-candidates with the same amount of campaign support as native-born nominees. Supposing that political parties behave neutrally, they would endow IO-candidates with campaign resources that are widely similar to the ones granted to native-born candidates. Which pattern emerges in the data at hand will be clarified hereinafter.




Figure 8.2.1: Difference in the mean share of party funding in the campaign expenses between native-born and IO-candidates.

Note: Difference is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$ (t-test). $N = 1.141$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

³⁸ No plausible argument suggests that a relationship between the district magnitude of MMDs and the list margin of IO-candidates exists. This conditioning factor is therefore discarded.

The candidates' election campaigns can be funded by three sources: party funding, private funding and donations. But as the focus of the dissertation is on party support, the share of party funding in the candidates' campaign expenses takes center stage in the present chapter. By comparing percentages, I take account of systematic differences in the financial means available to party organizations. Figure 8.2.1 displays the difference between IO- and native-born candidates in the mean share of party funding in the candidates' campaign expenses. In the campaign expenses spent by native-born candidates, party funding makes up 50 percent, while it is 51 percent among IO-candidates – the difference is small and statistically insignificant. The descriptive results point to a widely neutral treatment of IO-candidates as far as party funding is concerned. The high share of party funding in the candidates' campaign expenses stresses the importance of political parties in sponsoring election campaigns. Alternative financial sources, such as donations or private funding, play a minor role.




Figure 8.2.2: Difference in the mean size of campaign teams between native-born and IO-candidates.
Note: The difference is not significant at $p \leq 0.1$ (t-test). $N = 1.474$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

To gauge the personnel dimension of campaign support provided by political parties, the number of persons in candidates' personal campaign teams is inspected.³⁹ The number of volunteers engaging in a candidate's personal campaign team is an indicator of the intra-party support a candidate enjoys. Without the minimum support of the grassroots party members, donating their time and energy to campaign activities and doing the donkey work by delivering leaflets, putting up posters, organizing events and canvassing voters, candidates are incapable

³⁹ Three observation with campaign teams of far more than 100 persons were excluded as they were strong outliers.

of running effective election campaigns (Webb et al. 2017). As set out in figure 8.2.2, IO-candidates are supported by 8.1 volunteers on average, while it is 7.2 for native-born candidates. The difference of 0.9 fails statistical significance but suggests that IO-candidates are backed by marginally larger campaign teams than native-born contenders. The descriptive result points to a weak preferential treatment of IO-candidates when it comes to the degree of personnel campaign support. But the question of whether this results from the immigrant background or is due to other underlying factors calls for a multivariate framework.

To unravel the effect of the immigrant origin on the amount of campaign support provided by political parties, I will fit multivariate regression models which incorporate other relevant variables that might stand behind the relationship. As the share of party funding, which is indicative of the financial dimension of party support, is bounded between 0 and 1, I follow the advice of the econometric literature and employ fractional logit models. As proposed by Papke and Wooldrid (1996), I compute generalized linear models with a binomial distribution, a logit-link function, and robust standard errors (see also Baum 2008). The logit link ensures that the model predictions range between 0 and 1. In contrast to logit transformations, which would be an alternative approach, a loss of observations coded with 0 is avoided. As to the number of canvassers in the candidates' personal campaign teams, zero-inflated negative binomial regression models are run; the dependent variable is non-negative and integer-valued (Greene 1994; Yau et al. 2003; Zuur et al. 2009). Poisson regression models turned out to be inadequate for the data at hand because the variance of the response variable is larger than its mean and the number of zeros is excessive. The years of party membership and the electoral viability of nominations are defined as inflation components of the fitted models. To capture the predictors' effect sizes, which intrigue me the most, AMEs at observed values are reported while the regression coefficients are provided in the appendix.

To capture the effect of the immigrant background on the party support for launching election campaigns, I control for a couple of confounders. For the reasons given earlier, socio-demographic background variables are included. Moreover, incumbents (= 1) are expected to receive more campaign support from their political parties than applies to other candidates. Incumbents' re-election is prioritized as they are already familiar with the working processes of parliament and can continue their legislative work straightaway. In addition, incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage at the ballot box (e.g. Erikson 1971; Gelman/King 1990; Hainmueller/Lutz Kern 2008; Hainmueller et al. 2006; Lee 2001) on which political parties can capitalize by supporting incumbents' election campaigns and increasing their visibility to voters. The effect is expected to be amplified by an increasing number of terms served in parliament. Furthermore, I control for candidates' previous political experience, recorded by their

number of prior candidacies, the years of party membership, the party activity rate, the number of prior political offices, experience in local-level (= 1) and party office (= 1). The reason being that candidates with a long and extensive history of activities within and on behalf of their party organizations are most likely to be rewarded with campaign support.

It is also controlled for the candidates' number of organizational affiliations. Precisely because political parties hope to tap more electoral support through the candidates' organizational ties (Poguntke 2005b, 2006), well-networked candidates are assumed to receive more campaign support. However, also the reverse might be true. Well-networked candidates receive more donations and personnel campaign support from social organizations, and, therefore, are less dependent on party support. Scholars in the field of individualization furthermore suggested that candidates competing for office on party lists face fewer incentives to wage individualized election campaigns than those nominated in SMDs. The former do not strive for personal but for party votes (e.g. Gschwend/Zittel 2014; Zittel/Gschwend 2008). Therefore, I account for the candidates' mode of candidacy. Moreover, electorally viable candidates (= 1) are expected to receive more campaign support from their party organizations than those competing in hopeless races, as there is little to win for the latter. To control for the electoral viability of nominations, a binary variable is generated, taking on 1 if candidates run in viable SMDs, as measured in chapter 8.1, or if their list margin to the last won list position in the previous election is -3 or higher and 0 otherwise. Election and party fixed effects account for the pooled character of the data set.




Figure 8.2.3:

Predictors of party support in election campaigning.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on fractional logit regression models and zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.73 and A.74 in the appendix. Grey dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding of the party funding is a share. Dependent variable coding of the size of campaign teams is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N for party funding = 1.072; N for size of campaign team = 1.375.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Figure 8.2.3 visualizes the AMEs at observed values for each predictor introduced above. Evidently, the immigrant background exerts no notable effect on the predicted share of party funding, as displayed in the upper panel. The effect size is markedly small and statistically not different from zero. Even in the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), no statistically significant effect of the immigrant background is observed. Thus, the multivariate analysis confirms the descriptive result which pointed to neutrality. In fact, party organizations neither provide IO-candidates with extraordinary financial resources nor do they discriminate against IO-candidates by providing them with less financial means. Instead, a neutral treatment of IO-candidates in comparison to their native-born counterparts is revealed. When turning attention to the degree of personnel campaign support, displayed in the lower panel of figure 8.2.3, the immigrant background is found to have no impact on the predicted size of the personal campaign team. Apparently, the weak difference I hit upon in the descriptive analysis was not due to the

immigrant background but was caused by other confounding factors that are now netted out. Even in the bivariate model (grey dashed estimate), no statistically significant effect of the immigrant background arises. Overall, the results of the multivariate analysis clearly speak in favor of a neutral party behavior towards IO-candidates as far as the allocation of financial and personnel campaign resources is concerned.

Beyond the relationship between the immigrant background and campaign support which, in the light of the research question, intrigues me most, candidates are found to receive less financial support from their party organizations once their number of legislative terms spent in parliament increases. With each term, the predicted share of party funding declines by 3 percentage points. Candidates who have served previous terms in office have a higher public visibility and larger networks that provide them with campaign support from alternative sources, such as donations. Conversely, each prior candidacy increases the share of party funding by 3 percentage points. The result fits the earlier finding that candidates climb up on party lists with each candidacy, which also yields them more party funding to launch election campaigns. What is more, those candidates placed on party lists receive less party funding than holds true for SMD candidates – the difference is 18 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. In SMDs, candidates seek personal votes by candidate-centered election campaigns (e.g. Gschwend/Zittel 2014; Zittel/Gschwend 2008). Therefore, they heavily depend on financial party resources. Election campaigns at the grassroots level with local faces canvassing for votes are not only conducive to pulling nominal votes but also to boosting the party vote share (Ferrara/Herron 2005; Ferrara et al. 2005; Manow 2011). For this reason, they take high priority in the party funding.

Surprisingly, candidates with electorally viable nominations are equipped with less party funding than non-viable candidates – the gap is 9 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. On the one hand, viable candidates obtain more external sponsoring from social organizations and private donators that hope to maximize their political influence on the legislative decision-making process. On the other hand, viable candidates are more willing to invest private money in their election campaigns as pay and perks beckon for them. Compared to candidates competing for a seat in the German Bundestag, nominees in Hesse and Saxony have a lower predicted share of party funding, whereas Bavarian candidates seem to obtain higher percentages of party funding. In Bavaria, candidates are obliged to run for election on party lists (Eder/Magin 2008; Massicotte 2003; Trefs 2008). This leads to a more party-centered configuration of the electoral system, also reflected in the financial sources of election campaigns. Party funding is less pronounced in the CDU/CSU and FDP compared with the SPD, which is

in line with earlier findings (Wüst et al. 2006: 426). With regard to the FDP, the finding corresponds to the party's emphasis on individual responsibility. Candidates of the CDU/CSU, by contrast, can access more alternative financial sources due to their high electoral prospects. In BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, on the contrary, candidates' election campaigns are subsidized to a greater extent by the own political party.

When giving the size of the personal campaign team a glance, displayed in the lower panel of figure 8.2.3, a higher amount of party activity and a higher number of prior political offices are found to be conducive to the number of party volunteers supporting candidates' election campaigns. Candidates who greatly engage in party activities have larger support networks within the own party organization, which helps mobilize grassroots party members. What is more, the size of the personal campaign team is positively associated with the number of organizational affiliations. Through the candidates' organizational ties, members of social organizations can be mobilized as canvassers. Consistently with the previous results, party list candidates are equipped with smaller campaign teams compared to SMD candidates. As argued above, SMD candidates seek personal votes by candidate-centered election campaigns, and, therefore, depend more heavily on personal campaign teams than holds true for party list candidates who run for election under the party label (e.g. Gschwend/Zittel 2014; Zittel/Gschwend 2008).

Not surprisingly, electorally viable candidates are backed by larger campaign teams than contenders in unpromising electoral races, because it is about winning or losing. Compared to the Bundestag candidates, Saxon nominees are equipped with smaller campaign teams by a difference of 1.7 persons. In the other state elections, by contrast, no significant difference to the Bundestag candidates emerges. As party organizations in Saxony have a smaller membership (Niedermayer 2016), the challenge of finding canvassers that embark on the campaign trail is apparently bigger than in the other elections. Lastly, candidates of the FDP and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN are backed by smaller campaign teams than applies to SPD candidates, while no significant difference between the SPD and CDU/CSU becomes evident. The findings show that the smaller political parties are lacking in the personnel resources to back their candidates to an equal degree as the large party organizations.

As reported in the interviews, candidates are obliged to find canvassers willing to support their campaign activities by themselves. Within party organizations, no formal procedures are stipulated that allocate volunteers to candidates, but it is the candidates' responsibility to compile campaign teams. The party youth organizations and the grassroots party members of the district party organizations form the most important recruitment pools to find canvassers. The campaign teams plan the candidates' campaign activities and put them into practice, such as

distributing leaflets, organizing panel discussions, information stands or visits to social organizations. Due to the exhausting and tiring phase of election campaigning, the compilation of the campaign team is one of the most crucial tasks candidates must perform in the run-up to the election. Tensions within the campaigns teams could harm the candidates' electoral success. In line with the quantitative findings, no IO-candidate felt disadvantaged in the financial and personnel campaign support provided by their party organizations. Since the compilation of the campaign teams falls to the candidates themselves, they felt entirely responsible for the amount of personnel campaign support they received. Being deeply anchored in the own district party organization and having numerous intra-party contacts are most helpful in finding canvassers. For party newcomers of immigrant background, this is a big challenge. One IO-candidate being a party newcomer therefore attended party events with the primary aim of finding canvassers for the own campaign team:

When I learned that I would stand for election, I prospected for party members who could work in my campaign team. I attended many [party] events, participated in political tours to Berlin, Brussels where you meet people. And I asked the party leadership of my district party organization who is recommended (Interview 3).

IO-candidates being members of the ancillary organizations on migration and integration often receive financial and personnel campaign support from these. Even though these intra-party organizations were found to be of minor importance in being nominated, they seem to be relevant to the IO-candidates' election campaigns, but only if they come with a financial budget:

The network provided support for my election campaign. It has a budget to pay for some material [for election campaigning] (Interview 4).




Figure 8.2.4: Difference in the share of party funding in the campaign expenses between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on fractional logit regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a share. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. $N = 1.072$.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Even though the previous analysis suggested that political parties behave widely neutrally towards IO-candidates, I opted to set up more sensitive regression models that incorporate the conditioning effects of the control variables. While holding everything else constant, interaction terms between the immigrant origin and each control variable are computed. In the face of lacking gaps to the zero lines in all effect plots of figure 8.2.4 and virtually absent effect changes, the finding of a neutral party behavior is further underpinned and what is more, it is not related to IO-candidates' political experience. This is to say that political parties treat IO-candidates equally to native-born candidates when it comes to the allocation of financial resources for their campaign activities and this happens to be independent of the fact how long and how intensively IO-candidates engage in party activities.




Figure 8.2.5: Difference in the size of campaign teams between native-born and IO-candidates across control variables. *Note:* The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. The vertical lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1.375. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

When the same approach is adopted to the size of the personal campaign team, displayed in figure 8.2.5, the lacking gaps to the zero lines further support a widely neutral party behavior towards IO-candidates. Even though some shifts in the marginal effects are witnessed, for instance with regard to the number of prior candidacies, suggesting that IO-candidates are backed by larger campaign teams than native-born candidates if having stood for election more than twice, the marginal effects remain statistically insignificant throughout. The graphed estimates confirm the previous result which showed that IO-candidates are treated neutrally in comparison to their native-born colleagues, regardless of their political experience. As suggested by the qualitative interviews, the compilation of campaign teams is the candidates' sole responsibility. On this score, IO-candidates are running neither into bigger nor into smaller difficulties in finding canvassers than any other candidate.




Figure 8.2.6: Difference in the party support in election campaigning between native-born and IO-candidates across immigrant subgroups.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on fractional logit regression models and zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.75 and A.76 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding of the party funding is a share. Dependent variable coding of the size of campaign teams is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

The preceding statistical models ignored the internal heterogeneity of IO-candidates but built a lumping category. Previous research indicated that the nomination of IO-candidates can be a way to woo IO-voters (e.g. Barreto 2007; Bergh/Bjørklund 2011; Bobo/Gilliam 1990; Tate 2003). In cultural and religious terms, some immigrant groups, such as Muslims or those coming from non-European countries, stand out more clearly from the majority population than others (Czymara/Schmidt-Catran 2016; Fietkau 2016; Ford 2011). With the nomination of such IO-candidates, political parties intend to signal to voters that they are open to multiculturalism and appreciate the cultural diversity of the population. IO-candidates from more distinct immigrant groups might therefore produce bigger mobilization effects at the ballot. By supporting such IO-candidates in their campaign activities, political parties can try to capitalize on their larger mobilization effects.

Figure 8.2.6 displays the AMEs for different subsets of IO-candidates, based on the initial regression models. Turning to the share of party funding in the candidates' campaign expenses,

no statistically significant effect of the immigrant background is observed in any of the included immigrant subgroups. IO-candidates obtain a similar share of party funding as native-born candidates, irrespective of the immigrant subgroup they belong to. The second indicator of party support for election campaigning, which is the size of the personal campaign team, points to a comparable pattern. Even though the estimates for Muslim candidates, candidates from non-European and Muslim countries point in a positive direction, indicating that they are backed by somewhat larger campaign teams than native-born candidates, the marginal effects fail statistical significance throughout, and, therefore, must be taken with a grain of salt. Due to statistical uncertainty, I tentatively conclude that the pattern of neutrality applies to all immigrant subgroups under inspection. This is not implausible for the simple reason that political parties take a strong interest in supporting all contenders in their campaign activities in order to pull votes.




Figure 8.2.7:

Difference in the party support in election campaigning between native-born and IO-candidates across political parties.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on fractional logit regression models and zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.77 and A.78 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding of the party funding is a share. Dependent variable coding of the size of campaign teams is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N for party funding = 1.072; N for size of campaign team = 1.375.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, should provide IO-candidates with more campaign support than political parties that are to be found more on the right of the political spectrum, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP. Center-left parties attract more electoral support from voter groups of immigrant background (Kroh/Tucci 2009; Wüst 2000, 2002). Therefore, they suffer more painful electoral losses when failing to appeal to IO-voters than political parties that are situated more on the right of the political spectrum. By supporting IO-candidates more strongly in their election campaigns, center-left parties can increase IO-candidates' visibility so as to achieve stronger mobilization effects among IO-voters. In doing so, center-left political parties can furthermore highlight their openness to multiculturalism and their inclusionary political stance, going down well with the own leftist voters. To shed more light on potential party variances, figure 8.2.7 reports how the effect of the immigrant origin on the predicted amount of financial and personnel campaign support varies across political parties. The AMEs are based on interaction terms between the immigrant background and candidates' party affiliation while keeping the control variables constant.

By a visual inspection, no statistically significant effects of the immigrant background on the financial campaign support provided by political parties are found in any political party under examination. Although the estimates suggest that IO-candidates receive somewhat more party funding than native-born candidates when being listed on the ballot paper of the CDU/CSU and FDP, the yielded confidence intervals are markedly large and the marginal effects statistically not different from zero. When turning to the size of personal campaign teams, virtually the same pattern is evident. Despite a lack of statistical significance and large confidence intervals, it is noticed that the CDU/CSU and FDP provide IO-candidates with somewhat more financial and personnel campaign support than holds true for the center-left parties.

This can be interpreted as saying that the CDU/CSU and FDP lag behind the other political parties as respects the number of IO-candidates (Mediendienst Integration 2013a; Wüst 2011; Wüst/Saalfeld 2011). To ensure that IO-voters are addressed even though a low number of IO-candidates are listed on the ballot paper, these political parties might be somewhat more eager to support IO-candidates in their campaign activities to increase their visibility on the campaign trail. The CDU in particular is under pressure to shake off its image of being critical of multiculturalism and refusing to acknowledge the cultural diversity of the population. Overall, however, the large confidence intervals suggest that no strong differences between IO- and native-born candidates are present. This leads me to conclude that if political parties have decided to nominate IO-candidates for election, they have incentives to support their campaign activities to pull votes. For this particular reason, no strong difference between IO- and native-born candidates becomes evident, regardless of the political party to which they are affiliated.




Figure 8.2.8: Difference in the party support in election campaigning between native-born and IO-candidates across the mode of candidacy.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on fractional logit regression models and zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in table A.79 and A.80 in the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding of the party funding is a share. Dependent variable coding of the size of campaign teams is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD nomination. N for party funding = 1.072; N for size of campaign team = 1.375.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Up to this point, I ignored the institutional setting which might impact the amount of campaign support provided for IO-candidates. The abundance of studies on electoral system effects claimed that political parties are eager to nominate candidates from underrepresented groups on party lists which follow a ticket-balancing logic, whereas in SMDs, they have a bias towards candidates who resemble the average native-born voter (e.g. Matland 1993; Matland/Taylor 1997; Norris 2004; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994; Welch/Studlar 1990). Along these lines of reasoning which I adopt to election campaigns, political parties should be more hesitant about providing IO-candidates with campaign support if nominal races in SMDs are concerned. In doing so, political parties can downplay their otherness to arouse minimal opposition from local constituents. On party lists, in contrast, they should support IO-candidates more strongly in their campaign activities to highlight the diversity of their candidate tableaux and lure IO-voters. To put the conditioning effect of the mode of candidacy to the proof, AMEs are presented in figure 8.2.8 that are based on interaction terms between the immigrant background and the mode of candidacy.

The AMEs reveal that the immigrant background does not affect the financial and personnel campaign support in a statistically significant way, regardless of the mode of candidacy. But even though the marginal effects fail statistical significance, the estimates point in the expected direction. In accordance with the presumptions, IO-candidates are predicted to receive less party funding for their campaign activities and fewer personnel campaign resources than native-born candidates when standing for election in SMDs, whereas an opposite pattern arises on party lists. For dual candidacies, in turn, no strong difference between both candidate groups is suggested. One could surmise that the pattern relates to the fact that IO-candidates are more likely to enter non-viable nominal races (see chapter 8.1) in which election campaigning is less prioritized by political parties.




Figure 8.2.9:

Difference in the share of party funding in the campaign expenses between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level fractional logit regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.81 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a share. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 866.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

As no plausible argument suggests a relationship between the party selectorate type and the district magnitude of MMDs on the one hand, and the amount of campaign support on the other,

I attend to an investigation of the SMD context factors. Against the conventional wisdom which regards SMDs as being detrimental to minority representation, political parties were argued to face strong electoral incentives to nominate IO-candidates if SMDs have a large IO-population (e.g. Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstone/Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). Yet, political parties not only face incentives to nominate IO-candidates but to support their election campaigns so as to attract electoral support from IO-voters. Fielding IO-candidates in SMDs with a large IO-population is a tactic to appeal to IO-voters. Therefore, political parties having nominated IO-candidates in SMDs with a large IO-population should campaign especially hard for votes from IO-voters to capitalize on this electoral advantage. To gauge how the size of the local IO-population affects the predicted share of party funding which IO-candidates receive in comparison to native-born candidates, an interaction term between the immigrant background and the local proportion of foreigners in SMDs is incorporated while keeping the control variables and the other relevant SMD context factors constant. In the face of a hierarchical structure of the data, a two-level fractional logit regression model is run in which intercepts are allowed to vary across SMDs. A random slope for the immigrant variable is discarded because of its markedly low variance across SMDs. All estimations presented in figure 8.2.9 are predicated on this modelling strategy.

As visualized in the first panel of figure 8.2.9, in which the AME of the immigrant background is plotted against the foreigner share in SMDs, IO-candidates are predicted to receive somewhat less party funding than their native-born peers, indicating a weak closure in SMDs. But the marginal effect does not change across different levels of ethnic concentration. Different from the expectation put forward above, political parties do not provide extraordinary party funding for IO-candidates who run for election in culturally diverse SMDs. But even though the local ethnic concentration is not relevant to their amount of party funding, IO-candidates tailor their campaign activities to IO-voters if these are in the majority in SMDs to pull votes in these voter segments:

Because many Turkish-origin citizens live in my district, I prepared a leaflet in Turkish, I have visited Turkish organizations and so forth (Interview 5).

My election posters were systematically placed [...]. They were placed in areas where many citizens of immigrant background live (Interview 6).

Other IO-candidates, however, carefully avoid focusing on IO-voters in their election campaigns as they feel as though they are perceived as representatives of IO-citizens anyway. Gearring election campaigns only towards IO-voters is believed to put off native-born voters who feel voiceless and not adequately represented:

It was important for me to make clear to persons who didn't know me and thought, "This candidate works only on integration topics!", that the well-being of all persons in my electoral district was important to me and not only of IO-citizens. This would have been deadly in the election (Interview 3).

I did not emphasize migration and integration topics. I learned from other candidates that voters then asked, "Is there somebody who represents our interests and not only migrants' interests?" (Interview 4).

To the extent that constituents in SMDs are socially deprived and harbor prejudices against immigrants (e.g. Brader et al. 2008; Branton/Jones 2005; Dancygier/Donnelly 2013, 2014; Dancygier/Laitin 2014; Hainmueller/Hiscox 2010; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke/Sinnott 2006; Sides/Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004), political parties are expected to refrain from supporting IO-candidates in their campaign activities. When turning to the local unemployment rate, which taps into the economic dimension of social deprivation, the estimates run in the expected direction. At a low unemployment rate of 2 percentage points below average, IO-candidates are predicted to receive 5 percentage points less party funding than native-born candidates – yet, the effect is statistically insignificant. But the picture changes once electoral districts move towards a higher unemployment rate. At an unemployment rate of 6 percentage points above average, IO-candidates are predicted to receive 21 percentage points less party funding than their native-born counterparts and the effect is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Also with regard to the share of high school graduates in SMDs, which taps into the cultural dimension of social deprivation, political parties are found to be less eager to support IO-candidates in their campaign activities as long as the educational level is low. The gap in the predicted party funding to native-born candidates is 15 percentage points if the share of high school graduates is 20 percentage points below average and the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Yet, with increasing proportions of high school graduates, IO-candidates' predicted share of party funding approximates that of native-born candidates. Although being in line with my proposition, the findings come somewhat as a surprise. If political parties decide to field IO-candidates, they should take full interest in supporting IO-candidates' campaign activities as they seek office, or, at least, attempt to boost their party vote share by campaign activities at the grassroots level. Supposing that political parties are discouraged from nominating IO-candidates in SMDs, because these exhibit unpropitious demographic conditions, such as a high social deprivation, this should happen in the candidate selection and not just on the campaign trail. But the findings suggest that the degree to which local voters are socially deprived and harbor prejudices against immigrants affects the financial campaign support political parties provide for IO-candidates in a negative way.

Lastly, political parties were claimed to take account of the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in SMDs, measured by the local vote share of far-right political parties and the local population density. To the extent that local voters adopt critical stances on cultural diversity,

political parties are expected to refrain from supporting IO-candidates in their campaign activities. Contrary to expectations, however, no notable effect changes emerge, neither across the local far-right vote share nor across the population density.




Figure 8.2.10: Difference in the size of campaign teams between native-born and IO-candidates across SMD context factors.

Note: The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in table A.82 in the appendix. The dashed lines represent the 90-percent confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines represent the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 981.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

This final section is devoted to the personnel dimension of campaign support provided by political parties.⁴⁰ The AMEs are based on two-level negative binomial regression models with random intercepts which follow the modelling strategy of the previous computations. As visualized in figure 8.2.10, the amount of personnel campaign support provided for IO-candidates is no function of the SMD context factors. Overall, the effect changes are weakly pronounced and the AME of the immigrant background on the predicted size of campaign teams fails statistical significance throughout, irrespective of the simulated context. As previously argued, if

⁴⁰ As no multilevel tool for zero-inflated negative binomial regression models is available in Stata 14, multilevel negative binomial regression models are run.

political parties decided to field IO-candidates in SMDs, they take strong interest in supporting their campaign activities to come off well in the election. This is in all probability the reason why no conditioning effects arise from the SMD context factors.

9 Conclusion

The final chapter closes by revisiting the central findings of the empirical analysis before going on to discuss what to extract from the findings for the scholarly knowledge about the parties' selection behavior towards candidates from underrepresented groups, such as IO-candidates. In the last section, the limitations of the dissertation merit attention to highlight avenues for future research.

9.1 Summary of Findings

In the face of a persisting underrepresentation of IO-citizens in German parliaments, the question was raised as to how political parties go about selecting IO-candidates to respond to the mismatch between the cultural diversity of the population and the descriptive representation of IO-citizens in the legislative bodies. As political parties are meant to tie legislative bodies with their societal environment and keep them updated to demographic changes, the increasing cultural diversity of the German population on the one hand, and the persisting underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament on the other, were claimed to impact their selection behavior towards IO-candidates by some means or other. Understanding how and to what degree political parties can adapt their candidate selection behavior helps assess the parties' ability to feed recent demographic shifts into parliaments.

The main argument put forward in the dissertation advanced from the notion that most parliamentary candidates at the state and national level have certain recruitment trajectories in common, which evolve from informal selection criteria applied in the parties' nomination proceedings (Borchert 2003a; Borchert/Golsch 1999; Borchert/Zeiss 2003; Herzog 1975; Roberts 1988; Wessels 1997). By taking these default recruitment profiles that were measured by the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates as a point of departure, benchmarks were established that allowed to explore the selection practices employed towards IO-candidates.

These benchmarks can be crystallized into three superordinate patterns. When acting neutrally, IO-candidates must simply meet the default selection criteria which are also valid for native-born candidates and they receive a similar amount of party support in the candidate selection. In other words, political parties are willing to nominate IO-candidates for election but only on equal terms with their native-born counterparts. In the case of opening, in contrast, political parties respond more offensively to the numerical underrepresentation of IO-citizens in parliament. By applying less demanding selection criteria and providing more party support compared to native-born candidates, political parties can treat IO-candidates preferentially in

the candidate selection. In doing so, they can downsize the selectivity of their nominating proceedings and make them more permeable for representatives of so far underrepresented groups, such as IO-citizens. Yet, political parties cannot foretell how their established representational groups will react to attempts at forging closer representational links with IO-citizens. On the top of this comes the fact that at least parts of voters are prejudiced against IO-candidates (on Germany see Bieber 2013a; on France see Brouard/Tiberj 2011; on GB see Fisher et al. 2015; on GB see Stegmaier et al. 2013; on Germany see Street 2014). As the electoral consequences of nominating IO-candidates are difficult to foreknow, political parties may decide in favor of a highly defensive selection behavior towards aspiring IO-candidates. In the case of closure, IO-candidates must therefore outdo their native-born counterparts in their political qualifications to run for election and they receive less party support in the nomination proceedings.

Guided by previous findings of the legislative recruitment research, a framework was set up which recaps the most relevant factors in coming forward in the candidate selection and at the stage of standing for election. In the light of the research question of the dissertation, the focus was on recruitment factors which come within parties' sphere of influence. One of the most crucial selection criteria in the parties' nomination proceedings is the time party members spent in their party organizations before running for office at the state or national level. Generally, candidates must spend several years in their party organizations before making a bid for office, as political parties are the primary places for political apprenticeship. In this regard, the previous analysis provided evidence for a weak preferential treatment of IO-candidates. On average, they reach their first candidacy at the state or national level somewhat earlier than native-born candidates. However, the small difference in the number of predicted years also made clear that newcomer recruitment is no selection strategy which is most commonly used towards IO-candidates. Most IO-candidates do not compete for office soon after joining a party organization but become involved step by step. Only in rare cases, political parties play wild cards and let IO-candidates skip a longstanding party membership. More often than not, the initial impulses to recruit newcomers of immigrant background emanate from state party leaderships. A newcomer recruitment occurs primarily if IO-candidates are equipped with extensive expertise in immigration issues and are well-connected with immigrant organizations. These resources make their nomination a strong commitment to multiculturalism and effective means of linking with IO-voters.

Party actors can make use of encouragement to prod party members of immigrant background into office-seeking. However, the previous analysis provided evidence that IO-candidates are treated rather neutrally as far as being asked to enter the electoral contest for office is concerned. The rank-and-file party members, along with the chairmen of the district and sub-

district party organizations, are the most important sources of encouragement. They can provide a realistic first-hand assessment of the aspirants' chances of being nominated. In most cases, encouragement is tied to a prior signaling of political aspirations. Consequently, encouragement only reproduces the patterns of self-recruitment and is not deemed effective in counteracting a low supply of IO-applicants.

Most IO-candidates are backed by party mentors who advise them about strategically important aspects which must be considered in the candidate selection. While state party leaders often back party newcomers of immigrant background that are recruited outside of party organizations due to certain sought-after resources, IO-candidates that are deeply rooted in the party organization often obtain mentorship from their district or sub-district party chairmen. IO-candidates who previously worked for legislators tend to be mentored by these. Prospecting for a mentor is chiefly in the candidates' hands. Beyond informal mentorship, institutionalized mentoring programs exist within party organizations. But almost none of the party organizations under scrutiny implemented mentoring programs for party members of immigrant background.

The chance of being nominated also hinges on the degree to which candidate selection proceedings are contested. As to SMDs, IO-candidates are found to face higher levels of intra-party competition than native-born candidates, indicating a closure. A mobilization against IO-candidates is triggered off if these are backed by the district party leadership but have no standing in the district party organization earned through hard work at the grassroots level. Moreover, numerous intra-party groups compete for representation in the candidate selection. If new representational groups, such as IO-citizens, are considered relevant, this poses a threat to the representation of the established groups, leading to a higher counter-mobilization to shut new competitors out from the contest for representation. On party lists, by contrast, IO-candidates are found to face less intra-party competition than their native-born counterparts. On party lists that are more inclusive compared to SMDs, IO-candidates are valued for their contribution to the diversification of party tickets, instrumental in addressing a broad spectrum of voter segments.

When peering at the importance of party support in coming forward as a candidate, no significant difference between native-born and IO-candidates concerning the probability of being supported by state party leaderships becomes evident. Only in rare cases, state party leaderships provide IO-candidates with extraordinary support. This happens on the condition that IO-candidates are considered eminently qualified to establish closer representational ties with IO-voters and signal party expertise in immigration-related issues by having certain sought-after resources, such as close linkages with immigrant organizations, but are not yet sufficiently anchored in the party organization to come forward as a candidate. The findings also revealed that IO-candidates regard local party support as less important for their nomination compared

to native-born nominees. Although state party leaderships realize the need to establish closer representational ties with IO-citizens and mirror the cultural diversity of the population in parliament, parts of the local party chapters continue to pose obstacles to achieving this target. The finding is also echoed by other studies (Durose et al. 2013; Kittilson/Tate 2005; Sobolewska 2013; Soininen 2011). The reluctance of local party organizations is chiefly ascribed to potential electoral backlashes from local voters, as revealed by the qualitative interviews.

Previous experience in political office – especially in party and local-level office – serves as an acid test to assess the aspirants' political qualification to master higher-level positions and keep politically inept contenders at bay. Pertaining to the number of prior political offices, a weak preferential treatment of IO-candidates over native-born candidates was found. The result tallies with the previous finding on the years of party membership at the first candidacy that revealed that political parties nominate IO-candidates somewhat earlier in their career trajectories than native-born candidates. But, while the requirement of overall office experience seems to be somewhat reduced, experience in party and local-level office turned out to play equally important roles in the recruitment profiles of IO- and native-born candidates, stressing their considerable importance in being nominated at the state and national level.

Furthermore, the candidates' organizational affiliations are of paramount importance in the candidate selection. Establishing linkages with civil society organizations through their parliamentary candidates helps political parties with their collective voter mobilization (Allern/Bale 2012; Poguntke 2005b, 2006). When focusing on the candidates' number of organizational affiliations without immigrant organizations, the findings pointed to neutrality. Once immigrant organizations are included, IO-candidates are predicted to have somewhat more organizational affiliations than native-born candidates, but the difference is statistically insignificant. In line, the qualitative interviews stressed the importance immigrant organizations have for the nomination of IO-candidates. Political parties intend to forge closer ties with immigrant organizations to tap these as new support networks and reap their electoral support. To do so, they prospect for IO-candidates who are equipped with close ties with immigrant organizations. With this in mind, IO-candidates face incentives to present themselves as brokers to the immigrant community by linking with immigrant organizations. At the same time, however, they fear to be reduced to the role of cultural brokers and immigration experts, which can become a glass ceiling keeping them out of the major policy fields. To surmount the exclusive role of being a broker, most IO-candidates establish not only ties with immigrant organizations but with further organizations.

Many candidates come from professions which are treated as politics-facilitating (Cairney 2007). It was shown that IO-candidates have a similar probability as any other candidate of

coming from instrumental and brokerage occupations, indicating neutrality. Apparently, political parties do not reach out beyond their entrenched recruitment pools to increase their numbers of IO-candidates. The reason behind is that the acquisition of professional resources and skills crucial in the candidate selection and beyond, such as rhetorical or organizational skills, are by-products of politics-facilitating professions, whereas IO-candidates that work outside of such professions must acquire and hone these skills otherwise. This poses a big challenge concerning the compatibility between paid job and party engagement.

