



# Beyond Husserl and Schütz. Hermann Schmitz and Neophenomenological Sociology

Robert Gugutzer 

Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute of Sport Sciences, Frankfurt am Main, 60325, Germany

## Correspondence

Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute of Sport Sciences, Ginnheimer Landstr. 49, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 60325.  
Email: gugutzer@sport.uni-frankfurt.de

## Abstract

Phenomenological sociology is one of the most recognized approaches for explaining the constitution of social behaviour and the construction of social reality. To this day, phenomenological sociology usually belongs to the tradition of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and to Alfred Schütz's mundane phenomenology, thus generally presenting itself as sociology of lifeworld, sociology of everyday life, and sociology of knowledge. In contrast to this, this paper intends to outline an alternative kind of phenomenological sociology that finds its philosophical foundation in Hermann Schmitz's "New Phenomenology". With regards especially to Schmitz's theory of the felt body ("Leib") and his theory of situation, the basic principles of *Neophenomenological Sociology* (NPS) will be introduced. Their main components are (1) felt body and affective involvement as the pre-personal apriori of sociality, (2) felt-bodily communication as the basic unit of sociality, and (3) joint situations as the socio-ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality. With these specific key concepts, NPS proves itself to be a socio-theoretical approach whose foremost strength is that it can identify and properly analyse the *pathic* dimensions of social behaviour and social situations that social sciences tend to overlook.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2020 The Author. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd

**KEYWORDS**

felt body, felt-bodily communication, Hermann Schmitz, methodological situationism, new phenomenology, situation

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

Ever since the fundamental theoretical works of Alfred Schütz, phenomenology has been among the most important philosophical disciplines for sociology. Aside from its essential significance for what is called “phenomenological sociology”, the influence of phenomenology is most strongly noticeable in ethnomethodology, sociology of knowledge, and in the methodology of qualitative social research. But also Anthony Giddens's structuration theory, Niklas Luhmann's systems theory or Jürgen Habermas's critical theory bear a phenomenological influence. It is notable that sociological debates concerning phenomenological philosophy have so far been limited to a very narrow circle of authors and topics. It can generally be said though that ever since the path-breaking research conducted by Schütz (see Schütz, 1962a, 1964, 1966, 1967; Schütz & Luckmann, 1973/1989), the undisputed reference point for phenomenology-based sociology has been provided by Edmund Husserl's transcendental philosophy. Since its emergence, phenomenological sociology focuses primarily on the consciousness-related constitution of meaningful action, on the social – especially knowledge-based communicative – construction of social reality, on the problem of intersubjectivity and of understanding others, and on the lifeworld. Continuing the Husserl-Schütz-tradition, present phenomenological sociology shows itself mostly as a sociology of lifeworld, a sociology of everyday life, and a sociology of knowledge (for an overview concerning this matter, see Eberle, 2012; Endress, Psathas, & Nasu, 2005; Ferguson, 2006; Bird, 2009; Heiskala, 2011; Nasu, 2012; Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009).

Compared to the central place given to Husserl's phenomenology, other phenomenological approaches play only a very marginal role within sociological debates. While authors like Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Ricoeur, Emanuel Levinas, Jaques Derrida, Don Ihde, and especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty – who is of significant importance for the field of sociology of the body (see Crossley, 2001, 2012; Leder, 1990; O'Neill, 1989, 2004; Williams & Bendelow, 1998) – at least find some attention, they do not even come close to Husserl's outstanding position. This applies all the more to German philosopher *Hermann Schmitz*, who has so far remained completely unknown to international sociology, even though his work has recently received increasing attention in the German-speaking area. Who is Hermann Schmitz?

Hermann Schmitz (\*16.05.1928) studied philosophy at the University of Bonn and was a full professor of philosophy at the University of Kiel from 1971 to 1993. Between 1964 and 1980 he wrote his ten-volume main opus, “System der Philosophie” (Schmitz, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1978, 1980a, 1980b), which contains more than 5,000 pages.<sup>2</sup> Since 1980, Schmitz has been referring to his phenomenological approach as “New Phenomenology” (Schmitz, 1980c). In the meantime, this New Phenomenology has become well-known in the German-speaking area even far beyond the field of philosophy. This is largely due to annual symposia and numerous publications conducted by the “Gesellschaft für Neue Phänomenologie” (see [www.gnp-online.de](http://www.gnp-online.de)), which was founded in 1992.

Schmitz's low degree of international recognition within the fields of philosophy and sociology can most likely also be attributed to the fact that while his work finds its roots in the tradition of phenomenological philosophy, it nevertheless breaks with some of its key assumptions.<sup>3</sup> Schmitz basically criticizes the 'old' phenomenology's "psychologistic-reductionist-introjectionist objectification" stemming from Democrite and Plato (Schmitz, 2003, p. 7). Characteristically, this objectification splits up humans into body and soul and the world into an inner and an outer world, whereby the soul is considered to be a secluded inner world (containing one's mind and personal experiences) that is closed off from the outer world. According to Schmitz, this way of thinking has been intensified even more by Husserl's transcendental idealism, leading to a too high level of abstraction of phenomenology, which thus loses sight of essential contents of one's involuntary experience of life. Consequently, Schmitz believes that the central task of New Phenomenology, which he believes to be an empirical science (Schmitz, 2003, p. 3), is to rediscover those aspects of human life experience that have either been missed or repressed by old phenomenology. These include:

"[...] the felt body – which would seem to have fallen through in between the (material) body and the soul – and embodied communication (in exchanging glances and several other occasions in daily life), emotions as atmospheres, significant situations and, amongst them, rich impressions, the surfaceless spaces (passed over by Greek Geometry) of weather, sound, posture, felt impulses, emotion etc.; also half-things: voice, wind, an overpowering sense of gravity, pain as an imposing opponent and not merely as a state of the soul, emotions as half-things moving the felt body." (Schmitz, 2019a, pp. 55–56)

Similarities and differences between old and new phenomenology cannot be examined in more detail at this juncture. Regarding the further strain of thought, only two important divergences shall be emphasized: While Husserl's phenomenology is characterized by a primacy of consciousness as well as by a "triadic thing-ontology" (Schmitz, 2002a, p. 15), therefore thinking primarily in "constellations" (Schmitz, 2003, p. 372), Schmitz's phenomenology favours a primacy of "affective involvement" ("affektives Betroffensein") or, respectively, of the felt body ("Leib"),<sup>4</sup> and is representing a situation ontology (see sections 2 and 4). *Neophenomenological Sociology* (NPS), whose central concepts shall be described in this paper, follows on from Schmitz's phenomenology and shares its basic concepts, thus essentially considering itself a form of *sociology based on the felt body and on situations*.

NPS has so far been more of a program rather than an extensively developed theoretical and methodological approach. Apart from the works of Uzarewicz (2011) and Gugutzer (2012), there is no research in existence that thoroughly tries to investigate the development of a decidedly neophenomenological social theory. Against the background of this desideratum, the present article primarily pursues the objective to outline the *theory and research program of NPS* in its essential aspects. This shall demonstrate that aside from the dominant form of phenomenological sociology inspired by Schütz and his successors, there is also a completely different kind of phenomenological sociology in existence. To achieve this objective, the basic concepts of NPS will be introduced: *felt body* and the *affective involvement* as the pre-personal apriori of sociality (2.), *felt-bodily communication* as the basic form of sociality (3.), and *joint situations* as the socio-ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality (4.). In the resume section (5.), the knowledge potential of NPS and its advantage over 'old' phenomenological sociology will be summed up.

