

Grzegorz A. KLEPARSKI, Bożena KOCHMAN-HAŁADYJ

COMPONENTS, DOMAINS AND MENTAL SPACES: THE OVERVIEW OF CURRENT METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDY OF SEMANTIC CHANGE

Introductory Word

The principal aim of this paper is to outline and evaluate three approaches to the phenomenon of **lexical semantic change**, they are Componential Analysis, as employed by, among others, Kleparski (1986, 1990), Great Chain of Being Metaphors as propounded by researchers such as Kiełtyka (2005a, 2005b, 2006) and Blending Theory adopted by, among others, Grygiel (2004, 2005). To this end, selected pejorative developments that have taken place in the conceptual domain **FEMALE HUMAN BEING** will be viewed from three different methodological perspectives. In the major part of this paper we shall concentrate on presenting the main mechanisms pertinent to the three respective analytical methods. In the latter part we shall focus on both comparison and evaluation of these accounts by means of pointing to their merits and weaknesses and their practical application in the analysis of semantic change.

Componential Analysis

In the history of diachronic semantics an attempt to interpret historical semantic changes with the aid of Componential Analysis (henceforth: CA) was propounded by, among others, Kleparski (1986, 1990). However, any comprehensive account of the method would require extensive reference to the work of Trier (1931), who is commonly regarded as the founder of field theory. This is because, as Kleparski (1990:19) indicates, *componential analysis of meaning, although it developed independently of field theory, bears many affinities to it and has been applied in many studies operating*

with the concept of fields.¹ Broadly speaking, CA analysis rests upon the general thesis that the meanings of lexical items are not indivisible. It follows that the meanings of lexical units can be analysed and presented in terms of bundles of smaller elements, which are called **components**, **features** or **semes**. In other words, in the process of analysis lexical meanings come to be specified in terms of smaller elementary parts which form componential definitions of meanings. As an illustration, Kleparski (1990:20) analyses the semantics of the lexical item *woman* whose meaning may be presented as a combination of molecular conceptual parts, such as +HUMAN^+ADULT^-MALE, as opposed to that of *man*, which may be componentially specified as +HUMAN^+ADULT^+MALE.

Lyons (1977:318) differentiates between a European and an American tradition of CA oriented studies. In America the method was employed by researchers such as Goodenough (1956), Lounsbury (1956) and Hjelmslev (1961). Conversely, Pottier (1963) and Greimas (1966) and Coseriu (1967) can be listed among the representatives of the European tradition. Pottier's (1963) analysis of the domain of **SEATS** and Greimas' (1966) analysis of the domain of **SPATIAL ADJECTIVES** are commonly regarded to be the foremost implementations of CA principles in the European tradition. In the years that followed, the method was used both in Europe and in America in the analysis of different parts of the semantic system, for example, Bendix' analysis of a set of verbs in English, Hindi and Japanese (1966), **CULINARY TERMS** and **WINE TERMS** by Lehrer (1968) and (1974) respectively. In Polish linguistics the method was applied, for example, by Bojar (1972), Tokarski (1981, 1984) and Straš (1985). As far as semantic change is concerned, the framework was employed by, among others, Görlach (1974), Leech (1974), Werth (1974), Lipka (1979), Berndt (1982) and Kleparski (1986, 1988, 1990).

Now, for the sake of illustration, let us concentrate on Kleparski's (1990) analysis of semantic change in terms of CA. In his specialised study *Semantic Change in English – A Study of Evaluative Developments in the Domain of HUMANS* the author analyses the semantic history of a body of lexemes related to the conceptual category **HUMAN BEING** which have undergone what have traditionally been termed *ameliorative* and *pejorative* semantic developments. As his major research tool Kleparski (1990) adopts Nida's (1975) typology of components since it is Nida (1975) who is commonly regarded as having introduced a coherent terminology for the description of meaning in componential terms.² Thus, three types of components are postulated to

¹ The task of providing an exhaustive discussion of componential analysis was competently undertaken by Lyons (1977) and Gordon (1982) among others.

² The idea that semantics could be handled in terms of components was first argued with the investigation of **KINSHIP TERMS**. It was noted that it could be possible to classify kinship terms

represent the semantic structure of lexical items, that is **common**, **diagnostic** and **supplementary** components.