To run for election in SMDs, firm local roots are required. When exploring the candidates' biographical local rootedness in SMDs, no significant difference between IO- and native-born candidates became evident. Being a local is the main pathway to candidacies in SMDs and parachuting is the exception, not the rule. The reason why localness is virtually indispensable is that having a personal relationship with the local constituency and the district party organization is required to be nominated in SMDs. A parachuting of IO-candidates into electoral districts only occurs in vacant SMDs where no locally rooted aspirant waits to run for office. Ignoring local aspirants turned out to be a risky undertaking as a backlash from the local grassroots party members and the nominating body is likely, making the selection outcomes less controllable for the district party leadership.

Turning to the electoral viability with which candidates compete for office, the immigrant origin was found to be positively associated with the likelihood of running on a higher ballot position, whereas the opposite appeared to hold true for SMDs. This is in line with the propositions put forward by scholars concerned with electoral system effects on the representation of women and ethnic or racial minorities (e.g. Hennl/Kaiser 2008b; Matland 1998a; Matland/Studlar 1996; Norris 2004; Ruedin 2013; Rule/Norris 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1992; Rule/Zimmerman 1994). In SMDs, IO-candidates are believed to act as a deterrent to voters, while they are appreciated on party lists to highlight the parties' openness to cultural diversity and reap the electoral support of IO-voters.

The last opportunity for parliamentary candidates to improve their electoral prospects is to go on the campaign trail. The parties' impact on the candidates' electoral fate even extends to this recruitment stage. To tap into the amount of campaign support provided by political parties, party funding and the size of the personal campaign team were employed as indicators. Party organizations were found to neither provide IO-candidates with more financial and personnel campaign resources than native-born candidates nor do they discriminate against IO-candidates by allocating less campaign resources to them, but the findings pointed to a neutral treatment.

In a nutshell, the empirical findings sketched above paint a mixed picture with some indications of an opening of the candidate selection for IO-candidates when it comes to the length

of party membership at the first candidacy, the number of previous political offices and the electoral viability on party lists and some indications of a closure as regards the level of intra-party competition in SMDs, the importance of local party support and the electoral viability in SMDs. Opening endeavors are more likely to emanate from higher party levels, such as the state and district party leadership, while a greater reluctance to nominate IO-candidates became evident at the local grassroots party level. The finding emphasizes that political parties are by far no unitary actors which are unanimous in pursuing certain selection strategies towards candidates from underrepresented groups, such as IO-candidates. But the different party actors involved in the candidate recruitment also pursue divergent strategies. This makes it difficult to pursue one coherent recruitment strategy, which, however, would be most effective in increasing the number of IO-candidates. Overall, it is rather the party in central office than the party on the ground which drives an opening for IO-candidates. State leaderships define the general course state party organizations take in the upcoming election. If they define migration and integration as relevant policy issues, aspire to strengthen party ties with IO-voters and intend to demonstrate the parties' openness to multiculturalism, they prospect for IO-candidates who are thought to be particularly helpful in attaining these goals. Where necessary, they adopt opening measures if no contenders well-suited to meeting these objectives are found in the entrenched recruitment pools.

The main thrust of the results, however, provides support for the notion that a neutral selection behavior towards IO-candidates is employed. Consequently, IO-candidates making a bid for office are chosen by similar selection criteria as their native-born counterparts and obtain a similar amount of party support. Yet, it is very important to emphasize that, for reasons of data availability, the recruitment profiles of candidates were investigated that succeeded in the candidate selection. Accordingly, it can be concluded that those IO-candidates running for office do so on similar conditions as native-born candidates. But the data employed in the dissertation do not allow to leap to the conclusion that all applicants of immigrant background are treated neutrally in the candidate selection. Regarding the group of non-selected applicants of immigrant background, a stronger empirical evidence for a closure is conceivable, leading to their drop-out. Yet, those IO-candidates who succeeded in coming out on top in the candidate selection do not so because of a preferential treatment in most cases, but they are selected just like any other contender.

9.2 Discussion of Findings

The puzzling question which arises from the above is why neutrality emerges although all political parties that came under scrutiny have committed in one way or the other to an equal descriptive representation of IO-citizens in parliament. The upshot of the dissertation is that the parties' ability to open up their candidate selection to make it more permeable for underrepresented groups is severely constrained by the potential drawbacks coming along with a preferential treatment. The previous analysis unearthed the uneasy tension inherent in a preferential treatment of IO-candidates which cannot be easily resolved by political parties. This is the main reason why the parties' inclusionary rhetoric, as illustrated at the beginning of the dissertation, is not fully reflected in their candidate selection behavior.

The first conflict inherent in opening strategies is that treating IO-candidates preferentially over other longstanding party members with more political experience is likely to provoke a backlash from the rank-and-file party members. The latter feel ignored if IO-candidates are privileged, leading to a stronger counter-mobilization at the nominating convention and making it more difficult for the party leadership to clear the field of contenders and keep incompetent contenders at bay. What is more, the grassroots party members are the most important resource on the campaign trail by devoting time and energy to the candidates' campaign activities. Preferentially treated IO-candidates can therefore cost party organizations the crucial activist support of the grassroots party members and might result in lost seats. Beyond a backlash emanating from the party members, party selectorates and party member assemblies in particular tend to penalize strategic endeavors of the state or district party leaderships to nominate inexperienced IO-candidates by voting for challengers to demonstrate their disapproval.

A second complication arises as the candidate selection equals a contest for representation between different intra-party groups. When the representation of a new group gains in importance within party organizations, the representation of the established groups is under threat. Consequently, a mobilization against preferentially treated IO-candidates arises not only out of the ignorance of longstanding party members waiting for nomination but also from the competition for seats between different intra-party groups. Once a competitive situation in the candidate selection is given, other contenders depict the immigrant background as a weakness to keep aspiring IO-candidates at bay and safeguard the own nomination, whereas it remains unmentioned as long as the level of competition for nomination is low. To avoid putting off their established representational groups, leading to a decline in the electoral support and being a threat to the party cohesion, a neutral treatment of IO-candidates in the candidate selection is the best way to stay out of mischief.

Consequently, political parties are faced with a dilemma. From a normative point of view, an opening might be desirable to counteract a descriptive underrepresentation of certain social groups in parliament and to adapt the composition of legislative bodies to societal changes, both of which are conducive to the citizen-state linkage. Yet, it can also lead to intra-party conflicts which pose a threat to party unity. To sidestep a backlash against a preferential treatment, political parties tend to focus on meritocratic criteria in their nomination proceedings. Nominations which are predicated on meritocratic criteria, as envisioned in the neutrality model, were also preferred by most interviewed IO-candidates. Working hard and diligently at the grassroots level to make one's name in the party organization, building up intra-party support networks and gaining professional experience in lower-level political positions were considered the most sustainable career trajectory into parliament. Preferentially treated IO-parliamentarians are likely to be regarded as token migrants, owing their seat in parliament to their immigrant background rather than to their political expertise, qualification, commitment and diligence. This makes opening endeavors non-sustainable selection strategies as they curtail the candidates' political assertiveness and credibility within their party organizations and unavoidably, delimit the longevity of their political careers. It is not conducive to legislative careers to give the impression of having earned a position not through political qualification but through a preferential treatment.

Undoubtedly, a preferential treatment is a highly effective measure to increase the number of candidates from underrepresented groups, such as IO-candidates. But it is no sustainable selection strategy as politically inexperienced IO-candidates are likely to fail due to their lacking knowledge of the professional rules of the game, of how to navigate through politics and their lower acceptance from the rank-and-file party members and other parliamentarians. Their failure makes it more difficult for future contenders of immigrant background to come forward as candidates as it casts a damning light on their nomination and creates the impression that IO-citizens are not yet prepared to hold professional legislative mandates. Therefore, a rise in the number of rank-and-file party members of immigrant background and not a change in the selection practices would, after all, be the most sustainable way to feed the cultural diversity of the population into parliament. Only through a higher supply of party members of immigrant background, the number of IO-parliamentarians would increase in the long run. It is a problem which lies with the grassroots level rather than with the candidate selection. Opening efforts to recruit hard-to-find candidates can increase the number of IO-candidates standing for election, which can be instrumental in highlighting the openness of party organizations to IO-citizens and encouraging them to become politically active, but it does not guarantee a change in the supply pool.

One avenue to increase the number of rank-and-file party members of immigrant background are mentoring programs that are geared to party members of immigrant background. As discussed earlier, mentoring programs are instrumental in guiding party members of immigrant background through the parties' lengthy recruitment process, making them familiar with the party structure and culture, integrating them into a party network and encouraging them not to give up. Many party members of immigrant background – especially in the first immigrant generation – have no or false ideas of the intra-party recruitment processes, leading to disappointment and withdrawal if their expectations are not met. Mentoring programs avoid the pitfalls of a preferential treatment but can increase the number of party members of immigrant background that successfully come through the recruitment process:

One possibility would be to have coachings, seminars, trainings for people [of immigrant background]. It is difficult to get ahead [within a party organization] just by being interested or active [...]. You must pass through a certain trajectory within the party organization (Interview 6).

However, mentoring programs only address persons who already found their way to party organizations and support them in their further career trajectories. In order to attract more rank-and-file party members of immigrant background, party organizations must reach out through directed and systematic measures that are aimed at increasing the number of grassroots party members of immigrant background:

It is important to develop concepts at all stages, ranging from the party leaderships to lower party chapters, of how to recruit party members of immigrant background. This happens rather unsystematically (Interview 3).

If political parties want to mobilize persons [of immigrant background], they must be more present in places where these people are [...]. Translating party manifestos, the party website into different languages and organizing events [...] to pick up those persons where they stand [would be important] (Interview 5).

9.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

Several limitations of the dissertation call for attention in future research. One avenue pertains to the dependent variables employed in the previous analysis. As discussed earlier, comparing the recruitment profiles of successful applicants to those of failed applicants in order to assess whether IO-candidates need other recruitment profiles than native-born candidates to run for office is ruled out for want of data on non-selected applicants. Because only data on selected candidates are available, the outcome variable – the occurrence of selection versus non-selection – is conditioned. To address the question as to whether IO-candidates are selected by similar meritocratic criteria as native-born candidates and receive a similar amount of party support, I opted to use the recruitment profiles of native-born candidates as reference points for comparison. Although the previous analysis provided valuable insights into the parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates, indicating neutrality for the most part, it also made clear

that treating the nomination as a dependent variable would be a more accurate research design. Otherwise, we must deal with a pre-selected sample of candidates, which sets limits to the interpretation of the empirical findings. The results only refer to successfully selected candidates but not to dropped-out IO-applicants for which a clearer evidence of closure cannot be ruled out by the data at hand. This also explains why the conditioning effects were partly weakly pronounced. Those IO-candidates that were nominated in SMDs of hostile contextual conditions might form a highly selective sample which suffered no closure, whereas IO-applicants that encountered a closure bowed out. Despite its limitations, the previous analysis could yield valuable clues to the question of how IO-candidates who stand for election are selected.

To address the problem sketched above, data on applicants are needed. One way to gather information on the pool of applicants are media outlets. However, the analysis of media outlets comes along with two caveats which do not strain the empirical approach adopted here: First, media outlets on candidate selection processes are highly biased and incomplete as local newspapers do not report on each local nominating convention – especially at the level of state elections. Second, the sheer information on the names and numbers of applicants does not provide more substantial details about their political experience, qualification and personal background, which would be required to scrutinize whether the selection criteria differ between IO- and native-born candidates. An alternative way to go is to survey applicants competing at the nominating conventions. However, this is a costly undertaking as the sample size of applicants is large. Moreover, contacting applicants is difficult as their addresses are not available from the election officials. Instead, they must be contacted through their party organizations.

Beyond this major drawback to the dissertation, future research should attempt to generate a sample size of IO-candidates which allows to test the effects of the conditioning factors for each political party separately. In line with the literature on minority representation, it was claimed that several conditioning factors exist which universally affect parties' selection behavior towards IO-candidates. However, this approach might cloud interesting party variances in the selection behavior towards IO-candidates which are contingent on context factors. For instance, center-left parties which are more eager to nominate IO-candidates might be more responsive to contextual incentives than political parties that are situated more on the right of the political spectrum. Moreover, incorporating finer sub-categories of IO-candidates to truly understand which immigrant background triggers which selection behavior would be an instructive way to go in future research.

Moreover, the previous analysis suggested that parties' selection behavior relates to the supply of potential IO-candidates. Incorporating the supply of potential IO-candidates into the statistical models – for instance, the number of party members of immigrant background in the

party chapters – could clarify how their supply shapes parties' selection behavior. Unfortunately, no such data are available to party organizations.

As emphasized, a preferential treatment is a highly effective measure to increase the number of IO-candidates that stand for election and bridge a low supply of rank-and-file party members of immigrant background. But it does not automatically increase the number of rank-and-file party members of immigrant background. As soon as the supply of aspirants of immigrant background that are equipped with similar political experiences as native-born candidates increases, a higher descriptive representation of IO-citizens in parliament is likely to be the result, since a widely neutral selection behavior towards IO-candidates was found. Against this backdrop, future research should focus on rank-and-file party members of immigrant background and work on comprehending the major barriers to their party engagement and identifying mechanisms helpful in increasing their presence at the grassroots level. So far, research on party members of immigrant background is entirely missing.

In the previous analysis, I argued that studying the candidate selection behavior of political parties through the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates is a fertile approach to ascertaining whether IO-candidates are selected by similar criteria as native-born candidates. Party selectorates and party leaderships were argued to hesitate about providing unfiltered insights into the intra-party selection practices – especially if these diverge from the public commitment to an equal minority representation. Nonetheless, complementing the previous results by interviewing persons who participated in nomination proceedings in which applicants of immigrant origin were involved could be helpful in obtaining a more complete picture of the strategic calculus behind the nomination of IO-candidates.

Despite these limitations, the study concludes with a positive note. The dissertation attempted to take forward our scholarly knowledge of how political parties respond to the parliamentary underrepresentation of IO-citizens in their candidate selection proceedings. Driven by this aim, it delved into the candidate selection practices employed towards IO-candidates and unearthed that, for the most part, IO-candidates are selected by comparable criteria as their native-born counterparts. The parties' inclusionary rhetoric, as illustrated at the beginning of the dissertation, is not fully reflected in their candidate selection behavior. The reason behind is that opening strategies come along with severe pitfalls that imperil the intra-party unity, making neutral selection practices the most sustainable and non-hazardous selection strategies that can be pursued towards candidates from underrepresented groups.

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Appendix A

Table A.1: Years of party membership at the first candidacy (negative binomial regression)

	Dependent variable: Years of party membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.411*** (0.11)	-0.138 (0.10)	-0.131 (0.09)
Male		0.040 (0.05)	0.029 (0.05)
Age		0.026*** (0.00)	0.028*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.053** (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)
Party activity rate		-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.319*** (0.06)	0.219*** (0.05)
Local-level office		0.111 (0.07)	0.122* (0.07)
Party office		0.060 (0.08)	0.121 (0.08)
Number of org. affiliations		0.063*** (0.02)	0.051*** (0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.059 (0.07)
Bavaria			-0.061 (0.06)
Saxony			-0.034 (0.08)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-0.007 (0.07)
FDP			-0.286*** (0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.425*** (0.06)
Die Linke			-0.739*** (0.08)
Intercept	2.564*** (0.03)	2.146*** (0.13)	2.473*** (0.13)
Ln Alpha	-0.589*** (0.06)	-1.062*** (0.06)	-1.285*** (0.07)
N	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.002	0.061	0.083
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	12.66***	347.06***	472.87***
Log Likelihood	-2850	-2683	-2620
AIC	5706.5	5390.1	5278.3
BIC	5720.6	5446.5	5367.6

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at the first candidacy. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.2: Years of party membership at the first candidacy across immigrant subgroups (negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Years of party membership				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	-0.119 (0.22)				
Christian		-0.162 (0.13)			
Non-European country			-0.175 (0.14)		
Muslim country				-0.208 (0.16)	
European country					-0.057 (0.12)
Male	0.004 (0.05)	0.008 (0.05)	0.016 (0.05)	0.006 (0.05)	0.014 (0.05)
Age	0.030*** (0.00)	0.029*** (0.00)	0.030*** (0.00)	0.030*** (0.00)	0.028*** (0.00)
Age squared	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.025 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)	0.020 (0.02)	0.023 (0.02)
Party activity rate	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of political offices	0.214*** (0.05)	0.214*** (0.05)	0.214*** (0.05)	0.215*** (0.05)	0.220*** (0.05)
Local-level office	0.113 (0.08)	0.125* (0.07)	0.112 (0.07)	0.113 (0.07)	0.123 (0.08)
Party office	0.167** (0.08)	0.164** (0.08)	0.163** (0.08)	0.165** (0.08)	0.127 (0.08)
Number of org. affiliations	0.044** (0.02)	0.053*** (0.02)	0.045** (0.02)	0.043** (0.02)	0.052*** (0.02)
Election:					
Hesse	-0.062 (0.07)	-0.056 (0.07)	-0.066 (0.07)	-0.061 (0.07)	-0.051 (0.07)
Bavaria	-0.043 (0.06)	-0.065 (0.06)	-0.048 (0.06)	-0.042 (0.06)	-0.062 (0.06)
Saxony	-0.006 (0.08)	-0.012 (0.08)	-0.021 (0.08)	-0.007 (0.08)	-0.019 (0.08)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	-0.027 (0.07)	-0.022 (0.07)	-0.021 (0.07)	-0.025 (0.07)	-0.017 (0.07)
FDP	-0.297*** (0.07)	-0.285*** (0.07)	-0.296*** (0.07)	-0.299*** (0.07)	-0.289*** (0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.459*** (0.07)	-0.440*** (0.06)	-0.447*** (0.06)	-0.449*** (0.06)	-0.437*** (0.07)
Die Linke	-0.793*** (0.08)	-0.778*** (0.08)	-0.788*** (0.08)	-0.792*** (0.08)	-0.748*** (0.08)
Intercept	2.453*** (0.13)	2.440*** (0.13)	2.472*** (0.13)	2.472*** (0.13)	2.460*** (0.13)
Ln Alpha	-1.309*** (0.07)	-1.305*** (0.07)	-1.316*** (0.07)	-1.312*** (0.07)	-1.274*** (0.07)
N	763	781	778	771	787
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.087	0.086	0.087	0.087	0.082
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	467.53***	472.93***	476.04***	471.18***	454.82
Log Likelihood	-2463	-2520	-2505	-2486	-2548
AIC	4963.5	5077.7	5047.9	5009.0	5133.8
BIC	5051.6	5166.2	5136.4	5097.3	5222.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at the first candidacy. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.3: Years of party membership at the first candidacy across political parties (negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Years of party membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.504*** (0.18)	-0.378** (0.15)	-0.376** (0.15)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU	-0.074 (0.08)	-0.028 (0.07)	-0.028 (0.07)
FDP	-0.497*** (0.09)	-0.295*** (0.07)	-0.296*** (0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.597*** (0.08)	-0.455*** (0.07)	-0.454*** (0.07)
Die Linke	-0.844*** (0.09)	-0.797*** (0.08)	-0.796*** (0.08)
IO * CDU/CSU	0.085 (0.32)	0.263 (0.27)	0.270 (0.27)
IO * FDP	-0.128 (0.33)	0.101 (0.28)	0.103 (0.28)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.566 (0.36)	0.493* (0.30)	0.468 (0.30)
IO * Die Linke	0.146 (0.27)	0.546** (0.24)	0.547** (0.24)
Male		0.020 (0.05)	0.022 (0.05)
Age		0.028*** (0.00)	0.028*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.019 (0.02)	0.017 (0.02)
Party activity rate		0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.237*** (0.05)	0.221*** (0.05)
Local-level office		0.083 (0.07)	0.117 (0.07)
Party office		0.102 (0.08)	0.114 (0.08)
Number of org. affiliation		0.056*** (0.02)	0.054*** (0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.054 (0.07)
Bavaria			-0.057 (0.06)
Saxony			-0.024 (0.08)
Intercept	2.902*** (0.06)	2.514*** (0.13)	2.509*** (0.13)
Ln Alpha	-0.774*** (0.06)	-1.291*** (0.07)	-1.293*** (0.07)
N	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.026	0.084	0.084
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	147.99***	478.26***	479.42***
Log Likelihood	-2783	-2617	-2617
AIC	5587.1	5274.9	5279.7
BIC	5638.9	5368.9	5387.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at the first candidacy. References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.4: Years of party membership at the first candidacy across the mode of candidacy (negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Years of party membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.776*	-0.116	0.122
	(0.44)	(0.39)	(0.37)
Mode of candidacy			
Party list	0.362***	0.451***	0.152*
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Dual	0.197**	0.254***	0.055
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
IO * Party list	0.234	-0.207	-0.451
	(0.48)	(0.42)	(0.40)
IO * Dual	0.448	0.047	-0.165
	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.38)
Male		0.099*	0.050
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Age		0.027***	0.028***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared		-0.000***	-0.000*
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		0.058**	0.021
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Party activity rate		0.001	0.001
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of political offices		0.344***	0.227***
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Local-level office		0.065	0.118
		(0.07)	(0.07)
Party office		0.027	0.115
		(0.08)	(0.08)
Number of org. affiliation		0.059***	0.051***
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.069
			(0.07)
Bavaria			-0.087
			(0.06)
Saxony			-0.012
			(0.08)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-0.024
			(0.07)
FDP			-0.263***
			(0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.395***
			(0.07)
Die Linke			-0.704***
			(0.08)
Intercept	2.334***	1.871***	2.373***
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Ln Alpha	-0.615***	-1.121***	-1.293***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
N	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.006	0.067	0.084
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	32.39***	384.45***	478.99***
Log Likelihood	-2840	-2664	-2617
AIC	5694.7	5360.7	5280.1
BIC	5727.6	5435.9	5388.3

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at the first candidacy. References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. * $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.5: Years of party membership at the first candidacy across the type of party selectorate (negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Years of party membership			Party list		
	(1)	SMD (2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.370 (0.35)	-0.179 (0.31)	-0.119 (0.32)	-0.398* (0.23)	-0.107 (0.19)	-0.145 (0.18)
Party selectorate:						
Party member assembly	-0.621*** (0.12)	-0.356*** (0.10)	-0.252* (0.13)	-0.187* (0.11)	-0.134 (0.10)	0.045 (0.10)
IO * Party member assembly	0.017 (0.45)	0.243 (0.39)	0.273 (0.39)	0.069 (0.39)	0.117 (0.32)	0.125 (0.31)
Male		-0.049 (0.10)	-0.092 (0.10)		-0.005 (0.08)	-0.081 (0.08)
Age		0.019*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)		0.026*** (0.00)	0.026*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.123** (0.05)	0.106** (0.05)		0.078** (0.04)	0.075** (0.04)
Party activity		0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.320*** (0.08)	0.311*** (0.08)		0.356*** (0.08)	0.297*** (0.08)
Local-level office		0.383* (0.21)	0.329 (0.21)		0.548*** (0.20)	0.402** (0.19)
Party office		-0.008 (0.18)	0.027 (0.18)		-0.111 (0.19)	0.018 (0.18)
Number of org. affiliations		0.012 (0.04)	0.026 (0.04)		0.054* (0.03)	0.055* (0.03)
Election:						
Hesse			0.148 (0.18)			0.109 (0.12)
Bavaria			0.016 (0.16)			0.094 (0.11)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.087 (0.16)			-0.014 (0.11)
FDP			-0.336** (0.16)			-0.207* (0.12)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.041 (0.11)			-0.370*** (0.11)
Die Linke			-0.089 (0.11)			-0.678*** (0.13)
Intercept	2.871*** (0.10)	1.933*** (0.26)	2.070*** (0.29)	2.595*** (0.06)	1.828*** (0.19)	1.959*** (0.21)
Ln Alpha	-0.710*** (0.12)	-1.302*** (0.14)	-1.374*** (0.14)	-0.506*** (0.09)	-1.146*** (0.11)	-1.321*** (0.12)
N	209	209	209	304	304	304
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.022	0.089	0.095	0.032	0.079	0.095
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	31.16***	127.44***	136.41***	6.82*	168.85***	203.13***
Log Likelihood	-705	-656	-652	-1066	-985	-968
AIC	1419.2	1340.9	1344.0	2142.1	1998.1	1975.8
BIC	1435.9	1387.7	1410.8	2160.7	2050.2	2050.2

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at the first candidacy. References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.6: Years of party membership at the first candidacy across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Years of party membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>			
IO	-0.432*** (0.11)	-0.172* (0.10)	-0.153* (0.09)
Male		0.082 (0.05)	0.054 (0.05)
Age		0.029*** (0.00)	0.030*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.035 (0.03)	0.013 (0.03)
Party activity rate		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.296*** (0.06)	0.177*** (0.06)
Local-level office		0.061 (0.08)	0.109 (0.08)
Party office		0.153 (0.09)	0.231*** (0.08)
Number of org. affiliations		0.059*** (0.02)	0.047** (0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.087 (0.08)
Bavaria			-0.087 (0.07)
Saxony			-0.174 (0.11)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			0.005 (0.07)
FDP			-0.334*** (0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.386*** (0.07)
Die Linke			-0.683*** (0.09)
<i>MMD level:</i>			
District magnitude	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
IO * District magnitude	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>			
Variance MMD	0.021* (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	2.582*** (0.05)	2.172*** (0.15)	2.405*** (0.14)
Ln Alpha	-0.656*** (0.06)	-1.153*** (0.07)	-1.333*** (0.07)
N (Candidates)	685	685	685
N (MMDs)	25	25	25
Wald χ^2 (df)	15.15**	386.95***	547.64***
Log Likelihood	-2416	-2268	-2222
AIC	4843.9	4565.1	4485.4
BIC	4871.1	4633.0	4580.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at the first candidacy. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.7: Years of party membership at the first candidacy across SMD context factors (two-level negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Years of party membership				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-0.088 (0.12)	-0.068 (0.12)	-0.068 (0.12)	-0.072 (0.12)	-0.059 (0.12)
Male	0.040 (0.06)	0.039 (0.06)	0.042 (0.06)	0.040 (0.06)	0.038 (0.06)
Age	0.022*** (0.00)	0.022*** (0.00)	0.022*** (0.00)	0.022*** (0.00)	0.022*** (0.00)
Age squared	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)
Education	0.042 (0.03)	0.042 (0.03)	0.046 (0.03)	0.042 (0.03)	0.042 (0.03)
Party activity rate	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices	0.239*** (0.07)	0.241*** (0.07)	0.250*** (0.07)	0.241*** (0.07)	0.241*** (0.07)
Local-level office	0.081 (0.09)	0.077 (0.09)	0.067 (0.09)	0.079 (0.09)	0.074 (0.09)
Party office	0.162* (0.10)	0.160* (0.10)	0.158* (0.10)	0.159* (0.10)	0.164* (0.10)
Number of org. affiliations	0.029 (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	-0.024 (0.11)	-0.020 (0.11)	-0.017 (0.11)	-0.021 (0.11)	-0.019 (0.11)
Bavaria	-0.064 (0.11)	-0.062 (0.11)	-0.077 (0.11)	-0.065 (0.11)	-0.069 (0.11)
Saxony	0.071 (0.18)	0.075 (0.18)	0.070 (0.18)	0.072 (0.18)	0.052 (0.18)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.015 (0.10)	-0.019 (0.10)	-0.025 (0.10)	-0.019 (0.10)	-0.023 (0.10)
FDP	-0.326*** (0.09)	-0.326*** (0.09)	-0.315*** (0.09)	-0.328*** (0.09)	-0.329*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.438*** (0.08)	-0.438*** (0.08)	-0.424*** (0.08)	-0.441*** (0.08)	-0.442*** (0.08)
Die Linke	-0.750*** (0.09)	-0.752*** (0.09)	-0.744*** (0.09)	-0.752*** (0.09)	-0.754*** (0.09)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.010 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
% Unemployment	0.003 (0.02)	0.005 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)
% High school graduates	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.010 (0.04)	-0.011 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)	-0.010 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	0.005 (0.02)				
IO * % Unemployment		-0.024 (0.04)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.028** (0.01)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				0.020 (0.10)	
IO * Urbanity					-0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.011 (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)
Intercept	2.385*** (0.18)	2.391*** (0.18)	2.382*** (0.18)	2.390*** (0.18)	2.398*** (0.18)
Ln Alpha	-1.320*** (0.12)	-1.316*** (0.12)	-1.293*** (0.12)	-1.323*** (0.12)	-1.315*** (0.12)
N (Candidates)	527	527	527	527	527
N (SMDs)	344	344	344	344	344
Wald χ^2 (df)	373.22***	373.71***	380.34***	373.00***	374.45***
Log Likelihood	-1669	-1669	-1667	-1669	-1669
AIC	3384.2	3383.7	3377.7	3384.1	3383.6
BIC	3482.4	3481.9	3471.5	3482.3	3481.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at the first candidacy. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.8: Encouragement to run for election (binary logistic regression)

	Dependent variable: Encouragement		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.074 (0.34)	-0.076 (0.35)	-0.196 (0.35)
Male		-0.786*** (0.23)	-0.758*** (0.23)
Age		-0.006 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001* (0.00)	0.001** (0.00)
Education		-0.005 (0.10)	0.020 (0.11)
Incumbent		0.174 (0.58)	0.116 (0.59)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.111 (0.25)	0.066 (0.25)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.061 (0.13)	-0.047 (0.14)
Years of party membership		-0.006 (0.01)	-0.015 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.019* (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.034 (0.21)	0.071 (0.21)
Local-level office		0.218 (0.28)	0.184 (0.28)
Party office		-0.299 (0.34)	-0.279 (0.34)
Number of org. affiliations		0.114 (0.08)	0.065 (0.08)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-0.363 (0.32)
FDP			-0.838*** (0.32)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.936*** (0.32)
Die Linke			-0.427 (0.38)
Intercept	1.326*** (0.09)	1.892*** (0.59)	2.296*** (0.66)
N	731	731	731
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.000	0.037	0.053
Log Likelihood	-376	-362	-357
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	0.05	27.78**	39.52***
AIC	756.7	754.9	751.2
BIC	765.8	823.8	838.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013.

Table A.9: Encouragement to run for election across immigrant subgroups (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	-1.371 (0.99)				
Christian		-0.019 (0.53)			
Non-European country			-0.859 (0.54)		
Muslim country				-1.031* (0.61)	
European country					0.335 (0.51)
Male	-0.832*** (0.24)	-0.777*** (0.24)	-0.826*** (0.24)	-0.806*** (0.24)	-0.789*** (0.24)
Age	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Age squared	0.001* (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001** (0.00)
Education	0.013 (0.12)	-0.007 (0.11)	0.036 (0.11)	0.034 (0.11)	-0.027 (0.11)
Incumbency	0.147 (0.62)	0.102 (0.61)	0.073 (0.62)	0.080 (0.62)	0.192 (0.60)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.130 (0.27)	0.110 (0.26)	0.125 (0.26)	0.116 (0.27)	0.074 (0.25)
Number of prior candidacies	-0.085 (0.14)	-0.072 (0.14)	-0.068 (0.14)	-0.062 (0.14)	-0.062 (0.14)
Years of party membership	-0.016 (0.01)	-0.015 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.01)	-0.015 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.019* (0.01)	0.014 (0.01)	0.018* (0.01)	0.019* (0.01)	0.014 (0.01)
Number of political offices	-0.008 (0.22)	0.038 (0.21)	0.018 (0.22)	0.022 (0.22)	0.029 (0.21)
Local-level office	0.371 (0.29)	0.241 (0.29)	0.310 (0.29)	0.307 (0.29)	0.221 (0.29)
Party office	-0.232 (0.36)	-0.286 (0.35)	-0.268 (0.35)	-0.236 (0.35)	-0.289 (0.35)
Number of org. affiliations	0.070 (0.08)	0.065 (0.08)	0.074 (0.08)	0.070 (0.08)	0.080 (0.08)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	-0.288 (0.34)	-0.371 (0.32)	-0.231 (0.33)	-0.278 (0.33)	-0.406 (0.33)
FDP	-0.815** (0.33)	-0.796** (0.33)	-0.804** (0.33)	-0.815** (0.33)	-0.840** (0.33)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.902*** (0.33)	-0.905*** (0.33)	-0.867*** (0.32)	-0.915*** (0.33)	-0.947*** (0.33)
Die Linke	-0.521 (0.40)	-0.484 (0.40)	-0.390 (0.40)	-0.455 (0.40)	-0.525 (0.39)
Intercept	2.244*** (0.69)	2.388*** (0.68)	2.195*** (0.68)	2.196*** (0.69)	2.501*** (0.68)
N	682	701	695	690	711
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.060	0.051	0.059	0.060	0.055
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	42.27***	36.83***	42.72***	42.54***	39.73***
Log Likelihood	-330	-342	-339	-336	-342
AIC	698.8	721.2	715.1	710.2	723.0
BIC	784.8	807.7	801.4	796.4	809.7

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013.

Table A.10: Encouragement to run for election across political parties (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Encouragement	
	(1)	(2)
IO	0.147 (0.79)	0.041 (0.80)
Political party:		
CDU/CSU	-0.278 (0.32)	-0.272 (0.33)
FDP	-0.936*** (0.31)	-0.817** (0.33)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.737** (0.30)	-0.875*** (0.33)
Die Linke	-0.358 (0.33)	-0.516 (0.40)
IO * CDU/CSU	-0.974 (1.08)	-1.047 (1.10)
IO * FDP	-0.094 (1.17)	-0.066 (1.19)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.921 (1.12)	-0.937 (1.15)
IO * Die Linke	0.284 (1.12)	0.607 (1.14)
Male		-0.778*** (0.23)
Age		-0.003 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001** (0.00)
Education		0.007 (0.11)
Incumbent		0.088 (0.60)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.080 (0.26)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.046 (0.14)
Years of party membership		-0.015 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.018* (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.052 (0.21)
Local-level office		0.217 (0.28)
Party office		-0.263 (0.34)
Number of org. affiliations		0.068 (0.08)
Intercept	1.799*** (0.23)	2.309*** (0.66)
N	731	731
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.022	0.057
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	16.59*	42.65***
Log Likelihood	-368	-355
AIC	756.1	756.0
BIC	802.1	861.7

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013.

Table A.11: Encouragement to run for election across the mode of candidacy (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Encouragement	
	(1)	(2)
IO	0.346 (1.12)	0.226 (1.15)
Mode of candidacy:		
Party list	0.100 (0.30)	-0.295 (0.35)
Dual	0.067 (0.25)	-0.189 (0.29)
IO * Party list	-1.373 (1.28)	-1.284 (1.32)
IO * Dual	-0.067 (1.21)	-0.051 (1.25)
Male		-0.826*** (0.24)
Age		-0.006 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001** (0.00)
Education		0.014 (0.11)
Incumbent		0.116 (0.60)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.024 (0.26)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.022 (0.14)
Years of party membership		-0.014 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.017 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.058 (0.21)
Local-level office		0.209 (0.29)
Party office		-0.312 (0.35)
Number of org. affiliations		0.068 (0.08)
Political party:		
CDU/CSU		-0.327 (0.33)
FDP		-0.848*** (0.33)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen		-0.980*** (0.33)
Die Linke		-0.554 (0.40)
Intercept	1.264*** (0.22)	2.586*** (0.72)
N	731	731
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.004	0.058
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	3.22	43.43***
Log Likelihood	-375	-355
AIC	761.5	755.3
BIC	789.0	860.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
Source: GCS 2013.

