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Having “Banks Play Along”

Varieties of State-Bank Coordination and State-Guaranteed Credit Programs during the COVID-19 Crisis

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*“Banks play along,
although we ask them to distribute a product of general interest,
which is not their natural mission”*

Nicolas Dufourcq, General Manager of BPI France²

In times of crisis, governments have strong incentives to influence banks’ credit allocation because the survival of the economy depends on it. How do governments make banks “play along”? This paper focuses on the state-guaranteed credit programs (SGCPs) that have been implemented in Europe to help firms survive the COVID 19 crisis. Governments’ capacity to save the economy depends on banks’ capacity to grant credit to struggling firms (which they would not be inclined to do spontaneously in the context of a global pandemic). All governments thus face the same challenge: How do they make sure that state guaranteed loans reach their desired target and on what terms? Based on a comparative analysis of the elaboration and implementation of SGCPs in France and Germany, this paper shows that historically-rooted institutionalized modes of coordination between state and bank actors have largely shaped the terms of the SGCPs in these two countries.

Key words: state; banks; infrastructural power; institutions; COVID-19

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² Agefi Actifs, 22 April 2020, *Les banques françaises ont accordé près de 40 milliards d’euros de prêts garantis.*

1. Introduction

Political economists have long been interested in the many ways in which banks may influence public authorities. The matter of how states may influence banks has received much less attention. Yet, banks are key players in the process of allocating resources to society and governments have strong incentives to influence this process, especially in times of crisis. Governments need to go through the banking system when they want to increase the provision of credit to struggling firms. How do public officials try and make profit-oriented banks comply when the latter are reluctant to do so?

The state-guaranteed credit programs (SGCPs) implemented by the French and the German governments in the context of the COVID 19 crisis provides a good opportunity to explore this question.

Building on a comparative process analysis of the elaboration and implementations of SGCPs in France and Germany, this paper argues that the capacity of state officials to make banks “play along” largely relies on institutionalized modes of coordination that they typically apply to their national banking community. When state-bank coordination is characterized by mutual trust among a small number of socially homogeneous groups used to cooperating closely with each other (like in France), state officials seek to involve bankers in the elaboration of programs, and thus favor collectively crafted compromises if and when tensions arise. When state-bank coordination is more at arm’s length (like in Germany), state officials resort to straightforward incentives (for example higher fees for processing state-guaranteed loans) and pressures (for example naming and shaming banks for not supporting the economy in times of crisis) to persuade banks to comply.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section (Section 2) examines the tensions arising from the structural interdependencies between banks and states, and it argues that these tensions are resolved differently across political economies depending on the institutionalized state-bank mode of coordination to which they are accustomed. Section 3 describes the tensions emanating from having banks fulfill a public service (providing liquidity to struggling firms) in the specific context of the SGCPs. Thereafter, Section 4 depicts the different terms of the SGCPs in France and Germany.

Based on an extensive examination of media sources, Section 5 then shows that the different terms of state-guaranteed programs have been shaped by historically-rooted modes of coordination between bankers and state officials in France and Germany. In France, traditional mechanisms of smooth coordination between state and bank elites has led to the collective elaboration of the SGCP and to the resolution of tensions “*with mutual understanding*.”³ In the context of a relationship conceived by both sets of actors as a long-term exchange of mutual favors, the French SGCP’s terms have been relatively beneficial for the State: the French government did not have to increase the state guarantee when problems in the credit transmission channels arose. Banks also committed to making no profit from the program and priced credit at cost price. In Germany, arm’s length coordination between banks and the State led state officials to elaborate the SGCP autonomously without bankers’ input, and to make use of different incentives and to apply different forms of pressure to have banks increase their credit allocation to struggling German firms. Banks received a fee for each loan processed and government officials did not hesitate in naming and shaming banks for not supporting the economy in the press. However, this strategy did not work particularly well in addressing the problems in the credit transmission channels. Indeed, the German government eventually (and reluctantly) had to increase the state guarantee to 100% to convince banks to “play along.”

2. Infrastructural power relations between banks and states

The explicit objective of SGCPs is to make liquidity available to firms in order for them to survive a period where the economy has *de facto* been put to a stop due to the measures taken to manage the global crisis. On paper, the functioning of state-guaranteed credit is simple: firms borrow from their house bank, but in the event that they are not able to repay their loans, the State steps in and reimburses it on their behalf. Rather than the bank, it is the State and eventually the taxpayers that bear all or the majority (depending on the specifics of the program) of the credit risk. More specifically, credit guarantees are granted by national development banks, whose growing role in the economy has recently been underlined (Mertens and Thiemann 2019).