Common components are those semantic elements which are shared by all the members of a semantic domain and thus they establish the boundaries of semantic domains by stating the essential characteristics for a concept to belong to this particular domain. In the case of the conceptual category **HUMAN BEING** such a feature is +HUMAN. Diagnostic components, on the other hand, serve to encode those criterial elements of meaning which are shared by the semantic structures of certain lexical items but not by all lexical items in the same semantic domain. To give an example, Kleparski (1990:24) discusses the semantics of such lexical items as: *mother, harlot, virago, uncle, guy, son*, etc. for which the component +MALE is diagnostic in separating the meanings of *uncle, guy, son* from those of *mother, harlot, virago* which are marked –MALE. The third type of components which is necessary for adequate definition of meanings is a supplementary (connotative) component. In short, such components specify those features which are connotatively important but not really necessary, or significant, for establishing minimal contrasts. According to Nida (1975:36), two types of supplementary components may be distinguished, that is those which may be derived from the nature of referents and those which characterise the nature of lexical items employed to designate extralinguistic reality. Supplementary components of the first type reflect such culturally rooted concepts and stereotypical beliefs as /+STUPID/ with respect to *donkey* or /+FAITHFUL/ with reference to *dog*. Furthermore, such components encode those pieces of information that exist objectively but are not normally necessary for the relevant specification of meanings, e.g. /+WRINKLED/ in the semantic structure of *grandfather*. As for Nida's supplementary components derived from the nature of lexical items, certain components are associated with lexical items which are often classified by dictionaries as 'formal', 'euphemistic', 'slang', 'archaic' or 'literary', etc. The different values that may be encoded in supplementary components of this type become evident when we put together lexical items which carry the same cognitive load but belong to different stylistic registers (cf. Kleparski 1990:26), e.g.:

The queen <i>demised</i> at the age of forty.	/ +LEGAL/
The queen <i>died</i> at the age of forty.	/ +STANDARD/
This queen <i>popped off</i> at the age of forty.	/ +SLANG/
This queen <i>departed</i> at the age of forty.	/ +EUPHEMISTIC/
This queen <i>expired</i> at the age of forty.	/ +LITERARY/

with reference to categories such as sex, generation differences and degrees of relationship. Given these three sets of criteria, all the English kinship terms could be described in terms of components – the total meaning of a word being seen as a number of distinct elements.

In Kleparski (1986, 1990) the three types of components, that is common, diagnostic and supplementary are employed in the analysis of historical changes of lexical meaning, and the processes of change that are most frequently set to work in the analysis of semantic evolution of lexical items are those of component addition, suppression (loss), substitution, weakening and strengthening. These mechanisms are defined in the following way (see Kleparski 1990:48, Kardela and Kleparski 1990:3):

1) **Addition** of a diagnostic or a supplementary component to the existing semantic structure of lexical items. This process results in the narrowing of the range of reference to one particular subclass, or sub-type of objects, actions, events, etc., denoted by the word in its earlier meaning. Thus, for example, a case in point is the development of English *paramour* which at some stage of its evolution was used with reference to illicit lovers taking the place of a husband or wife, but in the present-day English the word is most frequently employed with reference to female illicit lovers. Hence, in order to account for the change that has taken place Kleparski (1990:98) posits the process of the addition of a supplementary component /-MALE/ which is optionally present in the semantic structure of *paramour* today.

2) **Suppression**, or **loss** of either supplementary or diagnostic component from the existing semantic structure results in the consequent widening of the range of reference. For example, during its course of semantic evolution English *tart* lost from its semantic structure the feature (+SWEET) (via weakening) and additionally strengthened the initial supplementary component /{UNCHASTE^DISREPUTABLE}/ and – as a result of pejorative downfall – finally started to be used synonymously with *whore* without a hint of the former implication of endearment.

3) **Substitution** may be defined as the process whereby some structural components present in a given structure are lost and new components replace them in the structure of the derived meaning. Generally speaking – as stressed by Kleparski (1990) – there is a prevailing tendency for components of the same type to enter the process of substitution, e.g. diagnostic components are replaced by other diagnostic components and supplementary components are replaced by other supplementary components. Thus, for instance, in the analysis of the semantic development of the English word *beldam* a substitution process is postulated (see Kleparski 1990:84), which historically replaced evaluatively neutral diagnostic complex component ([DISTANT[ANCESTOR]]) with such evaluatively charged complex component as ({SPITEFUL^LOATHSOME}). In the case discussed we see that the present-day English sense of *beldam* is ‘old, especially loathsome, spiteful woman’, though – at earlier stages of the history of English – it simply meant ‘grandmother or still more distant ancestress’. It was later generalised

to refer to any ‘woman of advanced age’, and – as it frequently happens with words used in the sense ‘old woman’ – the word underwent pejorative downfall to be used with reference to ‘a hag’.