## 2 | FELT BODY AND AFFECTIVE INVOLVEMENT AS THE PRE-PERSONAL APRIORI OF SOCIALITY

The fundamental analytical reference point of a Husserl-based phenomenological sociology is consciousness. Since reality is constituted by “activities of subjective consciousness” (Luckmann, 2008, p. 34), sociology is called upon to reconstruct the “subjective consciousness” of humans in order to learn more about how any given historical reality can be constructed through human activity, which is yet another feature of consciousness. Thus, the subjective perspective of the acting human is the final reference point of a socio-scientific analysis based on mundane phenomenology (see Hitzler, 2005, p. 236; see also Schütz, 1962a, p. 43).

NPS partially agrees with mundane phenomenology in this respect as it also makes *subjectivity* the central point of its analyses; its concept of subjectivity though is quite different. In a neophenomenological sense, subjectivity does not refer to subjective consciousness, but to “*subjective states of affairs (facts)*” (“subjektive Sachverhalte”), first and foremost the facts of affective involvement (Schmitz, 1990, p. 6). A state of affair is subjective “if one person at the most can say it (using their own name)” (Schmitz, 1990, p. 6). It is through affective involvement that I know with absolute certainty that *I* am experiencing pain or hunger, a certain fear or a strong desire. Other people that have witnessed me as I was experiencing hunger or pain or who are familiar enough with me to actually know about my concrete fears or desires can only refer to these facts as “objective” or “neutral” (see Schmitz, 1990, p. 6). None of them bear a personal subjective meaning for them as they do for me, since these phenomena only grip me and nobody else, because I and only I am actually affected. Subjective facts are situations that leave no doubt that they are about oneself. Facts of affective involvement bear a maximum evidence for subjectiveness. Schmitz concludes that, in the case of humans, affective involvement is “the most important thing in life” precisely because it clearly points out “what humans take seriously and for or against what they choose to take action with a great heart” (Schmitz, 2003, p. iii). Since his philosophy essentially aims at a rehabilitation of subjectivity, *affective involvement* can be seen as “the focal point of New Phenomenology” (Schmitz, 2003, p. iii).

NPS endorses this opinion and uses it to justify its normative goal: Since phenomena of the embodied-affective involvement are the most important things in human life, sociology as a human science has to further investigate on these very phenomena. Moreover, choosing a primacy of affective involvement has the advantage of allowing for a broad circle of relevant social actors, at least broader than it is common in sociology. On the one hand, affective involvement exists already on a *pre-personal* level, namely among humans who are not yet or no longer persons due to a lack of ability to self-ascription, e.g. infants or dementia-patients (and maybe coma patients have to be counted among them as well). On the other hand, affective involvement also exists on a *pre-human* level, at least in the case of higher animals. Believing affective involvement to be an apriori of sociality, NPS considers all of these to be (potential) social actors.

In this sense, an *apriori* of sociality means that affective involvement is the condition of possibility for sociality. Where no felt bodies but merely lifeless (material) bodies are involved, there is nobody who can actually be affected, and, therefore, sociality is impossible. Sociality requires at least one felt body. The felt body, in turn, is the apriori of *sociality* because affective involvement always refers to something or somebody else: A felt-bodily ego is affected by an alter ego despite the alter ego not necessarily being a felt-bodily entity and thus also not another human. The felt body in the *pathic* sense of affective involvement is a relational category where the self is associated with other entities (alien bodies, possibly even nonhuman, and also

immaterial things). As stated in section 3, the resultant felt-bodily communication is the primary unit of sociality.

Affective involvement is relevant for NPS not only as the apriori of sociality but also as a pivotal *action-theoretical* category. Speaking with Jürgen Hasse, this category can be referred to as “patheur”, meaning “an individual that follows vital and intuitive impulses rather than a rationally and methodically acting individual (see Hasse, 2010, p. 70). Translated into action-theoretical terms, this means that the *patheur* represents an anti-rationalist, anti-teleological concept of action. It points out that in many cases social behaviour is a felt-bodily motivated and physically carried out behaviour beyond any deliberate form of control. In this sense, it can also be conceived as embodied action (see Gugutzer, 2012, pp. 52–58; see also section 4.2).

Furthermore, it is characteristic for a social patheur that his actions are significantly influenced by the space surrounding him and its affecting *atmosphere*. “A patheur does not use the room like drivers use a street to get to their destination. Rather, he enables an [...] atmosphere to wield power over his personal situation and to gain influence on his actions” (Hasse, 2010, p. 70).<sup>5</sup> The social patheur is part of a spatially extended, atmospherically loaded situation that grips him in a way that influences his actions and thus the situation itself. For the sociological action theory, this leads to the conclusion that focusing on the social patheur ‘automatically’ draws attention to the categories space and atmosphere (which are otherwise nearly inexistent in action theories).

Finally and foremost, the category of the social patheur leads to a relativization of the activist concept of action that has so far been predominant in the sociological action theory (see Joas, 1996). Social action is not just a meaningful, deliberate-intentional behaviour (see Castellani, 2013), but also passively endured. The phenomenological-based action theory takes this into account by differing “between the endurance of something imposed and the causation of something available” (Luckmann, 1992, p. 28). However, due to its reference to Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness it has so far neglected to phenomenologically substantiate the behavioural dimension of endurance and to give the passive-pathic embodied action a central role in its action theory. NPS can fill this action-theoretical gap. By turning its gaze to the embodied *happenings* (“Widerfahrnisse”) in life, it also makes the surprising, unexpected, novel and thus not or only partially controllable elements of social situations a subject of discussion (see section 4.1).

Certain consequences for NPS-based *research programs* can be concluded from what has been said so far. On the one hand, neophenomenological-sociological studies are typically concerned with *empiric* subject areas that explicitly deal with affective involvement. Whether the focus lies on typical love rituals between couples, on cultures of dispute in companies, or on societal consequences of collective protests carried out by angry citizens – sociologically relevant phenomena of affective involvement can be found equally on micro-, meso-, and macro-social level. On the other hand, NPS always puts a *theoretical* focus on action and interaction of patheurs as well. Also, or even particularly in the case of topics that supposedly do not deal with the felt body and emotions, NPS turns its attention to the social relevance of passive-pathic embodied experiences. Overall, actor and patheur are of equal relevance for NPS.

### 3 | FELT-BODILY COMMUNICATION: THE BASIC FORM OF SOCIALITY

While NPS addresses embodied-affective involvement as the apriori of sociality, it has not yet automatically reached the level of sociality. Hunger, thirst, fear, or pain affect the individual in

a perceptible manner without requiring a second individual. The way from an individual to a trans-individual level is led by *felt-bodily communication* (“leibliche Kommunikation”; see Schmitz, 1978, pp. 75–109, Schmitz, 2011, pp. 29–53; see also Griffero 2017; Julmi, 2018), which, as mentioned above, is based on the relational character of affective involvement. If the patheur is the core subject of NPS, then *felt-bodily communication* is its *primordial concept of sociality*.