Table A.12: Encouragement to run for election across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>			
IO	-0.125 (0.36)	-0.131 (0.37)	-0.276 (0.38)
Male		-0.839*** (0.24)	-0.831*** (0.25)
Age		-0.013 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)
Age squared		0.002** (0.00)	0.002*** (0.00)
Education		-0.088 (0.12)	-0.077 (0.13)
Incumbent		0.295 (0.64)	0.249 (0.66)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.017 (0.27)	-0.104 (0.27)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.072 (0.14)	-0.032 (0.15)
Years of party membership		-0.010 (0.01)	-0.025* (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.017 (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.230 (0.24)	0.268 (0.24)
Local-level office		0.149 (0.31)	0.098 (0.32)
Party office		-0.357 (0.37)	-0.328 (0.38)
Number of org. affiliations		0.102 (0.08)	0.046 (0.09)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-0.331 (0.34)
FDP			-1.017*** (0.34)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-1.236*** (0.34)
Die Linke			-0.622 (0.46)
<i>MMD level:</i>			
District magnitude	0.004 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
IO * District magnitude	0.001 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.005 (0.02)
<i>Random part:</i>			
Variance MMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Variance IO	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intraclass correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	1.341*** (0.10)	2.225*** (0.69)	2.802*** (0.76)
N (Candidates)	607	607	607
N (MMDs)	16	16	16
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.002	0.101	0.141
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	0.63	28.45**	43.50***
Log Likelihood	-311	-295	-286
AIC	630.1	624.2	614.8
BIC	647.7	699.1	707.3

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013.

Table A.13: Encouragement to run for election across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Encouragement				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	0.221 (0.49)	0.096 (0.45)	0.112 (0.46)	0.321 (0.53)	0.223 (0.48)
Male	-0.668** (0.28)	-0.677** (0.28)	-0.677** (0.28)	-0.712** (0.28)	-0.663** (0.28)
Age	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Age squared	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education	-0.078 (0.13)	-0.078 (0.13)	-0.079 (0.13)	-0.089 (0.13)	-0.074 (0.13)
Incumbent	-0.168 (0.65)	-0.155 (0.66)	-0.168 (0.65)	-0.150 (0.65)	-0.239 (0.66)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.060 (0.29)	-0.065 (0.29)	-0.068 (0.29)	-0.047 (0.29)	-0.034 (0.29)
Number of prior candidacies	0.119 (0.19)	0.109 (0.19)	0.113 (0.19)	0.090 (0.19)	0.102 (0.19)
Years of party membership	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.008 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
Number of political offices	0.299 (0.26)	0.304 (0.26)	0.309 (0.26)	0.310 (0.26)	0.304 (0.26)
Local-level office	0.004 (0.33)	-0.004 (0.33)	-0.007 (0.33)	-0.029 (0.33)	-0.005 (0.34)
Party office	-0.510 (0.41)	-0.517 (0.41)	-0.529 (0.41)	-0.519 (0.40)	-0.508 (0.41)
Number of org. affiliations	0.088 (0.09)	0.092 (0.09)	0.093 (0.09)	0.092 (0.09)	0.089 (0.09)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	-0.545 (0.41)	-0.533 (0.40)	-0.526 (0.40)	-0.572 (0.41)	-0.558 (0.41)
FDP	-0.560 (0.38)	-0.552 (0.38)	-0.552 (0.38)	-0.560 (0.38)	-0.567 (0.38)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.786** (0.37)	-0.796** (0.36)	-0.799** (0.37)	-0.808** (0.36)	-0.803** (0.37)
Die Linke	-0.262 (0.44)	-0.273 (0.44)	-0.276 (0.44)	-0.302 (0.44)	-0.287 (0.44)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.018 (0.03)	0.013 (0.03)	0.013 (0.03)	0.010 (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)
% Unemployment	0.020 (0.05)	0.020 (0.05)	0.023 (0.05)	0.020 (0.05)	0.012 (0.05)
% High school graduates	-0.003 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.02)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.131 (0.15)	-0.139 (0.15)	-0.142 (0.15)	-0.172 (0.15)	-0.140 (0.15)
Urbanity	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.072 (0.07)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.029 (0.14)			
IO * % High school graduates			0.015 (0.06)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				0.930 (0.74)	
IO * Urbanity					-0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.054 (0.34)	0.049 (0.34)	0.051 (0.34)	0.033 (0.33)	0.051 (0.35)
Intraclass correlation	0.016 (0.10)	0.015 (0.10)	0.015 (0.10)	0.010 (0.10)	0.015 (0.10)
Intercept	2.928*** (0.83)	2.934*** (0.83)	2.952*** (0.83)	3.035*** (0.83)	2.956*** (0.83)
N (Candidates)	557	557	557	557	557
N (SMDs)	274	274	274	274	274
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.100	0.096	0.096	0.103	0.107
Wald χ^2 (df)	24.25	23.75	23.74	25.08	25.07
Log Likelihood	-271	-271	-271	-270	-270
AIC	593.4	594.3	594.2	592.5	592.1
BIC	705.8	706.6	706.6	704.9	704.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013.

Table A.14: Competition for nomination (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Contested candidate selection			Party list		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.644** (0.26)	0.703** (0.28)	0.524* (0.29)	-0.284 (0.24)	-0.482* (0.25)	-0.430* (0.26)
Male		-0.324* (0.17)	-0.325* (0.18)		0.102 (0.14)	0.301** (0.15)
Age		-0.015* (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.091 (0.09)	-0.112 (0.09)		0.024 (0.07)	-0.023 (0.08)
Incumbent		-1.143*** (0.38)	-1.147*** (0.39)		-0.339 (0.31)	-0.281 (0.33)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.218 (0.19)	-0.296 (0.20)		-0.409*** (0.14)	-0.319** (0.14)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.028 (0.13)	0.093 (0.14)		0.165* (0.09)	0.121 (0.09)
Years of party membership		0.018* (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)		-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.008 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)		0.004 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Number of political offices		-0.176 (0.14)	-0.220 (0.15)		0.024 (0.12)	-0.105 (0.13)
Local-level office		0.183 (0.21)	0.358 (0.24)		-0.214 (0.18)	0.076 (0.21)
Party office		0.128 (0.26)	0.206 (0.27)		-0.123 (0.22)	-0.080 (0.23)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.021 (0.06)	-0.121* (0.07)		0.024 (0.05)	0.001 (0.06)
Viable SMD/Viable party list slot		1.260*** (0.24)	0.863*** (0.30)		1.227*** (0.17)	1.294*** (0.18)
Local residence in SMD		-0.242 (0.21)	-0.264 (0.21)		-	-
Repeated candidacy in SMD		-0.836*** (0.28)	-1.058*** (0.29)		-	-
Vacant SMD		0.938** (0.42)	1.018** (0.44)		-	-
Election:						
Hesse			-0.293 (0.26)			-0.214 (0.21)
Bavaria			-0.332 (0.24)			-0.680*** (0.18)
Saxony			-0.723*** (0.28)			-0.156 (0.26)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.429 (0.33)			-0.298 (0.20)
FDP			-0.973*** (0.28)			0.318 (0.21)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-1.098*** (0.25)			1.499*** (0.22)
Die Linke			-0.972*** (0.28)			0.671*** (0.25)
Intercept	-0.949*** (0.07)	-0.377 (0.50)	0.491 (0.54)	0.181*** (0.06)	-0.032 (0.37)	-0.442 (0.41)
N	962	962	962	1.076	1.076	1.076
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.005	0.120	0.145	0.001	0.063	0.121
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	5.90**	139.11***	168.00***	1.45	92.82***	179.39***
Log Likelihood	-575	-509	-494	-742	-696	-653
AIC	1154.9	1055.7	1040.8	1487.3	1424.0	1351.4
BIC	1164.6	1148.2	1167.4	1497.3	1503.6	1465.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, no local residence in SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.15: Competition for nomination across immigrant subgroups (binary logistic regression)

	Dependent variable: Contested candidate selection									
	(1)	(2)	SMD (3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	Party list (3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	2.239*** (0.85)					-0.065 (0.63)				
Christian		0.796* (0.42)					-0.441 (0.38)			
Non-European country			1.438*** (0.50)					-0.442 (0.39)		
Muslim country				1.548*** (0.55)					-0.409 (0.47)	
European country					0.102 (0.37)					-0.445 (0.34)
Male	-0.328* (0.19)	-0.303 (0.19)	-0.345* (0.18)	-0.339* (0.18)	-0.281 (0.18)	0.345** (0.16)	0.331** (0.15)	0.308** (0.15)	0.325** (0.15)	0.344** (0.15)
Age	-0.014 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education	-0.055 (0.10)	-0.086 (0.09)	-0.066 (0.10)	-0.056 (0.10)	-0.097 (0.09)	-0.057 (0.08)	-0.036 (0.08)	-0.041 (0.08)	-0.060 (0.08)	-0.040 (0.08)
Incumbent	-1.210*** (0.41)	-1.274*** (0.40)	-1.210*** (0.41)	-1.211*** (0.41)	-1.206*** (0.39)	-0.310 (0.34)	-0.300 (0.33)	-0.255 (0.34)	-0.290 (0.34)	-0.370 (0.33)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.292 (0.21)	-0.285 (0.21)	-0.299 (0.20)	-0.293 (0.20)	-0.238 (0.20)	-0.279* (0.15)	-0.293** (0.15)	-0.308** (0.14)	-0.278* (0.15)	-0.285** (0.14)
Number of prior candidacies	0.112 (0.14)	0.084 (0.15)	0.120 (0.14)	0.118 (0.14)	0.042 (0.15)	0.108 (0.09)	0.094 (0.09)	0.122 (0.09)	0.119 (0.09)	0.098 (0.09)
Years of party membership	0.010 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.005 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.011* (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Number of political offices	-0.189 (0.16)	-0.146 (0.16)	-0.206 (0.16)	-0.208 (0.16)	-0.183 (0.16)	-0.106 (0.13)	-0.087 (0.13)	-0.128 (0.13)	-0.111 (0.13)	-0.062 (0.13)
Local-level office	0.278 (0.25)	0.284 (0.25)	0.307 (0.25)	0.291 (0.25)	0.333 (0.25)	0.100 (0.22)	0.099 (0.22)	0.028 (0.21)	0.033 (0.21)	0.116 (0.21)
Party office	0.227 (0.29)	0.112 (0.28)	0.233 (0.29)	0.242 (0.29)	0.172 (0.28)	-0.091 (0.24)	-0.122 (0.24)	0.021 (0.24)	-0.012 (0.24)	-0.200 (0.24)
Number of org. affiliations	-0.138* (0.07)	-0.129* (0.07)	-0.146** (0.07)	-0.149** (0.07)	-0.123* (0.07)	0.014 (0.06)	0.007 (0.06)	0.002 (0.06)	0.007 (0.06)	0.019 (0.06)
Viable SMD/Viable party list slot	0.799*** (0.31)	0.792** (0.31)	0.854*** (0.31)	0.811*** (0.31)	0.834*** (0.31)	1.313*** (0.18)	1.349*** (0.18)	1.278*** (0.18)	1.270*** (0.18)	1.331*** (0.18)
Local residence in SMD	-0.283 (0.22)	-0.309 (0.22)	-0.292 (0.22)	-0.274 (0.22)	-0.256 (0.22)	-	-	-	-	-
Repeated candidacy in SMD	-1.083*** (0.29)	-1.149*** (0.30)	-1.088*** (0.29)	-1.090*** (0.29)	-1.089*** (0.29)	-	-	-	-	-
Vacant SMD	0.959** (0.44)	0.925** (0.44)	0.969** (0.44)	0.953** (0.44)	0.962** (0.44)	-	-	-	-	-
Election:										
Hesse	-0.353 (0.28)	-0.284 (0.27)	-0.401 (0.27)	-0.401 (0.27)	-0.274 (0.27)	-0.211 (0.22)	-0.127 (0.22)	-0.213 (0.21)	-0.222 (0.21)	-0.173 (0.20)
Bavaria	-0.303 (0.24)	-0.324 (0.24)	-0.297 (0.24)	-0.299 (0.24)	-0.318 (0.24)	-0.648*** (0.19)	-0.630*** (0.19)	-0.641*** (0.19)	-0.636*** (0.19)	-0.635*** (0.19)
Saxony	-0.699** (0.28)	-0.714** (0.28)	-0.702** (0.28)	-0.715** (0.28)	-0.715** (0.28)	-0.146 (0.27)	-0.102 (0.27)	-0.172 (0.27)	-0.133 (0.27)	-0.090 (0.27)
Political party:										
CDU/CSU	-0.287 (0.33)	-0.275 (0.33)	-0.379 (0.33)	-0.312 (0.33)	-0.320 (0.33)	-0.338 (0.21)	-0.286 (0.20)	-0.306 (0.21)	-0.355* (0.21)	-0.320 (0.20)
FDP	-0.908*** (0.29)	-1.010*** (0.29)	-0.908*** (0.28)	-0.920*** (0.28)	-0.974*** (0.29)	0.341 (0.22)	0.344 (0.21)	0.335 (0.21)	0.329 (0.21)	0.312 (0.21)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-1.082*** (0.26)	-1.100*** (0.26)	-1.109*** (0.26)	-1.109*** (0.26)	-1.063*** (0.26)	1.479*** (0.22)	1.519*** (0.22)	1.467*** (0.22)	1.462*** (0.22)	1.488*** (0.22)
Die Linke	-0.779*** (0.29)	-0.792*** (0.29)	-0.887*** (0.29)	-0.881*** (0.29)	-0.837*** (0.28)	0.761*** (0.26)	0.771*** (0.26)	0.661** (0.26)	0.681*** (0.26)	0.731*** (0.26)
Intercept	0.299 (0.57)	0.550 (0.56)	0.365 (0.56)	0.310 (0.57)	0.411 (0.55)	-0.359 (0.42)	-0.455 (0.42)	-0.417 (0.42)	-0.316 (0.42)	-0.356 (0.42)
N	906	924	918	914	939	1.011	1.033	1.031	1.021	1.041
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.146	0.146	0.150	0.148	0.141	0.121	0.125	0.118	0.118	0.123
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	158.36***	161.42***	164.77***	161.91***	157.49***	169.01***	178.44***	167.23***	165.93***	176.46***
Log Likelihood	-462	-471	-468	-467	-479	-612	-623	-627	-620	-630
AIC	976.1	994.3	988.8	985.3	1010.1	1270.0	1292.9	1300.0	1287.0	1305.7
BIC	1101.2	1119.9	1114.2	1110.6	1136.1	1383.1	1406.6	1413.6	1400.3	1419.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, no local residence in SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.16: Competition for nomination across political parties (binary logistic regression)

	Dependent variable:					
	Contested candidate selection			Party list		
	(1)	SMD (2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	1.395** (0.55)	1.464** (0.59)	1.385** (0.59)	-0.397 (0.44)	-0.582 (0.46)	-0.600 (0.46)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU	0.170 (0.23)	-0.326 (0.33)	-0.306 (0.33)	-0.416** (0.19)	-0.315 (0.21)	-0.335 (0.21)
FDP	-0.961*** (0.24)	-0.836*** (0.28)	-0.906*** (0.29)	0.394** (0.19)	0.281 (0.22)	0.300 (0.22)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.985*** (0.22)	-1.052*** (0.26)	-1.077*** (0.26)	1.320*** (0.20)	1.346*** (0.22)	1.441*** (0.22)
Die Linke	-0.802*** (0.23)	-0.769*** (0.29)	-0.808*** (0.29)	0.790*** (0.22)	0.678*** (0.26)	0.742*** (0.26)
IO * CDU/CSU	-1.636* (0.93)	-1.817* (1.03)	-1.838* (1.03)	0.521 (0.73)	0.608 (0.76)	0.653 (0.77)
IO * FDP	-0.841 (0.90)	-1.046 (0.94)	-0.998 (0.94)	0.027 (0.72)	0.104 (0.76)	0.153 (0.77)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.318 (0.95)	0.204 (1.05)	0.186 (1.06)	1.335 (1.16)	1.705 (1.17)	1.539 (1.18)
IO * Die Linke	-1.435* (0.77)	-1.584** (0.81)	-1.558* (0.81)	-0.215 (0.67)	-0.385 (0.70)	-0.481 (0.71)
Male		-0.344* (0.18)	-0.329* (0.18)		0.251* (0.15)	0.305** (0.15)
Age		-0.011 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.096 (0.09)	-0.107 (0.09)		-0.000 (0.08)	-0.021 (0.08)
Incumbent		-1.246*** (0.38)	-1.154*** (0.39)		-0.368 (0.32)	-0.279 (0.33)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.286 (0.20)	-0.316 (0.20)		-0.334** (0.14)	-0.339** (0.14)
Number of prior candidacies		0.060 (0.14)	0.111 (0.14)		0.118 (0.09)	0.125 (0.09)
Years of party membership		0.008 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)		-0.006 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.009 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Number of political offices		-0.114 (0.15)	-0.207 (0.15)		0.019 (0.12)	-0.107 (0.13)
Local-level office		0.090 (0.22)	0.323 (0.24)		-0.168 (0.19)	0.074 (0.21)
Party office		0.139 (0.27)	0.210 (0.28)		-0.199 (0.23)	-0.092 (0.23)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.096 (0.07)	-0.129* (0.07)		0.012 (0.06)	0.005 (0.06)
Viable SMD/Viable party list slot		0.935*** (0.30)	0.866*** (0.30)		1.274*** (0.17)	1.321*** (0.18)
Local residence in SMD		-0.200 (0.21)	-0.251 (0.21)		-	-
Repeated candidacy in SMD		-0.965*** (0.28)	-1.072*** (0.29)		-	-
Vacant SMD		0.993** (0.43)	1.019** (0.43)		-	-
Election:						
Hesse			-0.257 (0.26)			-0.203 (0.21)
Bavaria			-0.310 (0.24)			-0.678*** (0.18)
Saxony			-0.728*** (0.28)			-0.165 (0.27)
Intercept	-0.440*** (0.15)	0.346 (0.54)	0.412 (0.55)	-0.178 (0.13)	-0.372 (0.41)	-0.439 (0.41)
N	962	962	962	1.076	1.076	1.076
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.053	0.145	0.151	0.065	0.114	0.124
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	61.51***	167.45***	174.96***	96.52***	169.71***	183.69***
Log Likelihood	-548	-495	-491	-694	-658	-651
AIC	1115.3	1043.3	1041.8	1408.2	1363.1	1355.1
BIC	1164.0	1174.8	1187.9	1458.1	1482.6	1489.6

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, no local residence in SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.17: Competition for nomination across the type of party selectorate (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Contested candidate selection			Party list		
	(1)	SMD (2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	1.296 (0.86)	0.632 (1.02)	0.600 (1.01)	-1.185** (0.52)	-1.392** (0.57)	-1.370** (0.61)
Party selectorate:						
Party member assembly	-1.193*** (0.24)	-1.228*** (0.31)	-0.506 (0.39)	0.109 (0.22)	0.105 (0.25)	-0.445 (0.28)
IO * Party member assembly	-0.599 (1.02)	-0.193 (1.18)	-0.382 (1.19)	0.831 (0.87)	0.984 (0.94)	1.317 (1.00)
Male		-0.139 (0.30)	-0.311 (0.33)		0.100 (0.21)	0.373 (0.24)
Age		-0.019 (0.01)	-0.021 (0.02)		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Education		-0.026 (0.15)	0.023 (0.15)		0.045 (0.10)	-0.039 (0.11)
Incumbent		-0.529 (0.54)	-0.833 (0.56)		-0.461 (0.42)	-0.579 (0.47)
Legislative terms in parliament		-0.455 (0.28)	-0.551* (0.30)		-0.711*** (0.20)	-0.740*** (0.22)
Number of prior candidacies		0.148 (0.20)	0.294 (0.21)		0.238** (0.12)	0.177 (0.13)
Years of party membership		0.007 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)		-0.017 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.016* (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)		0.008 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Number of political offices		-0.277 (0.22)	-0.226 (0.22)		0.076 (0.17)	0.002 (0.18)
Local-level office		1.281** (0.64)	1.240* (0.68)		0.194 (0.50)	0.598 (0.55)
Party office		-0.738 (0.54)	-0.814 (0.58)		-0.524 (0.48)	-0.798 (0.53)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.053 (0.11)	-0.149 (0.12)		0.013 (0.08)	-0.026 (0.09)
Viable SMD/Viable party list slot		0.686 (0.44)	0.020 (0.59)		1.475*** (0.27)	1.743*** (0.29)
Local residence in SMD		-0.644** (0.33)	-0.565* (0.34)		-	-
Repeated candidacy in SMD		-0.953** (0.48)	-1.312** (0.51)		-	-
Vacant SMD		0.559 (0.61)	0.255 (0.68)		-	-
Election:						
Hesse			0.415 (0.38)			0.014 (0.34)
Bavaria			0.441 (0.37)			-0.522* (0.31)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.362 (0.70)			-0.470 (0.33)
FDP			-1.366*** (0.51)			0.457 (0.33)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-1.612*** (0.48)			1.878*** (0.34)
Die Linke			-1.196** (0.50)			1.325*** (0.39)
Intercept	-0.379** (0.18)	0.009 (0.86)	0.264 (0.92)	0.022 (0.11)	-0.304 (0.53)	-0.559 (0.64)
N	408	408	408	497	497	497
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.066	0.158	0.188	0.010	0.088	0.170
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	30.63***	73.68***	87.68***	6.67*	60.68***	117.14***
Log Likelihood	-218	-197	-190	-341	-314	-286
AIC	444.8	431.8	431.8	690.3	664.3	619.8
BIC	460.9	516.0	540.1	707.1	740.1	720.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, no local residence in SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.18: Competition for nomination across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Contested candidate selection on party list		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>			
IO	-0.345 (0.34)	-0.555* (0.29)	-0.515* (0.27)
Male		0.109 (0.14)	0.278* (0.15)
Age		0.006 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.020 (0.07)	-0.017 (0.08)
Incumbent		-0.385 (0.32)	-0.360 (0.33)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.445*** (0.14)	-0.356** (0.15)
Number of prior candidacies		0.166* (0.09)	0.112 (0.09)
Years of party membership		-0.024*** (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.003 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.006 (0.12)	-0.043 (0.13)
Local-level office		-0.099 (0.20)	0.053 (0.21)
Party office		-0.096 (0.23)	-0.124 (0.23)
Number of org. affiliations		0.009 (0.06)	-0.016 (0.06)
Viable party list slot		1.360*** (0.18)	1.424*** (0.18)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.691 (0.48)
Bavaria			-0.229 (0.27)
Saxony			-0.869 (0.55)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-0.314 (0.21)
FDP			0.345 (0.22)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			1.526*** (0.22)
Die Linke			0.727*** (0.26)
<i>MMD level:</i>			
District magnitude	0.008* (0.00)	0.013** (0.01)	0.020*** (0.01)
IO * District magnitude	0.024 (0.02)	0.020 (0.02)	0.016 (0.01)
<i>Random part:</i>			
Variance IO	0.524 (0.91)	0.126 (0.53)	0.000 (0.00)
Variance MMD	0.089* (0.05)	0.123* (0.07)	0.127 (0.08)
Intraclass correlation	0.026 (0.01)	0.036 (0.02)	0.037 (0.02)
Intercept	0.218** (0.10)	-0.140 (0.39)	-0.407 (0.44)
N (Candidates)	1.076	1.076	1.076
N (MMDs)	25	25	25
Wald χ^2 (df)	7.33*	87.63***	143.13***
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.018	0.132	0.233
Log Likelihood	-731	-683	-642
AIC	1473.1	1405.2	1335.1
BIC	1503.0	1504.8	1464.6

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.19: Competition for nomination across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Contested candidate selection in SMD				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	0.400 (0.32)	0.495 (0.30)	0.498* (0.30)	0.474 (0.31)	0.392 (0.31)
Male	-0.284 (0.18)	-0.282 (0.18)	-0.283 (0.18)	-0.277 (0.18)	-0.289 (0.18)
Age	-0.015* (0.01)	-0.015* (0.01)	-0.015* (0.01)	-0.015* (0.01)	-0.016* (0.01)
Age squared	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Education	-0.124 (0.10)	-0.125 (0.10)	-0.126 (0.10)	-0.125 (0.10)	-0.125 (0.10)
Incumbent	-1.194*** (0.40)	-1.199*** (0.40)	-1.199*** (0.40)	-1.204*** (0.40)	-1.169*** (0.40)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.299 (0.20)	-0.301 (0.20)	-0.298 (0.20)	-0.298 (0.20)	-0.316 (0.20)
Number of prior candidacies	0.116 (0.14)	0.123 (0.14)	0.121 (0.14)	0.122 (0.14)	0.127 (0.14)
Years of party membership	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.009 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Number of political offices	-0.202 (0.16)	-0.195 (0.16)	-0.196 (0.16)	-0.196 (0.16)	-0.196 (0.16)
Local-level office	0.384 (0.25)	0.380 (0.25)	0.380 (0.25)	0.384 (0.25)	0.388 (0.25)
Party office	0.107 (0.28)	0.098 (0.28)	0.100 (0.28)	0.101 (0.28)	0.084 (0.28)
Number of org. affiliations	-0.110 (0.07)	-0.112 (0.07)	-0.112 (0.07)	-0.113 (0.07)	-0.107 (0.07)
Local residence in SMD	-0.267 (0.22)	-0.252 (0.22)	-0.248 (0.22)	-0.253 (0.22)	-0.279 (0.22)
Viable SMD	0.769** (0.31)	0.754** (0.31)	0.754** (0.31)	0.748** (0.31)	0.781** (0.31)
Repeated candidacy in SMD	-1.028*** (0.29)	-1.038*** (0.29)	-1.035*** (0.29)	-1.035*** (0.29)	-1.035*** (0.29)
Vacant SMD	1.138** (0.45)	1.146** (0.45)	1.143** (0.45)	1.145** (0.45)	1.137** (0.45)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	-0.227 (0.31)	-0.213 (0.31)	-0.215 (0.31)	-0.213 (0.31)	-0.217 (0.31)
Bavaria	-0.057 (0.31)	-0.065 (0.31)	-0.058 (0.31)	-0.057 (0.31)	-0.048 (0.31)
Saxony	-0.317 (0.50)	-0.324 (0.50)	-0.320 (0.50)	-0.322 (0.50)	-0.236 (0.51)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.439 (0.33)	-0.445 (0.33)	-0.441 (0.33)	-0.438 (0.33)	-0.441 (0.33)
FDP	-1.043*** (0.28)	-1.047*** (0.28)	-1.051*** (0.28)	-1.049*** (0.28)	-1.030*** (0.28)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-1.166*** (0.26)	-1.170*** (0.26)	-1.171*** (0.26)	-1.166*** (0.26)	-1.164*** (0.26)
Die Linke	-1.036*** (0.29)	-1.037*** (0.29)	-1.037*** (0.29)	-1.035*** (0.29)	-1.023*** (0.29)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.022 (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	0.027 (0.02)	0.027 (0.02)	0.031 (0.02)
% Unemployment	0.058 (0.04)	0.056 (0.04)	0.058 (0.04)	0.059 (0.04)	0.059 (0.04)
% High school graduates	0.018 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.018 (0.01)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.028 (0.10)	-0.021 (0.10)	-0.023 (0.10)	-0.018 (0.10)	-0.035 (0.11)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	0.042 (0.04)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.017 (0.09)			
IO * % High school graduates			0.011 (0.04)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.092 (0.27)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance IO	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intraclass correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	0.496 (0.57)	0.508 (0.57)	0.506 (0.57)	0.500 (0.57)	0.502 (0.57)
N (Candidates)	953	953	953	953	953
N (SMDs)	456	456	456	456	456
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.261	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.263
Wald χ^2 (df)	134.20***	133.66***	133.76***	133.77***	134.46***
Log Likelihood	-483	-484	-483	-483	-481
AIC	1028.3	1029.3	1029.2	1029.2	1026.3
BIC	1183.8	1184.8	1184.7	1184.7	1181.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (= 1), not or hardly contested (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, no local residence in SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.20: Importance of party support in the candidate selection (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Importance of support from the state party leadership in the candidate selection		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.244 (0.40)	0.221 (0.42)	0.071 (0.45)
Male		-0.790*** (0.22)	-0.893*** (0.24)
Age		0.008 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.138 (0.11)	-0.089 (0.11)
Incumbent		-0.782* (0.44)	-0.812* (0.47)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.034 (0.18)	-0.053 (0.19)
Number of prior candidacies		0.051 (0.13)	0.029 (0.13)
Years of party membership		-0.014 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.011* (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.317* (0.18)	0.291 (0.19)
Local-level office		-0.220 (0.47)	-0.439 (0.52)
Party office		-0.561 (0.44)	-0.486 (0.48)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.017 (0.09)	0.103 (0.10)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list		0.329 (0.40)	0.918* (0.47)
Dual		0.465 (0.38)	0.887** (0.42)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.494 (0.31)
Bavaria			-1.360*** (0.32)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			0.442 (0.33)
FDP			0.687* (0.37)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.644* (0.38)
Die Linke			0.492 (0.37)
Intercept	-1.414*** (0.10)	-0.120 (0.66)	0.039 (0.75)
N	631	631	631
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.001	0.048	0.109
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	0.37	29.84**	68.60***
Log Likelihood	-314	-299	-280
AIC	631.8	632.3	605.6
BIC	640.7	707.9	707.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.21: Importance of party support in the candidate selection (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Importance of support from the local party chapter in the candidate selection (1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.528 (0.34)	-0.430 (0.35)	-0.528 (0.35)
Male		-0.306 (0.19)	-0.442** (0.20)
Age		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.012 (0.09)	0.013 (0.09)
Incumbent		0.059 (0.38)	0.095 (0.40)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.008 (0.16)	-0.077 (0.17)
Number of prior candidacies		0.032 (0.11)	0.067 (0.11)
Years of party membership		0.006 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Party activity rate		-0.003 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.215 (0.15)	0.204 (0.15)
Local-level office		0.148 (0.40)	0.007 (0.41)
Party office		-0.060 (0.37)	0.032 (0.38)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.017 (0.07)	-0.002 (0.08)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list		-0.212 (0.30)	-0.579 (0.36)
Dual		0.017 (0.28)	-0.161 (0.32)
Election:			
Hesse			0.308 (0.26)
Bavaria			0.255 (0.26)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			0.446 (0.28)
FDP			-0.004 (0.30)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.451* (0.26)
Die Linke			-0.026 (0.31)
Intercept	0.633*** (0.09)	0.850 (0.54)	0.926 (0.59)
N	635	635	635
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.003	0.021	0.035
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	2.43	17.01	28.69**
Log Likelihood	-412	-404	-398
AIC	827.2	842.6	842.9
BIC	836.1	918.3	945.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.22: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across immigrant subgroups (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>									
	Importance of support from the state party leadership in the candidate selection					Importance of support from the local party chapter in the candidate selection				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	0.367 (0.79)					-0.860 (0.71)				
Christian		-0.144 (0.70)					-0.857* (0.51)			
Non-European country			0.268 (0.59)					-0.555 (0.52)		
Muslim country				0.808 (0.67)					-0.630 (0.62)	
European country					-0.028 (0.67)					-0.422 (0.47)
Male	-0.957*** (0.25)	-0.957*** (0.25)	-0.929*** (0.24)	-0.972*** (0.25)	-0.935*** (0.25)	-0.471** (0.21)	-0.494** (0.21)	-0.481** (0.21)	-0.488** (0.21)	-0.442** (0.21)
Age	0.015 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)	0.015 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Age squared	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education	-0.100 (0.12)	-0.093 (0.11)	-0.097 (0.11)	-0.102 (0.11)	-0.097 (0.11)	0.012 (0.09)	0.017 (0.09)	0.014 (0.09)	0.008 (0.09)	0.005 (0.09)
Incumbent	-0.744 (0.48)	-0.762 (0.48)	-0.718 (0.48)	-0.736 (0.48)	-0.780 (0.48)	0.102 (0.41)	0.145 (0.40)	0.119 (0.41)	0.105 (0.41)	0.108 (0.40)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.019 (0.20)	-0.036 (0.20)	-0.032 (0.20)	-0.007 (0.20)	-0.057 (0.20)	-0.093 (0.17)	-0.077 (0.17)	-0.060 (0.17)	-0.087 (0.17)	-0.099 (0.17)
Number of prior candidacies	-0.006 (0.14)	0.030 (0.14)	-0.012 (0.14)	-0.022 (0.14)	0.060 (0.14)	0.060 (0.11)	0.056 (0.11)	0.048 (0.11)	0.052 (0.11)	0.075 (0.11)
Years of party membership	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.013* (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Number of political offices	0.297 (0.19)	0.284 (0.19)	0.293 (0.19)	0.299 (0.19)	0.274 (0.16)	0.200 (0.16)	0.164 (0.16)	0.211 (0.16)	0.206 (0.16)	0.191 (0.15)
Local-level office	-0.563 (0.54)	-0.685 (0.55)	-0.476 (0.53)	-0.609 (0.54)	-0.797 (0.55)	0.038 (0.42)	-0.066 (0.42)	0.064 (0.42)	0.016 (0.42)	-0.182 (0.42)
Party office	-0.459 (0.51)	-0.297 (0.51)	-0.476 (0.50)	-0.381 (0.51)	-0.148 (0.52)	-0.049 (0.40)	0.107 (0.38)	-0.043 (0.40)	-0.020 (0.40)	0.190 (0.39)
Number of org. affiliations	0.090 (0.10)	0.117 (0.10)	0.103 (0.10)	0.097 (0.10)	0.109 (0.10)	-0.020 (0.08)	0.017 (0.08)	-0.022 (0.08)	-0.013 (0.08)	0.005 (0.08)
Mode of candidacy:										
Party list	1.194** (0.50)	1.155** (0.50)	1.028** (0.49)	1.049** (0.49)	1.041** (0.49)	-0.463 (0.36)	-0.488 (0.36)	-0.515 (0.36)	-0.514 (0.36)	-0.535 (0.36)
Dual	1.113** (0.45)	1.042** (0.45)	0.982** (0.43)	0.989** (0.43)	0.932** (0.44)	-0.022 (0.33)	-0.111 (0.33)	-0.072 (0.33)	-0.055 (0.33)	-0.172 (0.32)
Election:										
Hesse	-0.543* (0.32)	-0.571* (0.32)	-0.417 (0.31)	-0.498 (0.31)	-0.619** (0.31)	0.244 (0.27)	0.221 (0.27)	0.321 (0.27)	0.268 (0.27)	0.211 (0.27)
Bavaria	-1.399*** (0.33)	-1.397*** (0.33)	-1.333*** (0.33)	-1.383*** (0.33)	-1.406*** (0.33)	0.188 (0.27)	0.208 (0.27)	0.243 (0.27)	0.192 (0.27)	0.218 (0.26)
Political party:										
CDU/CSU	0.510 (0.34)	0.410 (0.34)	0.565* (0.34)	0.532 (0.34)	0.361 (0.34)	0.417 (0.29)	0.395 (0.29)	0.456 (0.29)	0.432 (0.29)	0.352 (0.29)
FDP	0.810** (0.38)	0.689* (0.37)	0.829** (0.38)	0.829** (0.38)	0.673* (0.37)	-0.017 (0.30)	-0.055 (0.30)	0.035 (0.30)	-0.006 (0.30)	-0.086 (0.30)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.563 (0.39)	-0.702* (0.39)	-0.535 (0.39)	-0.555 (0.39)	-0.721* (0.39)	-0.475* (0.27)	-0.525* (0.27)	-0.429 (0.27)	-0.469* (0.27)	-0.539** (0.27)
Die Linke	0.537 (0.39)	0.327 (0.39)	0.580 (0.38)	0.582 (0.39)	0.384 (0.39)	-0.080 (0.32)	-0.143 (0.32)	-0.054 (0.32)	-0.059 (0.32)	-0.113 (0.32)
Intercept	-0.103 (0.78)	0.024 (0.78)	-0.142 (0.76)	-0.030 (0.77)	0.137 (0.76)	0.929 (0.60)	0.964 (0.60)	0.876 (0.60)	0.969 (0.60)	1.074* (0.61)
N	602	611	610	605	613	606	615	614	609	617
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.117	0.113	0.116	0.120	0.109	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.033	0.031
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	70.11***	67.87***	70.61***	72.41***	65.85***	25.62	26.56	26.75	26.18	24.33
Log Likelihood	-264	-267	-270	-267	-269	-379	-386	-384	-381	-387
AIC	574.5	580.6	585.9	579.1	583.5	805.0	817.9	814.4	808.2	820.7
BIC	675.7	682.2	687.4	680.4	685.2	906.3	919.6	916.1	909.7	922.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.23: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across political parties (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Importance of support from the state party leadership in the candidate selection			Importance of support from the local party chapter in the candidate selection		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.557 (0.71)	0.635 (0.76)	0.468 (0.79)	-1.065* (0.61)	-0.846 (0.63)	-0.841 (0.63)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU	0.354 (0.31)	0.489 (0.34)	0.477 (0.34)	0.289 (0.27)	0.379 (0.29)	0.386 (0.29)
FDP	0.411 (0.33)	0.661* (0.37)	0.791** (0.38)	-0.080 (0.28)	-0.021 (0.30)	-0.026 (0.31)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.550 (0.35)	-0.769** (0.38)	-0.602 (0.39)	-0.441* (0.25)	-0.486* (0.27)	-0.482* (0.27)
Die Linke	0.439 (0.33)	0.381 (0.39)	0.468 (0.39)	-0.160 (0.29)	-0.067 (0.33)	-0.068 (0.33)
IO * CDU/CSU	-0.289 (1.12)	-0.705 (1.20)	-0.478 (1.22)	0.964 (1.06)	0.964 (1.07)	0.901 (1.07)
IO * FDP	-	-	-	0.417 (1.04)	0.207 (1.07)	0.139 (1.07)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-	-	-	0.777 (1.55)	0.336 (1.63)	0.377 (1.65)
IO * Die Linke	-0.018 (0.98)	-0.067 (1.05)	0.195 (1.10)	0.679 (0.89)	0.450 (0.92)	0.396 (0.92)
Male		-1.039*** (0.23)	-0.887*** (0.24)		-0.424** (0.20)	-0.439** (0.20)
Age		0.006 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)		-0.002 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.102 (0.11)	-0.086 (0.11)		0.019 (0.09)	0.015 (0.09)
Incumbent		-0.812* (0.45)	-0.789* (0.47)		-0.000 (0.38)	0.091 (0.40)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.054 (0.19)	-0.052 (0.20)		-0.058 (0.17)	-0.076 (0.17)
Number of prior candidacies		0.081 (0.13)	0.039 (0.13)		0.066 (0.11)	0.069 (0.11)
Years of party membership		-0.014 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.013* (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)		-0.006 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.348* (0.18)	0.278 (0.19)		0.208 (0.15)	0.203 (0.15)
Local-level office		-0.452 (0.51)	-0.482 (0.52)		0.063 (0.41)	0.014 (0.41)
Party office		-0.461 (0.47)	-0.404 (0.48)		-0.020 (0.38)	0.023 (0.38)
Number of org. affiliations		0.018 (0.09)	0.095 (0.10)		0.011 (0.08)	0.001 (0.08)
Mode of candidacy:						
Party list		0.128 (0.44)	0.926* (0.48)		-0.431 (0.32)	-0.579 (0.36)
Dual		0.324 (0.40)	0.892** (0.42)		-0.048 (0.30)	-0.159 (0.32)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.487 (0.31)			0.297 (0.26)
Bavaria			-1.340*** (0.32)			0.249 (0.26)
Intercept	-1.537*** (0.23)	0.062 (0.73)	-0.043 (0.75)	0.728*** (0.19)	1.035* (0.59)	0.955 (0.60)
N	622	622	622	635	635	635
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.023	0.079	0.110	0.015	0.034	0.036
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	14.46**	49.33***	68.81***	12.53	28.14	29.48
Log Likelihood	-305	-287	-278	-407	-399	-398
AIC	625.7	620.8	605.4	833.1	847.5	850.1
BIC	661.2	722.8	716.2	877.6	958.8	970.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.24: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across the mode of candidacy (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Importance of support from the state party leadership in the candidate selection			Importance of support from the local party chapter in the candidate selection		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	2.757** (1.28)	3.205** (1.30)	3.115** (1.34)	-0.644 (0.45)	-0.524 (0.47)	-0.581 (0.47)
Mode of candidacy:						
Party list	0.767* (0.41)	0.624 (0.43)	1.210** (0.50)	-0.057 (0.29)	-0.109 (0.30)	-0.485 (0.36)
Dual	0.692* (0.40)	0.668 (0.42)	1.082** (0.45)	0.190 (0.27)	0.107 (0.29)	-0.081 (0.33)
IO * Party list	-4.025** (1.66)	-4.537*** (1.69)	-4.739*** (1.73)	-0.136 (0.72)	-0.189 (0.73)	-0.260 (0.74)
IO * Dual	-2.302* (1.38)	-2.791** (1.41)	-2.778* (1.45)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Male		-0.816*** (0.22)	-0.936*** (0.24)		-0.311 (0.19)	-0.448** (0.20)
Age		0.009 (0.01)	0.019* (0.01)		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.137 (0.11)	-0.086 (0.11)		-0.014 (0.09)	0.008 (0.09)
Incumbent		-0.765* (0.45)	-0.810* (0.47)		0.071 (0.38)	0.098 (0.40)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.062 (0.19)	-0.013 (0.20)		0.023 (0.16)	-0.059 (0.17)
Number of prior candidacies		0.025 (0.13)	-0.001 (0.14)		0.020 (0.11)	0.053 (0.11)
Years of party membership		-0.015 (0.01)	-0.015 (0.01)		0.006 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.012* (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)		-0.003 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.325* (0.18)	0.300 (0.19)		0.214 (0.15)	0.203 (0.15)
Local-level office		-0.216 (0.48)	-0.434 (0.53)		0.171 (0.41)	0.028 (0.41)
Party office		-0.596 (0.45)	-0.534 (0.49)		-0.087 (0.37)	0.008 (0.38)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.013 (0.09)	0.116 (0.10)		-0.016 (0.07)	0.001 (0.08)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.556* (0.31)			0.289 (0.27)
Bavaria			-1.407*** (0.32)			0.239 (0.26)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.458 (0.34)			0.448 (0.28)
FDP			0.699* (0.37)			-0.010 (0.30)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.663* (0.38)			-0.456* (0.27)
Die Linke			0.365 (0.38)			-0.098 (0.31)
Intercept	-2.064*** (0.38)	-0.313 (0.68)	-0.082 (0.77)	0.549** (0.25)	0.774 (0.54)	0.890 (0.59)
N	631	631	631	632	632	632
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.016	0.061	0.124	0.007	0.022	0.036
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	9.88*	38.47***	77.63***	6.02	18.17	29.66
Log Likelihood	-309	-295	-275	-408	-402	-397
AIC	630.3	627.7	600.5	827.0	840.8	841.3
BIC	657.0	712.2	711.7	849.2	920.9	948.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.25: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across the type of party selectorate (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Importance of support from the state party leadership in the candidate selection					
	SMD			Party list		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	1.801** (0.80)	2.081** (0.88)	2.110** (0.90)	-0.404 (0.64)	-0.496 (0.69)	-0.644 (0.72)
Party selectorate:						
Party member assembly	0.021 (0.28)	0.098 (0.32)	-0.042 (0.39)	-0.010 (0.27)	-0.194 (0.30)	0.246 (0.34)
IO * Party member assembly	-1.487 (0.99)	-1.864* (1.09)	-1.966* (1.13)	0.358 (1.04)	0.341 (1.10)	0.297 (1.16)
Male		-0.801*** (0.29)	-1.002*** (0.32)		-0.688*** (0.24)	-0.905*** (0.26)
Age		0.017 (0.01)	0.023 (0.01)		0.007 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education		-0.153 (0.15)	-0.125 (0.15)		-0.174 (0.12)	-0.126 (0.13)
Incumbent		-1.029** (0.49)	-1.060** (0.54)		-0.931* (0.48)	-0.911* (0.52)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.517** (0.24)	0.503** (0.25)		0.118 (0.20)	0.023 (0.21)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.303 (0.20)	-0.352* (0.20)		0.011 (0.15)	-0.040 (0.15)
Years of party membership		-0.025 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)		-0.019 (0.01)	-0.019 (0.02)
Party activity rate		0.011 (0.01)	0.019** (0.01)		0.015** (0.01)	0.016* (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.290 (0.21)	0.279 (0.23)		0.413** (0.19)	0.416** (0.21)
Local-level office		-0.286 (0.61)	-0.521 (0.67)		-0.075 (0.56)	-0.636 (0.63)
Party office		-0.166 (0.56)	0.020 (0.61)		-0.895* (0.54)	-0.526 (0.60)
Number of org. affiliations		0.103 (0.11)	0.222* (0.13)		0.055 (0.10)	0.186* (0.11)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.446 (0.37)			-0.423 (0.35)
Bavaria			-1.010*** (0.38)			-1.249*** (0.35)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.534 (0.54)			0.389 (0.35)
FDP			0.861* (0.49)			0.590 (0.39)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.787 (0.52)			-1.163** (0.45)
Die Linke			0.215 (0.48)			0.127 (0.43)
Intercept	-1.513*** (0.23)	0.015 (0.81)	0.707 (0.90)	-1.330*** (0.13)	0.548 (0.62)	1.268* (0.73)
N	413	413	413	509	509	509
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.013	0.077	0.131	0.001	0.054	0.122
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	5.35	31.03**	52.92***	0.44	27.76**	63.26***
Log Likelihood	-199	-186	-175	-259	-245	-227
AIC	405.8	406.1	396.2	525.7	524.4	500.9
BIC	421.9	474.1	396.2	542.6	596.4	598.2