³ French Minister of the Economy and Finance Bruno Lemaire, quoted in *Figaro Premium*, 1 April 2020, Les banques jouent-elles le jeu du crédit aux entreprises ?

The logic behind SGCPs is also relatively simple. Banks are private firms whose business models consist of (among other things) issuing loans. It is their job to assess, price and bear the credit risk. Yet, in the context of a global pandemic, with low visibility in terms of economic recovery in the short- to medium-term, banks would either not grant any credit at all, or they would charge excessively for doing so. From a strictly commercial point of view, banks have no interest in granting credit. Yet, struggling firms need to have access to liquidity or the whole economy would collapse. As a consequence, the State removes the credit risk so that banks do actually grant loans to firms. Banks are thus requested to serve a function of public interest that pertains to crisis management on behalf of the State.

SGCPs reveal the intrinsic structural interdependencies between banks and states in capitalist political economies (Gerschenkron 1962; Chaudhry 1993; Mügge 2010; Braun and Gabor 2019).

States need banks because they are the only actors that have the infrastructural capacity to allocate funds efficiently to the real economy. This is true in Europe, where firms are financed mostly through bank credit, and this is *especially* true for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are the main targets of these programs. This aspect of the relationship between banks and states has been extensively examined by the recent scholarship on the structural power of banks in the context of post-crisis financial reforms (Moschella and Tsingou 2013; Culpepper and Reinke 2014; Culpepper 2015; Bell and Hindmoor 2017; Pagliari and Young 2017; Keller 2018; Macartney et al. 2020). The literature in this area has shown how banks' unique capacity to threaten to dry-up the flows of liquidity to the economy puts them in a "privileged position" to influence or capture public officials and policymaking processes (Lindblom 1983). Banks can also bring liquidity to firms while minimizing the costs of doing so for states, since only the loans that eventually default will actually be written down in states' budgets.

Conversely, banks need the State too: the fiscal capacity of taxpayers is unique in its ability to take on the responsibility of keeping their debtors (private firms) alive. Indeed, despite the transformations in banks' business models making them more dependent on strictly financialized channels of profit-making, they are still, *in fine*, reliant on the health of the real economy (Hardie et al. 2013). Banks are also dependent on governments' regulatory power and, ultimately, their possible capacity to provide fiscal support to them when they get into trouble (Moss 2004; Woll 2014).

However, such interdependency does not mean that the interests of states and banks are aligned. On the contrary, there are significant tensions that arise from this situation of interdependency between two sets of actors with different interests. With the massive provision of state-guaranteed loans to businesses, the objective of the government is to keep firms afloat and to maximize access to credit at a lower cost to itself. Banks are, for the most part, private enterprises which aim to maximize profits through their activities, carrying the lowest risk possible. How do the aforementioned tensions affect the allocation of state-guaranteed credit? Who out of the banks or the State does *in fine* make the decisions on allocation? Against what criteria are such decisions made? The answers to these three questions are not automatic. They depend on the institutional arrangements between the relevant governments, banks, businesses and civil society and they take on different forms from one country to the next with respect to regulatory provisions, informal agreements, and methods to exert pressure.

It is thus important to examine the different institutional arrangements in place in different political economies in order to address tensions that arise from the profit-oriented status of the banks and the public function assigned to them under the SGCPs. The issue drives to the heart of the debates on the infrastructural relations of power between the State and the financial sector (Mann 1994; Braun 2017). It is generally assumed that advanced democracies have an ample state capacity. Preventing a virus from destroying the whole economy is an important test of such capacity. It is thus no wonder that governments across the world have taken dramatic action to both manage the crisis and sustain the economy: doing otherwise would be indicative of a failed state⁴. But governments need banks to mobilize this capacity because, in contemporary advanced political economies, only banks have the infrastructure to allow liquidity to reach millions of small firms. The crucial question here is thus similar to the one asked by John Zysman in his seminal work: “how does the structure of finance contribute to the state’s capacity to act in the economy?” (Zysman, 1983, p298).

After several decades of convergence in banks’ business models towards globalized market-based banking (Aglietta and Breton 2001; Hardie et al. 2013), it has become clear that the capacity of a state to act on the economy is not just a function of the actual structure of the financial system, but it also involves the institutionalized modes of coordination between bankers and state officials. Infrastructural power relations between banks and states do not encapsulate the complexity of their relationships and they must be analyzed in the context of a

⁴ The controversial action of the US government on both accounts has led some to qualify it as a failed state (cf. Packer. 2020. *We are living in a failed state*. The Atlantic)

specific political economy of institutionalized relationships between different actors. In other words, the typical modes of coordination between bankers and state officials in a given political economy will affect the outcomes of the infrastructural power struggle between banks and states.

