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The market, competition, and structural exploitation

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1 | INTRODUCTION

This article claims that the institution of the market is structurally exploitative. It allows for exploitation, it encourages actors to engage in it and it even pressurizes them to do so. Within Marxism, this claim is well known, but can it be defended without strongly relying on Marxist concepts and arguments? I will answer in the affirmative and identify the forces of market competition to be a fundamental source of exploitative pressures.

By the market, I mean the social sphere that secures economic transactions through property rights and private contracts, and which, in its modern form, is characterized by a complex division of labor, a certain degree of competition between multiple sellers and buyers, and in which the majority of the population depends on market income. To link exploitation—that is, taking unfair advantage of others—systematically to the institution of the market is certainly highly contested. One prominent argument against the exploitation thesis is that the market grants its participants sufficient latitude to refrain from exploitative pressures. Arneson (2011, pp. 213–214), for example, argues that "the 'market' does not block people engaged in exchange from softening the terms of exchange in the direction of egalitarian sharing." Another line of argument objects that although the force of competition is operative in the market, competition is a "force for the good in society" (Dietsch, 2010, p. 223), as it allegedly eliminates ever more opportunities for exploitation rather than pushing actors to engage in it. Embraced by many contemporary philosophies of market exploitation (Miller, 1989; Wertheimer, 1996; Zwolinski, 2010), this is the basic thrust of neoclassical economics. A third position, stemming from the social philosophy of the market, criticizes this latter perspective as a fallacious idealization of the market but in the end, it effectively arrives at surprisingly similar results. Here, the argument, from Durkheim (1893/2013) to Etzioni (1988), is that economic theory usually abstracts from the sociality of the market by presupposing isolated, purely strategically oriented utility maximizers at its core. In reality, however, markets are always embedded in social and moral norms that endow economic actors with significant moral capacities, enabling them to refrain from exploitation even where there is an opportunity for it. As a prominent advocate of this position, Honneth concedes that market actors may use the market "to cheat, to pile on wealth and exploit others"

(Honneth, 2014, p. 182), but he underlines that this cannot be understood as being "systematically induced" (Honneth, 2014, p. 129) by the market.

According to the account I shall outline, all three approaches are wrong, or at least partially misleading. The first, voluntaristic approach neglects the forces of market competition. The standard economics approach, on the other hand, sets the fox to guard the geese. It hopes to solve the problem by employing a mechanism that is itself a major source of it. The embeddedness approach, finally, underestimates the powerful moral dynamic engendered by competition that pulls actors on a normative downward slope, with deteriorating levels of normative commitment.

The article is structured as follows. In the next part (2), I outline my general approach towards the problem of (structural) exploitation. Part 3 demonstrates how market competition fosters incessant one-upmanship among competitors, inducing them to clutch at exploitative strategies as a desperate measure, which in turn pressurizes others to follow suit. A refutation of objections from game theory, economics and political theory follows (4). The crucial claim of the article is spelt out in the fifth part. The normative slope argument elucidates the moral dynamics of competition, making the first moves towards exploitation appearing acceptable and subsequently pulling actors down a normative slope towards ever thicker forms of exploitation. Part 6 scrutinizes counteracting tendencies based on moral resources internal and external to the market. The conclusion sums up the argument and offers a short glimpse of institutional remedies. My broad goal is not just to prioritize constitutive transformations of the market over its external regulation, but to complement a distributive reconstitution of the market with a dispositional one.

2 | WHAT IS (STRUCTURAL) EXPLOITATION?

Exploitation means taking illegitimate or unfair advantage of someone else's weaknesses.[1] It is possible because exploiters may take advantage of particular vulnerabilities on the part of the exploited, or particular powers on their own part, or both. Benefiting from someone's vulnerability, however, is not of itself exploitation. The transaction in question must be unfair or illegitimate in some sense. There is nothing wrong in earning one's livelihood by satisfying the needs and wishes of others who may be considered vulnerable to me, assuming that I am in a privileged position to satisfy their needs and wishes (Arneson, 2013). Exploitation may comprise coercion, deception, or harming the interests of the exploited party, but exploitation may also be mutually consensual and beneficial. Consider the paradigmatic case of the "greedy rescuer": "A finds B in a pit. A can get B out at little cost or difficulty. A offers to get B out, but only if B agrees to pay a million euros or to sign a sweatshop contract with A. B signs the contract" (Vrousalis, 2013, p. 148). The contract is voluntary, and instead of harming B, it helps her to get out of her desperate lot. But still, the greedy rescuer is paradigmatic of what constitutes exploitation. She violates a procedural norm of exchange or interaction—grounded in a duty to respect or protect others—that overrides consequentialist arguments that only take into account the increase in benefit compared to the status quo ante.[2]

How is exploitation possible in the everyday operation of the market? Here are some examples. Suppliers may take advantage of power asymmetries in relation to buyers, as when, after a hurricane has destroyed large parts of a city, hotel owners make windfall gains by doubling their fees in the face of the sudden excess demand for hotel rooms.[3] Or suppliers may use substantial advertising and marketing power to influence the preferences of potential customers so that they feel an urgent need to buy the sellers' product, allowing the sellers to take advantage of the urgency of this need (Akerlof & Shiller, 2015, pp. 45–59). Or they may take advantage of the weaknesses of their counterpart, particularly psychological weaknesses; for example, their lack of self-control, proclivity to addiction, and emotional ties and desires, as when gyms exploit the overly optimistic ambitions of their customers, many of whom are chasing more or less unattainable ideals of beauty (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006). Taking advantage of information asymmetries is also an option. Consider the case of cheaply offering a base good while reaping profits from costly add-ons; the typical example being affordable printers combined with expensive ink cartridges (Gabaix & Laibson, 2006). Or, finally, taking advantage of negative externalities is also a possible strategy: producing a good may create toxic waste that is expensive to dispose of properly, so imposing these costs on unrelated third parties, who are often in a vulnerable position due to their geographical or temporal dispersion, is another way of benefitting unfairly (Reiff, 2013, p. 117).

To sum up, taking advantage of market power, information asymmetries, and externalities are three major opportunities for exploitation in the sphere of the market. Three points of clarifications are in order. First, these forms of exploitation are morally wrong pro tanto, and not because they generate social inefficiencies, as an economic understanding of market failure would have it.[4] Rather, their wrongness stems from injuring more general deontological principals, such as freedom from harm (as in the exploitation of externalities), autonomous consent (as in the exploitation of information asymmetries), or transactional fairness (as in the exploitation of monopoly power). I take it that from a broadly liberal-egalitarian perspective there is something wrong with these forms of advantage taking. But more work would be needed to sustain these claims against objections from, for example, a libertarian perspective.