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.26: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across the type of party selectorate (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Importance of support from the local party chapter in the candidate selection			Party list		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.132 (0.86)	0.044 (0.91)	-0.049 (0.92)	-0.438 (0.45)	-0.296 (0.47)	-0.382 (0.48)
Party selectorate:						
Party member assembly	-0.458* (0.24)	-0.334 (0.27)	-0.226 (0.34)	-0.411* (0.22)	-0.276 (0.24)	-0.253 (0.26)
IO * Party member assembly	-0.340 (1.00)	-0.465 (1.04)	-0.562 (1.06)	-0.100 (0.83)	-0.358 (0.86)	-0.478 (0.87)
Male		-0.253 (0.26)	-0.310 (0.27)		-0.233 (0.21)	-0.332 (0.22)
Age		0.008 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)		-0.005 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education		0.041 (0.12)	0.063 (0.12)		0.001 (0.10)	0.052 (0.10)
Incumbent		0.154 (0.41)	0.259 (0.44)		0.390 (0.43)	0.711 (0.46)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.129 (0.20)	0.118 (0.20)		-0.160 (0.18)	-0.273 (0.19)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.088 (0.14)	-0.105 (0.15)		0.092 (0.13)	0.103 (0.13)
Years of party membership		0.003 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)		0.004 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)		-0.000 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.145 (0.18)	0.143 (0.18)		0.273 (0.17)	0.257 (0.17)
Local-level office		0.194 (0.51)	0.133 (0.51)		0.135 (0.50)	-0.137 (0.51)
Party office		-0.090 (0.47)	-0.037 (0.48)		-0.173 (0.48)	0.068 (0.50)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.096 (0.09)	-0.109 (0.10)		-0.023 (0.08)	-0.000 (0.08)
Election:						
Hesse			0.275 (0.31)			0.635** (0.32)
Bavaria			0.117 (0.29)			0.289 (0.29)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.291 (0.42)			0.489 (0.32)
FDP			0.069 (0.42)			0.094 (0.32)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.353 (0.40)			-0.341 (0.30)
Die Linke			0.106 (0.44)			0.307 (0.37)
Intercept	1.048*** (0.20)	0.920 (0.66)	0.800 (0.73)	0.725*** (0.11)	0.786 (0.52)	0.259 (0.59)
N	413	413	413	513	513	513
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.010	0.026	0.034	0.008	0.027	0.046
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	5.38	13.49	17.53	5.44	17.76	30.86*
Log Likelihood	-259	-255	-253	-331	-325	-318
AIC	526.0	543.9	551.9	669.8	683.5	682.4
BIC	542.3	612.3	644.4	686.8	755.6	779.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.27: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Importance of support from the state party leadership in the candidate selection			Importance of support from the local party chapter in the candidate selection		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>						
IO	-0.098 (0.53)	-0.111 (0.55)	-0.241 (0.56)	-0.720** (0.36)	-0.572 (0.37)	-0.645* (0.38)
Male		-0.710*** (0.24)	-0.930*** (0.25)		-0.278 (0.21)	-0.390* (0.21)
Age		0.019* (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)		-0.005 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education		-0.140 (0.12)	-0.109 (0.12)		-0.024 (0.10)	0.022 (0.10)
Incumbent		-0.802* (0.48)	-0.744 (0.49)		0.556 (0.42)	0.574 (0.43)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.006 (0.20)	-0.067 (0.21)		-0.151 (0.18)	-0.228 (0.18)
Number of prior candidacies		0.031 (0.14)	0.033 (0.15)		0.074 (0.12)	0.112 (0.13)
Years of party membership		-0.012 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.011 (0.01)	0.014* (0.01)		-0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.289 (0.20)	0.341* (0.20)		0.265 (0.16)	0.283* (0.16)
Local-level office		-0.357 (0.55)	-0.526 (0.59)		-0.292 (0.48)	-0.446 (0.48)
Party office		-0.680 (0.52)	-0.628 (0.55)		0.284 (0.45)	0.354 (0.46)
Number of org. affiliations		0.097 (0.10)	0.146 (0.10)		-0.009 (0.08)	0.017 (0.08)
Election:						
Hesse			0.413 (0.55)			0.574 (0.40)
Bavaria			1.656 (1.61)			0.825 (1.02)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.444 (0.33)			0.481* (0.29)
FDP			0.674* (0.38)			0.063 (0.31)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.718* (0.41)			-0.490* (0.28)
Die Linke			0.347 (0.41)			0.123 (0.34)
<i>MMD level:</i>						
District magnitude	0.018* (0.01)	0.021* (0.01)	0.067* (0.04)	0.003 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	0.014 (0.02)
IO * District magnitude	0.007 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.03)	-0.001 (0.03)	0.002 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Fixed effects for MMDs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Intercept	-1.284*** (0.23)	0.486 (0.66)	-0.936 (1.38)	0.592*** (0.19)	0.797 (0.55)	0.095 (0.90)
N	557	557	557	561	561	561
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.064	0.111	0.136	0.022	0.042	0.057
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	36.54***	63.16***	77.01***	15.94	30.78	41.54*
Log Likelihood	-265	-252	-245	-357	-349	-344
AIC	552.7	552.1	546.3	735.7	746.9	744.1
BIC	600.3	655.9	667.3	783.3	850.8	865.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.28: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Importance of support from the state party leadership in the candidate selection				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	1.127*	1.159**	1.166**	0.947	1.117*
	(0.61)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.63)	(0.57)
Male	-1.050***	-1.048***	-1.049***	-1.064***	-1.052***
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Age	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.016
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.133	-0.135	-0.116	-0.140	-0.133
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Incumbent	-0.668	-0.700	-0.707	-0.694	-0.667
	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.411	0.425*	0.383	0.433*	0.412
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Number of prior candidacies	-0.335*	-0.341*	-0.311	-0.346*	-0.336*
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Years of party membership	-0.014	-0.015	-0.016	-0.015	-0.014
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party activity rate	0.022**	0.022**	0.022**	0.021**	0.022**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Number of political offices	0.300	0.313	0.330	0.298	0.299
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Local-level office	-0.606	-0.618	-0.596	-0.612	-0.605
	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.67)	(0.67)
Party office	-0.208	-0.222	-0.291	-0.168	-0.206
	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.59)
Number of org. affiliations	0.219*	0.217*	0.204	0.221*	0.219*
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	-1.229	-1.183	-1.290	-1.210	-1.225
	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.88)	(0.88)
Bavaria	-1.899**	-1.833**	-1.964**	-1.852**	-1.895**
	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.87)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.578	-0.612	-0.574	-0.591	-0.577
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)
FDP	0.925**	0.905**	0.940**	0.910**	0.925**
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.653	-0.661	-0.644	-0.655	-0.653
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Die Linke	0.144	0.101	0.140	0.130	0.145
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.025	0.025	0.031	0.021	0.025
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Unemployment	-0.298	-0.242	-0.294	-0.285	-0.298
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
% High school graduates	0.022	0.023	0.026	0.023	0.022
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% Right-wing vote share	0.025	0.014	0.026	0.030	0.025
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Urbanity	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.002				
	(0.06)				
IO * % Unemployment		-0.332			
		(0.37)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.059		
			(0.06)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.326	
				(0.43)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000
					(0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intraclass correlation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	1.594	1.610	1.648	1.582	1.589
	(1.09)	(1.08)	(1.08)	(1.08)	(1.08)
N (Candidates)	417	417	417	417	417
N (SMDs)	191	191	191	191	191
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.231	0.235	0.236	0.234	0.231
Wald χ^2 (df)	44.04**	44.60**	44.93**	44.48**	44.04**
Log Likelihood	-177	-176	-176	-176	-177
AIC	407.2	406.3	406.1	406.5	407.2
BIC	516.1	515.2	515.0	515.4	516.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.29: Importance of party support in the candidate selection across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Importance of support from the local party chapter in the candidate selection				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-0.562 (0.52)	-0.187 (0.51)	-0.269 (0.50)	-0.396 (0.50)	-0.339 (0.49)
Male	-0.358 (0.27)	-0.327 (0.27)	-0.336 (0.27)	-0.341 (0.27)	-0.341 (0.27)
Age	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Education	0.108 (0.12)	0.106 (0.12)	0.115 (0.13)	0.103 (0.12)	0.106 (0.13)
Incumbent	0.249 (0.43)	0.187 (0.43)	0.205 (0.43)	0.211 (0.43)	0.229 (0.43)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.147 (0.21)	0.171 (0.21)	0.131 (0.21)	0.152 (0.21)	0.142 (0.21)
Number of prior candidacies	-0.123 (0.15)	-0.125 (0.15)	-0.105 (0.15)	-0.118 (0.15)	-0.116 (0.15)
Years of party membership	0.017 (0.01)	0.015 (0.01)	0.015 (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)
Party activity rate	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Number of political offices	0.097 (0.18)	0.134 (0.18)	0.138 (0.18)	0.121 (0.18)	0.121 (0.18)
Local-level office	-0.118 (0.53)	-0.154 (0.53)	-0.124 (0.53)	-0.131 (0.52)	-0.122 (0.53)
Party office	0.121 (0.46)	0.062 (0.46)	0.038 (0.46)	0.097 (0.46)	0.074 (0.46)
Number of org. affiliations	-0.109 (0.10)	-0.118 (0.10)	-0.118 (0.10)	-0.111 (0.10)	-0.110 (0.10)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	-0.351 (0.70)	-0.360 (0.69)	-0.444 (0.70)	-0.418 (0.69)	-0.411 (0.69)
Bavaria	-0.247 (0.67)	-0.239 (0.67)	-0.349 (0.67)	-0.306 (0.66)	-0.318 (0.67)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.194 (0.42)	-0.258 (0.42)	-0.205 (0.42)	-0.215 (0.42)	-0.206 (0.42)
FDP	0.024 (0.38)	0.029 (0.38)	0.049 (0.38)	0.029 (0.38)	0.033 (0.38)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.379 (0.34)	-0.370 (0.34)	-0.370 (0.34)	-0.368 (0.34)	-0.376 (0.34)
Die Linke	0.126 (0.39)	0.069 (0.39)	0.107 (0.39)	0.121 (0.39)	0.117 (0.39)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.021 (0.04)	0.032 (0.03)	0.036 (0.03)	0.031 (0.03)	0.032 (0.04)
% Unemployment	0.036 (0.14)	0.102 (0.15)	0.034 (0.14)	0.036 (0.14)	0.030 (0.14)
% High school graduates	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.145 (0.13)	-0.164 (0.13)	-0.146 (0.13)	-0.141 (0.13)	-0.143 (0.13)
Urbanity	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	0.071 (0.06)				
IO * % Unemployment		-0.416 (0.29)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.038 (0.05)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.209 (0.33)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.021 (0.27)	0.005 (0.27)	0.036 (0.28)	0.001 (0.27)	0.028 (0.27)
Intraclass correlation	0.006 (0.08)	0.001 (0.08)	0.011 (0.08)	0.000 (0.08)	0.008 (0.08)
Intercept	0.954 (0.86)	1.071 (0.86)	1.088 (0.86)	1.050 (0.85)	1.055 (0.86)
N (Candidates)	417	417	417	417	417
N (SMDs)	191	191	191	191	191
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.081	0.082	0.077	0.076	0.076
Wald χ^2 (df)	21.22	21.54	20.24	20.39	19.91
Log Likelihood	-254	-253	-254	-254	-255
AIC	563.5	562.9	564.6	564.8	565.1
BIC	676.4	675.8	677.5	677.7	678.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (= 1), not important (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.30: Number of political offices at the first candidacy (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Number of political offices		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.238*** (0.08)	-0.151** (0.07)	-0.142* (0.07)
Male		-0.042 (0.04)	-0.021 (0.04)
Age		-0.004** (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.037* (0.02)	0.035 (0.02)
Years of party membership		0.021*** (0.00)	0.018*** (0.00)
Party activity rate		0.009*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of org. affiliations		0.026* (0.01)	0.035** (0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			0.166*** (0.05)
Bavaria			-0.065 (0.05)
Saxony			0.086 (0.06)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			0.106** (0.05)
FDP			-0.116* (0.06)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.055 (0.05)
Die Linke			-0.081 (0.07)
Intercept	0.335*** (0.02)	0.176* (0.09)	0.120 (0.10)
N	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.002	0.035	0.041
Wald χ^2 (df)	9.48*	217.10***	269.35***
Log Likelihood	-1073	-1037	-1030
AIC	2149.1	2091.4	2092.7
BIC	2158.5	2133.7	2168.0

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. * $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.31: Experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	(1)	Party office		(1)	Local-level office	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.575** (0.29)	-0.537* (0.32)	-0.501 (0.32)	-0.412 (0.27)	-0.279 (0.32)	-0.194 (0.33)
Male		-0.189 (0.20)	-0.189 (0.20)		-0.224 (0.19)	-0.149 (0.19)
Age		-0.043*** (0.01)	-0.043*** (0.01)		0.000 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.241*** (0.09)	0.244** (0.10)		0.097 (0.09)	0.052 (0.10)
Years of party membership		0.074*** (0.01)	0.076*** (0.01)		0.089*** (0.01)	0.077*** (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.054*** (0.01)	0.054*** (0.01)		0.040*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)
Number of org. affiliations		0.197** (0.08)	0.203** (0.08)		0.120 (0.07)	0.131* (0.08)
Election:						
Hesse		0.358 (0.30)	0.366 (0.30)		2.644*** (0.40)	2.681*** (0.40)
Bavaria		0.349 (0.24)	0.352 (0.24)		1.642*** (0.23)	1.680*** (0.24)
Saxony		0.301 (0.33)	0.315 (0.33)		1.858*** (0.33)	1.870*** (0.33)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.304 (0.32)			0.462 (0.30)
FDP			0.134 (0.31)			-0.402 (0.29)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.233 (0.29)			0.107 (0.28)
Die Linke			0.233 (0.33)			-0.562* (0.32)
Intercept	1.320*** (0.09)	0.591 (0.39)	0.408 (0.43)	0.719*** (0.08)	0.061 (0.39)	0.182 (0.43)
N	813	813	813	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.004	0.135	0.137	0.002	0.220	0.233
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	3.63	115.69***	116.84***	2.20	227.74***	241.39***
Log Likelihood	-425	-369	-369	-517	-404	-397
AIC	854.9	762.9	769.7	1038.2	832.6	827.0
BIC	864.3	819.3	844.9	1047.6	889.0	902.2

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.32: Number of political offices at the first candidacy across immigrant subgroups (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Number of political offices				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	-0.467** (0.22)				
Christian		-0.096 (0.08)			
Non-European country			-0.257*** (0.09)		
Muslim country				-0.279** (0.12)	
European country					-0.074 (0.10)
Male	-0.014 (0.04)	-0.014 (0.04)	-0.012 (0.04)	-0.013 (0.04)	-0.020 (0.04)
Age	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
Age squared	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.033 (0.02)	0.029 (0.02)	0.034 (0.02)	0.036 (0.02)	0.031 (0.02)
Years of party membership	0.019*** (0.00)	0.019*** (0.00)	0.019*** (0.00)	0.019*** (0.00)	0.019*** (0.00)
Party activity rate	0.008*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of org. affiliations	0.038** (0.02)	0.033** (0.02)	0.038** (0.02)	0.037** (0.02)	0.035** (0.02)
Election:					
Hesse	0.187*** (0.05)	0.155*** (0.05)	0.187*** (0.05)	0.190*** (0.05)	0.158*** (0.05)
Bavaria	-0.072 (0.05)	-0.059 (0.05)	-0.072 (0.05)	-0.073 (0.05)	-0.066 (0.05)
Saxony	0.089 (0.06)	0.081 (0.06)	0.091 (0.06)	0.089 (0.06)	0.083 (0.06)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	0.101** (0.05)	0.104** (0.05)	0.101** (0.05)	0.104** (0.05)	0.109** (0.05)
FDP	-0.120* (0.07)	-0.124* (0.07)	-0.112* (0.07)	-0.114* (0.07)	-0.119* (0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.054 (0.05)	0.058 (0.05)	0.054 (0.05)	0.057 (0.05)	0.059 (0.05)
Die Linke	-0.077 (0.08)	-0.070 (0.08)	-0.073 (0.08)	-0.068 (0.08)	-0.070 (0.08)
Intercept	0.176* (0.10)	0.194** (0.10)	0.172* (0.10)	0.162* (0.10)	0.192** (0.10)
N	763	781	778	771	787
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.042	0.040	0.041	0.042	0.040
Wald χ^2 (df)	246.47***	253.02***	261.11***	256.04***	251.92***
Log Likelihood	-972	-994	-989	-981	-1002
AIC	1975.8	2020.1	2009.1	1993.5	2036.5
BIC	2050.0	2094.7	2083.6	2067.8	2111.2

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.33: Experience in party office at the first candidacy across immigrant subgroups (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	-1.984** (0.79)				
Christian		0.022 (0.51)			
Non-European country			-1.362*** (0.47)		
Muslim country				-1.378** (0.56)	
European country					0.175 (0.47)
Male	-0.177 (0.21)	-0.129 (0.21)	-0.207 (0.21)	-0.211 (0.21)	-0.143 (0.21)
Age	-0.046*** (0.01)	-0.046*** (0.01)	-0.046*** (0.01)	-0.047*** (0.01)	-0.043*** (0.01)
Age squared	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education	0.233** (0.10)	0.210** (0.10)	0.260*** (0.10)	0.254** (0.10)	0.199** (0.10)
Years of party membership	0.081*** (0.01)	0.081*** (0.01)	0.081*** (0.01)	0.081*** (0.01)	0.078*** (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.053*** (0.01)	0.049*** (0.01)	0.058*** (0.01)	0.056*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)
Number of org. affiliations	0.222** (0.09)	0.196** (0.09)	0.214** (0.09)	0.222** (0.09)	0.213** (0.09)
Election:					
Hesse	0.701** (0.34)	0.365 (0.31)	0.637** (0.32)	0.702** (0.33)	0.430 (0.31)
Bavaria	0.269 (0.24)	0.342 (0.24)	0.301 (0.24)	0.275 (0.24)	0.311 (0.24)
Saxony	0.366 (0.35)	0.346 (0.34)	0.339 (0.34)	0.376 (0.35)	0.364 (0.34)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	0.178 (0.34)	0.206 (0.33)	0.158 (0.34)	0.182 (0.34)	0.286 (0.33)
FDP	0.012 (0.33)	0.047 (0.32)	0.097 (0.32)	0.042 (0.32)	0.062 (0.32)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.195 (0.31)	0.212 (0.30)	0.194 (0.31)	0.177 (0.31)	0.214 (0.30)
Die Linke	0.233 (0.36)	0.272 (0.35)	0.255 (0.35)	0.264 (0.35)	0.222 (0.34)
Intercept	0.480 (0.46)	0.518 (0.45)	0.411 (0.45)	0.434 (0.45)	0.569 (0.45)
N	763	781	778	771	787
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.157	0.135	0.156	0.159	0.133
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	124.94***	108.65***	127.02***	128.58***	108.16***
Log Likelihood	-336	-384	-345	-340	-351
AIC	703.8	728.8	721.9	711.8	734.7
BIC	778.0	803.3	796.4	786.2	809.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.34: Experience in local-level office at the first candidacy across immigrant subgroups (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	-1.213 (0.85)				
Christian		0.324 (0.52)			
Non-European country			-0.564 (0.49)		
Muslim country				-0.413 (0.59)	
European country					0.081 (0.44)
Male	-0.185 (0.20)	-0.182 (0.20)	-0.144 (0.20)	-0.142 (0.20)	-0.179 (0.20)
Age	0.005 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.051 (0.10)	0.031 (0.10)	0.043 (0.10)	0.062 (0.10)	0.041 (0.10)
Years of party membership	0.076*** (0.01)	0.078*** (0.01)	0.075*** (0.01)	0.076*** (0.01)	0.078*** (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.044*** (0.01)	0.039*** (0.01)	0.042*** (0.01)	0.044*** (0.01)	0.042*** (0.01)
Number of org. affiliations	0.119 (0.08)	0.132* (0.08)	0.132* (0.08)	0.118 (0.08)	0.131* (0.08)
Election:					
Hesse	2.757*** (0.43)	2.570*** (0.40)	2.744*** (0.42)	2.723*** (0.42)	2.591*** (0.40)
Bavaria	1.574*** (0.24)	1.700*** (0.24)	1.575*** (0.24)	1.554*** (0.24)	1.705*** (0.24)
Saxony	1.832*** (0.34)	1.867*** (0.34)	1.825*** (0.34)	1.832*** (0.34)	1.883*** (0.34)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	0.473 (0.31)	0.445 (0.31)	0.462 (0.31)	0.503 (0.31)	0.470 (0.31)
FDP	-0.383 (0.30)	-0.439 (0.30)	-0.351 (0.30)	-0.343 (0.30)	-0.430 (0.30)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.068 (0.29)	0.085 (0.28)	0.080 (0.28)	0.111 (0.28)	0.103 (0.28)
Die Linke	-0.561* (0.33)	-0.580* (0.33)	-0.592* (0.33)	-0.546* (0.33)	-0.549* (0.33)
Intercept	0.212 (0.45)	0.276 (0.45)	0.220 (0.44)	0.120 (0.44)	0.234 (0.44)
N	763	781	778	771	787
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.229	0.228	0.225	0.225	0.231
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	221.19***	224.89***	222.73***	220.13***	230.88***
Log Likelihood	-373	-380	-383	-379	-384
AIC	778.9	792.3	797.8	790.6	799.7
BIC	853.1	866.9	872.3	864.9	874.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.35 Number of political offices at the first candidacy across political parties (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Number of political offices		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.253*	-0.132	-0.148
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU	0.088*	0.106**	0.105**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
FDP	-0.323***	-0.130*	-0.119*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.122**	0.047	0.051
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Die Linke	-0.322***	-0.082	-0.074
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
IO * CDU/CSU	0.040	0.025	0.020
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)
IO * FDP	0.014	0.018	0.041
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.20)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.219	0.080	0.105
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)
IO * Die Linke	0.006	-0.079	-0.066
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Male		-0.023	-0.022
		(0.04)	(0.04)
Age		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared		-0.000	-0.000
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		0.033	0.036*
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Years of party membership		0.019***	0.018***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Party activity rate		0.009***	0.008***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of org. affiliations		0.027*	0.035**
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			0.167***
			(0.05)
Bavaria			-0.064
			(0.05)
Saxony			0.085
			(0.06)
Intercept	0.444***	0.215**	0.179*
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.10)
N	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.015	0.038	0.041
Wald χ^2 (df)	82.96***	251.64***	277.51***
Log Likelihood	-1058	-1033	-1030
AIC	2136.6	2100.5	2100.6
BIC	2183.6	2180.4	2194.6