The *spatial-dynamic structure of the felt body* provides the foundation for the concept of felt-bodily communication (see Schmitz, 2011, pp. 7–27). Schmitz names the intertwined tendencies of “contraction” (“Enge”) and “expansion” (“Weite”) as the basic pair of categories of the felt body: The felt-bodily condition constantly fluctuates between “the maximum of possible contraction (of the mere primitive present) and the maximum of possible expansion (pure, immoderate expansion) in thousandfold alterations without ever entirely reaching one of these poles” (Schmitz, 1965, pp. 75). The felt-bodily dynamic of contraction and expansion constitutes the human vital drive. During the waking state, a human always felt-bodily finds himself in between these two poles, with a predomination of contraction in the case of, for example, fright, fear, or hunger, and of expansion when falling asleep, while dozing, or after having an orgasm. As long as a human is conscious, contraction and expansion maintain a dynamic competitive relationship which means that they work against each other while nevertheless being unable to actually get rid of one another.

This inner (felt-bodily) dialogue between contraction and expansion becomes sociologically relevant because it may transform into a *trans-subjective felt-bodily dialogue*. Such a transformation takes place if an embodied subject gets affected by something or somebody outside of himself in a way that enforces a reaction. Thus, felt-bodily communication in this very sense occurs “when someone gets felt-bodily affected and afflicted by something in a way that puts him under its spell and tempts him to involuntarily comply with its demands and to find immediate orientation for his condition and behaviour in his situations of suffering and reaction” (Schmitz, 1978, pp. 31–32).

This quote already indicates that felt-bodily communication or “encorporation” (“Einleibung”) does not exclusively occur between living beings. Instead, a human can also be put under the spell of a movie or a beautiful sea view. These are cases of “one-sided encorporation” (“einseitige Einleibung”), which can be found in all situations of fascination or suggestion that are not inflicted by humans (music, pictures, places, landscapes and so on). In comparison, “mutual encorporation” (“wechselseitige Einleibung”) occurs when the interacting participants affect each other and thus making an impact on their respective actions. According to Schmitz, this form of felt-bodily communication can either be “antagonistic” or “solidary”. A typical and socially quite relevant example for antagonistic encorporation can be found in glances (visual contact), which Schmitz also describes as a form of “wrestling” (Schmitz, 1990, p. 136). On the contrary, singing in a choir or being part of a rowing team appears a lot more solidary: It includes a “shared vital drive” that connects the interaction partners by means of a common “integrating topic” (singing, rowing) even if they do not explicitly turn to each other (Schmitz, 2011, p. 47).

All these forms of encorporation (one-sided/mutual; antagonistic/solidary) occur in a mediating way. Encorporation becomes possible through *felt-bodily communication media* or, more precisely, through “bridging qualities that can be felt in one’s own body but also be perceived in encounters with others” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 33). Schmitz considers “suggestions of motion” (“Bewegungssuggestionen”; e.g. rhythm) and “synaesthetic characters” (“synaesthetische Charaktere”) – the latter referring to “so-called intermodal qualities, i.e. qualities that cross-connect the spheres of one’s senses (seeing, hearing, feeling and so on)” (Schmitz, 2005, p. 176) – to be



the most important “bridges of felt-bodily communication in space” (Schmitz, 2005, pp. 168–184). Air temperature as well as a voice can both be warm or cold, a cushion and a look can both be soft or hard, a night and a whistle can both be dark or bright, and all of them can have a massive influence on individual and social behaviour.

Felt-bodily communication is a relevant concept for sociology because, firstly, it provides an empiric foundation for social relationships between humans and non-human entities, and, secondly, it bears a basic theoretical relevance by helping to solve the problem of intersubjectivity, a problem that is vital for phenomenological sociology. It deals with the question *how* it is possible to access another, *how* ego and alter ego enter into a social relationship and recognize each other. Notoriously, Schütz dealt with this question under the aspect of “understanding strangers” and found answers in the structural similarity of the consciousness-processes of ego and alter ego as well as in the “general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives” (see Schütz, 1967, ch. 19). Therefore, the ego understands the behaviour of the alter ego in an approximate way because or insofar as it interprets the signals and indications given by the alter ego as expressions of its consciousness. Such a pragmatic access to others that focuses on a typification of motives suffices for everyday actions of humans. Thus, after distancing himself from Husserl, Schütz solved the problem of intersubjectivity, which had previously been dealt with transcendental-phenomenologically by Husserl, in a mundane-phenomenological manner: Intersubjectivity cannot be accessed by the transcendental subject because there is no direct way to the consciousness of another subject; it can become accessible in the lifeworld though, wherefore Schütz speaks of “mundane intersubjectivity” (Schütz, 1962b, p. 120).

However, from a neophenomenological perspective, not only Husserl's but also Schütz's attempt fail to actually solve the problem of intersubjectivity. The reason is that they have not really taken notice of the existence of the pathic, perceptibly-perceiving felt body,<sup>6</sup> merely basing their theories on the dualistic concept of the physical body on the one hand and the mind, soul, or consciousness on the other hand. In Schmitz's view, they thus represent and continue the predominant tradition of the “psychologicistic-reductionist-introjectionist objectification” of European intellectual culture (Schmitz, 2003, p. 133) which leaves open the question “how humans relate themselves to each other and to objects” (Schmitz, 2003, p. 133). While both Husserl and Schütz make use of the term “Leib” (felt body), they only refer to the living body or to the acting body (“fungierender Leib”) and not to the felt body. They regard ego and alter ego as two circumscribed, secluded bodies with an inner world – the seat of consciousness – that cannot be accessed from the outside. The only way for ego and alter ego to bridge this gap between oneself and the other is an interpretation of the perceptible signs of one another (for a closer examination on Schütz's position, see Coenen, 1985, pp. 201–203; in the case of Husserl, see Schmitz, 2003, pp. 146–147).

From the perspective of New Phenomenology, however, the problem of intersubjectivity is solved by felt-bodily communication: The gap between ego and alter ego is closed through mutual incorporation. Or, as Schmitz put it: “*Mutual incorporation* [...] is the *origin of the you-evidence*, of dealing with a conscious subject, be it a human or an animal” (Schmitz, 2003, pp. 39–40; emphasis by author; see also: Schmitz, 2011, pp. 42–43). This is based on the affective involvement of ego and alter ego (and vice versa). This was pointed out already by Sartre in his analysis of glances in which he put forward the view that by simply being the target of another's glance, which one perceives as a subjective involvement, the existence of the other can already be considered as verified (see Sartre, 1993, pp. 301–400). Therefore, Schmitz considers Sartre's “theory of involvement” to be the first theory that clearly identifies affective involvement as the origin of “primordial partner determination” (Schmitz, 1980b, p. 88). Sartre overlooked the

mutuality of glances though and pretended that, for example, the shame one feels when being looked at already suffices to actually be ‘with’ the other subject. Mutual incorporation is constitutive for primordial partner determination – in sociological terms: for the constitution of intersubjectivity – though: One feels that *he* is affected by the other, e.g. sensing his glance on one’s own felt body, just like the other’s embodied emotions are also perceived immediately – i.e. without any deliberate interpretations of signs – because they get transported directly via suggestions of motion (gesture) or synaesthetic characters (soft voice).

Of course, glances are not the only form of felt-bodily communication that constitute intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, they are a prime example of how a mutual relatedness can do without projections, apperceptions, conclusions by analogy, or empathizing with the other. In exchanging glances, ego and alter ego gain “the instinctive certainty to be dealing with another conscious subject [‘Bewussthaber’]” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 41). This assumption can sociologically be further pursued with a point made by Georg Simmel that the eye or, respectively, the glance “is the most immediate and purest mutual interrelation in existence” (Simmel, 1992, p. 723). In this sense, glances can be understood as the original source of sociality while *mutual incorporation* can be correspondently understood as the *basic form of sociality*.