Second, some of the cases of exploitation are rather slight, belonging to a form of advantage-taking that may be called thin exploitation, such as reaping profits from costly add-ons. If taken in isolation, such a practice may appear too slight, and thus negligible, but the picture changes when the practice becomes widespread and systematic—this is so, at least, when we take up insights from a Hegelian virtue ethics and Hegel's idea of ethical life. It pays special attention to how our entrenched practices form and shape our moral dispositions and social ethos.[5] When thin exploitation becomes a routine practice it may well have moral significance as it constitutes the social context of individual action. It will then be in danger of contributing to a corrosion of moral attitudes and dispositions.

Third, note that even thick exploitation, where more fundamental deontic principles are violated, may well be possible within the legal framework of the market. Think of gouging the prices of goods during a natural disaster.[6] And even if some forms of thick exploitation involve violating legal regulations, this does not necessarily mean that they do not belong to what the market essentially is. If it turns out that violations of legal regulations are structurally fostered by the market, then these practices must be part of our picture of how the market fundamentally works. The ideal and publicly acknowledged rules of a social system do not necessarily coincide with its inherent tendencies.[7]

Since Alan Wertheimer's influential study on exploitation, the focus of the debate has been on discrete transactions of individual actors but in recent years the question of structural exploitation has gained increasing attention.[8] Some accounts of structural exploitation focus on the hidden macro-level rules of the game that enable micro-level transactions to *appear* fair and non-exploitative while in fact they are not. Within this framework, classically put forward by Marx but also employed by feminist analyses, exploitation is largely unconscious and unintentional due to the covert nature of prior, deep-seated structural injustices (Sample, 2003, pp. 61–62, 97–130; Wood, 2004, pp. 138–142). Analytical Marxism demonstrates that with regard to structural exploitation of labor power in capitalism, the relevant silent background conditions consist of an unequal distribution of productive assets. On this account, capitalist exploitation should be conceived as "the distributional consequences of an unjust inequality in the distribution of productive assets and resources" (Roemer, 1994, p. 96). Now, the crucial point is that this diagnosis suggests that overcoming capitalist exploitation may well be realized *within* the boundaries of a market system, and precisely for this reason, it finds resonance in contemporary liberal political philosophy, where John Rawls's proposal for a property-owning democracy gains traction (Rawls, 2001, § 41; Thomas, 2017). This institutional "alternative to capitalism" (Rawls, 2001, pp. 135–136), defined by a broadly equalized distribution of productive assets, can be expected to overcome the systematic exploitation of wage laborers to a large part, as it would abolish the class division between wage laborers and capitalists. I am skeptical as to how far this economic system would take us in overcoming capitalist exploitation, but my main point is elsewhere. As a property-owning democracy is still a market system, market-based exploitation will persist. In other words, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that a non-capitalist market in the Rawlsian sense would be non-exploitative by definition; other actors besides employees may be victims of exploitation, be it customers, suppliers, subcontractors, vendors, or unrelated third parties. This is why I focus on market-based exploitation more generally, rather than on capitalist exploitation in a narrow sense.

Drawing on the pressures of market competition, this article places another approach center stage in explaining structural exploitation. It does not assume that structural exploitation operates purely behind individuals' back: they may have some knowledge about being exploited or being exploitative, even if only implicitly and vaguely. Instances of exploitation are enacted by formally free individuals endowed with a free will who nonetheless act within determinate institutions that are characterized by formal and informal rules and that operate with specific systemic mechanisms.

The peril of this methodological approach is, of course, to treat human beings as if they were mere appendages of systemic mechanisms where subjective attitudes and individual motivation appear for the most part to be negligible. To avoid this pitfall I draw particular attention to the way that institutional contexts contribute to shaping individual attitudes and dispositions such that exploitation may appear to be an acceptable choice of action from the perspective of market participants. Accounts focusing on the force of competitive pressures must take this social-psychological dimension seriously. From a strictly Kantian perspective of individual duty, this does not exonerate individuals from any moral charge. Such an individualistic perspective, however, ignores the extent to which a given social context supports or corrodes moral attitudes and dispositions. This is what Hegelian virtue ethics places center stage. It is not a call for individual moral heroism, where a single virtuous individual takes a stand against the bad, exploitative reality; rather, it analyzes whether or not our social institutions and practices encourage moral motivation and virtuous dispositions. (Hegel will be in the background of my argument, but I won't return to his work until the final part of the article.)

The account of structural exploitation elaborated in the following does not stipulate that all interactions in the market sphere are automatically and inevitably exploitative, as Marx's notion of capitalist exploitation suggests. Exploitation is structural when the following conditions are met: (a) the actors end up exploiting others significantly and frequently; (b) the patterns of exploitation can be traced back to the rules and mechanisms of the respective institution; and (c) the actors can be safely assumed to have entered the institution in question carrying external moral resources with them.

Recent exceptions to the general tendency to neglect the problem of structural market exploitation are G.A. Cohen's critical reflections on the market (Cohen, 2009) and Akerlof and Shiller's *Phishing for Phools* (2015). Yet Cohen, no less than Akerlof and Shiller, is too hasty in presupposing what actually ought to be explained in the first place. They all suggest that market actors, for the plain reason of acting within the market arena, are selfish utility maximizers. Cohen concludes, from the bare assumption that market transactions imply "instrumental" relations (Cohen, 2009, p. 43), that market actors want "to buy cheap and sell dear" (p. 42). He thinks that this amounts to "predation" (p. 82), which I take to mean exploitation. And Akerlof and Shiller are quick to assume that market actors follow "profit motives" (Akerlof & Shiller, 2015, p. 165). The crucial question, however, is how it comes about that markets structurally promote exploitation precisely when we assume that market participants enter the market with significant moral resources and capacities, thus departing from selfishly maximizing their own utility.