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election. * $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.36: Experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy across political parties (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Party office			Local-level office		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-1.375*** (0.51)	-1.152** (0.56)	-1.171** (0.56)	-0.436 (0.53)	-0.114 (0.55)	-0.173 (0.61)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU	0.129 (0.32)	0.134 (0.34)	0.157 (0.34)	0.144 (0.28)	0.273 (0.29)	0.498 (0.31)
FDP	-0.674** (0.29)	-0.082 (0.33)	-0.051 (0.33)	-1.027*** (0.26)	-0.482* (0.28)	-0.384 (0.30)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.424 (0.28)	0.082 (0.31)	0.097 (0.31)	-0.532** (0.24)	-0.022 (0.27)	0.088 (0.29)
Die Linke	-0.850*** (0.29)	0.137 (0.36)	0.167 (0.36)	-1.030*** (0.26)	-0.599* (0.31)	-0.583* (0.34)
IO * CDU/CSU	1.498 (1.21)	1.476 (1.26)	1.372 (1.26)	0.181 (0.99)	0.012 (1.01)	-0.608 (1.10)
IO * FDP	1.609* (0.97)	1.699* (1.03)	1.765* (1.04)	-0.439 (0.90)	-0.435 (0.92)	-0.292 (1.02)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	1.715 (1.22)	1.286 (1.27)	1.394 (1.27)	0.452 (1.03)	0.029 (1.07)	0.486 (1.11)
IO * Die Linke	0.889 (0.74)	0.327 (0.82)	0.333 (0.82)	0.139 (0.74)	0.097 (0.78)	0.111 (0.87)
Male		-0.175 (0.20)	-0.192 (0.20)		-0.084 (0.18)	-0.153 (0.19)
Age		-0.042*** (0.01)	-0.043*** (0.01)		0.011 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.223** (0.09)	0.250*** (0.10)		-0.067 (0.09)	0.054 (0.10)
Years of party membership		0.075*** (0.01)	0.075*** (0.01)		0.068*** (0.01)	0.077*** (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.052*** (0.01)	0.054*** (0.01)		0.030*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)
Number of org. affiliations		0.199** (0.08)	0.215*** (0.08)		0.021 (0.07)	0.132* (0.08)
Election:						
Hesse			0.373 (0.30)			2.700*** (0.40)
Bavaria			0.363 (0.24)			1.692*** (0.24)
Saxony			0.334 (0.33)			1.866*** (0.34)
Intercept	1.694*** (0.22)	0.746* (0.42)	0.495 (0.44)	1.209*** (0.19)	1.338*** (0.39)	0.175 (0.44)
N	813	813	813	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.028	0.138	0.142	0.042	0.116	0.234
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	24.04***	117.74***	121.30***	43.77***	119.84***	242.24***
Log Likelihood	-415	-368	-367	-496	-458	-397
AIC	850.5	770.8	773.3	1012.6	950.5	834.1
BIC	897.5	850.7	867.3	1059.6	1030.4	928.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.37: Number of political offices at first candidacy across the mode of candidacy (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Number of political offices		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.327 (0.36)	-0.275 (0.33)	-0.196 (0.31)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list	0.023 (0.06)	-0.090 (0.06)	-0.133** (0.07)
Dual	-0.000 (0.06)	-0.108* (0.06)	-0.102* (0.06)
IO * Party list	0.111 (0.38)	0.160 (0.35)	0.089 (0.33)
IO * Dual	0.085 (0.37)	0.135 (0.35)	0.056 (0.32)
Male		-0.050 (0.04)	-0.040 (0.04)
Age		-0.004** (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.040* (0.02)	0.035 (0.02)
Years of party membership		0.021*** (0.00)	0.018*** (0.00)
Party activity rate		0.009*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of org. affiliations		0.028* (0.01)	0.036** (0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			0.174*** (0.05)
Bavaria			-0.037 (0.05)
Saxony			0.068 (0.06)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			0.110** (0.05)
FDP			-0.128** (0.06)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.026 (0.06)
Die Linke			-0.126 (0.08)
Intercept	0.327*** (0.05)	0.299*** (0.10)	0.296*** (0.11)
N	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.002	0.036	0.042
Wald χ^2 (df)	9.97*	221.03***	275.23***
Log Likelihood	-1072	-1036	-1030
AIC	2156.9	2097.9	2099.3
BIC	2185.1	2159.0	2193.3

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. * $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.38: Experience in party and local-level office across the mode of candidacy (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	(1)	Party office		(1)	Local-level office	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.043 (1.17)	-0.600 (1.21)	-0.608 (1.23)	-1.491 (1.17)	-1.207 (1.19)	-1.415 (1.56)
Mode of candidacy:						
Party list	0.429* (0.26)	-0.059 (0.29)	-0.201 (0.35)	0.530** (0.23)	0.319 (0.25)	-0.462 (0.33)
Dual	0.248 (0.24)	-0.217 (0.26)	-0.279 (0.30)	0.305 (0.21)	0.156 (0.23)	-0.252 (0.28)
IO * Party list	-0.612 (1.28)	0.228 (1.33)	0.250 (1.35)	1.262 (1.26)	1.220 (1.29)	1.432 (1.66)
IO * Dual	-0.740 (1.23)	0.030 (1.28)	0.084 (1.29)	1.030 (1.22)	0.952 (1.25)	1.251 (1.62)
Male		-0.170 (0.21)	-0.211 (0.21)		-0.102 (0.18)	-0.219 (0.20)
Age		-0.042*** (0.01)	-0.044*** (0.01)		0.005 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.230** (0.09)	0.253*** (0.10)		-0.034 (0.09)	0.049 (0.10)
Years of party membership		0.074*** (0.01)	0.076*** (0.01)		0.078*** (0.01)	0.078*** (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.053*** (0.01)	0.055*** (0.01)		0.031*** (0.01)	0.041*** (0.01)
Number of org. affiliations		0.191** (0.08)	0.211** (0.08)		0.019 (0.07)	0.132* (0.08)
Election:						
Hesse			0.366 (0.30)			2.714*** (0.40)
Bavaria			0.406 (0.25)			1.792*** (0.26)
Saxony			0.303 (0.34)			1.835*** (0.34)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.267 (0.33)			0.527* (0.31)
FDP			0.137 (0.31)			-0.445 (0.29)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.180 (0.30)			0.022 (0.28)
Die Linke			0.147 (0.35)			-0.677** (0.34)
Intercept	1.056*** (0.21)	0.891** (0.43)	0.621 (0.52)	0.392** (0.18)	0.942** (0.40)	0.524 (0.51)
N	813	813	813	813	813	813
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.008	0.133	0.138	0.010	0.106	0.235
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	6.71	113.60***	117.93***	10.10*	109.83***	243.93***
Log Likelihood	-424	-370	-368	-513	-463	-396
AIC	859.9	767.0	776.6	1038.3	952.5	832.4
BIC	888.1	828.1	870.7	1066.5	1013.6	926.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.39 Number of political offices at the first candidacy across the type of party selectorate (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Number of political offices			Party list		
	(1)	SMD (2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.545*** (0.06)	-0.404*** (0.15)	-0.505*** (0.16)	-0.396** (0.18)	-0.261 (0.18)	-0.287 (0.18)
Party selectorate:						
Party member assembly	-0.277*** (0.08)	-0.064 (0.08)	-0.109 (0.11)	-0.296*** (0.09)	-0.202** (0.09)	-0.204** (0.09)
IO * Party member assembly	0.277 (0.24)	0.253 (0.25)	0.361 (0.26)	0.296 (0.27)	0.226 (0.27)	0.269 (0.27)
Male		-0.066 (0.08)	-0.014 (0.08)		0.036 (0.06)	0.067 (0.06)
Age		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)		-0.006* (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.064 (0.05)	0.072 (0.05)		0.050 (0.04)	0.052 (0.03)
Years of party membership		0.023*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)		0.025*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)
Party activity rate		0.007*** (0.00)	0.005* (0.00)		0.008*** (0.00)	0.005*** (0.00)
Number of org. affiliations		0.036 (0.03)	0.049* (0.03)		0.008 (0.02)	0.013 (0.02)
Election:						
Hesse			0.133 (0.09)			0.113 (0.09)
Bavaria			-0.127 (0.09)			-0.117 (0.09)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.095 (0.13)			0.102 (0.08)
FDP			-0.093 (0.14)			-0.158 (0.11)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.115 (0.12)			0.126 (0.09)
Die Linke			0.079 (0.12)			-0.014 (0.12)
Intercept	0.545*** (0.06)	0.143 (0.21)	0.062 (0.23)	0.396*** (0.04)	0.159 (0.14)	0.119 (0.16)
N	209	209	209	304	304	304
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.012	0.052	0.060	0.011	0.054	0.064
Wald χ^2 (df)	0.00	102.32***	107.92***	17.64***	133.31***	161.43***
Log Likelihood	-276	-265	-263	-398	-380	-376
AIC	558.1	551.7	559.2	803.4	782.2	786.8
BIC	568.1	588.5	616.0	818.3	823.1	850.0

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.40: Experience in party office at the first candidacy across the type of party selectorate (binary logistic regression)

	Dependent variable:					
	Party office			Party list		
	(1)	SMD (2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-3.219*** (1.18)	-3.884** (1.51)	-3.903** (1.57)	-1.304** (0.59)	-0.993 (0.65)	-0.958 (0.66)
Party selectorate:						
Party member assembly	-0.603 (0.43)	-0.147 (0.51)	-0.073 (0.60)	-1.238*** (0.32)	-1.034*** (0.37)	-1.073*** (0.41)
IO * Party member assembly	2.683* (1.39)	3.412** (1.69)	3.422** (1.74)	0.650 (0.96)	-0.106 (1.06)	-0.203 (1.07)
Male		-0.382 (0.50)	-0.366 (0.52)		0.336 (0.35)	0.360 (0.37)
Age		-0.030* (0.02)	-0.033* (0.02)		-0.033** (0.01)	-0.036** (0.02)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		0.002* (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education		0.284 (0.19)	0.294 (0.21)		0.362** (0.16)	0.398** (0.17)
Years of party membership		0.120*** (0.04)	0.124*** (0.04)		0.141*** (0.03)	0.143*** (0.03)
Party activity rate		0.048* (0.03)	0.046* (0.03)		0.051** (0.02)	0.048** (0.02)
Number of org. affiliations		0.237 (0.18)	0.196 (0.20)		0.126 (0.15)	0.116 (0.15)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.019 (0.55)			-0.166 (0.56)
Bavaria			0.235 (0.53)			-0.045 (0.52)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.177 (1.27)			0.717 (0.65)
FDP			-0.469 (0.76)			0.082 (0.57)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.110 (0.76)			0.330 (0.56)
Die Linke			-0.157 (0.83)			0.460 (0.64)
Intercept	1.833*** (0.38)	1.096 (0.94)	1.089 (1.06)	1.892*** (0.21)	0.735 (0.66)	0.418 (0.80)
N	209	209	209	304	304	304
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.049	0.222	0.227	0.067	0.267	0.273
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	10.78**	48.97***	49.92***	20.53***	82.06***	83.90***
Log Likelihood	-105	-86	-85	-144	-113	-112
AIC	217.5	193.3	204.4	295.0	247.5	257.6
BIC	230.9	230.1	261.2	309.9	288.4	320.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.41: Experience in local-level office at the first candidacy across the type of party selectorate (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Party list nomination: Local-level office		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.510 (0.68)	-0.085 (0.75)	-0.079 (0.78)
Party selectorate:			
Party member assembly	-0.779** (0.33)	-0.519 (0.40)	-0.489 (0.44)
IO * Party member assembly	1.426 (1.29)	0.594 (1.39)	0.317 (1.48)
Male		0.060 (0.38)	0.081 (0.41)
Age		-0.020 (0.01)	-0.023 (0.02)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education		0.296* (0.17)	0.399** (0.19)
Years of party membership		0.233*** (0.05)	0.232*** (0.05)
Party activity rate		0.061** (0.03)	0.053** (0.03)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.008 (0.16)	-0.032 (0.17)
Election:			
Hesse			1.067* (0.65)
Bavaria			0.131 (0.52)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			1.871** (0.94)
FDP			-0.151 (0.60)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.069 (0.61)
Die Linke			0.329 (0.69)
Intercept	1.809*** (0.20)	1.694** (0.75)	0.802 (0.89)
N	304	304	304
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.020	0.291	0.328
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	5.72	81.92***	92.12***
Log Likelihood	-138	-100	-95
AIC	283.6	221.4	223.2
BIC	405.6	379.0	402.6

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.42: Number of political offices at the first candidacy across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Number of political offices		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>			
IO	-0.240*** (0.06)	-0.131** (0.06)	-0.132* (0.08)
Male		-0.043 (0.04)	-0.019 (0.04)
Age		-0.004 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.034 (0.03)	0.034 (0.03)
Years of party membership		0.021*** (0.00)	0.018*** (0.00)
Party activity rate		0.009*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of org. affiliations		0.023 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)
<i>Election:</i>			
Hesse			0.177*** (0.04)
Bavaria			-0.049 (0.05)
Saxony			0.080 (0.07)
<i>Political party:</i>			
CDU/CSU			0.072 (0.06)
FDP			-0.151** (0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.022 (0.05)
Die Linke			-0.160 (0.10)
<i>MMD level:</i>			
District magnitude	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * District magnitude	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>			
Variance MMD	0.007 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	0.327*** (0.04)	0.232* (0.13)	0.210* (0.12)
N (Candidates)	685	685	685
N (MMDs)	25	25	25
Wald χ^2 (df)	14.58***	192.80***	151.92***
Log Likelihood	-900	-871	-866
AIC	1809.5	1764.2	1764.3
BIC	1832.2	1814.0	1836.7

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.43: Experience in party and local-level office across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	(1)	Party office (2)	(3)	(1)	Local-level office (2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>						
IO	-0.658** (0.31)	-0.472 (0.33)	-0.444 (0.34)	-0.479 (0.32)	-0.224 (0.34)	-0.114 (0.35)
Male		-0.132 (0.22)	-0.175 (0.22)		-0.162 (0.21)	-0.154 (0.21)
Age		-0.044*** (0.01)	-0.047*** (0.01)		0.001 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Age squared		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.248** (0.10)	0.307*** (0.11)		0.034 (0.11)	0.038 (0.11)
Years of party membership		0.083*** (0.01)	0.089*** (0.01)		0.082*** (0.01)	0.072*** (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.052*** (0.01)	0.055*** (0.02)		0.047*** (0.01)	0.049*** (0.01)
Number of org. affiliations		0.122 (0.09)	0.141 (0.09)		0.071 (0.08)	0.103 (0.08)
Election:						
Hesse			0.522 (0.39)			2.684*** (0.56)
Bavaria			0.524* (0.28)			1.744*** (0.30)
Saxony			0.433 (0.49)			1.698*** (0.53)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.210 (0.33)			0.358 (0.31)
FDP			0.165 (0.33)			-0.481 (0.31)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.208 (0.32)			-0.000 (0.30)
Die Linke			0.264 (0.39)			-0.753** (0.37)
<i>MMD level:</i>						
District magnitude	0.008* (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.006 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
IO * District magnitude	-0.022 (0.01)	-0.026* (0.01)	-0.027* (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.02)
<i>Random part:</i>						
Variance MMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.671** (0.27)	0.857** (0.35)	0.057 (0.08)
Intraclass correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.169 (0.06)	0.207 (0.07)	0.017 (0.02)
Intercept	1.386*** (0.10)	0.726* (0.42)	0.190 (0.49)	0.791*** (0.22)	0.957* (0.49)	0.243 (0.49)
N (Candidates)	685	685	685	685	685	685
N (MMDs)	25	25	25	25	25	25
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.021	0.271	0.296	0.016	0.215	0.413
Wald χ^2 (df)	9.47**	79.78***	82.24***	3.22	62.34***	108.12***
Log Likelihood	-349	-302	-299	-396	-355	-335
AIC	706.0	626.1	633.7	802.2	735.0	707.2
BIC	724.1	675.9	715.3	824.8	789.3	793.3

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.44: Number of political offices at the first candidacy across SMD context factors (two-level Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Number of political offices				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-0.127 (0.09)	-0.134 (0.10)	-0.146 (0.09)	-0.135 (0.09)	-0.142 (0.10)
Male	-0.076 (0.05)	-0.076 (0.05)	-0.080 (0.05)	-0.076 (0.05)	-0.075 (0.05)
Age	-0.005* (0.00)	-0.005* (0.00)	-0.005** (0.00)	-0.005* (0.00)	-0.005** (0.00)
Age squared	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.052* (0.03)	0.052* (0.03)	0.049 (0.03)	0.052* (0.03)	0.052* (0.03)
Years of party membership	0.021*** (0.00)	0.021*** (0.00)	0.021*** (0.00)	0.021*** (0.00)	0.021*** (0.00)
Party activity rate	0.007*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)
Number of org. affiliations	0.053*** (0.02)	0.053*** (0.02)	0.055*** (0.02)	0.054*** (0.02)	0.053*** (0.02)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	0.200** (0.08)	0.199** (0.09)	0.195** (0.09)	0.199** (0.09)	0.198** (0.09)
Bavaria	0.013 (0.08)	0.014 (0.08)	0.022 (0.08)	0.015 (0.08)	0.017 (0.08)
Saxony	0.049 (0.13)	0.049 (0.13)	0.049 (0.13)	0.050 (0.13)	0.058 (0.13)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	0.183** (0.07)	0.184** (0.07)	0.185*** (0.07)	0.185** (0.07)	0.186** (0.07)
FDP	-0.079 (0.08)	-0.078 (0.08)	-0.081 (0.08)	-0.079 (0.08)	-0.077 (0.08)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.099 (0.06)	0.099 (0.06)	0.094 (0.06)	0.099 (0.06)	0.101 (0.06)
Die Linke	0.055 (0.08)	0.055 (0.08)	0.054 (0.08)	0.055 (0.08)	0.057 (0.08)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
% Unemployment	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
% High school graduates	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
% Right-wing vote share	0.003 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.127 (0.09)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.004 (0.03)			
IO * % High school graduates			0.019* (0.01)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.009 (0.07)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance IO	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	0.058 (0.14)	0.058 (0.14)	0.071 (0.14)	0.057 (0.14)	0.054 (0.14)
N (Candidates)	527	527	527	527	527
N (SMDs)	344	344	344	344	344
Wald χ^2 (df)	168.45***	181.98***	183.67***	181.17***	181.38***
Log Likelihood	-667	-667	-667	-667	-667
AIC	1378.0	1378.0	1377.1	1378.0	1377.9
BIC	1471.8	1471.9	1471.0	1471.9	1471.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.45: Experience in party and local-level office at the first candidacy across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	Party office					Local-level office				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>										
IO	-0.359 (0.45)	-0.424 (0.43)	-0.426 (0.43)	-0.405 (0.46)	-0.511 (0.43)	-0.113 (0.44)	-0.139 (0.44)	-0.175 (0.43)	0.095 (0.57)	-0.121 (0.43)
Male	-0.295 (0.28)	-0.291 (0.28)	-0.300 (0.28)	-0.294 (0.28)	-0.257 (0.28)	-0.522** (0.26)	-0.520** (0.26)	-0.519** (0.26)	-0.532** (0.26)	-0.527** (0.26)
Age	-0.055*** (0.01)	-0.055*** (0.01)	-0.055*** (0.01)	-0.055*** (0.01)	-0.056*** (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Age squared	0.002* (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.277** (0.13)	0.278** (0.13)	0.272** (0.13)	0.278** (0.13)	0.283** (0.13)	0.070 (0.12)	0.074 (0.12)	0.072 (0.13)	0.070 (0.12)	0.072 (0.12)
Years of party membership	0.101*** (0.02)	0.101*** (0.02)	0.102*** (0.02)	0.101*** (0.02)	0.102*** (0.02)	0.076*** (0.02)	0.076*** (0.02)	0.076*** (0.02)	0.075*** (0.02)	0.076*** (0.02)
Party activity rate	0.049*** (0.02)	0.048*** (0.02)	0.048*** (0.02)	0.048*** (0.02)	0.048*** (0.02)	0.043*** (0.01)	0.043*** (0.01)	0.042*** (0.01)	0.042*** (0.01)	0.043*** (0.01)
Number of org. affiliations	0.227** (0.10)	0.228** (0.10)	0.232** (0.10)	0.227** (0.10)	0.228** (0.10)	0.243** (0.10)	0.245** (0.10)	0.245** (0.10)	0.242** (0.10)	0.246** (0.10)
Election:										
Hesse	0.202 (0.42)	0.186 (0.42)	0.169 (0.42)	0.186 (0.42)	0.177 (0.42)	2.851*** (0.53)	2.813*** (0.52)	2.808*** (0.52)	2.826*** (0.52)	2.829*** (0.52)
Bavaria	0.887** (0.43)	0.897** (0.43)	0.918** (0.44)	0.895** (0.43)	0.941** (0.44)	2.085*** (0.42)	2.112*** (0.42)	2.113*** (0.43)	2.069*** (0.42)	2.085*** (0.42)
Saxony	0.797 (0.71)	0.798 (0.71)	0.785 (0.71)	0.800 (0.71)	0.897 (0.71)	1.547** (0.67)	1.573** (0.67)	1.552** (0.67)	1.595** (0.68)	1.503** (0.68)
Political party:										
CDU/CSU	0.503 (0.55)	0.524 (0.55)	0.524 (0.55)	0.517 (0.55)	0.611 (0.56)	0.811 (0.51)	0.823 (0.51)	0.828 (0.51)	0.775 (0.51)	0.811 (0.51)
FDP	0.396 (0.39)	0.400 (0.39)	0.386 (0.39)	0.399 (0.39)	0.434 (0.39)	-0.459 (0.36)	-0.455 (0.36)	-0.457 (0.36)	-0.463 (0.36)	-0.463 (0.36)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.726* (0.38)	0.732* (0.38)	0.718* (0.38)	0.728* (0.38)	0.770** (0.38)	0.229 (0.35)	0.232 (0.35)	0.234 (0.35)	0.212 (0.35)	0.222 (0.35)
Die Linke	0.885** (0.42)	0.880** (0.42)	0.862** (0.42)	0.876** (0.42)	0.896** (0.42)	-0.324 (0.39)	-0.330 (0.39)	-0.326 (0.39)	-0.355 (0.39)	-0.329 (0.39)
<i>SMD level:</i>										
% Foreign population	0.016 (0.03)	0.013 (0.03)	0.013 (0.03)	0.012 (0.03)	0.019 (0.03)	-0.025 (0.03)	-0.028 (0.03)	-0.028 (0.03)	-0.027 (0.03)	-0.032 (0.03)
% Unemployment	0.077 (0.06)	0.076 (0.07)	0.075 (0.06)	0.077 (0.06)	0.079 (0.06)	0.011 (0.06)	0.011 (0.06)	0.011 (0.06)	0.013 (0.06)	0.010 (0.06)
% High school graduates	0.009 (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)	0.008 (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.093 (0.14)	-0.095 (0.14)	-0.097 (0.14)	-0.098 (0.14)	-0.104 (0.14)	0.034 (0.13)	0.026 (0.14)	0.031 (0.13)	0.010 (0.14)	0.037 (0.13)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.035 (0.06)					-0.046 (0.07)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.012 (0.14)					-0.057 (0.14)			
IO * % High school graduates			0.031 (0.05)					0.006 (0.05)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				0.039 (0.36)					0.515 (0.56)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000 (0.00)					-0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>										
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intracluster correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	-0.204 (0.61)	-0.221 (0.61)	-0.187 (0.61)	-0.215 (0.61)	-0.319 (0.61)	0.255 (0.59)	0.230 (0.59)	0.234 (0.59)	0.271 (0.59)	0.260 (0.59)
N (Candidates)	527	527	527	527	527	527	527	527	527	527
N (SMDs)	344	344	344	344	344	344	344	344	344	344
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.331	0.331	0.331	0.330	0.336	0.446	0.445	0.445	0.448	0.447
Wald χ^2 (df)	71.62***	71.36***	71.41***	71.43***	72.61***	103.51***	103.52***	103.41***	103.44***	103.53***
Log Likelihood	-235	-235	-235	-235	-234	-260	-260	-260	-260	-260
AIC	514.3	514.6	514.2	514.6	512.3	564.5	564.7	564.9	563.7	564.2
BIC	972.9	972.8	972.9	972.0	971.1	658.3	658.6	658.8	657.6	658.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.46: Number of organizational affiliations (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Number of organizational affiliations			Number of organizational affiliations		
	Without immigrant organizations			With immigrant organizations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.074 (0.08)	-0.050 (0.08)	-0.104 (0.07)	0.175 (0.12)	0.196 (0.12)	0.172 (0.11)
Male		0.048 (0.04)	0.081** (0.04)		0.031 (0.06)	0.050 (0.06)
Age		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		0.003 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)		-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Education		0.014 (0.02)	0.024 (0.02)		0.015 (0.03)	0.024 (0.03)
Incumbent		0.053 (0.07)	0.049 (0.07)		0.107 (0.11)	0.079 (0.10)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.007 (0.03)	0.010 (0.03)		-0.025 (0.05)	-0.030 (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies		0.009 (0.02)	0.030 (0.02)		0.009 (0.03)	0.046 (0.03)
Years of party membership		0.006*** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)		0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Party activity rate		0.001 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)		0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices		-0.001 (0.03)	-0.018 (0.03)		-0.017 (0.05)	-0.007 (0.04)
Local-level office		-0.031 (0.05)	0.056 (0.05)		0.017 (0.13)	0.048 (0.12)
Party office		0.072 (0.06)	0.083 (0.06)		0.167 (0.11)	0.129 (0.11)
Mode of candidacy:						
Party list		0.045 (0.06)	0.009 (0.07)		0.233** (0.10)	0.088 (0.12)
Dual		0.153*** (0.05)	0.097* (0.06)		0.353*** (0.09)	0.218** (0.10)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.248*** (0.06)			0.118 (0.08)
Bavaria			-0.045 (0.04)			0.320*** (0.08)
Saxony			-0.401*** (0.07)			Ref.
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.342*** (0.05)			-0.310*** (0.08)
FDP			-0.431*** (0.06)			-0.509*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.211*** (0.05)			-0.134* (0.08)
Die Linke			-0.118* (0.06)			-0.060 (0.10)
Intercept	0.630*** (0.02)	0.455*** (0.11)	0.642*** (0.12)	0.568*** (0.03)	0.117 (0.19)	0.184 (0.20)
N	1.391	1.391	1.391	649	649	649
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.000	0.015	0.037	0.001	0.021	0.044
Wald χ^2 (df)	0.86	88.24***	273.27***	2.07	55.46***	143.77***
Log Likelihood	-2242	-2209	-2160	-1042	-1021	-997
AIC	4488.1	4450.5	4366.6	2087.7	2073.5	2038.4
BIC	4498.6	4534.3	4487.0	2096.7	2145.1	2136.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.47: Number of organizational affiliations across immigrant subgroups (Poisson regression)

	Dependent variable: Number of organizational affiliations									
	Without immigrant organizations					With immigrant organizations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	0.000 (0.21)					0.476** (0.20)				
Christian		-0.063 (0.10)					0.186 (0.13)			
Non-European country			0.022 (0.12)					0.282 (0.18)		
Muslim country				0.103 (0.12)					0.448** (0.18)	
European country					-0.167* (0.10)					0.119 (0.13)
Male	0.078** (0.04)	0.089** (0.04)	0.081** (0.04)	0.076** (0.04)	0.080** (0.04)	0.056 (0.06)	0.074 (0.06)	0.050 (0.06)	0.047 (0.06)	0.072 (0.06)
Age	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Age squared	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Education	0.042** (0.02)	0.034* (0.02)	0.037** (0.02)	0.041** (0.02)	0.031* (0.02)	0.029 (0.03)	0.034 (0.03)	0.023 (0.03)	0.024 (0.03)	0.031 (0.03)
Incumbent	0.024 (0.08)	0.030 (0.07)	0.028 (0.08)	0.024 (0.07)	0.038 (0.07)	0.075 (0.10)	0.074 (0.06)	0.074 (0.10)	0.070 (0.10)	0.064 (0.10)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.021 (0.03)	0.017 (0.03)	0.014 (0.03)	0.023 (0.03)	0.016 (0.03)	-0.018 (0.04)	-0.020 (0.04)	-0.039 (0.05)	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.013 (0.04)
Number of prior candidacies	0.033 (0.02)	0.031 (0.02)	0.032 (0.02)	0.029 (0.02)	0.031 (0.02)	0.049 (0.03)	0.051 (0.03)	0.051* (0.03)	0.047 (0.03)	0.044 (0.03)
Years of party membership	0.005** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Party activity rate	0.001 (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices	-0.004 (0.03)	-0.011 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.03)	-0.013 (0.03)	0.004 (0.04)	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.002 (0.05)	0.008 (0.04)	0.005 (0.04)
Local-level office	0.028 (0.05)	0.048 (0.05)	0.040 (0.05)	0.028 (0.05)	0.055 (0.05)	0.025 (0.13)	0.047 (0.13)	0.033 (0.13)	0.021 (0.13)	0.056 (0.13)
Party office	0.089 (0.06)	0.084 (0.06)	0.087 (0.06)	0.089 (0.06)	0.084 (0.06)	0.119 (0.12)	0.122 (0.11)	0.123 (0.12)	0.116 (0.12)	0.116 (0.11)
Mode of candidacy:										
Party list	0.006 (0.07)	0.013 (0.07)	-0.008 (0.07)	0.005 (0.07)	0.013 (0.07)	0.092 (0.12)	0.084 (0.12)	0.078 (0.12)	0.094 (0.12)	0.094 (0.12)
Dual	0.077 (0.06)	0.095 (0.06)	0.083 (0.06)	0.080 (0.06)	0.090 (0.06)	0.192* (0.11)	0.205* (0.11)	0.204* (0.11)	0.209** (0.11)	0.211** (0.11)
Election:										
Hesse	-0.239*** (0.06)	-0.270*** (0.06)	-0.247*** (0.06)	-0.235*** (0.06)	-0.264*** (0.06)	0.118 (0.08)	0.088 (0.08)	0.121 (0.08)	0.122 (0.08)	0.102 (0.08)
Bavaria	-0.035 (0.05)	-0.039 (0.05)	-0.044 (0.05)	-0.040 (0.05)	-0.038 (0.05)	0.329*** (0.08)	0.324*** (0.08)	0.323*** (0.08)	0.321*** (0.08)	0.333*** (0.08)
Saxony	-0.391*** (0.07)	-0.392*** (0.07)	-0.398*** (0.07)	-0.391*** (0.07)	-0.400*** (0.07)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Political party:										
CDU/CSU	-0.338*** (0.05)	-0.328*** (0.05)	-0.341*** (0.05)	-0.337*** (0.05)	-0.329*** (0.05)	-0.312*** (0.08)	-0.287*** (0.08)	-0.309*** (0.08)	-0.306*** (0.08)	-0.292*** (0.08)
FDP	-0.406*** (0.06)	-0.401*** (0.06)	-0.423*** (0.06)	-0.408*** (0.06)	-0.405*** (0.06)	-0.478*** (0.09)	-0.467*** (0.09)	-0.488*** (0.09)	-0.478*** (0.09)	-0.478*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.194*** (0.05)	-0.180*** (0.05)	-0.211*** (0.05)	-0.195*** (0.05)	-0.182*** (0.05)	-0.107 (0.08)	-0.096 (0.08)	-0.133* (0.08)	-0.106 (0.08)	-0.099 (0.08)
Die Linke	-0.084 (0.06)	-0.081 (0.06)	-0.098 (0.06)	-0.084 (0.06)	-0.095 (0.06)	-0.009 (0.10)	-0.010 (0.10)	-0.029 (0.10)	-0.016 (0.10)	-0.025 (0.10)
Intercept	0.583*** (0.12)	0.586*** (0.12)	0.609*** (0.12)	0.590*** (0.12)	0.603*** (0.12)	0.173 (0.20)	0.123 (0.20)	0.206 (0.20)	0.198 (0.20)	0.120 (0.20)
N	1.311	1.341	1.332	1.322	1.353	619	629	627	622	631
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.035	0.037	0.036	0.035	0.037	0.044	0.045	0.043	0.044	0.044
Wald χ^2 (df)	255.05***	266.57***	260.96***	256.47***	268.86***	140.00***	142.37***	134.43***	140.17***	141.22***
Log Likelihood	-2037	-2081	-2071	-2055	-2098	-948	-959	-962	-954	-964
AIC	4120.3	4208.4	4187.4	4155.1	4242.8	1939.8	1962.6	1968.8	1951.5	1971.8
BIC	4239.4	4328.0	4306.9	4274.4	4362.6	2037.2	2060.4	2066.5	2049.0	2069.6

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.48: Number of organizational affiliations across political parties (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Number of organizational affiliations			Number of organizational affiliations		
	Without immigrant organizations			With immigrant organizations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.116 (0.10)	0.164 (0.10)	0.153 (0.10)	0.442*** (0.13)	0.481*** (0.14)	0.492*** (0.14)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU	-0.348*** (0.05)	-0.333*** (0.05)	-0.321*** (0.05)	-0.306*** (0.08)	-0.286*** (0.08)	-0.270*** (0.08)
FDP	-0.446*** (0.06)	-0.390*** (0.06)	-0.392*** (0.06)	-0.479*** (0.09)	-0.436*** (0.09)	-0.451*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.273*** (0.05)	-0.177*** (0.05)	-0.174*** (0.05)	-0.155** (0.08)	-0.057 (0.08)	-0.092 (0.08)
Die Linke	-0.229*** (0.05)	-0.069 (0.07)	-0.075 (0.06)	-0.149* (0.09)	0.019 (0.10)	0.007 (0.10)
IO * CDU/CSU	-0.274 (0.24)	-0.261 (0.24)	-0.270 (0.24)	-0.446 (0.29)	-0.424 (0.30)	-0.436 (0.29)
IO * FDP	-0.539** (0.25)	-0.544** (0.26)	-0.552** (0.25)	-0.473 (0.34)	-0.571* (0.34)	-0.631* (0.35)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.530* (0.30)	-0.644** (0.31)	-0.659** (0.31)	-0.643 (0.72)	-0.874 (0.80)	-0.769 (0.88)
IO * Die Linke	-0.326* (0.17)	-0.401** (0.17)	-0.389** (0.17)	-0.508* (0.29)	-0.479* (0.28)	-0.522* (0.28)
Male		0.089** (0.04)	0.083** (0.04)		0.082 (0.06)	0.045 (0.06)
Age		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)		-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Education		0.030 (0.02)	0.024 (0.02)		0.026 (0.03)	0.022 (0.03)
Incumbent		0.041 (0.07)	0.047 (0.07)		0.087 (0.10)	0.074 (0.10)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.009 (0.03)	0.014 (0.03)		-0.020 (0.05)	-0.027 (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies		0.017 (0.02)	0.030 (0.02)		0.033 (0.03)	0.049 (0.03)
Years of party membership		0.006*** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)		0.004 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Party activity rate		0.001 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.008 (0.03)	-0.018 (0.03)		-0.025 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)
Local-level office		-0.044 (0.05)	0.056 (0.05)		0.012 (0.12)	0.031 (0.12)
Party office		0.075 (0.06)	0.091 (0.06)		0.181* (0.11)	0.149 (0.11)
Mode of candidacy:						
Party list		0.077 (0.07)	0.014 (0.07)		0.296*** (0.11)	0.075 (0.12)
Dual		0.152*** (0.06)	0.099* (0.06)		0.395*** (0.10)	0.214** (0.10)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.248*** (0.05)			0.130 (0.08)
Bavaria			-0.048 (0.04)			0.328*** (0.08)
Saxony			-0.404*** (0.07)			
Intercept	0.869*** (0.03)	0.538*** (0.12)	0.604*** (0.12)	0.762*** (0.05)	0.123 (0.20)	0.155 (0.19)
N	1.391	1.391	1.391	649	649	649
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.018	0.030	0.039	0.019	0.040	0.047
Wald χ^2 (df)	110.76***	208.73***	278.81***	58.28***	133.23***	159.61***
Log Likelihood	-2202	-2175	-2156	-1023	-1001	-994
AIC	4425.0	4397.4	4366.4	2066.1	2051.4	2040.9
BIC	4477.4	4523.1	4507.8	2110.9	2158.8	2157.2