3. The tensions at the heart of SGCPs

Why do states choose to use banks to provide liquidity to millions of firms severely hit by the effects of the management of the crisis? There are several good reasons for doing so.

The first reason pertains to the two-tiered belief widely shared between public and private policymakers according to which: 1) even in times of a global pandemic, the allocation of funds should be efficient (meaning that these should not be used to save firms that would not have survived anyway); and 2) only the private sector is capable of deciphering which firms are fit to survive and which are so-called lame ducks. In the context of a global pandemic, the objective is to ensure that the majority of firms survive the crisis. Yet, banks should be able to detect zombie firms preying on opportunistic loans. Governments have thus been keen to maintain some participation of the banks in state-guaranteed loans – typically they would retain 10% of the credit risk, with the other 90% borne by the State (we'll see why some eventually decided to offer a 100% guarantee in the next section).

The second and third reasons are more pragmatic. The second reason is that SGCPs provide a route through which to funnel huge amounts of liquidity into the economy without excessively burdening the state budget. Indeed, the loans are supposed to be repaid. Only the risk of default is measured in the government deficit, and only the loans that do actually default will concretize into real deficit. The third reason is that banks have the logistical capacity to allow them to reach millions of firms. States are *de facto* not able to fulfil such a task. The institutions that once could have been used to do this in certain countries like the National Credit Council France are long gone (Zysman 1983). Today, states lack the logistical resources and the legal grounds to allocate private credit directly to firms.

There are thus good reasons for states to use banks to perform the public service of helping firms to survive the crisis. Yet, banks are also largely private and profit-maximizing firms and this leads to some tensions in the process of granting state-guaranteed credit.

Even if they take only a small amount of the risk, banks proceed under two sets of constraints. First, they are subject to capital ratio requirements that they calculate according to the risk of their assets (although these requirements have been significantly reduced during the crisis (BIS 2020, ECB 2020)). Second, they are supposed to make money out of loans. They thus may deem the risk of granting credit to struggling firms too costly, even with a 90% state guarantee. On the other hand, for those firms that are doing well, state-guaranteed loans may be competitive with the banks' own products, which they could price higher.

Banks may be prone to favoring large firms for different reasons: large firms apply for bigger and more profitable loans; and large firms typically benefit from a smaller state guarantee (70% or 80%), so banks can price the risk on a bigger proportion of the loan. Due to a mixture of commercial motivations including but also going well beyond the reasons mentioned immediately above, banks may also be tempted to privilege some firms over others in their access to state-guaranteed credit (e.g. their wealthiest or oldest clients). Differences and biases in banks' decisions on state-guaranteed credit may worsen social or territorial inequalities regarding the capacity of firms to survive the crisis. Finally, the process of assessing the company's financial data before deciding whether to grant it a loan or not may take too long for firms requiring liquidity immediately to meet their cash management needs.

How do governments try and resolve the tensions that inevitably arise from having banks fulfill a mission of public interest?

4. Varieties of SGCPs: the cases of France and Germany

Throughout the COVID 19 crisis, the European Commission adopted a series of measures to relax state aid rules in order to allow governments to help businesses through the crisis. These measures have been quite ambitious and the capacity to grant state aid has been increasing every week. On April 3, EU Member States were permitted to give guarantees on loans covering 100% of the risk for loans of up to €800,000 per firm. For loans exceeding €800,000, Member States are allowed to provide guarantees covering 90% of the risk. The amount of the loan cannot exceed 25% of the firm's annual turnover for 2019 or twice the cost of its personnel. This type of loans shall be granted before 31 December 2020 and cannot benefit firms which were already in difficulty as at December 2019 (Mertens and Thiemann 2020).