3 | COMPETITIVE ONE-UPMANSHIP, EXISTENTIAL STAKES, AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURES

I take the market to be competitive in a way that other spheres of social life are not. It is true that there are non-market contexts where competition is essential, or even held to be intrinsically valuable, as in games and sports. In the overall picture, however, competition is not a pervasive feature of social life, either in the family or in cultural life or politics.[9] Undeniably, in all areas of social life individuals will be confronted with conflicts of interest that arise when different individuals strive for the same object of desire or need. But to have competing claims to the same object does not necessarily result in competition: we may just as well share it, or collectively decide how to balance our claims in fair and just ways.

How are the competitive pressures of the market constituted?[10] At the very least, market competition requires some degree of formal liberty to enter the market to offer goods and services, which means that an established supplier offering a good may be driven out by a new supplier offering the good on more favorable terms. Under usual circumstances, several suppliers compete with one another to win buyers. It immediately follows from this that the various competitors are dynamically interrelated. One supplier will be able to sell, while her competitors will come away empty-handed; one's success is the other's failure. Thus, from the perspective of competitors, market competition is a zero-sum game for the most part. The same win–lose structure reappears on an aggregate level: gaining a larger share of the market usually means smaller shares for others. Suppliers may also succeed by eliciting additional demand for their product without drawing off buyers from other suppliers[11] but at one point or another aggregate demand is limited. Given this interrelatedness, advancing one's own competitive position necessarily results in worsening those of competitors who themselves try to avoid falling behind. If, however, suppliers are repeatedly outcompeted, they will eventually be driven out of the market, and this threat of elimination is aggravated by the fact that market competition essentially allows for an unlimited number of competitors.

In effect, the dynamic interconnectedness of competition unfolds a marginal coercive pressure of everyone's action upon the actions of their rivals, even without personal interaction. In the struggle for competitiveness everyone slightly and involuntarily coerces everyone else, with a cumulative effect over time.[12] The competitive pressures of the market, anonymously constituted over the course of time, amount to a "masterless slavery," in Weber's (1922/1978, p. 1186) laconic phrase. It keeps competitors caught in a rat race, burdening them with the infinite challenge to enhance their position, either in response to the competitors who just pulled ahead or to make up ground in fear of being swept out of the market entirely. Even when already miles ahead, furthering one's own position is a prudent anticipatory strategy, given the rival's incessant efforts to catch up and the profound uncertainty of one's own comparative advantage.[13] Hence, prudent suppliers will rarely settle for breaking even; they will attempt to make considerable profits and typically maximize them.

This is quite a *formal* argument, placing the origin of profit maximization in the structural characteristic of market competition. In addition, maximized gains in market competition provide *material* advantages, both in the short and long term. They may provide, for example, resources for short-term competitive advantages, which allows for undercutting competitors in a price war. Or they may provide the opportunity to realize long-term strategic advantages, for example, by permitting investment in more advanced productive assets or scaling up production in order to benefit from economies of scale.

Given these formal and material features of market competition, the maximum profit will then often be the minimum profit that the suppliers can afford to aim at.[14] Thus, under the silent compulsion of competitive pressures, the goals of suppliers tend to alter in the direction of profit maximization, even without assuming that the actors have been utility maximizers all along, that is, even if, initially, the participant's goals of action may have only been defensive and limited (producing cost covering, with due respect to rules of fairness).

Under these conditions of competitive pressure it will not be unlikely that at least one desperate supplier may clutch at exploitative strategies. Exploitation clearly permits competitive advantages, helping one to remain profitable instead of being sidelined by more reckless—or innovative—competitors. To be sure, the pressures of competition would not have a grave impact on competitors if everyone could easily opt out. But under market conditions this is not that simple. There are typically high stakes involved, first, in the sense that market competition often means risking sizable business assets and investments. This results from the normal logic of market competition. Recall that investments in scaling up production and productivity-enhancing technology are the usual, but expensive, strategies for gaining long-term advantages. Furthermore, market competition involves high stakes in the sense that market income typically secures our material existence. The capability of an enterprise to survive in market competition provides its owners, staff and investors with an income that is often indispensable for securing their livelihood. Being driven out of competition may pose an existential material threat.[15] This existential dependence on competitive outcomes is the most significant distinguishing feature between market competition and other forms of human competition.[16] In political competition, for example, citizens can easily refrain from politics if they wish.[17] Finally, in market competition we also put our social existence at stake. Our social status, providing us with esteem and recognition for our socioeconomic standing, is conditional on our access to a number of material goods, including housing, clothing, mobility, cultural activities, and so forth, which have to be attained through market income.

It thus becomes clear that in market competition participants are compelled to risk a number of distinct material and social stakes, burdening them in a highly individualized way. It is true that not every market participant is constantly and immediately threatened to lose all of the various high stakes at once. But market competition is peculiar in that almost all participants are almost constantly compelled to put substantial stakes at a considerable risk. For this reason, market competition induces actors to pass on these burdens to others, by externalizing costs or taking advantage of their weaknesses.

Now, it is important to see that market competition brings a particular leverage to bear on competitors who face at least one supplier reckless enough to embark on exploitative strategies. When one single supplier gains competitive advantages by making use of exploitative practices, the other competitors are put under pressure to catch up.[18] The rogue firm's exploitative edge is *automatically* a disadvantage to all its competitors. This is different from a non-competitive context, where the unethical conduct of one individual does not pressurize others to act in the same way. One doctor accepting bribes does not create any pressure on other doctors also to take bribes. In a competitive context, however, when one competitor engages in exploitation, moral concern often becomes costly for the others, threatening socially responsible suppliers to be driven out of business: they, too, are pressurized to stoop to the same level of exploitation as their competitor.

4 | REPUTATION MANAGEMENT, COMPETITIVE SELF-REGULATION, AND EXTERNAL REGULATION

One objection at this point is that in a market context, reputational concerns based on pure self-interest will often persuade suppliers to back away from exploitation, for fear of losing trade partners and buyers sooner or later. In fact, on an abstract level, game theory could show that even with its minimal assumptions, non-exploitative, cooperative behavior will evolve when the rational utility maximizer acts under conditions of repeated games among identifiable fellow players with high chances of meeting again (Axelrod, 1984).