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, SMD nomination, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.49: Number of organizational affiliations across the mode of candidacy (Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Number of organizational affiliations			Number of organizational affiliations		
	Without immigrant organizations			With immigrant organizations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.422*	-0.420*	-0.497**	0.223	0.100	-0.090
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.44)
Mode of candidacy:						
Party list	0.014	0.024	-0.013	0.196**	0.223**	0.070
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Dual	0.185***	0.137**	0.080	0.377***	0.351***	0.205*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)
IO * Party list	0.424	0.447	0.481*	0.019	0.165	0.321
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.48)
IO * Dual	0.350	0.386	0.407	-0.104	0.063	0.255
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.46)
Male		0.048	0.081**		0.031	0.050
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Age		-0.000	-0.002		0.003	-0.001
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared		-0.000***	-0.000***		-0.001***	-0.001***
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		0.015	0.025		0.015	0.024
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Incumbent		0.051	0.047		0.106	0.079
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.11)	(0.10)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.005	0.008		-0.026	-0.032
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Number of prior candidacies		0.010	0.032		0.010	0.048
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Years of party membership		0.006***	0.005**		0.003	0.003
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Party activity rate		0.001	0.002		0.002	0.002
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of political offices		0.000	-0.017		-0.017	-0.007
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.04)
Local-level office		-0.032	0.055		0.019	0.047
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Party office		0.073	0.084		0.164	0.130
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.11)	(0.11)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.246***			0.122
			(0.06)			(0.08)
Bavaria			-0.043			0.323***
			(0.04)			(0.08)
Saxony			-0.404***			
			(0.07)			
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.341***			-0.310***
			(0.05)			(0.08)
FDP			-0.429***			-0.507***
			(0.06)			(0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.210***			-0.133*
			(0.05)			(0.08)
Die Linke			-0.110*			-0.049
			(0.06)			(0.10)
Intercept	0.517***	0.468***	0.652***	0.288***	0.123	0.192
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.20)
N	1.391	1.391	1.391	649	649	649
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.005	0.015	0.037	0.009	0.021	0.044
Wald χ^2 (df)	27.67***	90.68***	278.25***	23.08***	56.28***	143.98***
Log Likelihood	-2231	-2208	-2159	-1033	-1021	-997
AIC	4474.7	4452.6	4368.4	2078.8	2077.3	2042.0
BIC	4506.1	4546.9	4499.3	2105.6	2157.8	2149.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.50: Number of organizational affiliations across the type of party selectorate (Poisson regression)

		<i>Dependent variable:</i> Number of organizational affiliations							
		Without immigrant organizations				With immigrant organizations			
		SMD		Party list		SMD		Party list	
		(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
IO		0.244 (0.21)	0.246 (0.16)	-0.088 (0.17)	-0.104 (0.14)	0.405* (0.21)	0.428*** (0.15)	0.057 (0.17)	0.045 (0.15)
Party selectorate:									
	Party member assembly	-0.109 (0.07)	0.239*** (0.09)	-0.081 (0.08)	-0.098 (0.08)	-0.135* (0.07)	0.186* (0.10)	-0.108 (0.08)	-0.131 (0.08)
	IO * Party member assembly	-0.433 (0.28)	-0.489* (0.25)	-0.168 (0.28)	-0.113 (0.28)	-0.396 (0.29)	-0.460* (0.26)	-0.054 (0.28)	0.018 (0.27)
Male			0.021 (0.07)		0.128** (0.06)		-0.033 (0.07)		0.081 (0.06)
Age			-0.003 (0.00)		-0.003 (0.00)		-0.003 (0.00)		-0.002 (0.00)
Age squared			-0.001*** (0.00)		-0.001*** (0.00)		-0.001*** (0.00)		-0.001*** (0.00)
Education			0.049 (0.03)		0.023 (0.03)		0.044 (0.04)		0.031 (0.03)
Incumbent			0.055 (0.10)		0.104 (0.11)		0.055 (0.10)		0.121 (0.11)
Number of legisl. terms in parliament			0.020 (0.05)		-0.030 (0.05)		-0.002 (0.05)		-0.040 (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies			0.031 (0.04)		0.054* (0.03)		0.050 (0.04)		0.057* (0.03)
Years of party membership			0.002 (0.00)		0.005 (0.00)		0.002 (0.00)		0.004 (0.00)
Party activity rate			0.003 (0.00)		0.002 (0.00)		0.003 (0.00)		0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices			0.007 (0.05)		-0.018 (0.05)		0.015 (0.05)		-0.021 (0.05)
Local-level office			0.048 (0.16)		0.208 (0.15)		0.067 (0.16)		0.232 (0.15)
Party office			0.120 (0.14)		-0.043 (0.13)		0.119 (0.14)		-0.032 (0.13)
Election:									
	Hesse		0.233** (0.09)		0.113 (0.10)		0.175* (0.10)		0.089 (0.10)
	Bavaria		0.459*** (0.09)		0.316*** (0.08)		0.423*** (0.09)		0.316*** (0.08)
Political party:									
	CDU/CSU		-0.464*** (0.10)		-0.284*** (0.08)		-0.504*** (0.10)		-0.300*** (0.08)
	FDP		-0.639*** (0.12)		-0.474*** (0.09)		-0.642*** (0.12)		-0.520*** (0.10)
	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen		-0.343*** (0.10)		-0.090 (0.09)		-0.343*** (0.11)		-0.108 (0.09)
	Die Linke		-0.261** (0.12)		0.072 (0.11)		-0.263** (0.12)		0.059 (0.11)
Intercept		0.643*** (0.05)	0.178 (0.21)	0.598*** (0.03)	0.290 (0.18)	0.693*** (0.05)	0.323 (0.22)	0.637*** (0.03)	0.332* (0.18)
N		420	420	525	525	420	420	525	525
McFadden's Pseudo R ²		0.004	0.052	0.002	0.041	0.005	0.056	0.001	0.045
Wald χ^2 (df)		6.58***	130.37***	3.38***	112.71***	9.36***	141.96***	2.40	120.78***
Log Likelihood		-662	-630	-863	-835	-680	-646	-850	-813
AIC		1331.5	1303.6	1734.5	1698.2	1369.0	1336.2	1707.6	1669.1
BIC		1347.6	1392.5	1751.7	1758.5	1385.1	1425.1	1724.6	1762.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.51: Number of organizational affiliations across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Number of organizational affiliations			Number of organizational affiliations		
	Without immigrant organizations			With immigrant organizations		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>						
IO	-0.073 (0.06)	-0.041 (0.06)	-0.084 (0.07)	0.164 (0.13)	0.188 (0.13)	0.169 (0.12)
Male		0.050 (0.04)	0.094*** (0.03)		0.013 (0.06)	0.057 (0.06)
Age		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Age squared		-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)		-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Education		0.020 (0.03)	0.029 (0.02)		0.029 (0.03)	0.046 (0.03)
Incumbent		0.050 (0.05)	0.028 (0.05)		0.106 (0.12)	0.073 (0.11)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.032 (0.02)	0.034 (0.02)		-0.017 (0.05)	-0.028 (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies		0.020 (0.02)	0.031 (0.02)		0.026 (0.03)	0.057* (0.03)
Years of party membership		0.006*** (0.00)	0.006*** (0.00)		0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Party activity rate		0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)		0.003 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices		-0.030 (0.03)	-0.034 (0.03)		-0.003 (0.05)	-0.011 (0.05)
Local-level office		0.046 (0.04)	0.073** (0.03)		0.094 (0.15)	0.117 (0.14)
Party office		0.080 (0.06)	0.089 (0.06)		0.091 (0.13)	0.076 (0.13)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.230*** (0.05)			
Bavaria			-0.070 (0.06)			-0.018 (0.12)
Saxony			-0.321*** (0.04)			-0.121 (0.31)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.391*** (0.04)			-0.343*** (0.08)
FDP			-0.428*** (0.05)			-0.506*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.169*** (0.05)			-0.124 (0.08)
Die Linke			-0.057 (0.08)			0.037 (0.11)
<i>MMD level:</i>						
District magnitude	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.003* (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.005*** (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.008 (0.01)
IO * District magnitude	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	0.002 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Fixed effects for MMDs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Random part:</i>						
Variance IO	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-	-	-
Variance MMD	0.008** (0.00)	0.007* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-	-	-
Intercept	0.646*** (0.04)	0.502*** (0.14)	0.671*** (0.12)	0.594*** (0.03)	0.378** (0.18)	0.543* (0.28)
N (Candidates)	1.189	1.189	1.189	574	574	574
N (MMDs)	25	25	25	-	-	-
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	-	-	-	0.008	0.027	0.047
Wald χ^2 (df)	7.02*	211.97***	240.26***	17.04***	76.45***	146.34***
Log Likelihood	-1920	-1894	-1855	-926	-908	-890
AIC	3849.1	3822.4	3752.9	1860.0	1862.0	1833.5
BIC	3874.5	3908.8	3859.6	1877.4	1962.1	1951.0

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.52: Number of organizational affiliations across SMD context factors (two-level Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Number of organizational affiliations (without immigrant organizations)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-0.103 (0.09)	-0.124 (0.09)	-0.142 (0.09)	-0.134 (0.09)	-0.117 (0.09)
Male	0.037 (0.04)	0.037 (0.04)	0.037 (0.04)	0.034 (0.04)	0.037 (0.04)
Age	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Age squared	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)
Education	0.024 (0.02)	0.024 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.024 (0.02)
Incumbent	0.055 (0.08)	0.049 (0.08)	0.047 (0.08)	0.058 (0.08)	0.051 (0.08)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.025 (0.04)	0.027 (0.04)	0.025 (0.04)	0.024 (0.04)	0.026 (0.04)
Number of prior candidacies	0.020 (0.03)	0.019 (0.03)	0.020 (0.03)	0.020 (0.03)	0.019 (0.03)
Years of party membership	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Party activity rate	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices	-0.004 (0.04)	-0.004 (0.04)	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)	-0.005 (0.04)
Local-level office	0.082 (0.06)	0.081 (0.06)	0.078 (0.06)	0.082 (0.06)	0.082 (0.06)
Party office	0.057 (0.07)	0.058 (0.07)	0.056 (0.07)	0.059 (0.07)	0.061 (0.07)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	-0.289*** (0.06)	-0.293*** (0.06)	-0.289*** (0.06)	-0.292*** (0.06)	-0.293*** (0.06)
Bavaria	-0.074 (0.07)	-0.071 (0.07)	-0.076 (0.07)	-0.075 (0.07)	-0.076 (0.07)
Saxony	-0.278** (0.12)	-0.273** (0.12)	-0.275** (0.12)	-0.277** (0.12)	-0.287** (0.12)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.434*** (0.06)	-0.432*** (0.06)	-0.433*** (0.06)	-0.433*** (0.06)	-0.434*** (0.06)
FDP	-0.433*** (0.07)	-0.433*** (0.07)	-0.429*** (0.07)	-0.433*** (0.07)	-0.433*** (0.07)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.230*** (0.06)	-0.230*** (0.06)	-0.228*** (0.06)	-0.232*** (0.06)	-0.231*** (0.06)
Die Linke	-0.188*** (0.07)	-0.189*** (0.07)	-0.186*** (0.07)	-0.189*** (0.07)	-0.190*** (0.07)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.006 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
% Unemployment	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)
% High school graduates	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.032 (0.02)	-0.035 (0.02)	-0.033 (0.02)	-0.034 (0.02)	-0.032 (0.02)
Urbanity	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.012 (0.01)				
IO * % Unemployment		-0.030 (0.03)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.016* (0.01)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				0.011 (0.07)	
IO * Urbanity					-0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	0.778*** (0.13)	0.779*** (0.13)	0.778*** (0.13)	0.776*** (0.13)	0.778*** (0.13)
N (Candidates)	991	991	991	991	991
N (SMDs)	465	465	465	465	465
Wald χ^2 (df)	248.11***	245.27***	249.24***	248.20***	246.34***
Log Likelihood	-1546	-1546	-1546	-1547	-1546
AIC	3146.7	3146.4	3145.6	3147.4	3146.6
BIC	3278.9	3278.7	3277.9	3279.7	3278.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.53: Number of organizational affiliations across SMD context factors (two-level Poisson regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Number of organizational affiliations (with immigrant organizations)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	0.163 (0.15)	0.121 (0.16)	0.103 (0.16)	0.119 (0.17)	0.133 (0.15)
Male	-0.039 (0.07)	-0.042 (0.07)	-0.042 (0.07)	-0.043 (0.07)	-0.038 (0.07)
Age	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Age squared	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)
Education	0.047 (0.04)	0.048 (0.04)	0.051 (0.04)	0.048 (0.04)	0.048 (0.04)
Incumbent	0.076 (0.10)	0.077 (0.10)	0.064 (0.10)	0.087 (0.10)	0.071 (0.10)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.006 (0.05)	0.009 (0.05)	-0.001 (0.05)	0.003 (0.05)	0.007 (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies	0.044 (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)	0.050 (0.04)	0.043 (0.04)	0.044 (0.04)
Years of party membership	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Party activity rate	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Number of political offices	-0.012 (0.05)	-0.016 (0.05)	-0.007 (0.05)	-0.019 (0.05)	-0.010 (0.05)
Local-level office	0.110 (0.15)	0.105 (0.15)	0.114 (0.15)	0.109 (0.15)	0.107 (0.15)
Party office	0.099 (0.13)	0.110 (0.13)	0.082 (0.13)	0.112 (0.13)	0.103 (0.13)
Election:					
Hesse	0.030 (0.19)	0.043 (0.18)	0.021 (0.19)	0.042 (0.19)	0.028 (0.19)
Bavaria	0.294 (0.19)	0.311* (0.19)	0.284 (0.19)	0.304 (0.19)	0.296 (0.19)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	-0.517*** (0.09)	-0.518*** (0.09)	-0.506*** (0.09)	-0.512*** (0.09)	-0.519*** (0.09)
FDP	-0.561*** (0.11)	-0.565*** (0.11)	-0.551*** (0.11)	-0.562*** (0.11)	-0.559*** (0.11)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.226*** (0.08)	-0.228*** (0.08)	-0.223*** (0.08)	-0.230*** (0.08)	-0.227*** (0.08)
Die Linke	-0.209** (0.10)	-0.214** (0.10)	-0.207** (0.10)	-0.208** (0.10)	-0.211** (0.10)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.006 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
% Unemployment	0.020 (0.04)	0.029 (0.04)	0.022 (0.04)	0.019 (0.04)	0.022 (0.04)
% High school graduates	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.035 (0.03)	-0.038 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.03)	-0.035 (0.03)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.015 (0.02)				
IO * % Unemployment		-0.065 (0.11)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.023** (0.01)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				0.032 (0.09)	
IO * Urbanity					-0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	0.459** (0.23)	0.445* (0.24)	0.464* (0.24)	0.436* (0.23)	0.457* (0.23)
N (Candidates)	424	424	424	424	424
N (SMDs)	191	191	191	191	191
Wald χ^2 (df)	144.00***	139.91***	155.10***	135.34***	143.80***
Log Likelihood	-533	-512	-494	-685	-684
AIC	1069.8	1055.4	1033.2	1406.0	1404.7
BIC	1080.1	1137.6	1151.4	1479.6	1478.3

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, Saxon state election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.54: Politics-facilitating profession (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Instrumental occupation			Brokerage occupation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.010 (0.31)	0.043 (0.32)	-0.101 (0.33)	0.146 (0.22)	0.248 (0.23)	0.161 (0.24)
Male		0.289 (0.18)	0.357* (0.18)		0.169 (0.13)	0.203 (0.13)
Age		-0.001 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)		0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)		-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)
Education		0.059 (0.09)	0.151 (0.09)		0.461*** (0.07)	0.504*** (0.07)
Incumbent		-0.134 (0.34)	-0.144 (0.35)		0.016 (0.28)	0.020 (0.29)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.293* (0.16)	0.247 (0.17)		0.194 (0.12)	0.145 (0.12)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.325*** (0.12)	-0.294** (0.12)		-0.058 (0.08)	-0.024 (0.08)
Years of party membership		0.006 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.011* (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)		0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.524*** (0.14)	0.546*** (0.14)		0.233** (0.11)	0.280** (0.11)
Local-level office		-0.537** (0.23)	-0.627** (0.26)		-0.052 (0.17)	-0.165 (0.19)
Party office		-0.237 (0.29)	-0.239 (0.29)		0.024 (0.21)	0.004 (0.21)
Number of org. affiliation		-0.120* (0.07)	-0.188*** (0.07)		0.046 (0.05)	0.002 (0.05)
Election:						
Hesse			0.161 (0.25)			0.161 (0.19)
Bavaria			0.169 (0.22)			0.321** (0.16)
Saxony			0.083 (0.29)			-0.162 (0.22)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.372 (0.24)			-0.270 (0.18)
FDP			-1.645*** (0.37)			-0.739*** (0.21)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.544** (0.26)			-0.451** (0.19)
Die Linke			0.188 (0.27)			-0.216 (0.21)
Intercept	-1.749*** (0.08)	-1.469*** (0.47)	-1.515*** (0.50)	-0.447*** (0.06)	-2.146*** (0.36)	-1.993*** (0.38)
N	1.302	1.302	1.302	1.302	1.302	1.302
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.000	0.045	0.078	0.000	0.058	0.069
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	0.00	49.36***	84.81***	0.42	100.91***	121.03***
Log Likelihood	-546	-522	-504	-871	-821	-811
AIC	1096.7	1073.4	1051.9	1746.9	1674.6	1668.5
BIC	1107.1	1150.9	1165.7	1757.2	1757.3	1787.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.55: Politics-facilitating profession across immigrant subgroups (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>								
	Instrumental occupation				Brokerage occupation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim					-0.801 (0.69)				
Christian	-0.413 (0.55)					0.322 (0.34)			
Non-European country		-0.018 (0.53)					-0.162 (0.40)		
Muslim country			-0.067 (0.60)					0.145 (0.44)	
European country				-0.070 (0.41)					0.268 (0.30)
Male	0.411** (0.19)	0.429** (0.19)	0.435** (0.19)	0.348* (0.19)	0.267* (0.14)	0.226* (0.14)	0.251* (0.14)	0.258* (0.14)	0.201 (0.14)
Age	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)
Education	0.110 (0.09)	0.116 (0.09)	0.117 (0.09)	0.125 (0.09)	0.464*** (0.07)	0.498*** (0.07)	0.475*** (0.07)	0.476*** (0.07)	0.501*** (0.07)
Incumbent	-0.055 (0.35)	-0.087 (0.36)	-0.093 (0.36)	-0.116 (0.35)	0.069 (0.29)	0.021 (0.29)	0.046 (0.29)	0.059 (0.29)	0.055 (0.29)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.202 (0.17)	0.255 (0.17)	0.248 (0.17)	0.225 (0.17)	0.124 (0.13)	0.117 (0.13)	0.127 (0.13)	0.127 (0.13)	0.121 (0.12)
Number of prior candidacies	-0.252** (0.12)	-0.294** (0.13)	-0.290** (0.13)	-0.278** (0.12)	-0.016 (0.08)	-0.000 (0.08)	-0.014 (0.08)	-0.013 (0.08)	-0.008 (0.08)
Years of party membership	0.014 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.006 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of political offices	0.506*** (0.14)	0.495*** (0.14)	0.498*** (0.14)	0.543*** (0.14)	0.259** (0.12)	0.274** (0.12)	0.263** (0.12)	0.253** (0.12)	0.268** (0.12)
Local-level office	-0.603** (0.26)	-0.508* (0.26)	-0.486* (0.26)	-0.642** (0.26)	-0.071 (0.20)	-0.125 (0.20)	-0.127 (0.20)	-0.112 (0.20)	-0.117 (0.19)
Party office	-0.179 (0.31)	-0.228 (0.30)	-0.254 (0.30)	-0.209 (0.30)	-0.051 (0.22)	0.005 (0.22)	0.000 (0.22)	-0.013 (0.22)	0.001 (0.22)
Number of org. affiliation	-0.177** (0.07)	-0.187** (0.07)	-0.179** (0.07)	-0.182** (0.07)	0.002 (0.05)	0.007 (0.05)	0.001 (0.05)	0.002 (0.05)	0.005 (0.05)
Election:									
Hesse	0.243 (0.26)	0.205 (0.25)	0.215 (0.26)	0.210 (0.25)	0.269 (0.19)	0.228 (0.19)	0.224 (0.19)	0.215 (0.19)	0.212 (0.19)
Bavaria	0.181 (0.22)	0.167 (0.22)	0.172 (0.22)	0.165 (0.22)	0.333** (0.16)	0.343** (0.16)	0.340** (0.16)	0.332** (0.16)	0.332** (0.16)
Saxony	0.122 (0.29)	0.074 (0.29)	0.101 (0.29)	0.115 (0.29)	-0.159 (0.22)	-0.147 (0.22)	-0.132 (0.22)	-0.163 (0.22)	-0.177 (0.22)
Political party:									
CDU/CSU	-0.389 (0.24)	-0.316 (0.24)	-0.310 (0.24)	-0.375 (0.24)	-0.266 (0.19)	-0.289 (0.19)	-0.302 (0.19)	-0.270 (0.19)	-0.275 (0.19)
FDP	-1.608*** (0.37)	-1.545*** (0.38)	-1.537*** (0.38)	-1.617*** (0.37)	-0.708*** (0.21)	-0.734*** (0.21)	-0.740*** (0.21)	-0.719*** (0.21)	-0.746*** (0.21)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.521** (0.26)	-0.442* (0.26)	-0.474* (0.26)	-0.554** (0.26)	-0.386** (0.19)	-0.449** (0.19)	-0.423** (0.19)	-0.408** (0.19)	-0.449** (0.19)
Die Linke	0.218 (0.28)	0.301 (0.28)	0.295 (0.28)	0.163 (0.28)	-0.150 (0.23)	-0.242 (0.22)	-0.188 (0.22)	-0.150 (0.22)	-0.278 (0.22)
Intercept	-1.504*** (0.51)	-1.613*** (0.51)	-1.614*** (0.51)	-1.425*** (0.50)	-1.972*** (0.40)	-2.033*** (0.40)	-1.967*** (0.39)	-1.992*** (0.39)	-2.024*** (0.39)
N	1.255	1.248	1.240	1.266	1.229	1.255	1.248	1.240	1.266
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.067	0.070	0.067	0.066	0.070
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	78.25***	78.60***	78.30***	79.69***	109.40***	118.18***	110.96***	109.68***	119.28***
Log Likelihood	-484	-484	-482	-492	-766	-782	-778	-775	-789
AIC	1011.9	1012.8	1007.1	1028.0	1576.3	1607.5	1600.7	1593.2	1621.7
BIC	1124.9	1125.7	1119.8	1141.2	1688.8	1720.5	1713.5	1705.9	1734.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.56: Politics-facilitating profession across political parties (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Instrumental occupation			Brokerage occupation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.210 (0.49)	0.303 (0.51)	0.308 (0.51)	0.016 (0.40)	0.100 (0.42)	0.093 (0.42)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU	-0.027 (0.22)	-0.351 (0.24)	-0.345 (0.24)	-0.180 (0.18)	-0.289 (0.19)	-0.287 (0.19)
FDP				-0.714*** (0.19)	-0.725*** (0.21)	-0.738*** (0.21)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.537** (0.24)	-0.531** (0.26)	-0.529** (0.26)	-0.481*** (0.18)	-0.432** (0.19)	-0.434** (0.19)
Die Linke	0.021 (0.24)	0.190 (0.29)	0.200 (0.29)	-0.559*** (0.19)	-0.286 (0.23)	-0.261 (0.23)
IO * CDU/CSU	-0.512 (0.92)	-0.687 (0.98)	-0.701 (0.99)	0.254 (0.68)	0.282 (0.71)	0.262 (0.71)
IO * FDP	-	-	-	-0.023 (0.74)	0.003 (0.76)	-0.038 (0.76)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.289 (1.18)	-0.700 (1.22)	-0.629 (1.23)	-0.698 (0.91)	-0.866 (0.93)	-0.773 (0.93)
IO * Die Linke	-0.378 (0.76)	-0.593 (0.78)	-0.599 (0.78)	0.466 (0.59)	0.404 (0.63)	0.388 (0.63)
Male		0.431** (0.19)	0.424** (0.19)		0.215 (0.13)	0.205 (0.13)
Age		-0.007 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)		-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)
Education		0.147 (0.09)	0.151 (0.09)		0.493*** (0.07)	0.503*** (0.07)
Incumbent		-0.187 (0.35)	-0.175 (0.36)		0.003 (0.28)	0.017 (0.29)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.253 (0.18)	0.242 (0.18)		0.157 (0.12)	0.148 (0.12)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.302** (0.13)	-0.305** (0.13)		-0.026 (0.08)	-0.025 (0.08)
Years of party membership		0.007 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)		-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.010* (0.01)	0.010* (0.01)		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.567*** (0.14)	0.588*** (0.15)		0.232** (0.11)	0.277** (0.11)
Local-level office		-0.621** (0.24)	-0.702*** (0.27)		-0.070 (0.17)	-0.157 (0.19)
Party office		-0.275 (0.30)	-0.286 (0.30)		0.050 (0.21)	0.012 (0.21)
Number of org. affiliation		-0.209*** (0.07)	-0.201*** (0.07)		0.007 (0.05)	0.001 (0.05)
Election:						
Hesse			0.189 (0.26)			0.144 (0.19)
Bavaria			0.120 (0.23)			0.310* (0.16)
Saxony			0.134 (0.29)			-0.166 (0.22)
Intercept	-1.463*** (0.16)	-1.430*** (0.52)	-1.448*** (0.52)	-0.090 (0.12)	-1.977*** (0.39)	-1.990*** (0.39)
N	1.082	1.082	1.082	1.302	1.302	1.302
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.008	0.060	0.060	0.013	0.067	0.070
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	7.94	58.56**	59.23***	22.72***	117.11***	122.84***
Log Likelihood	-488	-462	-462	-860	-814	-811
AIC	991.4	968.3	973.6	1741.5	1673.2	1673.4
BIC	1031.2	1078.0	1098.2	1793.3	1792.1	1807.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.57: Politics-facilitating profession across the mode of candidacy (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Instrumental occupation			Brokerage occupation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.272 (0.57)	0.353 (0.58)	0.300 (0.59)	0.025 (0.72)	-0.073 (0.74)	-0.239 (0.74)
Mode of candidacy:						
Party list	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	0.182 (0.19)	0.353* (0.21)	0.197 (0.24)
Dual	0.195 (0.19)	-0.085 (0.21)	0.012 (0.22)	0.386** (0.18)	0.198 (0.19)	0.136 (0.21)
IO * Party list	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	0.106 (0.84)	0.221 (0.86)	0.346 (0.87)
IO * Dual	-0.124 (0.68)	-0.146 (0.70)	-0.301 (0.71)	0.118 (0.78)	0.403 (0.80)	0.487 (0.80)
Male		0.280 (0.20)	0.340* (0.20)		0.214 (0.13)	0.232* (0.14)
Age		0.003 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)
Education		0.077 (0.10)	0.173* (0.10)		0.467*** (0.07)	0.508*** (0.07)
Incumbent		-0.187 (0.37)	-0.176 (0.38)		0.033 (0.28)	0.023 (0.29)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.450** (0.19)	0.393** (0.20)		0.198 (0.12)	0.150 (0.12)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.523*** (0.15)	-0.488*** (0.15)		-0.058 (0.08)	-0.026 (0.08)
Years of party membership		0.005 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)		0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.012** (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)		0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.600*** (0.15)	0.609*** (0.15)		0.247** (0.11)	0.283** (0.12)
Local-level office		-0.678*** (0.26)	-0.754*** (0.28)		-0.076 (0.17)	-0.169 (0.19)
Party office		-0.246 (0.32)	-0.213 (0.33)		0.019 (0.21)	0.004 (0.21)
Number of org. affiliation		-0.055 (0.07)	-0.134* (0.08)		0.043 (0.05)	-0.001 (0.05)
Election:						
Hesse			0.210 (0.28)			0.156 (0.19)
Bavaria			0.188 (0.23)			0.286* (0.17)
Saxony			-0.137 (0.38)			-0.128 (0.22)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.346 (0.25)			-0.273 (0.19)
FDP			-1.442*** (0.38)			-0.727*** (0.21)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.538* (0.29)			-0.412** (0.19)
Die Linke			0.380 (0.31)			-0.153 (0.22)
Intercept	-1.930*** (0.16)	-1.503*** (0.53)	-1.701*** (0.56)	-0.718*** (0.16)	-2.384*** (0.40)	-2.170*** (0.44)
N	1.113	1.113	1.113	1.302	1.302	1.302
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.002	0.055	0.086	0.004	0.060	0.070
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	1.41	50.54***	79.02***	6.79	104.49***	122.35***
Log Likelihood	-458	-433	-419	-869	-820	-811
AIC	923.1	900.0	885.5	1749.5	1677.8	1673.9
BIC	943.1	985.2	1005.8	1780.5	1776.0	1808.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.58: Politics-facilitating profession across the type of party selectorate on party lists (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Instrumental occupation			Brokerage occupation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.540 (0.76)	-0.841 (0.90)	-0.830 (0.89)	-0.422 (0.47)	-0.304 (0.51)	-0.304 (0.52)
Party selectorate:						
Party member assembly	-0.687* (0.38)	-0.413 (0.41)	-0.641 (0.44)	-0.639*** (0.24)	-0.496* (0.26)	-0.587** (0.29)
IO * Party member assembly	0.859 (1.35)	1.274 (1.47)	1.136 (1.50)	1.109 (0.85)	1.009 (0.91)	1.076 (0.92)
Male		0.850** (0.35)	0.968*** (0.35)		0.349 (0.22)	0.425* (0.22)
Age		-0.001 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)		0.009 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.240 (0.17)	0.281 (0.17)		0.636*** (0.12)	0.653*** (0.12)
Incumbent		0.156 (0.55)	0.275 (0.59)		-0.196 (0.41)	-0.020 (0.43)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.346 (0.35)	0.279 (0.37)		0.123 (0.18)	0.091 (0.18)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.898*** (0.27)	-0.834*** (0.28)		-0.091 (0.12)	-0.040 (0.13)
Years of party membership		0.002 (0.02)	0.006 (0.02)		-0.009 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.017* (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)		0.003 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.785*** (0.22)	0.776*** (0.23)		0.265 (0.17)	0.235 (0.17)
Local-level office		0.534 (0.98)	0.590 (0.98)		0.876 (0.54)	0.853 (0.55)
Party office		-0.012 (0.86)	-0.095 (0.86)		-0.289 (0.50)	-0.214 (0.51)
Number of org. affiliation		-0.109 (0.12)	-0.178 (0.12)		0.121 (0.08)	0.071 (0.09)
Election:						
Hesse			0.440 (0.48)			0.523 (0.33)
Bavaria			0.452 (0.44)			0.484 (0.30)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			0.032 (0.41)			-0.090 (0.30)
FDP			-0.959* (0.57)			-0.596* (0.33)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.295 (0.44)			0.144 (0.31)
Die Linke			0.726 (0.55)			-0.134 (0.39)
Intercept	-1.711*** (0.14)	-4.024*** (1.08)	-4.618*** (1.18)	-0.271*** (0.10)	-3.322*** (0.63)	-3.788*** (0.71)
N	517	517	517	517	517	517
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.010	0.143	0.164	0.012	0.100	0.112
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	4.18	58.44***	67.30***	8.13***	69.52***	77.96***
Log Likelihood	-203	-176	-171	-344	-313	-309
AIC	413.8	385.6	388.7	695.1	659.7	663.3
BIC	430.8	457.8	486.4	712.1	731.9	761.0