In summary, this means that from the perspective of New Phenomenology, the problem of intersubjectivity gets solved by means of an extension and deepening of the relationship between ego and alter ego. While in the ego-logical perspective the ego’s consciousness is directed at the consciousness of the alter ego ( $E \rightarrow A$ ) – without actually being able to tell how one consciousness gets connected to the other –, the neophenomenological perspective focuses on mutual affective involvement of ego and alter ego: ego’s felt body is directly affected by alter ego’s physical and/or felt body ( $E \rightarrow A$ ) and vice versa ( $E \rightarrow A$ ). Since the embodied-affective involvement is the apriori of sociality, the mutually incorporating kind of felt-bodily communication deriving from it is a sufficient criterion for the evidence that others exist for me while I exist for others ( $E \leftrightarrow A$ ). Therefore, not mundane intersubjectivity, but felt-bodily intersubjectivity is the solution NPS provides for the problem of intersubjectivity.

The consequences of what has been said in this section concerning the neophenomenological-sociological *research program* are obvious: NPS provides basic theoretical contributions to questions on both the constitution and the construction of sociality. Neophenomenological-sociological studies view felt-bodily communication as the smallest analytical unit of sociality and give special attention to non-rational and non-lingual processes of coordination and communication during social situations. Therefore, they primarily focus on the micro-social level of analysis. Accordingly, meso- or macro-social events need to be ‘brought down’ to the micro-social level. Afterall, NPS pursues the debordering (Entgrenzung) of the ‘in’ and the ‘outside’ of sociality. Its studies also take social actors into consideration that do not yet or not anymore possess the ability to speak or to be fully conscious (infants, dementia patients, coma patients) as well as animals, things and half-things (e.g. atmospheres).

#### **4 | JOINT SITUATIONS AS THE SOCIO-ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION AND MANIFESTATION OF SOCIALITY**

So far, the focus of this study lay on the felt-body-based foundations of NPS. Anyhow, NPS is not a type of sociology solely based on the felt body nor is it a sociology of the felt body. Such a conception of NPS would fail to achieve its sociological aspirations since many basic topics of sociology – like values, norms, roles, power, structures, institutions, organisations,



and, last but not least, ‘the’ society – would be discounted. The neophenomenological concept that allows for an inclusion of these central issues can be found in Schmitz’s *situation theory* (see Schmitz, 1977, pp. 411–429; Schmitz, 1999, pp. 21–28; Schmitz, 2005, pp. 18–61). Especially the concept of “joint situations” (“gemeinsame Situationen”) – derived from the ontological term “situation” (see Schmitz, 1980b, pp. 23–74) – is of particular relevance for sociology. Like the situation in general, joint situations possess invariant structure features; as a result, they can be regarded as the *socio-ontological foundation of form and practices of human life*. At the same time, joint situations are *empirical phenomena*, as they – in accordance with their respective socio-historic-cultural form – give a concrete shape to universal traits.

The neophenomenological concept of situation thus bears a similar significance for NPS as Husserl’s lifeworld concept (see Husserl, 1970) does for the phenomenological sociology based on Schütz (see Schütz & Luckmann, 1973/1989). However, as an analytical category, the concept of situation is more ‘subtle’ than the lifeworld concept since it succeeds in getting smaller analysis units into its focus. It is typical of the empiric reality that the lifeworld is “a mesh of situations that are nested within and intersected by one another” (Schmitz, 2005, p. 26). In other words: Situations are the “primary homes, sources, and partners” of all human behaviour, experiencing, imaginations, expectations, wishes, and desires (see Schmitz, 2003, p. 91). In the following, the usefulness of Schmitz’s situation theory will be explained.

#### 4.1 | Schmitz’s situation theory

Situation in Schmitz’s understanding is an ontological concept and, in this sense, the empirically not determinable foundation of human experience, action, expectation, imagination, desire or will. The ontological term “situation” can therefore only be defined. Schmitz says:

“A *situation* [...] is characterized by wholeness (i.e. internal cohesion and differentiation from the outside) as well as by an integrating meaningfulness deriving from states of affairs, programs and problems, and an internal diffuseness of this meaningfulness, which means that the meanings contained in a situation are not altogether singular – and in pre-personal experiencing they never are.” (Schmitz, 2005, p. 22; emphasis in original)

A lecture at a university is a situation that features *wholeness* as it is coherent thematically (teaching content), socially (lecturer/students), locally (lecture hall/seating arrangement), and in terms of time (90 minutes). *Programs*<sup>7</sup> of this situation include rules like examination requirements, but also the students’ hope for the lecture to be entertaining. *Problems* (surprising events, interruptions, crises, worries and so on) may emerge in case of a defective beamer or loud murmuring or noisy chatter in the room cause the lecturer to lose his concentration. During a lecturing situation, all these and even more elements are intertwined with each other in an internally diffuse manner. While the singular elements of the lecturing situation constitute a context that explains what the situation is about and what is of relevance for it, there is no *ex ante* definition of what kinds of things or factors may contribute to the meaningfulness of the situation. In the eyes of NPS, it is important that, in addition to the meaningfulness, “a situation can contain just anything” (Schmitz, 1999, p. 21), including, for instance, things, atmospheres, or animals.

As Michael Großheim (2005, p. 141) appositely pointed out, Schmitz's concept of situations bears an "advantage of abstractness" as "it makes it possible to appropriately deal with the given diversity of situations". This diversity becomes apparent in Schmitz's classification of situations, which is based on four bipolar categories: "Concerning the type of the momentary circumstance, I distinguish between *impressive* and *segmented* situations; concerning its chronological sequence, I distinguish between *current* and *state-like* situations (Schmitz, 1999, p. 22; emphasis in original). *Impressive* situations (impressions) are pre-reflexively presented "in one fell swoop" (Schmitz, 2019a, p. 74), thus appearing to be holistic in the moment they are perceived. Examples are the first impression of another human or when entering a stranger's apartment. In contrast, *segmented* situations "never come to light in full in a single moment" (Schmitz, 1999, p. 22). In this sense, native language, home, nation, social class, family, or generation are segmented situations. A *current* ("aktuelle") situation occurs right now, and its chronological sequence can be split up into procedural phases. An example for such a situation is a conversation. In turn, *state-like* ("zuständige") situations are continuous, e.g. the biography of a human, so that it would not make sense to divide them into smaller time units.

The third pair of opposites, which is the most relevant one for NPS, is the difference between "personal" and "joint" situation (Schmitz, 1990, pp. 75–79). The *personal* situation is made up by the "personal character" and the "personal felt-bodily disposition", thus being nearly equivalent to the personality of a person (for more details on this issue, see Schmitz, 1980a, pp. 287–415). The personal situation is embedded in *joint* situations which are further divided into "implanting" ("implantierende") and "inclusive" ("includierende") situations. An *implanting* situation contains the personal situation to an extent that only after a longer period of time a person may succeed in distancing himself from it – if he succeeds at all. One's native tongue and one's family of origin are such implanting situations from which the personal situation emerges by means of primary socialisation; one's companionship with a life partner, on the other hand, is an implanting situation that the persons involved grow into. Compared to that, an *inclusive* situation integrates the person more loosely, thus leaving more room for a deliberate withdrawal. While one may grow into a peer group, a political party, or a subculture by adopting their conventions, ideologies, or lifestyle, it is nevertheless rather easy to leave them.