Ultimately, however, this kind of argument is severely limited, as reliance on self-interest is unstable and quite restricted in scope. Purely self-interested agents will seize the opportunity for exploitation whenever possible, and in complex, modern economies, these opportunities will be frequent; for example, when exploitative effects are hard to discern or become discernible only in the long run; when chains of action are fluid or obscure, so that exploiters remain largely unidentifiable; or when one-way dependencies between transaction partners crystallize, leaving the exploited part with few alternatives. Finally, pure self-interest is perfectly compatible with what I call *latent* exploitation. Market actors, refraining from exploitation for the simple strategic purpose of avoiding reputational loss, may continually harbor exploitative intentions by busying themselves with seeking out the opportunity to get away with exploitation. They may acquiesce to the fact that the right time has not yet come, but only to continue their quest for the time being. This is effectively exploitation on standby. Here, exploitative aims remain purely "*ideal*, *intended*," as the most materialist philosopher of all, namely Karl Marx, put it; but the "intention of *plundering*, of *deception*" does lurk "in the background" (Marx, 1844/1975, p. 226). In that case, the problem is not so much exploitation as a social practice, much less as a distributive outcome; rather, the problem is an attitudinal deficit, namely one in the recognitive stance towards one's fellow beings. From a consequentialist perspective that adopts some kind of "no harm, no foul" morality, this would be, of course, entirely irrelevant. From the perspective of virtue ethics, however, latent exploitation is significant, for it may contribute to forming character dispositions and motivational stances.

Another argument in support of market competition is put forward by neoclassical economists. Here, the standard textbook solution readily accepts that competitive pressures may urge actors to seize exploitative opportunities. But it underlines that these very pressures will quickly compel other actors to compete away the exploitative advantages in the same measure. The argument commences by conceding, in agreement with my previous reflections, that market competition is indeed a social force, but it is a benign one that incrementally eliminates ever more possibilities for exploitation. The reason is that the extra profit, for example due to a monopoly position, will function as an incentive to other suppliers to enter the market, who are able to offer goods at a marginally lower but still overpriced level. Thus, competition gets stronger, giving buyers more choice and rendering them less vulnerable to exploitation. Gradually, more and more competitors enter the market, triggering a downward pressure on prices in that market until eventually, after some iterations, the mark-up prices are competed away and the prices approach the marginal cost of production (Dietsch, 2010; Zwolinski, 2010, p. 337). Similar mechanisms may be assumed to be at work with information asymmetries and externalities.[19] Over time, these various competitive forces internal to the market are believed to render exploitation increasingly impossible, moving the existing, imperfect market towards ever more optimal conditions.

This line of argument, however, is severely flawed on several counts.[20] To begin with, even when assuming that stronger competition in fact reduces opportunities for exploitation, it still means taking the source of the problem as a means for its solution—since it is precisely the dynamic of competition that has spurred exploitation in the first place. As such, monopolists are in no way compelled to take advantage of their market power. If they do, it may be for many reasons, such as greed; but according to the argument put forward here, one crucial reason is the experience of competition itself. Momentarily enjoying a monopoly position does not mean that one cannot be swept from the market the following day (e.g., because of a sudden technology change). The monopolist knows this too well, for it was she who forced her competitors out of the market. The lesson she learned is that, in general, furthering one's own position is a prudent anticipatory strategy, even when she is ahead of the game. This means, in turn, that increasing actual competition structurally amounts, to some degree, to adding fuel to the flames.

There is another problem with the hope of attaining a perfectly competitive market. It would not guarantee non-exploitation. This is because the perfectly competitive market would not warrant fairness of transactions, as it would be indifferent to more fundamental principles of justice, such as need (Sample, 2003, pp. 73–84), desert (Hahnel, 2005), or cost of production (Reiff, 2013, pp. 100–109).[21] But the more important point is that the perfectly competitive market is an empty ideal in any case. There is no continual approximation to the allegedly ideal conditions. In each particular dimension of exploitation, that is, power asymmetries, information asymmetries, and externalities, heterodox economic approaches could show that the competitive elimination of exploitative opportunities is foiled, to some extent, by countervailing tendencies. For example, monopoly power is often a result of high entry costs that shield the incumbent to a considerable degree from would-be competitors. Recall that high entry costs are not a contingent external feature of market competition but a regular side effect of the standard strategies of profit maximization, namely, scaling up production or increasing capital intensity.[22] In addition to these field-specific reasons, there are more general reasons why competitive pressures fail at minimizing exploitation. First, competitive dynamics regularly send shock waves through the existing shape of the market, when innovative suppliers introduce new products and new production methods. This frequently results in temporary imbalances and turbulences, opening up ever new possibilities of exploitation (Wolff, 1998). Second, competition always involves the problem of a race to the bottom, which also contribute to the proliferation of exploitative conditions.[23] In a fiercely competitive environment suppliers may feel pressurized to reduce their safety standards in order to gain a competitive advantage in virtue of lower production costs. In response, their rivals will follow suit and equally lower standards. Eventually, no supplier gains from the lower costs, but all suffer from greater workplace dangers. The third and final argument is this: hypothetically, we might grant, if only for the sake of the argument, that the market comes ever closer to perfect competition, "even if it is a tendency that is never perfectly realized" (Zwolinski, 2010, p. 352). Even then the possibility of exploitation would not be ruled out; it would be encouraged all the more. At best, the near-total competitive pressures would only be able to *coerce* suppliers into refraining from actual exploitative practices. Yet this is perfectly compatible with, and conducive to, latent exploitation. Fraught with the relentless pressures of competition, a supplier will likely be in the intentional state of "seeing to it" (Goodin & Pasternak, 2016, p. 285) that exploitation will happen, by actively attempting to spot the opportunities for exploitation. Furthermore, because, according to the assumption, the market always falls short of actually reaching the level of perfect competition to *some* extent, it will in fact always offer at least some opportunities for exploitation. But then there is a dialectic at work. The more fiercely that near-total competition burdens suppliers the more they are pressurized incessantly to seek out these opportunities and recklessly take advantage of them.