There is thus a European legal framework regarding the SGCPs implemented by Member States. Yet, as shown in table 1, governments retain important leeway on different key

dimensions of the programs. For example, the proportion of the loan guaranteed by the State is different in France and Germany. For SMEs, the French state guarantees 90% of the loan. Likewise, the German government also guaranteed 90% of the loans when the program was launched in March. However, this changed on April 7 when it decided to increase its guarantee to 100% for some of these loans. The mode and level of remuneration of banks in return for allocating state-guaranteed loans also varies. In France, banks committed (although this is not legally binding) to price the loans at cost price – thereby committing to not making any profit out of the program. A guarantee premium is payable directly to the BPI by the borrower. In Germany, the State fixed the interest rate to 3% - payable to the KfW. Banks are to receive a fee of €1000 per loan granted plus a 0.2% fee per year calculated on the total amount of the loan (payable by the State). The conditions are thus apparently less advantageous for French banks, and more advantageous for their German counterparts. The latter indeed bear none of the risk (compared to 10% in France) and are remunerated more than their French counterparts.

Based on an analysis of the elaboration and adjustment of the SGCPs in France and Germany, the next section shows that these disparate outcomes result from the ability of state and bank actors to tackle the tensions that inevitably surface from having banks fulfill a public service through typical institutionalized modes of coordination.

Table 1: terms of SGCPs in France and Germany

	Total amount of state's guarantee	Nat' dev' bank	Proportion of loan guaranteed by state (small firms)	Payment	Interest rate	Price of guarantee	Banks' fees	Refusal rates
France	€300 bn	BPI	<p>SMEs and ETIs: 90%.</p> <p>Large firms: 70 to 80% (but exception for Air France: 90%)</p>	<p>One year without redemption.</p> <p>Option to extend redemption over 5 years</p>	<p>SMEs and ETIs: commitment of banks to apply "cost price"</p> <p>Large firms: idem</p>	<p>SME: 0.25% for the first year, then 0.5% and 1%.</p> <p>ETI: 0.5% for first year then 1% and 2%</p> <p>Large firms: 0.5% first year, then 1% and 2%</p>	None	2-3%
Germany	€822 bn (increased from €460 bn)	KfW	<p>SMEs and ETIs: 100% (increased from 90%)</p> <p>Large firms: 80%</p>	<p>Option of two years without redemption.</p> <p>Option to extend redemption over 10 years</p>	<p>SMEs and ETIs 100% guaranteed loans: 3% (fixed, proceeds go to KfW).</p> <p>For the other loans, Hausbank sets the interest rate (proceeds go to banks for non-guaranteed amounts)</p>	None	<p>SMEs and ETIs: €1000 per application + 0.2% of loan amount per year</p>	2-3%

5. How institutionalized modes of state-bank coordination shaped SGCPs in France and Germany

The analysis of the elaboration of SGCPs in France and Germany as reported by multiple media sources shows that institutionalized modes of coordination between state and bank actors have largely shaped the terms of these programs. The specific terms of the programs cannot be explained by the infrastructural power of banks only (which is characteristic of all capitalist societies, including France and Germany). Instead, we need to examine how infrastructural power relations between state and bank actors are deployed through typical institutionalized modes of coordination between those actors.

France: an institutionalized symbiotic mode of coordination leads to tensions being resolved in a collaborative way

The French retail banking market is heavily dominated by the five leading banks - BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, BPCE, and Crédit Mutuel - which make up around 90% of the domestic market share. Although it has more than 500 members, the French Banking Federation (FBF) is dominated by these five banks, which are all members of its Executive Council. The President of the FBF is always chosen from the ranks of the management of these large groups and presides over weekly meetings among the banks' top executives. These traditional and regular meetings allow them to raise individual issues and settle possible conflicts among themselves (Coleman 1994; Massoc 2020).

During the elaboration of the SGCP, Frédéric Oudéa, CEO of Société Générale and President of the FBF, has been able to coordinate positions among French banks, to speak on their behalf, and to be the privileged interlocutor of the French government. For the SGCP to succeed, coordination among banks is essential. A lack of a common plan of action may quickly lead to banks engaging in competitive behavior, seeking to attract "better" loans and avoid riskier ones. In such a context, a bank "playing the game" by granting credit to smaller or more fragile firms could find itself penalized. More generally, uncertainty about the behavior of other banks may lead banks to refrain from granting credit generously.

The situation here is similar to the public banking bailouts in 2008. In the context of a liquidity crisis where all banks did not know about the solvency situation of other banks, accepting a state bailout was considered an explicit recognition of a bank being in difficulty. Therefore,

many banks preferred to avoid the stigmatization of being bailed out, sometimes at the price of delaying needed recapitalization and mitigating further difficulties. In contrast, accepting a collective bailout would have avoided any such stigmatization for more fragile banks that would have needed it anyway, while improving the situation of those that may have been able to survive the crisis without the aid. In France, banks were able to accept a collective state bailout because cooperation in the French banking community is a well-oiled mechanism that fosters trust and ensures that defection is limited (Jabko and Massoc 2012; Woll 2014).