Schmitz's theory of situations is of great benefit for sociology for at least two reasons. Firstly, it helps to overcome the classical and rather unproductive comparison of individual and society. A situation analysis based on Neophenomenological Sociology assumes an *interconnection between personal and joint situation*. Though NPS focuses on joint situations in its analyses, it does so only in relation to the respective personal situations embedded in or emerging from them. Joint situations constitute the "social background" (Schmitz, 1980b, p. 46) and the social leeway of the personal situation. Such a focus comes along with the abolishment of the difference between action theory and structure theory. Instead, NPS employs a *methodological situationism* (see section 4.3) that integrates these divergent theoretical paradigms. This, secondly, means that NPS is not limited to either the social micro-, meso-, or macro-level. In other words: NPS is not only open for sociological topics connected to one of those three levels; rather, in its analyses it *integrates micro-, meso-, and macro-level* right from the outset. This is due to the fact that humans are always simultaneously involved in several interconnected situations. Therefore, it is owed to sociological explication work to extract singular aspects from a network of situations and to distribute them among the different social levels.

## 4.2 | Joint situations: Emergence, stabilisation, transformation

Drawing upon the statements given in section 3, where felt-bodily communication was introduced as the basic form of sociality, it can be said that felt-bodily communication plays a vital role for the *emergence of joint situations*. Especially the *antagonistic* form of mutual incorporation provides the basis for the emergence of current joint situations which could possibly lead to state-like joint situations.<sup>8</sup> Through antagonistic mutual incorporation, a collective felt body emerges spontaneously, spreading over and integrating all persons involved. Words are by no means required for this process. The abovementioned suggestions of motion (glances, gestures) and synaesthetic characters (hard, soft) suffice as felt-bodily communication media to assure the communication partner of being part of a joint situation (e.g. waiting in line) and its concomitant programs (norm: no pushing, wish: may it not take long) and possibly also problems (someone else pushing). Through repetition and subsequent habituation, current situations can become state-like joint situations. If this is the case, waiting in line becomes an “institution” that gets “enacted” (Schmitz, 1990, p. 414) again and again, thus remaining its existence.

*Solidary* forms of mutual incorporation are rarer to be empirically found even though they are of great importance for social integration in an empathic sense. According to Schmitz (1980b, pp. 109–113), singing can be regarded as a prime example in this respect. When people sing together, a collective felt body emerges ad hoc in which they get melted together. The reason for this is that the respective internally diffuse meaningfulness of the situation is loaded with a collective atmosphere that can be perceived by all participants as – more or less – “being in the grip of emotions” (Schmitz, 2014, p. 59). The more intense this atmospheric grip is, the more likely it is that the current situation becomes state-like, being stored in the memories of one or more persons and possibly being brought to mind even years later with the effect of once again creating commonality: “Do you remember the Stones concert in London, 1999, where they played ‘Start Me Up’ and everyone at Wembley Stadium was going crazy? That was so incredible!”

So far, this article has emphasized that mutual incorporation provides the foundation for current and state-like joint situations. This does not mean though that mutual incorporation is the only source for the emergence of joint situations. While NPS places particular attention on felt-bodily communication as the basis (and product) of joint situations, it also pays regard to the specifically human competence to *explicate* out of situations. By employing this form of explication of singular meanings (states of affairs, programs, problems) out of the internally diffuse meaningfulness of situations, humans succeed in getting through and even being in control of the chaos of the situation, thus bringing order to the world (see Schmitz, 2005, p. 28). The constellations resulting from such an explication makes life appear (more) lucid, (more) structured, and (more) controllable by establishing a *social order*. Or, as Schmitz put it: “These constellations lead to the formation of institutions and organizations within the field of social activity, i.e. patterns of social behaviour that predefine the way in which people repeatedly interact with each other” (Schmitz, in: Sohst & Schmitz, 2005, p. 37). Marriage is such an institution that brings order to the chaotic manifoldness of relationships by regulating who is accepted (spouse), who is a potential teammate for the “legitimate players” (Schmitz, 1990, p. 414) (relatives, friends), and which adopted roles become permanent (father/mother) or are allowed (dance partner) or denied (lover) in a specific situational setting.

The continuance of an institution like marriage is partially the result of a probably rather strong embedding in the higher-level-institution of the “state” (see Schmitz, 1990, pp. 425–438)

which makes marriage seem to be a particularly desirable form of partnership e.g. by means of fiscal relief. This does not suffice as an adequate explanation for the endurance of the institution of marriage though. As Pierre Bourdieu pointed out in his theory of habitus and field, institutions only persist if they not only get objectified by rules, but also are embedded in the habitus of the human “inhabitants” (see Bourdieu, 1990, p. 57). In neophenomenological terms, this means that in order to persist, institutions and other state-like joint situations require to establish themselves within the personal situation embedding the people involved. This occurs mainly through the impact that states of affairs, programs and/or problems of this situation have on one's “primitive present”,<sup>9</sup> thus involving him in an embodied-affective manner to the extent that the situation – and especially its programmatic content – becomes part of the felt-bodily disposition (e.g. by means of repetition) of the person. In this sense, marriage as an institution is rooted in felt-bodily-based rules, norms, judgments, expectations, fears, hopes, desires etc. linked to it. Accordingly, ‘cheating’ on one's partner is a threat to the institution of marriage since it damages the nomos of the joint situation in a noticeable way (jealousy, rage, hatred).

Social institutions and social order generally owe their stability to the embodiment of the inhabitants. NPS pays special regard to this aspect. However, its interests also include the *felt-bodily-based transformation of social order*. In the light of NPS, social change does not appear to be solely or primarily the result of rationally planned, teleological (collective) acts; rather, its minimum requirement is that a joint situation felt-bodily involves the respective humans in a negative way. Social change “is based on a dissatisfaction with the current social order, and dissatisfaction is an embodied condition” (Gugutzer, 2012, p. 56). Consequently, the *main actors of social change are patheurs*: Humans begin to change the present joint and state-like situation when it involves them in a perceptible manner. This applies equally to the social micro-, meso-, and macro-level. Couples decide to work on their relationship when one person suffers so much from the other's lack of interest that the relationship as a whole is at stake. Companies organize coaching- or mediation-weekends for their employees when mutual mobbing has reached such dimensions that good cooperation has become impossible. Thousands of people take to the streets and demonstrate when their country's social and political grievances have become unbearable for them. If these circumstances lead to a transformation of the respective order of the relationship, company or political conditions, this is mainly due to one or more patheurs having ‘taken matters into their own hands’.

### 4.3 | Methodological situationism

The methodological consequence deriving from this situation-theoretical foundation of NPS can be referred to as *methodological situationism*: Joint situations are the core level of analysis (while felt-bodily communication is its smallest analysis unit), whereby NPS examines joint situations on micro-, meso-, and macro-social levels alike. Methodological situationism means, that NPS clarifies the respective states of affairs, the programmatic content of the situation, and the problem(s) that is (are) of significance in the situation and that influence the joint action of the actors and patheurs, for instance by motivating, challenging, inspiring, or forcing them. Thus, NPS is a methodological situationism that does not ignore the subject, but rather – with regards to the entanglement of personal and joint situation – always raises the question how felt-bodily subjects take part in the emergence, stabilization, and transformation of sociality and how they are shaped or at least influenced by their nomos and problems.