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.59: Politics-facilitating profession across the district magnitude of MMDs (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Instrumental occupation			Brokerage occupation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Individual level:</i>						
IO	0.006 (0.37)	0.036 (0.38)	-0.108 (0.39)	0.135 (0.24)	0.290 (0.25)	0.223 (0.26)
Male		0.278 (0.20)	0.372* (0.20)		0.194 (0.14)	0.241* (0.14)
Age		0.001 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)		0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Education		0.076 (0.10)	0.188* (0.10)		0.503*** (0.08)	0.548*** (0.08)
Incumbent		-0.219 (0.37)	-0.141 (0.38)		-0.165 (0.30)	-0.110 (0.31)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		0.467** (0.20)	0.407** (0.20)		0.286** (0.13)	0.234* (0.14)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.524*** (0.15)	-0.494*** (0.15)		-0.105 (0.09)	-0.078 (0.09)
Years of party membership		0.005 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)		0.003 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate		0.013** (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)		0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.592*** (0.15)	0.585*** (0.15)		0.267** (0.12)	0.291** (0.12)
Local-level office		-0.636** (0.26)	-0.719** (0.28)		0.016 (0.19)	-0.100 (0.21)
Party office		-0.236 (0.32)	-0.185 (0.33)		-0.008 (0.23)	-0.004 (0.23)
Number of org. affiliation		-0.072 (0.07)	-0.143* (0.08)		0.082 (0.05)	0.053 (0.06)
Election:						
Hesse			0.519 (0.33)			0.359 (0.23)
Bavaria			0.033 (0.25)			0.178 (0.18)
Saxony			0.220 (0.45)			0.004 (0.31)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.348 (0.25)			-0.222 (0.19)
FDP			-1.423*** (0.38)			-0.636*** (0.22)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.513* (0.29)			-0.271 (0.20)
Die Linke			0.430 (0.31)			-0.116 (0.25)
<i>MMD level:</i>						
District magnitude	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.005* (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)
IO * District magnitude	-0.026 (0.02)	-0.030* (0.02)	-0.031* (0.02)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
<i>Random part:</i>						
Variance MMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intraclass correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	-1.800*** (0.09)	-1.600*** (0.52)	-1.884*** (0.56)	-0.402*** (0.06)	-2.312*** (0.40)	-2.306*** (0.42)
N (Candidates)	1.113	1.113	1.113	1.113	1.113	1.113
N (MMDs)	25	25	25	25	25	25
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.011	0.116	0.193	0.003	0.122	0.135
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	5.33	52.40***	72.89***	2.67	86.90***	97.43***
Log Likelihood	-456	-430	-415	-749	-700	-693
AIC	919.2	894.0	877.8	1506.5	1433.5	1434.4
BIC	939.3	979.3	998.1	1526.5	1518.7	1554.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, MMD district magnitude at its mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.60: Instrumental profession across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Instrumental occupation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-0.050 (0.42)	-0.187 (0.43)	-0.179 (0.42)	-0.968 (0.72)	-0.127 (0.42)
Male	0.379* (0.23)	0.369 (0.23)	0.366 (0.23)	0.421* (0.23)	0.374 (0.23)
Age	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.002** (0.00)	-0.002** (0.00)	-0.002** (0.00)	-0.002** (0.00)	-0.002** (0.00)
Education	0.110 (0.11)	0.113 (0.11)	0.108 (0.11)	0.110 (0.11)	0.112 (0.11)
Incumbent	-0.191 (0.37)	-0.166 (0.38)	-0.169 (0.38)	-0.167 (0.38)	-0.187 (0.38)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.144 (0.19)	0.141 (0.19)	0.139 (0.19)	0.129 (0.19)	0.145 (0.19)
Number of prior candidacies	-0.217 (0.15)	-0.218 (0.15)	-0.212 (0.15)	-0.198 (0.15)	-0.217 (0.15)
Years of party membership	0.020* (0.01)	0.021* (0.01)	0.020* (0.01)	0.021* (0.01)	0.020* (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Number of political offices	0.533*** (0.16)	0.523*** (0.16)	0.519*** (0.16)	0.513*** (0.16)	0.528*** (0.16)
Local-level office	-0.572* (0.29)	-0.565* (0.29)	-0.556* (0.30)	-0.530* (0.30)	-0.569* (0.29)
Party office	-0.539 (0.33)	-0.529 (0.33)	-0.534 (0.33)	-0.527 (0.33)	-0.534 (0.33)
Number of org. affiliation	-0.135 (0.08)	-0.132 (0.08)	-0.131 (0.08)	-0.129 (0.08)	-0.133 (0.08)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	0.002 (0.37)	0.003 (0.37)	-0.002 (0.37)	0.006 (0.37)	-0.001 (0.37)
Bavaria	0.189 (0.36)	0.181 (0.36)	0.205 (0.36)	0.245 (0.36)	0.194 (0.36)
Saxony	-0.520 (0.60)	-0.513 (0.60)	-0.498 (0.60)	-0.556 (0.61)	-0.507 (0.60)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.093 (0.31)	-0.090 (0.31)	-0.081 (0.31)	-0.073 (0.32)	-0.086 (0.31)
FDP	-1.310*** (0.41)	-1.305*** (0.41)	-1.307*** (0.41)	-1.291*** (0.41)	-1.304*** (0.41)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.297 (0.30)	-0.299 (0.30)	-0.303 (0.30)	-0.278 (0.30)	-0.297 (0.30)
Die Linke	0.569* (0.32)	0.575* (0.32)	0.576* (0.32)	0.627* (0.32)	0.572* (0.32)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	-0.018 (0.03)	-0.020 (0.03)	-0.019 (0.03)	-0.019 (0.03)	-0.021 (0.03)
% Unemployment	0.000 (0.05)	-0.004 (0.05)	0.003 (0.05)	0.009 (0.05)	0.001 (0.05)
% High school graduates	0.012 (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)
% Right-wing vote share	0.155 (0.12)	0.153 (0.12)	0.146 (0.12)	0.174 (0.12)	0.150 (0.12)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.031 (0.06)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.057 (0.12)			
IO * % High school graduates			0.040 (0.05)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-1.379* (0.72)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intraclass correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	-1.200* (0.62)	-1.226** (0.62)	-1.216* (0.62)	-1.313** (0.63)	-1.215* (0.62)
N (Candidates)	913	913	913	913	913
N (SMDs)	452	452	452	452	452
Wald χ^2 (df)	54.41***	54.46***	54.95***	57.56***	54.32***
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.175	0.175	0.174	0.204	0.174
Log Likelihood	-363	-363	-363	-361	-364
AIC	783.0	783.0	782.6	777.8	783.2
BIC	917.8	917.9	917.5	912.6	918.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.61: Brokerage profession across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Brokerage occupation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	0.273 (0.31)	0.218 (0.29)	0.235 (0.29)	0.221 (0.30)	0.263 (0.29)
Male	0.251 (0.17)	0.248 (0.17)	0.253 (0.17)	0.250 (0.17)	0.251 (0.17)
Age	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)
Education	0.376*** (0.09)	0.378*** (0.09)	0.380*** (0.09)	0.377*** (0.09)	0.377*** (0.09)
Incumbent	0.052 (0.30)	0.060 (0.31)	0.038 (0.30)	0.053 (0.30)	0.046 (0.30)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	0.136 (0.15)	0.135 (0.15)	0.137 (0.15)	0.137 (0.15)	0.140 (0.15)
Number of prior candidacies	-0.022 (0.10)	-0.023 (0.10)	-0.022 (0.10)	-0.023 (0.10)	-0.024 (0.10)
Years of party membership	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.004 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Number of political offices	0.303** (0.13)	0.299** (0.13)	0.308** (0.13)	0.301** (0.13)	0.303** (0.13)
Local-level office	-0.285 (0.22)	-0.282 (0.22)	-0.291 (0.22)	-0.283 (0.22)	-0.286 (0.22)
Party office	-0.139 (0.25)	-0.135 (0.25)	-0.142 (0.25)	-0.136 (0.25)	-0.133 (0.25)
Number of org. affiliation	-0.003 (0.06)	-0.001 (0.06)	-0.004 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.06)	-0.003 (0.06)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	0.191 (0.27)	0.190 (0.27)	0.196 (0.27)	0.190 (0.27)	0.187 (0.27)
Bavaria	0.179 (0.27)	0.179 (0.27)	0.178 (0.27)	0.183 (0.27)	0.176 (0.27)
Saxony	-0.470 (0.44)	-0.467 (0.44)	-0.469 (0.44)	-0.467 (0.44)	-0.493 (0.45)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.065 (0.25)	-0.062 (0.25)	-0.064 (0.25)	-0.061 (0.25)	-0.066 (0.25)
FDP	-0.559** (0.25)	-0.556** (0.25)	-0.553** (0.25)	-0.556** (0.25)	-0.560** (0.25)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.317 (0.22)	-0.317 (0.22)	-0.310 (0.22)	-0.316 (0.22)	-0.317 (0.22)
Die Linke	-0.013 (0.25)	-0.011 (0.25)	-0.010 (0.25)	-0.010 (0.25)	-0.015 (0.25)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	-0.031 (0.02)	-0.032 (0.02)	-0.033* (0.02)	-0.033 (0.02)	-0.034* (0.02)
% Unemployment	-0.024 (0.04)	-0.025 (0.04)	-0.024 (0.04)	-0.024 (0.04)	-0.025 (0.04)
% High school graduates	0.007 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
% Right-wing vote share	0.051 (0.09)	0.050 (0.09)	0.052 (0.09)	0.050 (0.09)	0.053 (0.09)
Urbanity	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.016 (0.04)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.017 (0.08)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.029 (0.03)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.029 (0.26)	
IO * Urbanity					-0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intraclass correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	-1.359*** (0.48)	-1.370*** (0.48)	-1.363*** (0.48)	-1.369*** (0.49)	-1.357*** (0.48)
N (Candidates)	913	913	913	913	913
N (SMDs)	452	452	452	452	452
Wald χ^2 (df)	68.76***	68.68***	69.12***	68.64***	68.79***
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.107	0.107	0.108	0.107	0.108
Log Likelihood	-577	-577	-577	-577	-577
AIC	1209.9	1210.0	1209.3	1210.0	1209.8
BIC	1344.7	1344.9	1344.2	1344.9	1344.7

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: yes (= 1), no (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.62: Local rootedness in SMD (binary logistic regression and negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Local residence in SMD			Residence time in SMD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.451 (0.31)	-0.295 (0.32)	-0.289 (0.33)	-0.170 (0.14)	-0.037 (0.14)	-0.038 (0.14)
Male		0.078 (0.20)	0.076 (0.21)		0.237*** (0.08)	0.236*** (0.08)
Age		-0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)		0.010*** (0.00)	0.015*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.241** (0.11)	-0.306*** (0.12)		-0.064* (0.04)	-0.107*** (0.04)
Repeated candidacy in SMD		0.666*** (0.25)	0.641** (0.25)		-	-
Years of party membership		0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)		0.009** (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Party activity rate		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)		-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of political offices		-0.291** (0.14)	-0.297** (0.14)		-0.093 (0.08)	-0.056 (0.09)
Local-level office		0.738*** (0.22)	0.895*** (0.25)		0.393*** (0.10)	0.322*** (0.11)
Party office		0.492* (0.28)	0.466 (0.29)		-0.107 (0.11)	-0.098 (0.11)
Number of org. affiliation		0.159** (0.08)	0.153* (0.08)		0.044 (0.03)	0.052* (0.03)
Viable SMD		0.120 (0.28)	0.576 (0.38)		0.240** (0.12)	0.072 (0.15)
Vacant SMD		1.158* (0.65)	1.244* (0.67)		0.110 (0.17)	0.084 (0.18)
Election:						0.048 (0.11)
Hesse			-0.077 (0.32)			
Bavaria			-0.173 (0.28)			0.078 (0.10)
Saxony			-0.805*** (0.27)			0.131 (0.11)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU			-0.475 (0.42)			0.070 (0.17)
FDP			0.498 (0.33)			-0.069 (0.12)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.349 (0.30)			-0.250** (0.11)
Die Linke			-0.116 (0.31)			-0.498*** (0.13)
Intercept	1.694*** (0.09)	1.438*** (0.53)	1.593*** (0.59)	3.239*** (0.04)	2.993*** (0.20)	3.338*** (0.23)
Ln Alpha	-	-	-	-0.661*** (0.07)	-0.851*** (0.07)	-0.906*** (0.08)
N	982	982	982	440	440	440
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.002	0.047	0.067	0.000	0.022	0.028
χ ² of Likelihood Ratio Test	2.00	41.00**	59.43***	1.34	79.47***	101.67***
Log Likelihood	-431	-411	-403	-1830	-1791	-1780
AIC	865.1	852.3	849.0	3665.5	3611.4	3603.2
BIC	874.9	925.7	956.6	3677.8	3672.7	3693.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression and negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding of local residence in SMD is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). Dependent variable coding of the years of local residence in SMD is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.63: Local rootedness in SMD across immigrant subgroups (binary logistic regression and negative binomial regression)

	Dependent variables:									
	Local residence in SMD					Residence time in SMD				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	0.459 (1.09)					0.077 (0.31)				
Christian		-0.203 (0.52)					-0.225 (0.21)			
Non-European country			-0.023 (0.59)					0.036 (0.22)		
Muslim country				-0.032 (0.66)					0.120 (0.23)	
European country					-0.463 (0.39)					-0.080 (0.17)
Male	0.012 (0.22)	0.042 (0.22)	0.011 (0.21)	-0.020 (0.22)	0.081 (0.21)	0.268*** (0.08)	0.269*** (0.08)	0.252*** (0.08)	0.258*** (0.08)	0.258*** (0.08)
Age	0.005 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.013*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.015*** (0.00)
Age squared	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education	-0.299*** (0.12)	-0.330*** (0.12)	-0.284** (0.12)	-0.297** (0.12)	-0.312*** (0.12)	-0.100** (0.04)	-0.104*** (0.04)	-0.098** (0.04)	-0.102** (0.04)	-0.105*** (0.04)
Repeated candidacy in SMD	0.618*** (0.26)	0.655*** (0.26)	0.634*** (0.26)	0.637*** (0.26)	0.638*** (0.26)	-	-	-	-	-
Years of party membership	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Party activity rate	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of political offices	-0.284* (0.15)	-0.296** (0.15)	-0.288** (0.15)	-0.290** (0.15)	-0.304** (0.14)	-0.061 (0.09)	0.053* (0.03)	-0.058 (0.09)	-0.061 (0.09)	-0.063 (0.09)
Local-level office	0.947*** (0.26)	0.925*** (0.26)	0.958*** (0.26)	0.972*** (0.26)	0.910*** (0.25)	0.340*** (0.11)	0.363*** (0.11)	0.317*** (0.11)	0.327*** (0.11)	0.354*** (0.11)
Party office	0.333 (0.30)	0.426 (0.30)	0.344 (0.30)	0.352 (0.30)	0.436 (0.29)	-0.136 (0.12)	-0.119 (0.12)	-0.118 (0.12)	-0.125 (0.12)	-0.106 (0.12)
Number of org. affiliation	0.167** (0.08)	0.178** (0.08)	0.152* (0.08)	0.153* (0.08)	0.165** (0.08)	0.051* (0.03)	0.053* (0.03)	0.049* (0.03)	0.052* (0.03)	0.056** (0.03)
Viable SMD	0.505 (0.40)	0.527 (0.40)	0.472 (0.39)	0.518 (0.39)	0.596 (0.39)	0.064 (0.16)	0.071 (0.18)	0.067 (0.15)	0.055 (0.15)	0.113 (0.15)
Vacant SMD	1.247* (0.67)	1.295* (0.67)	1.227* (0.67)	1.243* (0.67)	1.301* (0.67)	0.086 (0.18)	0.068 (0.11)	0.090 (0.18)	0.086 (0.18)	0.079 (0.18)
Election:										
Hesse	0.106 (0.35)	-0.037 (0.34)	0.151 (0.35)	0.137 (0.35)	-0.079 (0.33)	0.039 (0.11)	0.073 (0.10)	0.041 (0.11)	0.038 (0.11)	0.059 (0.11)
Bavaria	-0.216 (0.28)	-0.210 (0.28)	-0.214 (0.28)	-0.207 (0.28)	-0.184 (0.28)	0.053 (0.10)	0.126 (0.12)	0.060 (0.10)	0.054 (0.10)	0.066 (0.10)
Saxony	-0.737*** (0.27)	-0.784*** (0.27)	-0.786*** (0.27)	-0.743*** (0.27)	-0.760*** (0.27)	0.117 (0.12)	0.122 (0.12)	0.122 (0.12)	0.120 (0.12)	0.131 (0.12)
Political party:										
CDU/CSU	-0.481 (0.43)	-0.472 (0.43)	-0.396 (0.42)	-0.478 (0.43)	-0.544 (0.43)	0.086 (0.18)	-0.039 (0.12)	0.075 (0.17)	0.087 (0.18)	0.050 (0.18)
FDP	0.430 (0.34)	0.458 (0.33)	0.457 (0.33)	0.449 (0.33)	0.471 (0.33)	-0.058 (0.12)	-0.215** (0.11)	-0.070 (0.12)	-0.074 (0.12)	-0.045 (0.12)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.331 (0.31)	0.313 (0.31)	0.370 (0.31)	0.338 (0.31)	0.323 (0.30)	-0.220** (0.11)	-0.457*** (0.13)	-0.230** (0.11)	-0.234** (0.11)	-0.229** (0.11)
Die Linke	-0.201 (0.33)	-0.110 (0.33)	-0.160 (0.32)	-0.200 (0.33)	-0.091 (0.32)	-0.466*** (0.13)	0.269*** (0.08)	-0.476*** (0.13)	-0.482*** (0.13)	-0.483*** (0.13)
Intercept	1.750*** (0.62)	1.769*** (0.62)	1.636*** (0.61)	1.709*** (0.62)	1.635*** (0.61)	3.291*** (0.23)	3.258*** (0.23)	3.303*** (0.23)	3.315*** (0.23)	3.280*** (0.23)
Ln Alpha	-	-	-	-	-	-0.904*** (0.08)	-0.901*** (0.08)	-0.909*** (0.08)	-0.909*** (0.08)	-0.896*** (0.08)
N	925	944	938	933	958	416	423	422	420	429
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.070	0.027	0.028	0.027	0.027	0.029
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	53.71***	55.19***	54.86***	54.86***	58.53***	94.54***	99.60***	93.48***	94.59***	102.42***
Log Likelihood	-372	-381	-379	-376	-392	-1687	-1713	-1711	-1703	-1736
AIC	788.6	805.4	801.9	797.0	828.3	3418.4	3470.7	3465.3	3449.6	3516.4
BIC	894.8	912.1	908.5	903.4	935.3	35078.1	3559.7	3554.3	3538.5	3605.7

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression and negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding of local residence in SMD is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). Dependent variable coding of the years of local residence in SMD is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.64: Local rootedness in SMD across political parties (binary logistic regression and negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>					
	Local residence in SMD			Residence time in SMD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.524 (0.60)	-0.280 (0.62)	-0.384 (0.62)	-0.062 (0.24)	0.006 (0.23)	0.016 (0.23)
Political party:						
CDU/CSU	-0.145 (0.31)	-0.577 (0.42)	-0.557 (0.43)	0.170 (0.14)	0.088 (0.18)	0.072 (0.18)
FDP	-0.067 (0.30)	0.518 (0.33)	0.463 (0.34)	-0.180 (0.11)	-0.057 (0.12)	-0.062 (0.12)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.128 (0.28)	0.383 (0.31)	0.381 (0.31)	-0.335*** (0.10)	-0.232** (0.11)	-0.234** (0.11)
Die Linke	-0.402 (0.28)	-0.063 (0.33)	-0.069 (0.33)	-0.351*** (0.11)	-0.488*** (0.13)	-0.498*** (0.13)
IO * CDU/CSU	0.770 (1.25)	1.197 (1.32)	1.165 (1.33)	-0.683 (0.78)	-0.062 (0.74)	-0.049 (0.74)
IO * FDP	0.943 (1.23)	0.838 (1.26)	0.844 (1.27)	-0.171 (0.41)	-0.054 (0.39)	-0.051 (0.39)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.277 (1.05)	-0.491 (1.08)	-0.517 (1.07)	-0.527 (0.50)	-0.496 (0.47)	-0.478 (0.47)
IO * Die Linke	-0.093 (0.78)	-0.108 (0.80)	-0.114 (0.81)	-0.067 (0.34)	0.009 (0.32)	0.002 (0.33)
Male		0.089 (0.20)	0.091 (0.21)		0.239*** (0.08)	0.237*** (0.08)
Age		0.003 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)		0.015*** (0.00)	0.015*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		-0.295** (0.12)	-0.307*** (0.12)		-0.110*** (0.04)	-0.107*** (0.04)
Repeated candidacy in SMD		0.718*** (0.25)	0.655** (0.26)		- (0.00)	- (0.00)
Years of party membership		-0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)		0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Party activity rate		-0.002 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of political offices		-0.285** (0.14)	-0.300** (0.14)		-0.078 (0.08)	-0.055 (0.09)
Local-level office		0.742*** (0.23)	0.914*** (0.25)		0.369*** (0.10)	0.321*** (0.11)
Party office		0.481* (0.28)	0.454 (0.29)		-0.080 (0.11)	-0.093 (0.12)
Number of org. affiliation		0.195** (0.08)	0.158* (0.08)		0.044 (0.03)	0.051* (0.03)
Viable SMD		0.621* (0.37)	0.589 (0.38)		0.055 (0.15)	0.075 (0.15)
Vacant SMD		1.340** (0.66)	1.266* (0.67)		0.077 (0.18)	0.085 (0.18)
Election:						
Hesse			-0.087 (0.32)			0.044 (0.11)
Bavaria			-0.184 (0.28)			0.073 (0.10)
Saxony			-0.805*** (0.26)			0.128 (0.11)
Intercept	1.846*** (0.21)	1.429** (0.60)	1.586*** (0.60)	3.409*** (0.08)	3.328*** (0.23)	3.331*** (0.23)
Ln Alpha	- (0.07)	- (0.08)	- (0.08)	-0.730*** (0.07)	-0.905*** (0.08)	-0.909*** (0.08)
N	982	982	982	440	440	440
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.008	0.059	0.070	0.008	0.028	0.028
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	6.91	51.12***	60.25***	30.18***	101.28***	102.75***
Log Likelihood	-428	-406	-401	-1815	-1780	-1779
AIC	876.2	858.0	854.9	3652.7	3605.6	3610.1
BIC	925.1	970.5	982.0	3697.6	3699.6	3716.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression and negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding of local residence in SMD is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). Dependent variable coding of the years of local residence in SMD is a count. References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.65: Local residence in SMD across the type of party selectorate (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Local residence in SMD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.930 (0.87)	-0.650 (0.98)	-0.723 (1.01)
Party selectorate:			
Party member assembly	-0.287 (0.30)	0.151 (0.34)	0.168 (0.42)
IO * Party member assembly	0.246 (1.04)	-0.071 (1.14)	-0.125 (1.17)
Male		0.119 (0.32)	0.057 (0.34)
Age		-0.007 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Age squared		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Education		-0.426** (0.18)	-0.490*** (0.19)
Repeated candidacy in SMD		0.671 (0.41)	0.652 (0.44)
Years of party membership		0.019 (0.02)	0.020 (0.02)
Party activity rate		-0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.035 (0.21)	0.042 (0.22)
Local-level office		0.274 (0.56)	0.354 (0.58)
Party office		0.330 (0.52)	0.279 (0.54)
Number of org. affiliation		0.190 (0.12)	0.219* (0.13)
Viable SMD		0.098 (0.51)	1.248 (0.88)
Vacant SMD		1.479 (1.12)	1.688 (1.17)
Election:			
Hesse			0.698* (0.39)
Bavaria			0.644* (0.37)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-1.118 (1.00)
FDP			1.130** (0.55)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.502 (0.49)
Die Linke			0.139 (0.51)
Intercept	1.846*** (0.25)	2.434*** (0.89)	1.875** (0.95)
N	415	415	415
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.009	0.074	0.113
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	3.31	27.95**	42.39**
Log Likelihood	-187	-174	-167
AIC	381.3	382.7	380.2
BIC	397.4	451.2	472.9

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.66: Local residence in SMD across SMD context factors (two-level binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Local residence in SMD				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-0.378 (0.36)	-0.227 (0.35)	0.013 (0.38)	-0.151 (0.35)	-0.321 (0.35)
Male	-0.056 (0.22)	-0.035 (0.22)	-0.006 (0.22)	-0.020 (0.22)	-0.047 (0.22)
Age	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Education	-0.296** (0.12)	-0.298** (0.12)	-0.301** (0.12)	-0.301** (0.12)	-0.296** (0.12)
Repeated candidacy in SMD	0.637** (0.26)	0.635** (0.26)	0.629** (0.26)	0.642** (0.26)	0.649** (0.26)
Years of party membership	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Party activity rate	0.000 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)
Number of political offices	-0.260* (0.15)	-0.244* (0.15)	-0.236 (0.15)	-0.244* (0.15)	-0.236 (0.15)
Local-level office	0.845*** (0.26)	0.836*** (0.26)	0.822*** (0.26)	0.840*** (0.26)	0.837*** (0.26)
Party office	0.428 (0.30)	0.406 (0.30)	0.417 (0.30)	0.413 (0.30)	0.373 (0.30)
Number of org. affiliation	0.181** (0.08)	0.176** (0.08)	0.172** (0.08)	0.174** (0.08)	0.178** (0.08)
Viable SMD	0.650* (0.38)	0.646* (0.38)	0.651* (0.38)	0.625* (0.38)	0.632* (0.38)
Vacant SMD	1.156* (0.68)	1.132* (0.68)	1.124* (0.68)	1.138* (0.68)	1.152* (0.68)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	-0.400 (0.39)	-0.339 (0.39)	-0.310 (0.40)	-0.349 (0.39)	-0.366 (0.39)
Bavaria	-0.599 (0.38)	-0.634* (0.38)	-0.619 (0.38)	-0.602 (0.38)	-0.601 (0.38)
Saxony	-0.981* (0.54)	-1.007* (0.53)	-1.004* (0.54)	-0.989* (0.54)	-0.904* (0.53)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.389 (0.41)	-0.416 (0.41)	-0.427 (0.41)	-0.400 (0.41)	-0.386 (0.41)
FDP	0.626* (0.35)	0.606* (0.34)	0.622* (0.35)	0.601* (0.34)	0.622* (0.34)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.385 (0.31)	0.386 (0.31)	0.401 (0.31)	0.398 (0.31)	0.389 (0.31)
Die Linke	-0.096 (0.32)	-0.105 (0.32)	-0.117 (0.33)	-0.103 (0.32)	-0.080 (0.32)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	-0.060** (0.02)	-0.045* (0.02)	-0.050** (0.02)	-0.048** (0.02)	-0.045* (0.02)
% Unemployment	-0.096* (0.05)	-0.108** (0.05)	-0.098* (0.05)	-0.095* (0.05)	-0.096* (0.05)
% High school graduates	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.126 (0.11)	-0.104 (0.11)	-0.102 (0.11)	-0.103 (0.11)	-0.127 (0.11)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	0.097* (0.05)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.123 (0.10)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.058 (0.05)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.185 (0.27)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000* (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.088 (0.31)	0.093 (0.31)	0.151 (0.32)	0.105 (0.31)	0.085 (0.30)
Intraclass correlation	0.026 (0.09)	0.027 (0.09)	0.044 (0.09)	0.031 (0.09)	0.025 (0.09)
Intercept	1.863*** (0.63)	1.898*** (0.63)	1.907*** (0.64)	1.882*** (0.63)	1.896*** (0.63)
N (Candidates)	973	973	973	973	973
N (SMDs)	460	460	460	460	460
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.174	0.170	0.169	0.166	0.173
Wald χ^2 (df)	61.48***	59.57***	58.48***	58.69***	61.74***
Log Likelihood	-386	-387	-387	-388	-386
AIC	829.9	832.8	832.7	833.8	830.0
BIC	971.4	974.3	974.2	975.3	971.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (= 1), no local residence (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.67: Years of local residence in SMD across SMD context factors (two-level negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Years of local residence				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-0.124 (0.14)	-0.072 (0.14)	-0.040 (0.14)	-0.116 (0.17)	-0.146 (0.14)
Male	0.211*** (0.08)	0.220*** (0.08)	0.207*** (0.08)	0.217*** (0.08)	0.219*** (0.08)
Age	0.016*** (0.00)	0.016*** (0.00)	0.016*** (0.00)	0.016*** (0.00)	0.015*** (0.00)
Age squared	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education	-0.108*** (0.04)	-0.109*** (0.04)	-0.111*** (0.04)	-0.107*** (0.04)	-0.109*** (0.04)
Years of party membership	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Party activity rate	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Number of political offices	-0.079 (0.08)	-0.077 (0.09)	-0.089 (0.09)	-0.079 (0.09)	-0.074 (0.08)
Local-level office	0.339*** (0.11)	0.338*** (0.11)	0.358*** (0.11)	0.345*** (0.11)	0.344*** (0.11)
Party office	-0.041 (0.11)	-0.046 (0.11)	-0.046 (0.11)	-0.057 (0.11)	-0.059 (0.11)
Number of org. affiliation	0.061** (0.03)	0.061** (0.03)	0.062** (0.03)	0.060** (0.03)	0.058** (0.03)
Viable SMD	0.123 (0.15)	0.127 (0.15)	0.138 (0.15)	0.089 (0.15)	0.158 (0.15)
Vacant SMD	0.112 (0.18)	0.109 (0.18)	0.102 (0.18)	0.106 (0.18)	0.105 (0.18)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	0.017 (0.13)	0.030 (0.13)	0.036 (0.13)	0.039 (0.13)	0.028 (0.13)
Bavaria	0.003 (0.12)	-0.003 (0.12)	0.021 (0.13)	0.002 (0.13)	0.026 (0.12)
Saxony	-0.173 (0.22)	-0.182 (0.22)	-0.179 (0.22)	-0.188 (0.22)	-0.099 (0.22)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	0.043 (0.17)	0.033 (0.17)	0.034 (0.17)	0.065 (0.17)	0.013 (0.17)
FDP	-0.080 (0.12)	-0.075 (0.12)	-0.080 (0.12)	-0.094 (0.12)	-0.045 (0.12)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.270** (0.11)	-0.266** (0.11)	-0.273** (0.11)	-0.280*** (0.11)	-0.246** (0.11)
Die Linke	-0.534*** (0.13)	-0.522*** (0.13)	-0.527*** (0.13)	-0.535*** (0.13)	-0.508*** (0.13)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
% Unemployment	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)
% High school graduates	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
% Right-wing vote share	0.050 (0.04)	0.059 (0.04)	0.053 (0.04)	0.057 (0.04)	0.049 (0.04)
Urbanity	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	0.034 (0.02)				
IO * % Unemployment		0.052 (0.04)			
IO * % High school graduates			0.031** (0.02)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.104 (0.17)	
IO * Urbanity					0.000*** (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	3.349*** (0.23)	3.348*** (0.23)	3.350*** (0.23)	3.364*** (0.23)	3.320*** (0.23)
Ln Alpha	-0.937*** (0.08)	-0.934*** (0.08)	-0.939*** (0.08)	-0.931*** (0.08)	-0.952*** (0.08)
N (Candidates)	436	436	436	436	436
N (SMDs)	305	305	305	305	305
Wald χ^2 (df)	126.54***	125.54***	128.46***	123.88***	135.34***
Log Likelihood	-1757	-1758	-1757	-1758	-1754
AIC	3570.1	3571.4	3569.0	3572.5	3564.4
BIC	3684.3	3685.6	3683.2	3686.7	3678.6

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.68: Viable SMD nomination (binary logistic regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Viable SMD nomination		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.461 (0.35)	-0.436 (0.41)	-0.841 (0.53)
Male		0.352* (0.21)	-0.082 (0.29)
Age		-0.037*** (0.01)	-0.041** (0.02)
Age squared		-0.001* (0.00)	-0.002* (0.00)
Education		0.269** (0.12)	0.141 (0.15)
Incumbent		0.867*** (0.27)	0.723* (0.39)
Years of party membership		0.084*** (0.01)	0.058*** (0.02)
Party activity rate		0.016*** (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Number of political offices		0.472*** (0.16)	0.483** (0.23)
Local-level office		0.023 (0.28)	0.102 (0.42)
Party office		-1.294*** (0.34)	-1.121** (0.47)
Number of org. affiliations		-0.319*** (0.08)	-0.315*** (0.12)
Local residence in SMD		0.441 (0.28)	0.654 (0.42)
Election:			
Hesse			0.039 (0.39)
Bavaria			-1.810*** (0.48)
Saxony			-0.909* (0.47)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			3.521*** (0.43)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-3.382*** (0.64)
Die Linke			-1.152*** (0.41)
Intercept	-0.970*** (0.08)	-1.856*** (0.65)	-0.983 (0.92)
N	799	799	799
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	1.93	225.74***	540.44***
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.002	0.243	0.581
Log Likelihood	-464	-352	-195
AIC	932.7	732.9	430.2
BIC	942.0	798.4	523.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: viable (= 1), non-viable (= 0). References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.69: Party list margin (OLS regression)

	Dependent variable:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
		List margin	
IO	1.877 (1.75)	2.464 (1.57)	3.224** (1.53)
Male		-3.179*** (0.93)	-3.450*** (0.89)
Age		-0.015 (0.04)	-0.108** (0.04)
Age squared		0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Education		1.005* (0.58)	1.117** (0.54)
Incumbent		3.380 (2.14)	-0.857 (2.39)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		2.048** (1.01)	3.458*** (1.09)
Number of prior candidacies		1.532*** (0.53)	1.468*** (0.53)
Years of party membership		-0.001 (0.05)	0.081 (0.05)
Party activity rate		0.154*** (0.04)	0.203*** (0.04)
Number of political offices		1.887*** (0.73)	2.784*** (0.82)
Local-level office		-2.418** (1.18)	-1.463 (1.25)
Party office		-1.159 (1.50)	-2.323 (1.44)
Number of org. affiliations		0.254 (0.37)	-0.082 (0.36)
Non-viable SMD nomination		10.017*** (0.91)	6.933*** (0.93)
Election:			
Hesse			-10.245*** (1.80)
Bavaria			3.275*** (0.96)
Saxony			-0.169 (1.54)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-3.837** (1.69)
FDP			4.334*** (1.23)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			1.622 (1.10)
Die Linke			4.987*** (1.55)
Intercept	-12.556*** (0.52)	-17.762*** (2.92)	-14.791*** (2.92)
N	1.173	1.173	1.173
R ²	0.001	0.227	0.310
F-test	1.15	25.12***	18.90***
Log Likelihood	-4983	-4832	-4766
AIC	9969.6	9696.1	9577.5
BIC	9979.8	9777.2	9694.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is metric: margin to the last won list position in the previous election. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination/viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.70: Party list margin across immigrant subgroups (OLS regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	List margin				
Muslim	7.618** (3.61)				
Christian		1.710 (2.46)			
Non-European country			2.953 (2.26)		
Muslim country				5.697** (2.74)	
European country					2.989 (2.02)
Male	-3.719*** (0.92)	-3.650*** (0.92)	-3.485*** (0.91)	-3.659*** (0.92)	-3.855*** (0.91)
Age	-0.129*** (0.04)	-0.110** (0.04)	-0.124*** (0.04)	-0.128*** (0.04)	-0.112*** (0.04)
Age squared	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Education	1.209** (0.57)	1.171** (0.55)	1.169** (0.56)	1.163** (0.56)	1.215** (0.55)
Incumbent	-1.532 (2.46)	-0.524 (2.45)	-1.538 (2.44)	-1.517 (2.45)	-0.447 (2.41)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	3.539*** (1.13)	3.444*** (1.13)	3.507*** (1.11)	3.522*** (1.13)	3.386*** (1.12)
Number of prior candidacies	1.563*** (0.55)	1.534*** (0.54)	1.575*** (0.54)	1.552*** (0.54)	1.517*** (0.54)
Years of party membership	0.110** (0.05)	0.084 (0.05)	0.109** (0.05)	0.110** (0.05)	0.082 (0.05)
Party activity rate	0.196*** (0.04)	0.191*** (0.04)	0.193*** (0.04)	0.192*** (0.04)	0.191*** (0.04)
Number of political offices	2.782*** (0.85)	2.536*** (0.83)	2.835*** (0.84)	2.822*** (0.84)	2.572*** (0.81)
Local-level office	-1.044 (1.30)	-1.207 (1.28)	-1.114 (1.28)	-0.958 (1.29)	-1.291 (1.27)
Party office	-2.629* (1.51)	-1.624 (1.52)	-2.572* (1.49)	-2.836* (1.50)	-1.990 (1.49)
Number of org. affiliations	-0.191 (0.38)	-0.066 (0.38)	-0.137 (0.37)	-0.148 (0.38)	-0.078 (0.37)
Non-viable SMD nomination	7.038*** (0.97)	6.948*** (0.96)	7.119*** (0.95)	7.113*** (0.96)	6.983*** (0.96)
Election:					
Hesse	-10.628*** (1.87)	-10.447*** (1.88)	-10.551*** (1.85)	-10.470*** (1.86)	-10.256*** (1.87)
Bavaria	3.139*** (0.98)	3.211*** (0.97)	3.095*** (0.98)	3.111*** (0.98)	3.180*** (0.97)
Saxony	-0.223 (1.57)	0.004 (1.56)	-0.505 (1.55)	-0.198 (1.57)	0.031 (1.56)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	-3.551** (1.75)	-4.014** (1.72)	-3.704** (1.74)	-3.585** (1.75)	-3.820** (1.72)
FDP	4.755*** (1.26)	4.296*** (1.25)	4.573*** (1.25)	4.494*** (1.25)	4.309*** (1.25)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	1.975* (1.13)	1.569 (1.13)	1.971* (1.11)	1.951* (1.12)	1.510 (1.12)
Die Linke	5.968*** (1.64)	4.864*** (1.65)	5.803*** (1.61)	5.821*** (1.62)	4.847*** (1.61)
Intercept	-15.021*** (3.05)	-15.681*** (3.01)	-15.073*** (3.01)	-14.857*** (3.03)	-15.400*** (3.00)
N	1.103	1.128	1.123	1.113	1.137
R ²	0.316	0.308	0.315	0.313	0.308
F-test	18.18***	18.05***	18.50***	18.27***	18.48***
Log Likelihood	-4486	-4591	-4565	-4525	-4623
AIC	9017.3	9227.7	9175.5	9096.3	9291.4
BIC	9132.5	9343.3	9291.1	9211.6	9407.2

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is metric: margin to the last won list position in the previous election. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination/viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.71: Party list margin across political parties (OLS regression)