There is some evidence that this typical coordination between bankers resurfaced during the elaboration and implementation of the state-guaranteed program. The FBF President Oudéa is the only banker who speaks publicly about the SGCP on behalf of the whole French banking community, and while doing so he often stands alongside the Minister of Finance and the General Director of the BPI in press conferences. An executive director of the BPI admitted that “[she] see[s] that banks are organizing themselves so that they each take their part in the program.”⁵ A journalist at *Les Echos Business*, a specialized outlet, wrote that “banks have agreed among themselves that these loans would not be a tool for commercial prospection.”⁶

The French political economy is also characterized by close coordination between top bank executives and government officials, especially the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (*Bercy*) and its bureaucrats at the Treasury. The prevalence of proximity among elites in this country has repeatedly been underlined by French scholars, often when exploring how banks have “captured” government policies (Bourdieu 1996; Dudouet and Gremont 2010; Véron 2007). Yet, such mechanisms of social capture also work the other way around. French bankers are indeed more prone than their European counterparts to help out state officials should the need arise (Massoc forthcoming). Government officials and bankers are able to agree on policymaking processes because they belong to a small elite group in which social interactions are governed by powerful norms of cooperation and reciprocal favors in the face of adversity. In their study of the French banking bailout, Jabko and Massoc emphasized the role of this “informal consortium” which “fostered organic solidarity [between state officials and bankers] in the face of a crisis ” (Jabko and Massoc 2012, p563).

⁵ Anne Guérin, BPI executive director in charge of financing and network, *Banque Expert*, 22 April 2020, Les banques s’organisent pour prendre chacune leur part du PGE.

⁶ Yves Vilaginés quoted *Les Echos Business*, 6 April 2020, Prêt garanti par l’Etat : l’enthousiasme des entreprises douché par la prudence des banques.

This institutionalized mode of coordination between French bankers and state officials allowed them to start composing a plan that would be acceptable for both sets of actors very soon after the first crisis-related measures were decided upon. The General Director of the BPI, Nicolas Dufourcq, shared his recollection about the elaboration of the French SGCP:

“As soon as the confinement was decided and that it meant closing non-essential businesses, there was immediately a meeting between the FBF and the Ministry of Finance in order to elaborate a plan that would permit to consent massive guarantees to French firms over credits distributed by the whole networks of private banks as well as BPI France.”⁷

On 24 March 2020, the French SGCP was publicly announced during a press conference organized collectively by the BPI, Bercy and the FBF. The press conference outlined the collective agreement and commitment of both public and private actors to cooperate in fighting the crisis by providing firms the liquidity they needed. Frédéric Oudéa of the FBF emphasized the commonality of the plan while presenting it: “By combining State resources with our own, we will be able to convey the right solutions to businesses struggling during this unprecedented crisis. French banks are and will remain by their side!” (Ministère de l’Economie et al. 2020). The President of the FBF also made a commitment “on behalf of the French banking community” that French banks will not benefit from the state-guaranteed loans⁸. This means that banks apply an interest rate equivalent to the cost price of the credit, (i.e. what it costs for them to finance the loan – usually fixed by the interbank market interest rates, which are today very low due to the liquidity support programs to banks implemented by the European Central Bank). Thus, a state-guaranteed loan should be almost free for the firm receiving it, besides the risk premium that is to be paid to the BPI.

However, shortly after the launching of the program, problems in the transmission channels of the SGCP appeared. SMEs’ representatives complained that some firms were being denied the loan, or that some banks sought to apply unacceptable conditions to grant a loan (such as a collateral requirement or high processing fees). Banks were accused of being reluctant to bear the 10% risk on loans for firms on which they had very low visibility. Accessing liquidity was

⁷ Nicolas Dufourcq quoted in *Paris Normandie*, 22 April 2020, Covid-19. Les Prêts garantis de l’État (PGE) : faire traverser le fleuve à un maximum d’entreprises.

⁸ Bruno Lemaire quoted in *AGEFI Actifs*, 25 March 2020.

particularly difficult for small firms, firms in sectors heavily impacted by the crisis, as well as firms whose financial condition was fragile before the crisis. Subsequently, applications to the credit mediation, an institution attached to the French central bank (created in 2008) to help firms to resolve issues they may encounter with their bank, increased dramatically⁹.