It is characteristic of NPS that it avoids the traps of situationism or contextualism – which only know spatiotemporally limited social units and face-to-face-interaction – since its conception of joint situations contains not only current and impressive, but also state-like and segmented situations. Traditionally spoken, NPS is tied to a *trans-situative situation theory* in this respect. At the same time, it is a *trans-human situation theory* that also acknowledges non-human entities as integral parts or participants.

The attitude of NPS concerning *research programs* is close to that of Erving Goffman who said that his sociology is not so much interested in “men and their moments. Rather moments and their men.” (Goffman, 1967, p. 3) Like Goffman, NPS is interested primarily in situations and only secondarily in how they are brought up, inhabited, shaped, incorporated etc. by humans. Nevertheless, the thematic starting point of empirical research can typically be found in phenomena that affect a singular human being as a *patheur*. *Problematic* states of affairs are of particular interest for sociology, regardless of whether they are related to interpersonal misunderstandings, tensions, disputes, or to societal conflicts, crises, injustices and so on. Based on these problems – which actually generate the research issue at hand – the main research task is to reconstruct the very joint situation whose problem is the focus of the research. This reconstruction aims for a better understanding of emergence, processes, and structures of joint situations.

## 5 | SUMMARY

This paper attempted to outline the theoretical and the research program of Neophenomenological Sociology, thus providing an alternative to the leading phenomenological sociology based on Husserl and Schütz. While an explicit comparison of new and ‘old’ phenomenological sociology was not intended, some basic differences were made clear (see table 1). However, these pointed differentiations are *not* meant to play the two phenomenological positions off against each other or to even claim a superiority of NPS compared to the Schütz-based phenomenological sociology. The actual intention was to emphasize the peculiarities of NPS and its knowledge potential.

A particular advantage of NPS is that it straightens out some rather one-sided theoretical and conceptual foundations of sociology and also helps to identify and analyse empirical phenomena that sociology tends to overlook or to even ignore intentionally. In conclusion of this paper, four specific theoretical and conceptual peculiarities or, respectively, benefits of NPS shall be emphasised.

*Firstly*, due to its felt-bodily-based phenomenological foundation, NPS puts an end to the “quasi-mentalistic narrow-mindedness” (Lindemann, 2005, p. 115) of sociology. Sociological concepts, which have traditionally been designed in a cognitivist manner, gain an additional felt-bodily dimension. Meaning, understanding, communication, knowledge, action etc. are thus conceived as felt-bodily meaning, felt-bodily understanding, felt-bodily communication and so on. In this manner, NPS rectifies the cartesian conception of man predominant in sociology as well as its consequent assumption that society is the product of generally consciously and rationally acting humans. *Secondly* and accordingly, NPS also straightens out the activist bias of sociology, especially in the case of the sociological acting theory. NPS puts a focus on the pathic involvement of humans in social contexts and on the pathic dimension of social behaviour. Therefore, NPS is not primarily interested in social control and social order but in happenings, surprises, irritations, and disturbances of human cohabitation. Against the background of

**TABLE 1** 'Old' versus new phenomenological sociology

Comparison criteria	'Old' phenomenological sociology	New phenomenological sociology (NPS)
<i>Main philosophical author</i>	Edmund Husserl	Hermann Schmitz
<i>Kind of phenomenology</i>	Transcendental phenomenology	Realist (empirical) phenomenology
<i>Social apriori</i>	Consciousness	Felt body (affective involvement)
<i>Basic concept of subject</i>	Actor (intentional-reflexive actions)	Patheur (embodied, pre-reflexive actions)
<i>Basic concept of sociality</i>	Intersubjectivity	Felt-bodily communication
<i>Ontology</i>	Thing ontology (constellationism)	Situational ontology
<i>Socio-ontological foundation</i>	Lifeworld	Joint situations
<i>Methodology</i>	Methodological individualism	Methodological situationism
<i>Sociology</i>	Human sociology	Transhuman sociology

these two focal points, NPS presents itself as a felt-bodily sociology that is not content with the plain thought that societies exist only in the heads of people and present themselves in a deliberate and intentional manner. NPS adds the idea of an inextricable entanglement of felt body and world to the rationalistic-cognitivist reduction of the construction of social reality.

*Thirdly*, the concept of felt-bodily communication, which is crucial for NPS, makes it possible to get an analytical grip on social processes that take place pre-reflexively and therefore without intentional meaning-positing and interpretation. This refers to social situations shaped by spontaneous, intuitive, and improvisatory actions and interactions, or, to put it with Schmitz, by „co-agitation free of reaction time“(Schmitz, 2011, p. 32). This is closely linked to a specific attentiveness of NPS towards non-symbolic means of social behaviour, in particular the abovementioned suggestions of motion and synaesthetic characters. Lastly, the concept of felt-bodily communication allows for a relativisation of the general primary focus on humans that social sciences usually employ. As stated above, felt-bodily communication does not only occur between humans, but also between humans and animals as well as between humans and objects devoid of a felt body. The glance of a dog affects a human as well as the sight of a painting or the atmosphere of a cathedral, and all of them can have consequences for the individual's further behaviour. To this end, not only humans, but also animals, things, and half-things are present within the bounds of sociality. For this reason, NPS considers itself to be a *transhuman sociology*. While humans remain the most important actors and patheurs, they are not the only ones. An empirically undisputed reason for this is that humans as well as other forms of life – especially pets – and also nonliving but nevertheless beloved objects can be of social importance. Another theoretical reason has been put forward by Bruno Latour (2005). According to Latour, it is problematic to grant the status of a social actor only to entities that possess the ability to act intentionally or, respectively, subjectively purposeful. Even on the ground of ethical reasons alone – though Latour himself does not address these reasons –, the objection has to be raised that such a conception of social actors illegitimately excludes infants and people with dementia. NPS also shares Latour's belief that “*any thing* that does modify a state of



affairs by making a difference is an actor – or [...] an actant” (Latour, 2005, p. 71; emphasis in original). Since human situations are constantly changed by things, half-things, and animals in a meaningful way, they should not be denied the status of being a member of society.

Finally, NPS corrects sociology's so-far dominant concept of situation, which is limited to the here and now of human co-presence. The neophenomenological concept of situation exceeds this conception of situation by integrating the past as well as the absence of persons. Additionally, the neophenomenological concept of situation allows for the construction of a typology of forms of sociality that goes against the grain of common sociological group classifications. In this respect, Michael Uzarewicz made an instructive offer. He differentiates between four rather general types of situations: *Companionships*, meaning “segmented, state-like, joint and implanting” situations (families, friendships), *associations*, namely “impressive, current, joint, and (in general communal) inclusive” situations (sports teams, bus passengers), *circles*, meaning “state-like, joint, (in general societal) inclusive” situations (school classes, companies), and *society*, which refers to “segmented, state-like, joint, inclusive” situations that “consist of references to present absentees who do not have any actual vis-a-vis-contact or -encounter with each other” (Uzarewicz, 2011, pp. 259–260). Further specific types of situations include, for instance, “crowds”, “hordes”, “clusters” or “herds” (ebd.). These examples show the advantage of the neophenomenological situation theory to analytically and conceptually grasp types of sociality that sociology usually – with the exceptions of companionship and society – fails to detect.