	Dependent variable:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
		List margin	
IO	2.524 (2.88)	4.280 (2.81)	4.585* (2.52)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU	-5.955*** (1.84)	-4.080** (1.87)	-3.851** (1.75)
FDP	3.704*** (1.41)	5.067*** (1.36)	4.566*** (1.26)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	3.098** (1.34)	2.895** (1.26)	1.817 (1.14)
Die Linke	5.882*** (1.73)	6.698*** (1.78)	5.307*** (1.66)
IO * CDU/CSU	1.412 (7.22)	-0.437 (6.23)	0.355 (5.98)
IO * FDP	-4.154 (4.25)	-2.933 (4.18)	-3.339 (3.77)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.092 (4.96)	-2.796 (4.35)	-2.964 (4.15)
IO * Die Linke	-2.709 (3.76)	-3.812 (3.58)	-2.599 (3.59)
Male		-3.107*** (0.94)	-3.430*** (0.89)
Age		-0.085* (0.04)	-0.110*** (0.04)
Age squared		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Education		1.200** (0.58)	1.121** (0.54)
Incumbent		2.545 (2.19)	-0.888 (2.39)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		2.733*** (1.04)	3.482*** (1.09)
Number of prior candidacies		1.095** (0.53)	1.469*** (0.53)
Years of party membership		0.096* (0.06)	0.083 (0.05)
Party activity rate		0.165*** (0.04)	0.202*** (0.04)
Number of political offices		2.219*** (0.76)	2.776*** (0.82)
Local-level office		-2.055* (1.16)	-1.474 (1.25)
Party office		-1.745 (1.49)	-2.273 (1.45)
Number of org. affiliations		0.258 (0.38)	-0.106 (0.36)
Non-viable SMD nomination		6.805*** (0.96)	6.914*** (0.94)
Election:			
Hesse			-10.262*** (1.81)
Bavaria			3.260*** (0.96)
Saxony			-0.219 (1.54)
Intercept	-13.382*** (1.15)	-17.815*** (3.24)	-14.899*** (2.95)
N	1.173	1.173	1.173
R ²	0.054	0.255	0.310
F-Test	5.85***	17.30***	16.05***
Log Likelihood	-4951	-4811	-4765
AIC	9921.7	9669.6	9584.6
BIC	9972.4	9791.3	9721.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is metric: margin to the last won list position in the previous election. References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination/viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.72: Party list margin across the type of party selectorate (OLS regression)

	Dependent variable:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
		List margin	
IO	1.152 (3.90)	4.924 (3.27)	5.926** (2.86)
Party selectorate:			
Party member assembly	-5.290*** (1.87)	-2.583 (1.64)	-3.520** (1.73)
IO * Party member assembly	1.423 (6.99)	-2.346 (5.80)	-3.567 (5.34)
Male		-4.044** (1.59)	-4.961*** (1.49)
Age		0.060 (0.06)	-0.064 (0.06)
Age squared		0.006* (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Education		1.870** (0.90)	1.641** (0.83)
Incumbent		5.947* (3.03)	0.508 (3.26)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		4.176*** (1.50)	5.390*** (1.52)
Number of prior candidacies		0.848 (0.82)	1.085 (0.84)
Years of party membership		0.009 (0.09)	0.101 (0.09)
Party activity rate		0.203*** (0.05)	0.269*** (0.05)
Number of political offices		1.462 (1.09)	3.142*** (1.16)
Local-level office		-7.463* (4.10)	-2.662 (3.72)
Party office		5.416 (4.21)	-0.399 (3.72)
Number of org. affiliations		0.360 (0.62)	0.051 (0.63)
Non-viable SMD nomination		8.108*** (1.55)	7.295*** (1.60)
Election:			
Hesse			-10.336*** (2.22)
Bavaria			4.367** (1.88)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			4.104 (3.02)
FDP			6.241*** (2.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			3.710* (1.92)
Die Linke			4.593 (2.86)
Intercept	-11.485*** (1.02)	-20.676*** (4.67)	-18.753*** (4.69)
N	511	511	511
R ²	0.014	0.283	0.391
F-test	2.84**	12.82***	8.87***
Log Likelihood	-2223	-2141	-2099
AIC	4453.1	4318.0	4246.4
BIC	4470.1	4394.2	4348.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is metric: margin to the last won list position in the previous election. References: native-born, party delegate assembly, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination/viable SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.73: Share of party funding in the campaign expenses (fractional logit regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Share of party funding in the campaign expenses in %		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.017 (0.17)	-0.052 (0.19)	-0.081 (0.19)
Male		-0.368*** (0.10)	-0.118 (0.10)
Age		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.028 (0.05)	0.049 (0.05)
Incumbent		-0.163 (0.19)	-0.107 (0.19)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.300*** (0.10)	-0.168* (0.09)
Number of prior candidacies		0.191*** (0.06)	0.137** (0.05)
Years of party membership		-0.016*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Party activity rate		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices		-0.129 (0.08)	-0.146* (0.08)
Local-level office		0.189 (0.12)	0.333*** (0.12)
Party office		0.172 (0.14)	0.098 (0.15)
Number of org. affiliations		0.112*** (0.03)	0.012 (0.04)
Electoral viability		-0.612*** (0.11)	-0.365*** (0.11)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list		-1.203*** (0.17)	-0.870*** (0.18)
Dual		0.026 (0.12)	0.100 (0.13)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.289** (0.14)
Bavaria			0.219* (0.12)
Saxony			-0.728*** (0.14)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-1.440*** (0.16)
FDP			-0.454*** (0.13)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.818*** (0.12)
Die Linke			0.575*** (0.15)
Intercept	0.006 -0.017	0.304 -0.052	-0.118 -0.081
N	1.072	1.072	1.072
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.000	0.067	0.144
Wald χ^2 (df)	0.01	196.8***	488.9***
Log Likelihood	-609	-560	-502
AIC	1222.9	1155.5	1055.0
BIC	1232.9	1245.1	1179.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from fractional logit regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a share. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.74: Size of campaign team (zero-inflated negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Size of campaign team (in persons)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	0.048 (0.11)	0.069 (0.11)	-0.007 (0.10)
Male		0.010 (0.06)	-0.007 (0.06)
Age		-0.007*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.024 (0.03)	0.034 (0.03)
Incumbent		0.135 (0.12)	0.165 (0.12)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.055 (0.06)	-0.121** (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.032 (0.04)	0.012 (0.04)
Party activity rate		0.010*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.220*** (0.05)	0.159*** (0.05)
Local-level office		-0.174** (0.08)	-0.134 (0.08)
Party office		-0.220** (0.10)	-0.153* (0.09)
Number of org. affiliations		0.094*** (0.02)	0.070*** (0.02)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list		-0.212* (0.11)	-0.226** (0.11)
Dual		0.114 (0.08)	0.098 (0.08)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.026 (0.09)
Bavaria			-0.105 (0.08)
Saxony			-0.261*** (0.10)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			0.105 (0.09)
FDP			-0.538*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.311*** (0.08)
Die Linke			-0.081 (0.09)
Intercept	2.238*** (0.03)	2.338*** (0.17)	2.425*** (0.19)
Ln Alpha	-0.293*** (0.07)	-0.401*** (0.07)	-0.531*** (0.07)
<i>Inflated components:</i>			
Years of party membership	0.013* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)
Electoral viability	-1.704*** (0.26)	-1.581*** (0.25)	-1.510*** (0.22)
Intercept	-0.990*** (0.14)	-1.047*** (0.14)	-0.992*** (0.13)
N	1.375	1.375	1.375
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	0.19	129.95***	193.22***
Log Likelihood	-4011	-3946	-3914
AIC	8033.7	7932.0	7882.7
BIC	8065.1	8036.5	8023.8

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from zero-inflated negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, mean years of party membership, non-viable nomination. * $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.75: Share of party funding in the campaign expenses across immigrant subgroups (fractional logit regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Share of party funding in the campaign expenses in %				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	0.228 (0.50)				
Christian		0.031 (0.28)			
Non-European country			0.064 (0.32)		
Muslim country				-0.140 (0.34)	
European country					-0.058 (0.23)
Male	-0.152 (0.10)	-0.162 (0.10)	-0.115 (0.10)	-0.143 (0.10)	-0.152 (0.10)
Age	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)
Age squared	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.052 (0.05)	0.053 (0.05)	0.051 (0.05)	0.051 (0.05)	0.043 (0.05)
Incumbent	-0.078 (0.20)	-0.134 (0.19)	-0.099 (0.20)	-0.076 (0.20)	-0.101 (0.19)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.185** (0.09)	-0.174* (0.09)	-0.166* (0.09)	-0.198** (0.09)	-0.166* (0.09)
Number of prior candidacies	0.137** (0.06)	0.132** (0.06)	0.145** (0.06)	0.151*** (0.06)	0.117** (0.06)
Years of party membership	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.000 (0.00)
Party activity rate	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Number of political offices	-0.153* (0.08)	-0.135* (0.08)	-0.144* (0.08)	-0.153* (0.08)	-0.148* (0.08)
Local-level office	0.375*** (0.13)	0.314** (0.13)	0.371*** (0.13)	0.383*** (0.13)	0.329*** (0.12)
Party office	0.110 (0.15)	0.097 (0.15)	0.103 (0.15)	0.110 (0.15)	0.097 (0.15)
Number of org. affiliations	0.007 (0.04)	0.014 (0.04)	-0.003 (0.04)	0.004 (0.04)	0.017 (0.04)
Mode of candidacy:					
Party list	-0.959*** (0.19)	-0.891*** (0.19)	-0.910*** (0.19)	-0.950*** (0.19)	-0.918*** (0.19)
Dual	0.083 (0.14)	0.138 (0.13)	0.071 (0.14)	0.079 (0.14)	0.098 (0.13)
Electoral viability	-0.397*** (0.11)	-0.404*** (0.11)	-0.358*** (0.11)	-0.388*** (0.11)	-0.409*** (0.11)
Election:					
Hesse	-0.369** (0.15)	-0.404*** (0.14)	-0.345** (0.14)	-0.357** (0.15)	-0.376*** (0.15)
Bavaria	0.231* (0.12)	0.223* (0.12)	0.230* (0.12)	0.234* (0.12)	0.224* (0.12)
Saxony	-0.717*** (0.14)	-0.724*** (0.14)	-0.729*** (0.14)	-0.720*** (0.14)	-0.729*** (0.14)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	-1.476*** (0.16)	-1.437*** (0.16)	-1.482*** (0.16)	-1.479*** (0.16)	-1.418*** (0.16)
FDP	-0.503*** (0.13)	-0.451*** (0.13)	-0.479*** (0.13)	-0.509*** (0.13)	-0.438*** (0.13)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.773*** (0.13)	0.816*** (0.13)	0.803*** (0.13)	0.777*** (0.13)	0.814*** (0.13)
Die Linke	0.553*** (0.16)	0.599*** (0.16)	0.595*** (0.16)	0.557*** (0.16)	0.570*** (0.15)
Intercept	-0.072 (0.30)	-0.073 (0.30)	-0.119 (0.30)	-0.086 (0.30)	-0.025 (0.30)
N	1.012	1.032	1.027	1.020	1.044
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.151	0.151	0.147	0.150	0.148
Wald χ^2 (df)	496.6***	497.1***	492.0***	498.9***	492.6***
Log Likelihood	-470	-479	-479	-474	-486
AIC	989.5	1008.9	1008.2	998.7	1022.6
BIC	1112.9	1132.4	1131.6	1121.9	1146.3

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from fractional logit regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a share. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.76: Size of campaign team across immigrant subgroups (zero-inflated negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Size of campaign team (in persons)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Muslim	0.075 (0.26)				
Christian		0.039 (0.15)			
Non-European country			0.179 (0.17)		
Muslim country				0.130 (0.20)	
European country					-0.092 (0.14)
Male	-0.004 (0.06)	-0.006 (0.06)	-0.013 (0.06)	-0.008 (0.06)	0.008 (0.06)
Age	-0.008*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)
Age squared	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.039 (0.03)	0.039 (0.03)	0.039 (0.03)	0.040 (0.03)	0.036 (0.03)
Incumbent	0.113 (0.13)	0.122 (0.13)	0.113 (0.13)	0.107 (0.13)	0.163 (0.12)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.100* (0.06)	-0.091 (0.06)	-0.102* (0.06)	-0.100* (0.06)	-0.100* (0.06)
Number of prior candidacies	0.001 (0.04)	-0.010 (0.04)	0.001 (0.04)	0.003 (0.04)	-0.007 (0.04)
Party activity rate	0.007*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of political offices	0.175*** (0.05)	0.171*** (0.05)	0.173*** (0.05)	0.176*** (0.05)	0.163*** (0.05)
Local-level office	-0.135 (0.09)	-0.132 (0.09)	-0.142* (0.09)	-0.147* (0.09)	-0.121 (0.09)
Party office	-0.178* (0.10)	-0.203** (0.10)	-0.169* (0.10)	-0.174* (0.10)	-0.176* (0.10)
Number of org. affiliations	0.071*** (0.02)	0.069*** (0.02)	0.070*** (0.02)	0.070*** (0.02)	0.069*** (0.02)
Mode of candidacy:					
Party list	-0.278** (0.12)	-0.252** (0.11)	-0.268** (0.12)	-0.278** (0.12)	-0.242** (0.11)
Dual	0.092 (0.09)	0.084 (0.09)	0.093 (0.09)	0.097 (0.09)	0.089 (0.08)
Election:					
Hesse	-0.030 (0.10)	-0.037 (0.09)	-0.047 (0.09)	-0.041 (0.09)	-0.031 (0.09)
Bavaria	-0.089 (0.08)	-0.093 (0.08)	-0.090 (0.08)	-0.089 (0.08)	-0.102 (0.08)
Saxony	-0.269*** (0.10)	-0.267*** (0.10)	-0.262** (0.10)	-0.269*** (0.10)	-0.271*** (0.10)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	0.085 (0.10)	0.092 (0.09)	0.080 (0.09)	0.086 (0.09)	0.103 (0.09)
FDP	-0.552*** (0.10)	-0.573*** (0.09)	-0.545*** (0.09)	-0.549*** (0.09)	-0.572*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.310*** (0.09)	-0.320*** (0.09)	-0.321*** (0.09)	-0.313*** (0.09)	-0.312*** (0.09)
Die Linke	-0.078 (0.10)	-0.081 (0.10)	-0.086 (0.10)	-0.078 (0.10)	-0.077 (0.09)
Intercept	2.435*** (0.20)	2.465*** (0.19)	2.445*** (0.20)	2.439*** (0.20)	2.424*** (0.19)
Ln Alpha	-0.487*** (0.07)	-0.512*** (0.07)	-0.506*** (0.07)	-0.495*** (0.07)	-0.507*** (0.07)
<i>Inflation component:</i>					
Years of party membership	0.012* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)	0.013* (0.01)
Electoral viability	-1.471*** (0.23)	-1.469*** (0.22)	-1.473*** (0.23)	-1.485*** (0.23)	-1.493*** (0.22)
Intercept	-0.996*** (0.14)	-0.975*** (0.14)	-1.002*** (0.14)	-0.998*** (0.14)	-1.002*** (0.14)
N	1.295	1.325	1.316	1.306	1.337
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	177.98***	189.10***	182.44***	181.52***	189.18***
Log Likelihood	-3679	-3760	-3746	-3713	-3798
AIC	7411.5	7574.9	7545.7	7479.8	7649.8
BIC	7550.9	7715.0	7685.6	7619.5	7790.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from zero-inflated negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, mean years of party membership, non-viable nomination. * $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.77: Share of party funding in the campaign expenses across political parties (fractional logit regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Share of party funding in the campaign expenses in %		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.045 (0.25)	-0.139 (0.26)	-0.143 (0.27)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU	-1.746*** (0.16)	-1.455*** (0.16)	-1.469*** (0.16)
FDP	-0.278** (0.13)	-0.413*** (0.13)	-0.472*** (0.13)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.961*** (0.12)	0.873*** (0.13)	0.823*** (0.13)
Die Linke	0.617*** (0.13)	0.642*** (0.16)	0.601*** (0.16)
IO * CDU/CSU	0.373 (0.68)	0.499 (0.72)	0.483 (0.75)
IO * FDP	0.278 (0.49)	0.381 (0.53)	0.339 (0.56)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.220 (0.57)	-0.024 (0.63)	-0.033 (0.61)
IO * Die Linke	-0.142 (0.41)	-0.132 (0.40)	-0.135 (0.41)
Male		-0.071 (0.10)	-0.114 (0.10)
Age		-0.010** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.054 (0.05)	0.050 (0.05)
Incumbent		-0.144 (0.19)	-0.108 (0.19)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.170* (0.09)	-0.169* (0.09)
Number of prior candidacies		0.106* (0.06)	0.136** (0.05)
Years of party membership		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Party activity rate		-0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices		-0.140* (0.07)	-0.145* (0.08)
Local-level office		0.242** (0.11)	0.332*** (0.12)
Party office		0.111 (0.14)	0.092 (0.14)
Number of org. affiliations		0.049 (0.04)	0.013 (0.04)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list		-0.616*** (0.17)	-0.863*** (0.18)
Dual		0.231* (0.13)	0.109 (0.13)
Electoral viability		-0.281*** (0.10)	-0.365*** (0.11)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.289** (0.14)
Bavaria			0.219* (0.12)
Saxony			-0.725*** (0.14)
Intercept	-0.014 (0.08)	-0.378 (0.29)	-0.124 (0.30)
N	1.072	1.072	1.072
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.115	0.136	0.144
Wald χ^2 (df)	345.2***	432.8***	502.9***
Log Likelihood	-524	-509	-502
AIC	1067.4	1069.5	1060.3
BIC	1117.2	1198.9	1206.7

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from fractional logit regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a share. References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.78: Size of campaign team across political parties (zero-inflated negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Size of campaign team (in persons)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.209 (0.19)	-0.191 (0.19)	-0.182 (0.19)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU	0.066 (0.09)	0.088 (0.09)	0.076 (0.09)
FDP	-0.726*** (0.09)	-0.580*** (0.09)	-0.576*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.409*** (0.08)	-0.337*** (0.09)	-0.321*** (0.09)
Die Linke	-0.285*** (0.09)	-0.096 (0.10)	-0.083 (0.10)
IO * CDU/CSU	0.275 (0.30)	0.397 (0.30)	0.361 (0.30)
IO * FDP	0.432 (0.33)	0.516 (0.32)	0.484 (0.32)
IO * Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	0.198 (0.39)	0.141 (0.38)	0.068 (0.38)
IO * Die Linke	0.287 (0.28)	0.101 (0.27)	0.068 (0.27)
Male		-0.001 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.06)
Age		-0.008*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)
Age squared		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.037 (0.03)	0.038 (0.03)
Incumbent		0.104 (0.12)	0.155 (0.12)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.114** (0.05)	-0.119** (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies		0.005 (0.04)	0.009 (0.04)
Party activity rate		0.008*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.192*** (0.05)	0.164*** (0.05)
Local-level office		-0.203*** (0.08)	-0.139* (0.08)
Party office		-0.201** (0.09)	-0.170* (0.09)
Number of org. affiliations		0.080*** (0.02)	0.072*** (0.02)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list		-0.242** (0.11)	-0.236** (0.11)
Dual		0.109 (0.08)	0.100 (0.08)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.031 (0.09)
Bavaria			-0.106 (0.08)
Saxony			-0.256** (0.10)
Intercept	2.484*** (0.06)	2.474*** (0.19)	2.441*** (0.19)
Ln Alpha	-0.460*** (0.06)	-0.525*** (0.07)	-0.530*** (0.07)
<i>Inflation component:</i>			
Years of party membership	0.013* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)
Electoral viability	-1.536*** (0.21)	-1.489*** (0.22)	-1.516*** (0.22)
Intercept	-0.942*** (0.13)	-0.990*** (0.13)	-0.998*** (0.14)
N	1.375	1.375	1.375
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	89.60***	189.46***	196.57***
Log Likelihood	-3966	-3916	-3913
AIC	7960.3	7888.5	7887.4
BIC	8033.5	8034.8	8049.4

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from zero-inflated negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, SPD, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Bundestag election, mean years of party membership, non-viable nomination. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.79: Share of party funding in the campaign expenses across the mode of candidacy (fractional logit regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Share of party funding in the campaign expenses in %		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.241 (0.54)	-0.345 (0.50)	-0.571 (0.47)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list	-1.065*** (0.17)	-1.258*** (0.17)	-0.947*** (0.19)
Dual	-0.236* (0.12)	0.016 (0.13)	0.083 (0.14)
IO * Party list	0.773 (0.72)	0.873 (0.71)	1.275 (0.87)
IO * Dual	0.132 (0.57)	0.208 (0.55)	0.405 (0.51)
Male		-0.367*** (0.10)	-0.119 (0.10)
Age		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.015*** (0.00)
Age squared		0.000* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.025 (0.05)	0.048 (0.05)
Incumbent		-0.165 (0.19)	-0.109 (0.19)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.304*** (0.10)	-0.172* (0.09)
Number of prior candidacies		0.194*** (0.06)	0.140** (0.05)
Years of party membership		-0.015*** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Party activity rate		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Number of political offices		-0.129 (0.08)	-0.146* (0.08)
Local-level office		0.185 (0.12)	0.332*** (0.12)
Party office		0.175 (0.14)	0.100 (0.15)
Number of org. affiliations		0.113*** (0.03)	0.011 (0.04)
Electoral viability		-0.610*** (0.11)	-0.367*** (0.11)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.293** (0.14)
Bavaria			0.224* (0.12)
Saxony			-0.735*** (0.14)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			-1.440*** (0.16)
FDP			-0.455*** (0.13)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			0.819*** (0.12)
Die Linke			0.596*** (0.15)
Intercept	0.352*** (0.11)	0.328 (0.27)	-0.093 (0.29)
N	1.072	1.072	1.072
McFadden's Pseudo R ²	0.020	0.068	0.145
Wald χ^2 (df)	45.6***	198.9***	503.2***
Log Likelihood	-595	-559	-502
AIC	1201.3	1158.4	1057.1
BIC	1231.2	1258.0	1191.5

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from fractional logit regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a share. References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.80: Size of campaign team across the mode of candidacy (zero-inflated negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Size of campaign team (in persons)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO	-0.005 (0.33)	-0.077 (0.31)	-0.202 (0.30)
Mode of candidacy:			
Party list	-0.394*** (0.12)	-0.245** (0.11)	-0.256** (0.11)
Dual	0.231*** (0.08)	0.110 (0.08)	0.092 (0.08)
IO * Party list	0.304 (0.43)	0.403 (0.41)	0.414 (0.39)
IO * Dual	0.030 (0.35)	0.107 (0.33)	0.174 (0.32)
Male		0.009 (0.06)	-0.006 (0.06)
Age		-0.007*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education		0.025 (0.03)	0.036 (0.03)
Incumbent		0.133 (0.12)	0.161 (0.12)
Number of legislative terms in parliament		-0.056 (0.06)	-0.121** (0.05)
Number of prior candidacies		-0.031 (0.04)	0.014 (0.04)
Party activity rate		0.011*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Number of political offices		0.221*** (0.05)	0.161*** (0.05)
Local-level office		-0.179** (0.08)	-0.137* (0.08)
Party office		-0.218** (0.10)	-0.153* (0.09)
Number of org. affiliations		0.094*** (0.02)	0.069*** (0.02)
Election:			
Hesse			-0.029 (0.09)
Bavaria			-0.102 (0.08)
Saxony			-0.263*** (0.10)
Political party:			
CDU/CSU			0.098 (0.09)
FDP			-0.540*** (0.09)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen			-0.311*** (0.08)
Die Linke			-0.073 (0.09)
Intercept	2.104*** (0.08)	2.341*** (0.17)	2.426*** (0.19)
Ln Alpha	-0.227*** (0.08)	-0.400*** (0.07)	-0.530*** (0.07)
<i>Inflation component:</i>			
Years of party membership	0.014* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)
Electoral viability	-1.819*** (0.34)	-1.584*** (0.25)	-1.514*** (0.22)
Intercept	-1.150*** (0.16)	-1.049*** (0.14)	-0.994*** (0.13)
N	1.375	1.375	1.375
χ^2 of Likelihood Ratio Test	46.17***	131.26***	194.43***
Log Likelihood	-3988	-3945	-3914
AIC	7995.8	7934.7	7885.5
BIC	8048.0	8049.6	8037.1

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from zero-inflated negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, SMD nomination, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, mean years of party membership, non-viable nomination. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.

Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.81: Share of party funding in the campaign expenses across SMD context factors (two-level fractional logit regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Share of party funding in the campaign expenses in %				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	-1.301*** (0.44)	-1.125*** (0.43)	-1.415*** (0.43)	-1.393*** (0.43)	-1.378*** (0.42)
Male	0.273 (0.30)	0.323 (0.30)	0.255 (0.30)	0.262 (0.30)	0.267 (0.30)
Age	-0.022 (0.02)	-0.022 (0.02)	-0.021 (0.02)	-0.022 (0.02)	-0.022 (0.02)
Age squared	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Education	-0.019 (0.17)	-0.043 (0.18)	-0.022 (0.17)	-0.019 (0.17)	-0.019 (0.17)
Incumbent	-0.583 (0.49)	-0.691 (0.49)	-0.602 (0.49)	-0.589 (0.49)	-0.597 (0.49)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.165 (0.32)	-0.111 (0.32)	-0.162 (0.32)	-0.159 (0.32)	-0.157 (0.32)
Number of prior candidacies	0.288 (0.25)	0.245 (0.26)	0.278 (0.26)	0.272 (0.25)	0.272 (0.25)
Years of party membership	0.002 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)
Party activity rate	-0.015 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)	-0.015 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)
Number of political offices	-0.389* (0.20)	-0.368* (0.20)	-0.395* (0.20)	-0.386* (0.20)	-0.385* (0.20)
Local-level office	0.849** (0.37)	0.844** (0.37)	0.877** (0.37)	0.855** (0.37)	0.849** (0.37)
Party office	0.743* (0.41)	0.739* (0.41)	0.750* (0.41)	0.738* (0.41)	0.741* (0.41)
Number of org. affiliations	0.037 (0.12)	0.047 (0.12)	0.046 (0.12)	0.044 (0.12)	0.041 (0.12)
Electoral viability	-0.002 (0.36)	0.016 (0.35)	-0.038 (0.36)	-0.042 (0.36)	-0.024 (0.36)
Election:					
Hesse	-0.167 (0.55)	-0.103 (0.56)	-0.184 (0.55)	-0.160 (0.55)	-0.164 (0.55)
Bavaria	0.658 (0.51)	0.838 (0.53)	0.680 (0.52)	0.673 (0.51)	0.670 (0.51)
Saxony	-0.894 (0.70)	-0.787 (0.71)	-0.908 (0.70)	-0.886 (0.70)	-0.897 (0.70)
Political party:					
CDU/CSU	-3.910*** (0.60)	-3.905*** (0.60)	-3.888*** (0.60)	-3.884*** (0.60)	-3.906*** (0.62)
FDP	-2.521*** (0.60)	-2.490*** (0.60)	-2.540*** (0.61)	-2.522*** (0.61)	-2.531*** (0.61)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.310 (0.71)	-0.279 (0.72)	-0.355 (0.72)	-0.321 (0.72)	-0.330 (0.72)
Die Linke	-1.055 (0.67)	-1.035 (0.67)	-1.087 (0.68)	-1.068 (0.68)	-1.075 (0.68)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.103*** (0.04)	0.092*** (0.03)	0.095*** (0.03)	0.094*** (0.03)	0.093*** (0.03)
% Unemployment	0.140* (0.07)	0.191** (0.08)	0.143** (0.07)	0.142** (0.07)	0.141** (0.07)
% High school graduates	-0.061*** (0.02)	-0.063*** (0.02)	-0.064*** (0.02)	-0.060*** (0.02)	-0.060*** (0.02)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.064 (0.17)	-0.095 (0.17)	-0.077 (0.17)	-0.073 (0.17)	-0.071 (0.16)
Urbanity	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	-0.056 (0.06)				
IO * % Unemployment		-0.275*** (0.10)			
IO * % High school graduates			0.048 (0.04)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.012 (0.20)	
IO * Urbanity					-0.000 (0.00)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intraclass correlation	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Intercept	3.076*** (1.02)	3.113*** (1.06)	3.105*** (1.03)	3.091*** (1.03)	3.099*** (1.03)
N (Candidates)	866	866	866	866	866
N (SMDs)	444	444	444	444	444
Wald χ^2 (df)	146.60***	146.05***	145.90***	146.57***	153.06***
Log Likelihood	-204	-202	-203	-204	-204
AIC	465.6	462.6	465.4	466.1	466.1
BIC	603.7	600.8	603.5	604.3	604.2

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level fractional logit regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a share. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
Source: GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Table A.82: Size of campaign team across SMD context factors (two-level negative binomial regression)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Size of campaign team (in persons)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Individual level:</i>					
IO	0.013 (0.14)	0.071 (0.13)	0.050 (0.13)	0.047 (0.13)	0.061 (0.13)
Male	-0.014 (0.07)	-0.007 (0.07)	-0.009 (0.07)	-0.010 (0.07)	-0.009 (0.07)
Age	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)
Age squared	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Education	0.017 (0.04)	0.016 (0.04)	0.016 (0.04)	0.016 (0.04)	0.016 (0.04)
Incumbent	0.055 (0.14)	0.032 (0.14)	0.047 (0.14)	0.049 (0.14)	0.045 (0.14)
Number of legislative terms in parliament	-0.151** (0.06)	-0.146** (0.06)	-0.152** (0.06)	-0.151** (0.06)	-0.149** (0.06)
Number of prior candidacies	0.017 (0.04)	0.017 (0.04)	0.019 (0.04)	0.019 (0.04)	0.018 (0.04)
Years of party membership	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Party activity rate	0.006** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)
Number of political offices	0.192*** (0.06)	0.198*** (0.06)	0.196*** (0.06)	0.194*** (0.06)	0.194*** (0.06)
Local-level office	-0.122 (0.10)	-0.128 (0.10)	-0.123 (0.10)	-0.121 (0.10)	-0.122 (0.10)
Party office	-0.102 (0.11)	-0.107 (0.11)	-0.107 (0.11)	-0.105 (0.11)	-0.103 (0.11)
Number of org. affiliations	0.076*** (0.03)	0.076*** (0.03)	0.076*** (0.03)	0.076*** (0.03)	0.075*** (0.03)
Electoral viability	0.170** (0.08)	0.178** (0.08)	0.175** (0.08)	0.174** (0.08)	0.178** (0.08)
<i>Election:</i>					
Hesse	-0.223* (0.13)	-0.221* (0.13)	-0.216* (0.13)	-0.219* (0.13)	-0.219* (0.13)
Bavaria	-0.320** (0.13)	-0.315** (0.13)	-0.321** (0.13)	-0.321** (0.13)	-0.323** (0.13)
Saxony	0.045 (0.20)	0.047 (0.20)	0.048 (0.20)	0.047 (0.20)	0.038 (0.21)
<i>Political party:</i>					
CDU/CSU	-0.011 (0.11)	-0.015 (0.11)	-0.012 (0.11)	-0.012 (0.11)	-0.014 (0.11)
FDP	-0.657*** (0.11)	-0.656*** (0.11)	-0.652*** (0.11)	-0.655*** (0.11)	-0.655*** (0.11)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.460*** (0.10)	-0.453*** (0.10)	-0.455*** (0.10)	-0.456*** (0.10)	-0.454*** (0.10)
Die Linke	-0.304*** (0.11)	-0.300*** (0.11)	-0.302*** (0.11)	-0.302*** (0.11)	-0.302*** (0.11)
<i>SMD level:</i>					
% Foreign population	0.000 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
% Unemployment	0.014 (0.02)	0.017 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)
% High school graduates	0.012** (0.00)	0.011** (0.00)	0.012** (0.00)	0.011** (0.00)	0.011** (0.00)
% Right-wing vote share	-0.100** (0.04)	-0.099** (0.04)	-0.098** (0.04)	-0.098** (0.04)	-0.097** (0.04)
Urbanity	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
IO * % Foreign population	0.012 (0.02)				
IO * % Unemployment		-0.041 (0.04)			
IO * % High school graduates			-0.006 (0.02)		
IO * % Right-wing vote share				-0.003 (0.12)	
IO * Urbanity					-0.006 (0.12)
Ln Alpha	-0.371*** (0.07)	-0.369*** (0.07)	-0.368*** (0.07)	-0.369*** (0.07)	-0.367*** (0.07)
<i>Random part:</i>					
Variance SMD	0.077** (0.03)	0.075** (0.03)	0.075** (0.03)	0.076** (0.03)	0.075** (0.03)
Intercept	2.406*** (0.21)	2.412*** (0.21)	2.408*** (0.21)	2.406*** (0.21)	2.406*** (0.21)
N (Candidates)	981	981	981	981	981
N (SMDs)	462	462	462	462	462
Wald χ^2 (df)	248.89***	249.72***	248.75***	248.45***	248.82***
Log Likelihood	-3060	-3060	-3060	-3060	-3060
AIC	6181.9	6181.2	6182.2	6182.3	6182.1
BIC	6333.4	6332.7	6333.7	6333.9	6333.7

Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from two-level zero-inflated negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native-born, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. *Source:* GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys.

Appendix B

Table B.1: Representativeness of the German Candidate Study 2013

	Sample	Population
Mode of candidacy		
Party list	25.2	30.6
SMD	23.8	22.1
Dual	51.1	47.3
Elected		
Yes	20.4	22.7
No	79.6	77.3
Political party		
CDU/CSU	15.0	19.2
SPD	16.3	15.4
FDP	12.6	13.1
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	15.0	13.2
Die Linke	13.7	12.4
Piraten	16.1	13.8
AfD	11.3	13.0
Gender		
Female	28.1	28.9
Male	71.9	71.1
Age in years (mean)	45.9	46.1
Share (percent)	41.0	100.0
Number (absolute)	1.137	2.776

Table B.2: Representativeness of the state-level candidate surveys

	Hesse		Bavaria		Saxony	
	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population
Mode of candidacy						
Party list	33.3	38.4	41.7	43.0	45.8	42.8
SMD	17.9	17.3	-	-	44.6	46.2
Dual	48.8	44.4	58.3	57.0	-	-
Elected						
Yes	19.2	18.4	10.7	12.1	20.8	22.7
No	80.8	81.6	89.3	88.0	79.2	77.3
Political party						
CDU/CSU	22.2	21.8	8.7	11.0	13.8	14.6
SPD	19.5	18.4	12.7	11.0	11.3	11.0
FDP	9.8	9.2	11.2	11.8	9.2	12.2
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	11.8	11.6	14.4	12.1	17.9	11.3
Die Linke	12.1	10.4	9.7	10.5	13.3	12.8
Freie Wähler	9.1	10.6	10.7	9.9	7.5	7.0
Piraten	8.1	8.0	8.2	8.8	13.8	11.2
AfD	4.0	5.7	-	-	7.1	8.1
Republikaner	1.7	2.7	7.4	9.1	-	-
ÖDP	-	-	15.2	12.1	-	-
NPD	1.7	1.6	2.0	3.8	6.3	11.9
Gender						
Female	24.5	29.3	25.4	26.3	26.7	23.9
Male	75.5	70.7	74.6	73.7	73.7	76.1
Age in years (mean)	48.8	47.8	50.6	49.4	43.6	44.8
Share (percent)	49.7	100	40.1	100	43.2	100
Number (absolute)	297	597	599	1.494	240	556

02/2013 – 02/2018

Promotionsstudium

Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität zu Frankfurt am Main

- Titel der Dissertation: „Criteria of German Political Parties for the Selection of Candidates of Immigrant Origin. Neutrality, Opening or Closure?“ (Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Thomas Zittel, Zweitgutachterin: Prof. Sigrid Roßteutscher, PhD)

10/2007 – 07/2012

Magistra Artium der Politikwissenschaft

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz

- Hauptfach: Politikwissenschaft
- Nebenfächer: Publizistik, Ethnologie
- Titel der Magisterarbeit: „Die politische Integration der zweiten Migrantengeneration in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine quantitativ-empirische Analyse der politischen Partizipation auf Grundlage des European Social Surveys“ (Betreuerin: Prof. Dr. Edeltraud Roller)

08/1998 – 07/2007

Allgemeine Hochschulreife

Albrecht-Dürer Schule, Weiterstadt