As we will see in the next section, when confronted by similar issues of transmission, the German government decided to increase the state guarantee from 90% to 100% for small firms to convince banks to lend to them. Why did the French government not resort to the same option? France has arguably less fiscal leeway than Germany, yet Italy, with less fiscal leeway than France, also opted for the 100% state guarantee. Simply put, French state officials opted against increasing the public guarantee to 100% because they did not need to. They quickly reached out to top French bankers to find collaborative ways to address arising conflicts. Minister of the Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire said that his team was working “*with mutual understanding*” with the FBF to understand what was going wrong and to find solutions. Banks’ representatives explained that the difficulties in obtaining loans were due to misunderstandings on the ground from councilors who had to adapt very quickly to the SGCP and were not necessarily aware of the possibility to grant loans and accept risk significantly more generously than usual. Now, these mistakes would not happen again.”¹⁰ Meanwhile, all French public officials, at Bercy, at the BPI and at the French central bank, praised the banks for “*playing along*.”¹¹

This collaborative approach contrasts with the more conflicting and critical approach taken by the German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, Peter Altmaier, towards banks when problems regarding credit transmission arose.

⁹ AGEFI Quotidien, 15 April 2020, La médiation du crédit croule sous les demandes ; Banque Express, 16 April 2020, Les Banques doivent passer au-delà de leurs réflexes traditionnels ; Echos Business, 6 April 2020, L’enthousiasme des entreprises douché par la prudence des banques ;

¹⁰ Anonymous banker quoted in Figaro Premium, 1 April 2020, Les banques jouent-elles le jeu du crédit aux entreprises ?

¹¹ Bruno Lemaire, Minister of the Economy, AFP 27 April 2020, Coronavirus: les banquiers tentent de colmater les brèches à coup de prêts garantis; Francois Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France, Figaro Premium, 1 April 2020, Les banques jouent-elles le jeu du crédit aux entreprises ?; Nicolas Dufourcq, General Manager of the BPI, AGEFI Quotidien, 22 April 2020, Les banques françaises ont accordé près de 40 milliards d’euros de prêts garantis.

Germany: arm-length coordination between bankers and government officials led to greater involvement of the State

Germany is characterized by its three-pillar banking system consisting of: private banks (for example Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank – the largest two German commercial banks); cooperative banks (*Genossenschaftsbanken*); and public banks (including the network of small savings banks (*Sparkassen*) and their central state banks (*Landesbanken*)). Each of these groups has its own representative association. German banks are not only separated legally and politically, but also socially. The top German bankers are strikingly more numerous and more diverse than their French counterparts, having different educational backgrounds, banking cultures, and even nationalities. At Deutsche Bank, executives are often non-German nationals and have been educated abroad, mostly in Anglo-American universities. Meanwhile, at Landesbanken, members of the executive boards are almost exclusively German and educated in Germany (Choulet 2016; Massoc forthcoming).

German bankers thus lack the institutions that would allow for tight and quick coordination and each bank could not predict with any degree of certainty the behavior of its counterparts. In this context, it is difficult to even temporarily sideline competitive behavior within the banking sector. Banks may fear being penalized if they “play along” while other banks adopt more self-interested practices instead. During its management of the 2008 crisis, the German government was in favor of a collective banking bailout. Yet, it proved impossible to get all banks on board. The saving banks claimed that they had no responsibility for the crisis and that they did not want to be associated with the banks who were responsible for it. Some larger banks, like Deutsche Bank, claimed that they could survive the crisis without public support and refused to be bailed out and face the inevitable stigma attached to doing so. The German management of the banking crisis was thus characterized by individual bailouts that ended up being costly for taxpayers (Woll 2014; Culpepper and Reinke 2015).

Typical relations between banks and the federal government are also quite different from the French reality as depicted in the previous section. In Germany, successive federal governments, regardless of which party held a majority, have consistently considered since the 1980s that it was crucial for an economic power like Germany to have its own national champion. Deutsche Bank in particular is considered as a ‘jewel of the crown’ by German state officials (Deeg 2003,

Admati and Hellwig 2014; Mitchell 2016). Treasury officials, the Minister of Finance, and even the Chancellor can be accessed so easily by Deutsche Bank's top executives that observers have dubbed the bank "the state within the state."¹² Yet, the decentralized and fragmented organization of both German banks and the German government, as well as the relatively loose sociological proximity between federal government and commercial bank elites, does not foster the same informal government-banks institutional linkages as in France. On the other hand, public-sector banks entertain very narrow links with federal states' (Lander) politicians, but they maintain an attitude of general defiance vis-à-vis the central government (Deeg 1993; Choulet 2016).