For many political theorists the most obvious remedy against market exploitation is tightening external regulation and increasing redistributive policies. Given the manifold forms of legal regulations against exploitation in our current market system, in contract law, commercial, competition, labor, consumer protection, and environmental law, why should it not be feasible to simply "encapsulate" (Etzioni, 1988, p. 199) the market in an even tighter frame of legal regulation? It can be argued that tightening legal regulation, with comprehensive monitoring and sanctioning, may even strengthen a non-exploitative ethos, by stabilizing reciprocal expectations about behavior, thus increasing the generalized trust in non-exploitation. Yet the problem is that, even in a hypothetical market with very tight regulation, numerous forms of exploitation would still be possible and also structurally promoted. In many cases of thin exploitation, legal regulation is more or less unfeasible, as for example, with regard to some forms of information asymmetries: misleading advertising is hard to ban as long as it does not slip into outright lies (Heath, 2014, p. 35). Thicker forms of exploitation would likewise continue to be possible to a certain degree because, in complex social systems regulation is frequently difficult to enforce, even when it is possible and desirable in theory, because of the inevitability of oversights and loopholes (Heath, 2014, p. 112). Moreover, tight regulation would still be quite vulnerable to "dirty" exploitation (Mayer, 2007, p. 613), where legal rules are violated straight away. This is because competitive pressures may be even stronger than before because of the higher number of competitors. Also, market actors can still be expected to have a tendency to see regulation as a mere *external impediment* to their untrammeled freedom (already evidenced today by the widespread aversion to "regulation mania" and bureaucracy, which would be even stronger in a more tightly regulated market). Finally, a tightly regulated market would be compatible with *latent* exploitation. Being surrounded by numerous regulations, market actors may continually attempt to find loopholes for their exploitative strategies. Again, exploitation will then often not be carried out in practice, but it would still be present by lurking in the background.

5 | NORMATIVE SLOPES

The assumption at the beginning of the article was that the market is a moral universe, and, in particular, that we should presuppose in our analysis actors who are at least partially endowed with moral capacities. Is this not a countervailing force against competitive pressures? Certainly it is, but in the following I shall explain that market competition itself unfolds a *genuinely moral dynamic*. Market competition establishes a slippery slope that additionally induces suppliers to go down the exploitative path.[24] The idea behind the following argument is that the morality of the social context within which individuals act is of crucial importance for their moral agency. Human actors are much less the detached, autonomous agents, governed solely by their moral reasoning, than many moral theories believe them to be. Of course, this does not mean that individuals are mere pawns in the hands of supra-individual forces. But the morality of institutionalized norms and routines should not be underestimated.

i. *On the edge of the slope*. The starting point of the normative slope argument is that market competition pits us against one another. It places us in circumstances where our own plans to achieve an important good will effectively impede others to realize their plans to achieve that good.[25] Social conditions like these can be expected to feed a good deal of malevolence into social relations, even before any exploitation is involved. This is particularly obvious when a rival suffers damage. It gives us cause to rejoice. There is "not a ship at sea," Rousseau (1755/1997, p. 198) writes, "of which the loss would not be good news to some merchant or other." Rousseau's example does not imply a direct moral wrong, as the competing merchants are not assumed to have caused the rival's harm. Yet they *gloat* over it.

ii. *Tiny steps downward*. At the initial level the normative slope promoted malicious interpersonal *attitudes*, such as ill will and hostility. But now it encourages us to effectively *act* in ways that go against the widely shared rules of our everyday morality, particularly the golden rule (see Heath, 2014, pp. 95–103). This is, of course, the whole point of establishing and promoting competitive settings. Competitors are discouraged from cooperating with their rivals (by our anti-trust laws, for example), while defecting is rewarded, that is, winning out over others who come away empty handed. In competitive relations each competitor would be ill advised to ponder over whether she agreed if "others did unto her what she is doing unto them"; for example, by offering customers aggressive markdowns in order to take over the market share from competitors. Instead, competitors are expected to slash prices flat out and aggressively (because it is believed to be beneficial for the customers). In suspending the golden rule, market competition thus offers "limited 'moral immunity' from the norms of everyday morality" (Heath, 2014, p. 110). But this conferral of immunity not only involves the readiness to engage in aggressive price wars; competitors must also be prepared to put their rivals out of business. From a purely consequentialist first-person perspective, however, losing one's business because of competition is almost as harmful as losing it due to illegal actions. "When Tesco opens its new supermarket at the end of my road," as Wolff (1998, p. 84) puts it, "it will put many local traders out of business. What is the difference between that and theft or arson?" Note that, if Tesco is able to cut out the local trader, it can do so without having exchanged one word with its competitor. This is a fundamental difference from political competition. Here, the burdens that one group seeks to impose on others have to be thoroughly justified in a meticulous public debate. In market competition, however, justificatory practices are often not required, and to some degree, communicating with your rival is even legally prohibited (because collusion is suspected).

iii. *The slope gets subtly steeper*. On the next level of the normative slope, one supplier may begin to engage in thin exploitation, such as luring customers into buying superfluous products by employing misleading advertising strategies. Why is this initial step towards exploitation likely? Because the preceding stage of the normative slope already comprises some form of "deontic weakening" (Heath, 2014, p. 9), contributing to a lowering of the baseline of what is perceived as morally permissible. Hence, this step of a single actor engaging in thin exploitation appears only as a small deviance from the established standard. In addition, when coming under pressure to justify their behavior, the exploiters can easily seek refuge in the contractual form of market exchange. In fact, the form of contract almost invites actors to use it as some kind of a carte blanche (Falk & Szech, 2013). It fosters the belief that the mere adherence to the letter of the contract and legal regulation exonerates actors from claims to non-exploitation that stem from the underlying spirit of the legal rules or wider moral norms. This is all the more the case because, at this stage of the normative slope, we are dealing only with thin forms of exploitation that do not appear to be too morally problematic in each individual case.

So, on this level of the normative slope we can witness at least one actor being induced to seize the opportunity of thin exploitation. This action can easily function as a moral signal to other competitors, which may trigger a further shift in the established moral norms that will then make thin exploitation appear morally acceptable (Herzog, 2019). In addition, competitors are already pressurized by the exploitative edge of their rival, so that there is more than one reason for them to follow suit in embarking on strategies of thin exploitation. Once generalized, the systematicity of exploitation will then foster an atmosphere of double standards and cynicism, even if it is only thin exploitation at this stage.

iv. *Sloping downward more steeply*. Now actors increasingly no longer even shrink back from thicker forms of exploitation where more fundamental deontic principles are violated. Think of market actors actively searching the regulatory body for oversights and loopholes. The actors still do not break legal rules yet they take advantage of loopholes that are clearly at odds with the spirit of the law. Again, behavior on this level deviates only in minor ways from previous standards. But there is a normative shift: on the previous level the actors sought refuge behind the letter of the law only when coming under pressure to justify their behavior; now they begin to seek out aggressively gaps in the law. And, of course, in complex social systems, oversights and loopholes are inevitable (Heath, 2014, p. 112).

v. *The slope gets slippery*. But how does the level of exploitation go further downhill? To dirty exploitation, where legal rules are violated straight away? Let's begin with the assumption that every single competitor is at least decent enough to shy away from dirty exploitation. In that situation our "half-decent" suppliers may face one competitor winning a competitive advantage by offering, for example, meat at an exceptionally affordable price. Acting behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing the terms and conditions of their competitor's business methods, our half-decent suppliers cannot be certain if their competitor is playing by fair means or foul. Is the low price of the meat due to more cost-effective production? Or is it due to mixing rotten meat into the product? Under conditions of incomplete knowledge, and given the prevailing double standards and cynicism due to anti-cooperative competitiveness and some degree of exploitation, one of the half-decent suppliers may be tempted to conclude that the competitive advantage of their competitor can only be the result of foul play. She may have the opportunity to call in the regulatory authority to review the suspicious competitor. But perhaps this option is not readily available. Maybe the authorities are reacting too sluggishly; maybe the initial evidence is too thin; maybe our half-decent competitor even has reason to believe that the authorities are in cahoots with the alleged offender.