In conclusion, the knowledge potential of NPS can be described as follows: NPS is a socio-theoretical approach (1) based on joint situations that are not limited to the spatial-temporal presence of humans. It analyses (2) the not merely symbolically conveyed social behaviour of humans and nonhuman entities and (3) provides a specific focus on the pathetic (felt-bodily) dimension of sociality. With regards to these characteristics, further development of NPS needs to put a focus on aspects that have so far been overlooked due to its theoretical foundation, Schmitz' New Phenomenology. These aspects include especially the material body, the active and reflexive side of social action, as well as social institutions and organisations, all of which remain to be included into the theoretical as well as the empirical research program of NPS.

## ORCID

Robert Gugutzer  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2622-8110>

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Unless stated otherwise, this article, including all originally German citations, was translated into English by Martin Bastert. The translation was supported by the “Stiftung Neue Phänomenologie” (<http://www.snp-online.net/>).

<sup>2</sup>Schmitz has provided a summary of his „System der Philosophie“ in Schmitz (1990). He also authored a short introduction to New Phenomenology (Schmitz, 2009), an English translation of which was recently published (Schmitz, 2019a), as well as two monographs in which he summarizes key elements of New Phenomenology (Schmitz, 2003, 2016). The lack of prominence of New Phenomenology at an international level is certainly at least partially owe to the fact that to date there are only four English publications of Hermann Schmitz himself: A very brief handbook article on New Phenomenology (Schmitz, 2002b), an article on his theory of emotions that also contains a highly recommendable summary of New Phenomenology (Schmitz, Müllan, & Slaby, 2011), an

article about “atmospheric spaces” (Schmitz, 2019b), and an interview with Schmitz (Schmitz & Apostolescu, 2016). English publications with a strong reference to Schmitz have been provided by Slaby (2008), Griffero (2014, 2017a, 2017b), Gugutzer (2019), or Julmi (2018).

<sup>3</sup>Schmitz provided a broad examination on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s theories in Schmitz (1996).

<sup>4</sup>In Schmitz (2019a, pp. 64–65), Schmitz describes the terms „felt-bodily“ (leiblich) and „felt body“ (Leib) as follows: „When I say ‚felt-bodily‘ or ‚embodied‘, I am not speaking of the visible or tactile body but of the felt body as the carrier of such embodied impulses as, for instance, fear, pain, lust, hunger, thirst, disgust, vigor, tiredness and being in the grip of emotions.“

<sup>5</sup>Among the current sociological actor models the „emotional man“ (Flam, 1990a, 1990b) comes closest to what is described here as a *patheur*. The difference between these two concepts lies in the *patheur* focusing on the embodied affective moment of social action while the “constraint emotional man” – which is empirically more significant than the “pure emotional man” – is marked as normative and rational from the outset (see Schimank, 2000, pp. 108–121).

<sup>6</sup>While Husserl did point out the subjectivity of the felt body in contrast to the material body in his “Ideas II” (Husserl, 1989), paradigmatically demonstrated on the “sensations of touch”, he does not get beyond an activist understanding of the felt body, which is perceived purely as an acting felt body. The pathic conception of the felt body, i.e. feeling oneself, is discussed neither by him nor by Schütz.

<sup>7</sup>*Programs* include norms and wishes. A *norm* is a program – a “guideline for self-guidance” (Schmitz, 2012, p. 11) – that points out what should (not) be. In this sense, a norm is a “program for potential obedience” (Schmitz, 2012, p. 11) working, for example, through rules, commandments and prohibitions, ideologies etc. On the contrary, a *wish* implies “that something shall be” (Schmitz, 2016, p. 132) which includes motives, hopes, ideals or desires. Norms and wishes together make up the programmatic content of a situation, which Schmitz refers to as “*nomos*” (Schmitz, 2012, p. 13).

<sup>8</sup>Schmitz believes face-to-face-conversations to be the prime example for how people enter into contact with each other and thus create a joint situation by means of antagonistic mutual encorporation (see Schmitz, 1980b, pp. 97–109).

<sup>9</sup>„Primitive present“ (or „personal regression“) together with the „unfolded present“ (or “personal emancipation”) form the two aspects (or dynamics) of personhood; for a more thorough investigation of this issue, see Schmitz (1980a); for a summary, see Schmitz (1990, pp. 153–174); concerning the relationship between person and felt body, see Schmitz (2011, pp. 71–87).

## REFERENCES

- Bird, G. (2009). What is phenomenological sociology again? *Human Studies*, 32(4), 419–439. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-009-9131-3>
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The logic of practice*. Stanford/Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Castellani, M. (2013). Alfred Schütz and Herbert Simon: Can their action theories work together? *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 43(4), 383–404. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12015>
- Coenen, H. (1985). Leiblichkeit und Sozialität. Ein Grundproblem der phänomenologischen Soziologie. In H. Petzold (Ed.), *Leiblichkeit: Philosophische, gesellschaftliche und therapeutische Perspektiven* (pp. 197–228). Paderborn: Junfermann.
- Crossley, N. (2001). *The social body. Habit, identity and desire*. London: Sage.
- Crossley, N. (2012). Phenomenology and the body. In B. S. Turner (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of body studies* (pp. 130–143). New York: Routledge.
- Eberle, T. S. (2012). Phenomenology and sociology: Divergent interpretations of a complex relationship. In H. Nasu, & F. Chaput Waksler (Eds.), *Interaction and everyday life. Phenomenological and ethnomethodological essays in honor of George Psathas* (pp. 135–152). Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Endress, M., Psathas, G., & Nasu, H. (Eds.) (2005). *Explorations of the Life-World: continuing dialogues with Alfred Schutz*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Ferguson, H. (2006). *Phenomenological sociology. Insight & experience in modern society*. London: Sage.