During the different phases of elaboration and implementation of the German SGCP, public actors acted mostly unilaterally, including when problems regarding the transmission channels of credit arose.

Interestingly, and in contrast with France where the FBF was present from the outset, the press conference to announce the launch of the German SGCP on 23 March 2020 was held collectively by all public actors involved: the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the national development bank (KfW). While the wording at the corresponding conference in France emphasized the joint efforts of the State and the banks, in Germany the emphasis was placed on the joint efforts of the State and the KfW. Minister of Finance, Olaf Scholz, declared:

*"Together with KfW we are ensuring that companies remain solvent even during the crisis. To this end we are also leveraging the enormous financial strength of our government. The German government will provide the necessary guarantee volumes for KfW."*¹³

At the beginning of March, state officials considered it essential that banks remain autonomous in the process of credit allocation and that they thus should retain a part of the risk. Although typical German ordo-liberalism recognizes the importance of the role of the State to maintain the institutions and order necessary for economic freedom (Bonefeld 2012), there is a widely shared distrust among German policymakers regarding the direct involvement of the State in

¹² Interview with the author, European banking lobbyist, 4 May 2015, Brussels.

¹³ German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz quoted in BMWi et al. (2020).

the economy as well as a shared belief that private economic actors should be trusted with economic decisions, rather than the State. The declaration of KfW spokesman Wolfram Schweickhardt illustrated this point of view quite well: “A credit risk assessment is essential. We support companies in difficulties although we are not allowed to do so normally. That’s why a part of the risk still has to remain within the house bank.”¹⁴ The original German SGCP thus provisioned a state guarantee of 90%.

German banks promptly declared that they would stand ready to participate in the program along with the KfW¹⁵. Yet, they soon started to complain about the contradictory implications of the program. Although one may think that most private actors would agree with the principle according to which banks should remain as autonomous as possible from the State, German bankers were quick to highlight the paradox of pushing them to grant as much credit as possible and at the same time pressing them to keep doing their job as usual (i.e. evaluating and pricing the risk). As long as they were supposed to retain a part of the risk, they could not help many companies facing difficulties or businesses in sectors strongly impacted by the crisis. Marija Kolak, the President of the National Association of German Cooperative Banks (BVR), explained: “Banks cannot disregard the requirements of the supervisory authorities or their commercial diligence.”¹⁶ In public outlets, German bankers started to call for more comprehensive measures to support firms, including measures that would go beyond liquidity provisions, as well as the increase to a 100% state guarantee¹⁷.

Bankers’ demands were only intensified by the credit transmission problems that quickly surfaced. SMEs’ representatives in particular stressed the difficulties being faced by many firms in accessing the SGCP. The role of banks in denying them credit was often underlined in the press. Eric Schweitzer, President of the German Trade Association (DIHK), explained that as long as the banks remained responsible for 10% of the risk, credit approval would take too long, and too many firms would be denied credit, including from savings banks. He also expressed concerns about alleged bad practices of banks charging a provision fee from

¹⁴ Wolfram Schweickhardt, quoted in Kieler Nachrichten, 2 April 2020, Hohe Hürden bremsen Corona-Kredite.

¹⁵ See Reuters, 18 March 2020, KfW und Banken stehen in Startlöchern für Notfallkredite.

¹⁶ Marija Kolak quoted in DK (2020).

¹⁷ See Reuters, 18 March 2020, KfW und Banken stehen in Startlöchern für Notfallkredite; Handelsblatt, 30 March 2020, Helmut Schleweis im Interview; Sparkassen-Präsident warnt: Viele Unternehmen bekommen keine Förderkredite

companies for the loan or setting a higher interest rate than the one set by the KfW¹⁸. The German government was thus under multiple sources of pressure from banks and SMEs in the weeks that followed the implementation of the SGCP to increase the state guarantee and to enhance the State's involvement more generally.

The reaction of the German government to problems arising in the transmission channels of state-guaranteed credit was to publicly state its dissatisfaction towards banks' handling of the program. Minister Peter Altmaier expressed his discontent towards banks¹⁹. Finance Minister Scholz stated: "Every bank employee should be aware that this is now a great, joint, national effort, which is necessary, and thus they should take a more relaxed view of things when deciding to grant credit or not."²⁰ Meanwhile, the managerial team of the KfW explicitly opposed the demands made by banks to increase the state guarantee to 100%: "Our program is a credit program and not a grant program. It is very important that the banks maintain some of the liability" (26/03/2020, Reuters). A similar stance was taken by Bundesbank, whose executive team insisted that it was the economic task of banks to grant loans and bear the associated risks, and that they should stand ready to accept their responsibilities, particularly in difficult times²¹.