So our half-decent supplier assumes her competitor is engaging in dirty exploitation and then takes this supposition as an excuse to do what she alleges her competitor does. She starts with dirty exploitation, in this case, mixing rotten meat into her product. The point here is that autonomous self-commitment to moral norms is eroded when individuals deliberate and act in a social context characterized by deontic weakening and double standards, where other actors cannot be assumed with sufficient likelihood to be committed to moral conduct themselves. This idea is captured by what moral psychologists call "conditional cooperation" (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). When conditionally cooperating, actors are initially willing to commit to moral or cooperative norms but they defect from such norms if others are assumed to be defecting themselves.

Thus, the result on this level is an increased readiness to begin dirty exploitation. But then we are back to square one, only on a more exploitative level, where one competitor commences dirty exploitation but eventually pressurizes others to follow suit. Now we approach the level where it becomes evident why there are so many oil companies making a profit by risking immense ecological damage, why the car industry cheats on emission standards, or why the real-estate industry frequently uses illegal measures designed to force tenants out of their homes.

vi. *Hitting rock bottom*. Ultimately, at the lowest level of the normative slope we can observe a *systemic negligibility* of individual moral integrity. When actors are "locked in" (Mayer, 2007, p. 610) structural exploitation, with almost every competitor embarking on exploitative strategies, it is difficult for a single actor to refrain from competition all by herself. Every competitor has reason to assume that her isolated decision to quit her exploitative business would have almost no discernible effect on the established practice; others would quickly take over her place and continue these exploitative practices.

The normative slope shows that market competition structurally fosters systematic and significant practices of exploitation by eroding the ethos of market participants. Compare this with the ethical effects of the political forum, which, despite its competitive features, has an inherent tendency to improve the ethos of participants. It integrates everyone into a process of public deliberation, which structurally induces citizens to orient themselves toward the common good.[26] My overall argument does not, of course, amount to a normative justification of exploitative practices in the market. It is not a plea to let exploiters off the hook. On a normative plane, we may well have good reasons to argue that it is just and reasonable for a supplier, faced with the choice to exploit or vanish, to accept sizable losses of assets and income, a deprivation in social status, and the resort to social security aid. But such abstract normative arguments based on individuals' duty fail to take into account the importance of the socio-moral qualities (or deficiencies) of our institutionalized practices. This should not amount to a deterministic picture of human agency. It is a stylized argument that attempts to capture particular dispositions and dynamics that are offset, to some degree, by the counter-tendencies discussed above (see part 4). The normative slope certainly does not lead to complete moral nihilism. The image of a tug-of-war between the normative slope and counteracting tendencies is probably the most appropriate. But are there any further counter-tendencies to be taken into account?

6 | COUNTERACTING MORALITIES INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO THE MARKET

There are two additional counteracting tendencies that I now want to consider, one based on the inner morality of the market, the other on the surrounding external morality that may reshape the inner dynamic of the market. I will not deny that both tendencies are operative in the market but I shall demonstrate the limited power of both.

Let us first turn to the idea of an "implicit morality of the market," as recently elucidated by Heath (2014, p. 114). He contends that market competition itself provides a ratchet mechanism against pushing actors further down the normative slope. According to Heath, market competition is akin to competition in games and sports where some actions that would usually count as immoral in everyday life are exempted from moral blame. Think of bluffing in poker. In competitive games the partial immunity from everyday morality does not, however, dissolve the binding force of more basic moral norms. Despite the legitimacy of bluffing, the players know that marking cards, for example, is impermissible and usually act accordingly. In other words, even if a practice contains some deontic weakening this does not necessarily trigger downward-sloping effects. Heath argues that this is not only or not primarily due to the explicit articulation of the basic rules in our sports codes and their monitoring and sanctioning. It is, more importantly, because of the implicit morality of competition embodied in our practice of sports: the norm of good sportsmanship. Heath thinks that in market competition, too, the ideal of being something like a good sport can be invoked in order to prevent the exploitation of market failures, even while market competition exempts actors from certain everyday moral norms (Heath, 2014, pp. 104–113).

Yet, on closer inspection, Heath's argument, though brilliantly expounded, is flawed. He misjudges the fundamental difference between the moral dynamics of competition in competitive games and market competition. Compared with competition in games and sports, market competition pushes actors more strongly down on the normative slope from the very outset, while, subsequently, the next levels below unfold their pull more subtly, almost insidiously. Let us spell out these two claims separately.

First, why is the initial push down the slope in market competition stronger than in competitive games? To begin with, and as mentioned above, market competition typically involves high stakes, while competition in games and sports usually does not. This makes self-commitment to moral norms less likely in the former case. Witness that *when* competitive sports involve high stakes, norm erosion is rampant, evidenced by the ceaseless doping scandals in professional sports. In addition, games are voluntary while market competition is not. We can choose the game and decline to play at all, but most of us are compelled to earn a living. If participation is involuntary, then self-commitment to moral norms becomes even less likely—as it must be genuinely voluntary.[27] Finally, and most importantly, the morality of the initial levels of the normative slope is already much more adverse, compared with competitive games. As we saw above, immunity from everyday morality in market competition already implies on the second level of the slope ("Tiny steps downward") that competitors must be prepared to cause someone else's ruin. Certainly, competitive games are also uncooperative in the sense that one's own victory is the other's loss. But in market competition your winning out over others does not simply impose the dishonor of defeat on them, but grave existential costs. Market actors must be poised to inflict that harm on others without scruples. Thus, even at the earliest levels of the normative slope, actors are induced to partake in what psychologists call "moral disengagement" (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996, p. 364).