- Flam, H. (1990a). Emotional 'man' I: The emotional 'man' and the problem of collective action. *International Sociology*, 5(1), 39–56. <https://doi.org/10.1177/026858090005001004>
- Flam, H. (1990b). Emotional 'man' II: Corporate actors as emotion-motivated emotion managers. *International Sociology*, 5(2), 225–234. <https://doi.org/10.1177/026858090005002007>
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Griffero, T. (2014). *Atmospheres. Aesthetics of Emotional Spaces*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Griffero, T. (2017a). *Quasi-Things. The Paradigm of Atmospheres*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Griffero, T. (2017b). Felt-bodily communication. A neophenomenological approach to embodied affects. *Studi di Estetica*, 8(2), 71–86. <https://doi.org/10.7413/18258646019>
- Großheim, M. (2005). Der Situationsbegriff in der Philosophie. Mit einem Ausblick auf seine Anwendung in der Psychiatrie. In D. Schmoll, & A. Kuhlmann (Eds.), *Symptom und Phänomen. Phänomenologische Zugänge zum kranken Menschen* (pp. 114–149). Freiburg/Munich: Alber.
- Gugutzer, R. (2012). *Verkörperungen des Sozialen. Neophänomenologische Grundlagen und soziologische Analysen*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
- Gugutzer, R. (2019). Being and feeling addicted to exercise: Reflections from a neophenomenological perspective. *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, 46(1), 30–48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2019.1566004>
- Hasse, J. (2010). Raum der Performativität. ‚Augenblicksstätten‘ im Situationsraum des Sozialen. *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 98(2), 65–82.
- Heiskala, R. (2011). The meaning of meaning in sociology. The achievements and shortcomings of Alfred Schutz's phenomenological sociology. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 41(3), 231–243. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2011.00461.x>
- Hitzler, R. (2005). Die Beschreibung der Struktur der Korrelate des Erlebens. Zum (möglichen) Stellenwert der Phänomenologie in der Soziologie. In U. Schimank, & R. Greshoff (Eds.), *Was erklärt die Soziologie? Methodologien, Modelle, Perspektiven* (pp. 230–240). Berlin: Lit.
- Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of european sciences and transcendental phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy. Second book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution*. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer.
- Joas, H. (1996). *The creativity of action*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Julmi, C. (2018). A theory of affective communication: On the phenomenological foundations of perspective taking. *Human Studies*, 41(4), 623–641. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-09485-0>
- Latour, B. (2005). *Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Leder, D. (1990). *The Absent Body*. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
- Lindemann, G. (2005). Die Verkörperung des Sozialen. Theoriekonstruktionen und empirische Forschungsperspektiven. In M. Schroer (Ed.), *Soziologie des Körpers* (pp. 114–138). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Luckmann, T. (1992). *Theorie des sozialen Handelns*. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter.
- Luckmann, T. (2008). Konstitution, Konstruktion. Phänomenologie, Sozialwissenschaft. In J. Raab, M. Pfadenhauer, P. Stegmeier, J. Dreher, & B. Schnettler (Eds.), *Phänomenologie und Soziologie. Theoretische Positionen, aktuelle Themenfelder, empirische Untersuchungen* (pp. 33–40). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Nasu, H. (2012). The phenomenological sociology movement in the United States: The developmental process of an intellectual movement. In H. Nasu, & F. C. Waksler (Eds.), *Interaction and everyday life. Phenomenological and ethnomethodological essays in honor of George Psathas* (pp. 3–21). Lanham: Lexington Books.
- O'Neill, J. (1989). *The communicative body. Studies in communicative philosophy, politics, and sociology*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University press.
- O'Neill, J. (2004). *Five bodies. Re-figuring relationships*. London: Sage.
- Overgaard, S., & Zahavi, D. (2009). Phenomenological sociology – The subjectivity of everyday life. In M. H. Jacobson (Ed.), *Encountering the everyday. An introduction to the sociology of the unnoticed* (pp. 93–115). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sartre, J. P. (1993). *Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology*. Washington: Washington Square Press.

- Schimank, U. (2000). *Handeln und Strukturen. Einführung in die akteurtheoretische Soziologie*. Weinheim & Munich: Juventa.
- Schmitz, H. (1964). *System der Philosophie, Band 1: Die Gegenwart*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1965). *System der Philosophie. Band 2, Teil 1: Der Leib*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1966). *System der Philosophie. Band 2, Teil 2: Der Leib im Spiegel der Kunst*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1967). *System der Philosophie, Band 3, Teil 1: Der leibliche Raum*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1969). *System der Philosophie, Band 3, Teil 2: Der Gefühlsraum*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1973). *System der Philosophie, Band 3, Teil 3: Der Rechtsraum*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1977). *System der Philosophie, Band 3, Teil 4: Das Göttliche und der Raum*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1978). *System der Philosophie, Band 3, Teil 5: Die Wahrnehmung*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1980a). *System der Philosophie, Band 4: Die Person*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1980b). *System der Philosophie, Band 5: Die Aufhebung der Gegenwart*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1980c). *Neue Phänomenologie*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1990). *Der unerschöpfliche Gegenstand. Grundzüge der Philosophie*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1996). Husserl und Heidegger. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (1999). *Adolf Hitler in der Geschichte*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Schmitz, H. (2002a). Was ist ein Phänomen? In H. Schmitz, G. Marx, & A. Moldzio (Eds.), *Begriffene Erfahrung. Beiträge zur antireduktionistischen Phänomenologie* (pp. 13–22). Rostock: Koch.
- Schmitz, H. (2002b). Hermann Schmitz, the 'New Phenomenology'. In A.-T. Tymieniecka (Ed.), *Phenomenology world-wide. Foundations – expanding dynamics – life-engagements. A guide for research and study* (pp. 491–494). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Schmitz, H. (2003). *Was ist Neue Phänomenologie?* Rostock: Koch.
- Schmitz, H. (2005). *Situationen und Konstellationen. Wider die Ideologie der Vernetzung*. Freiburg & Munich: Alber.
- Schmitz, H. (2009). *Kurze Einführung in die Neue Phänomenologie*. Freiburg & Munich: Alber.
- Schmitz, H. (2011). *Der Leib*. Berlin & Boston: de Gruyter.
- Schmitz, H. (2012). *Im Reich der Normen*. Freiburg & Munich: Alber.
- Schmitz, H. (2014). *Atmosphären*. Freiburg & Munich: Alber.
- Schmitz, H. (2016). *Ausgrabungen zum wirklichen Leben. Eine Bilanz*. Freiburg & Munich: Alber.
- Schmitz, H. (2019a). *New Phenomenology. A brief introduction*. (Transl. by Rudolf O. Müllan with support from Martin Bastert. With an introduction by Tonino Griffero). Milan: Mimesis International.
- Schmitz, H. (2019b). Atmospheric spaces. *Ambiances* [En ligne], Redécouvertes, mis en ligne le 27 avril 2016, consulté le 03 mars 2019. Retrieved from <http://journals.openedition.org/ambiances/711>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/ambiances.711>
- Schmitz, H., & Apostoiescu, J. (2016). The things themselves in the light of new phenomenology. An interview with Hermann Schmitz by Julian Apostoiescu. Symposium. *Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy*, 20(1), 230–236. <https://doi.org/10.5840/symposium201620114>
- Schmitz, H., Müllan, R. O., & Slaby, J. (2011). Emotions outside the box – The new phenomenology of feeling and corporeality. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 10(2), 241–259. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9195-1>
- Schütz, A. (1962a). *Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Schütz, A. (1962b). Phenomenology and the social sciences. In A. Schütz (Ed.), *Collected papers I: The problem of social reality* (pp. 118–139). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Schütz, A. (1964). *Collected papers II: Studies in social theory*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Schütz, A. (1966). *Collected papers III: Studies in phenomenological philosophy*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Schütz, A. (1967). *The phenomenology of the social world*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Schütz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1973/1989). *The structures of the Life-World* (Vol. 1 and 2). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Simmel, G. (1992). Exkurs über die Soziologie der Sinne. In G. Simmel (Ed.), *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (pp. 722–742). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Slaby, J. (2008). Affective intentionality and the feeling body. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 7(4), 429–444. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9083-x>

- Sohst, W., & Schmitz, H. (2005). *Hermann Schmitz im Dialog. Neun neugierige und kritische Fragen an die Neue Phänomenologie*. Berlin: Xenomoi.
- Uzarewicz, M. (2011). *Der Leib und die Grenzen der Gesellschaft. Eine neophänomenologische Soziologie des Transhumanen*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.
- Williams, S. J., & Bendelow, G. (1998). *The lived body. Sociological themes, embodied issues*. London: Routledge.  
www.gnp-online.de

**How to cite this article:** Gugutzer R. Beyond Husserl and Schütz. Hermann Schmitz and Neophenomenological Sociology. *J Theory Soc Behav*. 2020;50:184–202. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12240>