Yet, it soon appeared that publicly voiced discontent of public actors towards banks and their explicit insistence that banks take some part of the risk was not having the effect of improving the scope of liquidity provision to struggling German firms. On 6 April 2020, the German government thus announced an important modification to the SGCP: the State took on the full risk for all credit granted to SMEs. This 100% state guarantee was intended to create a practice of banks' granting so-called "instant loans".

The banks were satisfied by the change and committed to alter their behavior, thus confirming that they would grant more credit conditional on this 100% guarantee. The President of the German Savings Banks Association (DSGV), Helmut Schleweis, declared: "the program will

¹⁸ See Handelsblatt 20 March 2020, Hilfsprogramme; Coronakrise: Wie kommen Unternehmen an die staatlichen Hilfen? ; Spiegel Online 25 March 2020, Handel warnt vor massenhaften Pleiten; Business Insider, 30 March 2020, Mittelständler sauer auf Hausbanken wegen Vergabe von KfW-Krediten.

¹⁹ Focus Online, 31 March 2020, Corona-Kredite nur auf eigenes Risiko; Altmaiers Nothilfe stockt: Wie Banken Unternehmer in der Krise hängen lassen; Rheinische Post, 6 April 2020, Bafin nimmt die Banken in Schutz

²⁰ Börse Online, 31 March 2020.

²¹ Focus Online, 9 April 2020, Bundesbank-Vorstand: Krise wird an den Banken nicht spurlos vorbeigehen.

make it possible to grant loans to companies quickly and in an unbureaucratic way and also considers those companies whose loan applications have been refused under the “old” KfW programs.”²²Christian Ossig, Chief Executive of the Association of German commercial banks’ agreed that “the new KfW program makes it possible that much more people can use the KfW credit program.”²³

6. Conclusion

Preventing a virus from destroying the whole economy is an important test of state capacity. Indeed, governments have had to make liquidity quickly available to firms in order for them to survive a period in which the economy has *de facto* been put to a stop due to the restrictive measures taken in response to the global pandemic. However, governments need banks’ assistance in this regard. After all, it is only banks which have the infrastructure in place to permit liquidity to reach millions of small firms. Today, governments lack the legal tools to decide for themselves about the allocation of private credit, even when the risk of this credit is borne by the State. But banks are also firms whose job it is to evaluate and price the risk of credit. From a commercial point of view, no banks would grant cheap credit in large proportions to struggling firms in the context of a global pandemic. As a consequence, state officials must find a way to make banks “play along” and fulfill a mission of public interest that is not – and to some extent contrary to – their “natural mission.”

The arrangements put in place to try and resolve the tensions arising from a situation where banks are fulfilling a mission of public interest differ across political economies. Based on the analysis of the elaboration and implementation of SGCPs in France and in Germany during the COVID-19 crisis, this paper shows that in France state officials have resorted to traditional mechanisms of symbiotic coordination with bankers in order to make banks “play along” when tensions in the credit transmission channels have arisen. In Germany, state officials have used arm’s length incentives and exerted pressure on banks to increase their credit allocation to struggling German firms. However, this strategy was initially ineffective and eventually (and

²² Helmut Schleweis quoted in DSGVO (2020).

²³ Christian Ossig, chief executive of the Association of German banks (Bankenverband) quoted in Bankenverband (2020).

reluctantly) the German government resorted to increasing the state guarantee to 100% to convince banks to “play along.”

The financialized and globalized capitalism of the early 21st century has already been riddled with crises for which extensive state intervention is required. Even more so than was the case for the financial crisis of 2008, the management of the COVID-19 crisis is characterized by the huge commitment of public resources. This confirms the importance of analyzing the transformation of power relations between finance and state, and what this means for the role of the State in the economy (Levy 2006; Vogel 2018; Naqvi 2018; Alimi and Dixon 2020).

More specifically, a question about the extent to which the State has the legitimacy to allocate resources to promote the public interest should also be raised. Providing an answer to this particular question is well beyond the ambition of this paper. With crucial challenges related to public health and environmental crises lying ahead, it nevertheless seems obvious that the issue of state-led resources allocation should not be dictated by institutional arrangements between bankers and state officials. They should instead be brought into the domain of public and democratic debates.

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