Second, why is the pull of the subsequent levels of the normative slope harder to resist than it is in competitive games? For a start, this is because of the greater moral ambivalence of the following levels of the slope, particularly its third level ("The slope gets subtly steeper"), compared with the greater normative clarity in games. This additionally undermines Heath's argument. Recall that on the third level of the slope market actors began to engage in thin exploitation by preying on the gullibility of customers. Now compare this to exploiting the clumsiness of one's adversary in soccer by nutmegging them: though somewhat humiliating, it is certainly legitimate. In contrast, playing handball in soccer is clearly impermissible. Is preying on the gullibility of customers more like nutmegging or more like handball? It is probably somewhere in between, but it is definitely not morally innocent. The problem is, however, that in the sphere of the market there are hardly any institutionalized channels for clarifying these gray areas: if actors wish to criticize certain market practices as exploitative, they typically have to turn to the political sphere. The claim here, of course, is not that there are no legal rules in the market that could provide the basis for legal action but that because of its complexity the market sphere is characterized by a much bigger normative gray area unregulated by explicit rules, than competitive games (explicit rules may be missing either because they have not yet been enacted or because they are undesirable or unfeasible to enact). But the case of preying on the gullibility of customers shows that the range of legally permissible actions is not morally innocent.

On the following levels of the normative slope engendered by market competition, the downward drift remains insidious. Each level implies only a small deviance from the previous standard, but each, step by step, shifts the baseline to lower levels of deontic commitment. Every single level appears like nothing but a small step, but each clearly vectors downward and eventually the actors end up in a social context that makes it difficult not to partake in grave moral wrongs.

So the conclusion is that the moral ratchet devices internal to the market and working against downward-sloping tendencies are much weaker than it seems. But what about moral resources external to the market? The external morality surrounding and reshaping the market is highlighted by the embeddedness approach mentioned in the introduction.[28] This approach notes that markets function well only by relying on the social stock of pre-market norms, such as a particular work ethic, trust, honesty, and a commitment to keep promises, which have to be nurtured by the social spheres surrounding the market, be it families, schools, or local communities. In the case of market failures that would otherwise provide an opportunity for exploitation, it is these social and moral norms, so it is argued, that may work against the exploitative pressures exerted by market competition.

This kind of argument is extremely important as a counterweight to the much too narrowly constructed idealizing models of perfect competition typically put forward by neoclassical theory. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the respective pre-market social norms may not only attenuate the practices of exploitation rather insignificantly, but they may in fact help to sustain and even exacerbate these very practices. Indeed, the normative slope engendered by market competition may be even more strongly downward sloping precisely *when* individuals are moral actors carrying significant normative dispositions and expectations into the market sphere, as opposed to assuming them to be cold-hearted, calculating maximizers of their own utility. The reason is that when there are in fact substantial normative expectations brought into the marketplace by the actors, then the moral dynamic engendered by market competition contributes to triggering a feeling of disappointment and betrayal, emotions that exacerbate the mistrust experienced in being exploited as well as the readiness to engage in exploitation oneself. Think of it in this way. It is like being in a prisoner's dilemma with someone who you previously trusted and helped; but right before the two of you were caught by the police and put into separate cells you found clues that your companion has gotten the better of you. In this case, the situation is significantly different from the standard form of the prisoner's dilemma, where the actors merely cannot be sufficiently sure if they can trust one another. In our case, the outsmarted actor has good reasons for her mistrust and feelings of resentment. The important issue is that these reactions are genuinely social. They are induced for the very reason that the actors had significant normative dispositions and expectations in the first place, which have then, subsequently, been disappointed and frustrated.

Hence, the result is that both the morality internal to the market and morality surrounding the market are likely to only feebly counteract the downward sloping tendency of market competition.

7 | CONCLUSION: RECONSTITUTING THE MARKET

The conclusion of the article is that market competition is not so much a means against exploitation as its structural cause. Exploitative dispositions may be part of human nature, and they are certainly also prevalent in many non-market contexts, but they are strongly fostered by market competition. This is because market competition confronts participants with the constant imperative to enhance their position, while simultaneously being compelled to put existential stakes at risk. The exploitative dynamic is aggravated by the normative slope constituted by market competition, pulling actors from competitive ill will to a suspension of basic moral norms to thin exploitation and then ever thicker forms of exploitation.

What does all this suggest in terms of institutional change? The focus of the article was critical and diagnostic, but the question of institutional remedies is surely crucial. If external regulation and pre-distributive strategies are insufficient, what else could we do? We should rethink our notion of what it could mean to reconstitute the market. It must mean more than the *distributive* reconstitution that Rawlsians have in mind—that is, more than (ex post) redistribution and (ex ante) pre-distribution. It must mean to transform the constitutive rules in such a way as to prevent the formation of exploitative dispositions from the outset, at least as much as possible. In other words, the action orientations and even the mindsets of market participants should be deliberately altered through institutional change. Thus, we should complement a distributive reconstitution of the market with a dispositional one. The reconstitution must include what Hegel calls the "ethical disposition."[29] If we follow the key insight guiding his notion of the ethical life, this is indispensable: our abstract macro-principles of justice and of political autonomy must be backed by our everyday institutions of social life, making these principles into binding social norms and fostering a vivid social ethos.[30] Economic practices and institutions nurture (or undermine) certain virtuous dispositions, particularly civic virtues, such as a republican sense for the common good, and more generally, moral virtues, such as our sense of justice. Exploitative dispositions, however, are detrimental to both our civic virtues in particular and moral virtues more generally.

The big question of what the dispositional reconstitution of the market requires in more detailed institutional terms must await another occasion. Candidates could be mandating the cooperative form of the business enterprise; institutionalizing an unconditional basic income; or regulating competition internally, with the help of egalitarian forms of associative democracy.[31] The important issue here is the broader goal: reconstituting the market must mean to alter the ethos of market participants in the medium of institutional change. Yet this deliberate attempt to change the action orientations and even mindsets of actors through institutional transformations is, of course, anathema to almost all liberal approaches.

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NOTES

[1] This is the core meaning of exploitation shared by many contemporary theories, despite a broad range of other differences. See, for example, Sample (2003); Goodin (1987); Wertheimer (1996); Vrousalis (2013). For an overview, see Vrousalis (2018).

[2] That procedural, non-consequentialist norm has been spelt out in various ways: as the duty to "protect the vulnerable" (Goodin, 1987, p. 167); or to refrain from "domination for self-enrichment" (Vrousalis, 2013, p. 131) or from interacting with others "for the sake of further advantage in a way that degrades the other person in virtue of her vulnerability" (Sample, 2003, p. 88); or as the duty to adhere to "the fundamental norm of fairness for voluntary exchange" (Christiano, 2016, p. 128).

[3] See on this example Zwolinski (2010).

[4] For such an approach, see Heath (2014). The use of the concept of market failures can even be misleading, as it easily creates the impression of referring to anomalies rather than standard cases. But the idealized market presupposed in large parts of neoclassical economic theory—the perfectly competitive market—only obtains in the "model platonism" of economic theory, hardly ever in the real world. Depending on the specific approach, the perfectly competitive market requires large number of sellers, no externalities, free entry and exit, perfect information, constant returns on scale, complete factor mobility, product homogeneity, no transaction costs, and self-interested actors with exogenous, well-ordered preferences (Blaug, 2001, pp. 37–48; Roberts, 1987). Roberts notes that "no important market fully satisfies the conditions of perfect competition and [. . .] most would not appear even to come close" (Roberts, 1987, p. 7622).

[5] On Hegel's virtue ethics see Herzog (2013). Hegel's concept of virtue is embedded in his theory of ethical life, or *Sittlichkeit*: Hegel (1821/2008, §§ 142–157). On the idea ethical life see Wood (1990: part IV). There is a somewhat misleading affinity here to Cohen (1991). It is misleading as his notion of ethos is non-Hegelian; rather, he attempts to "out-Kant" (Vrousalis, 2012, p. 148) even the most famous Kantian of contemporary political theory, that is, John Rawls. Cohen's ethos is supposed to be the complement to just social institutions on the part of individuals, while on my Hegelian (neo-Aristotelian) account, social institutions themselves must be structured so that they contribute to cultivating the adequate ethos of the individuals.

[6] There are anti-gouging laws in some US states but not others. See Zwolinski (2010).

[7] On this issue, see Charles Mills's (2005) important critique of ideal theory.

[8] Wertheimer (1996). On structural exploitation see Sample (2003, Chapter 4), Zwolinski (2012) and Wollner (2019).

[9] We do not love our children based on their competitive success for our love, and we do not usually see our friends as rivals in a contest; when playing music in an orchestra we do not strive with our fellow musicians but we collaborate in a joint activity; and when debating an argument in politics, it is not about struggling for victory but about getting it right. In each of these spheres, there are, of course, strong elements of competition, but they are not, or at least they should not be, at the center of each of these spheres or practices.

[10] It should be mentioned right away that Marx tended to view competition merely as a superficial "effect" of a deeper "cause"—the "immanent laws of capital" (Marx, 1861–1863/1991, p. 102). This is a problematic position for many reasons.

[11] Note, however, that this reveals why the above-mentioned strategy of manufacturing new desires and wishes has so much appeal to many suppliers.

[12] For an excellent examination of competitive pressures following Max Weber see Ulrich (2008, pp. 120–125).

[13] For a lucid analysis of this rat race logic see Neuhouser (2013, p. 205).

[14] Mayer (2007, p. 617). Of course, there are market niches that are relatively well safeguarded from competitive pressures; for example, some forms of local craft businesses. These niches depend, among others, on the level of entry costs, the stickiness of established customers, or the absence of economies of scale.

[15] This is even true for (most models of) a property-owning democracy, because one's material resources are sooner or later depleted, if not utilized in the market. Certainly, the welfare state often provides, to some extent, social security programs, but unless these social benefits are granted unconditionally, which until now they have never been, they are stigmatizing, patronizing, and often come with sanctions. On fear for one's material and social existence as a characteristic of market societies see also Cunningham (2005).

[16] This is one of the few Marxist arguments that I rely on (see also Meiksins Wood, 2013, pp. 47–48). But it does not depend on particularly demanding conceptual presuppositions that would require specialized Marxist knowledge.

[17] Certainly, the results of political competition affect the ways in which we secure our material and social existence in the market. For example, the winner of a political competition may impose harsh burdens on the loser, such as high taxes. But this requires economic incomes to be taxed in the first place. They must be generated in the economic sphere, rendering the stakes in market competition structurally higher than those of political competition.

[18] Heath (2014, pp. 112–113) conveys this point convincingly.

[19] For the case of information asymmetries see Gabaix and Laibson (2006). For the case of externalities see Coase (1960).

[20] See also Blaug (2001) and Roberts (1987).

[21] For this reason, I do not follow Miller (1989) and Wertheimer (1996) in employing the perfectly competitive market as a benchmark for non-exploitation.

[22] See Roberts (1987). For information asymmetries see Gabaix and Laibson (2006). For externalities see Hahnel and Sheeran (2009).

[23] See Frank (2011).

[24] I am indebted to Lisa Herzog's analysis of "cultural slopes" (Herzog, 2019).

[25] "Competitive institutions," in Hussain's (2018, p. 570) words, "put people in situations where they must undermine one another as a necessary side effect of their pursuit of their own aspirations."

[26] As Elster (1997, p. 12) puts it: "the conceptual impossibility of expressing selfish arguments in a debate about the public good, and the psychological difficulty of expressing other-regarding preferences without ultimately coming to acquire them, jointly bring it about that public discussion tends to promote the common good." Note that this is an argument on the level of the social ontology of democracy. Of course, representative democracy in its empirically existing form has many built-in features that heavily distort the social-ontological kernel of deliberation. In contrast, the market implies exploitative tendencies already in its kernel—because, for example, contractual exchanges permit, and even induce, the disregard for the harms it generates in relation to third parties.

[27] See Jütten (2016) for a further elaboration on these arguments.

[28] For a recent philosophical re-articulation of this idea see Honneth (2014, pp. 178–197) and Herzog (2016).

[29] Hegel (1821/2008, § 207). For a systematic reconstruction see Novakovic (2017, pp. 44–56).

[30] Hegel (1821/2008, §§ 142–157). For a recent non-Hegelian account broadly in line with my approach see Bowles (2016).

[31] On cooperative ownership see Elster (1989); on basic income see Van der Veen and Van Parijs (1986); on associative democracy see Cohen and Rogers (1995). For further reflections see Kuch (2016).

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