4) **Weakening** of a diagnostic component may be defined as a change whereby a diagnostic component undergoes weakening of its diagnostic function and acquires supplementary status in the structure of the derived meaning. A case in point, for instance, is the semantic evolution of *wench* which at some stage of its development underwent the process of addition of the supplementary component /{UNCHASTE^DISREPUTABLE}/ accompanied by the weakening of the diagnostic function of the ([LOW[*SOCIAL*[*STATUS*]]]) component. Thus, as postulated by Kleparski (1990:107), the socially loaded derived sense ‘female of low social status’ preceded the rise of heavily evaluatively loaded ‘unchaste, disreputable woman’.

5) **Strengthening** of a supplementary component is understood as a change whereby a supplementary component optionally present in a given semantic structure undergoes strengthening and becomes diagnostically present in the structure of the derived meaning. And so, for example, the English word *shrew* at an earlier stage of its semantic evolution was used in the sense ‘small, insectivorous mammal resembling mice but having a long snout’. It was only in the 18th century that the word established itself in its present-day meaning ‘malicious, vexatious woman’. The rise of this specialised derivative that has come down to our time may be interpreted as a case of addition of the initially supplementary component /-MALE/, which finally – by the process of strengthening – acquired diagnostic status (-MALE). A representative example of the way Kleparski (1990) analyses semantic change is the pejorative development of English *quean*, presented diagrammatically in *Figure 1*:

quean




Figure 1. Pejorative development of *quean* (Kleparski 1990:98).

More specifically, in the O.E. period *quean* was used in the sense ‘woman’ (Stage A). The original meaning of *quean* is documented with the following *OED* quotations given below:

Seo clæneste *cwæn* ofer eorþan. /B&T/

Ic wæs feaxhar *cwene*. /B&T/

a1023 Pat.. ane *cwenan* zemænum ceape biczað .. and wið Ða ane fylðe adreozað .

Starting from the E.Mid.E period *quean* came to be applied in the evaluatively loaded sense ‘bold, impudent woman’ (Stage B). Within the model adopted in Kleparski (1990), it may be said that the process of the addition of behaviourally negative elements, encoded in a complex diagnostic component ({BOLD^IMPUDENT}), determined the rise of a new specialised meaning from the existing semantic base ‘woman’. Also, the addition process of the complex component ({BOLD^IMPUDENT}) determined what may be conventionally termed as the process of behavioural pejoration.

Given the paucity of data it is difficult to state with certainty when further pejorative evolution of the meaning of *quean* started. However, it might be assumed that it was in the 16th century that the process of moral pejoration affected the semantic structure of *quean* with the result that it came to be applied in the meaning of ‘spiteful, unchaste woman’ (Stage C). Today, this sense thread is archaic, although Baker’s *Dictionary* defines *quean* as ‘slut, strumpet’. The development of the 16th century meaning ‘spiteful, unchaste woman’ is clearly an example of the substitution for a behaviourally negative complex component ({BOLD^IMPUDENT}) of a morally charged ({SPITEFUL^UNCHASTE}) component:

1589 All spent in Touerne amongst a consort of *queanes* and fiddlers.

1627 The common *queanes*, which got their maintenance by that trade.

1670 A certain poultry *Quean* in mans apparel, that would pass for a Lady.

1880 The dame’s a most commodious *quean*, A gypsy born and go-between!

The material quoted in the *OED Supplement* provides evidence of a change in the second half of the 19th century, when *quean*, probably under the influence of girl’s name *Queanie* (see Partridge’s *Dictionary*), acquired the meaning ‘male homosexual’ (Stage D). This change may be interpreted by means of the operation of the process of substitution for the complex component ({SPITEFUL^UNCHASTE}) of a component (+HOMOSEXUAL) and – additionally – by the process of value change of the diagnostic component (-MALE), as documented by the following quotations:

- 1935** We did hear startling tales.. of family life, of marriage ceremonies, of fights with knives for the favour of some ‘*queans*’ as the perverts are called in prison.
- 1968** I did not want him to think me ‘*quean*’ and myself a part of homosexuality, a term I disliked since it included prostitutes, pansies, pouffs and *queans*.

With the aid of CA apparatus both Kleparski (1986, 1990) and Czapiga (2006) manage to show that the process of pejorative evolution is much commoner than that of ameliorative development. Kleparski (1990) observes a few general tendencies within the former group.³ Even cursory reading of the dictionary data available allows one to conclude that the mechanism of pejoration affects various subsystems of the lexicon, i.e. nouns such as *leman* (‘sweetheart’ > ‘unlawful mistress’) or *mistress* (‘woman who has care or authority over children’ > ‘woman who illicitly occupies the place of wife’), and adjectives such as *base* (‘low in the social hierarchy’ > ‘dishonourable’) or *lewd* (‘not in holy orders’ > ‘unchaste’). However, it is the category of nouns that is the subject particular to all kinds of evaluative developments, very frequently analysed by means of the componential approach. Evaluating a particularly copious growth of new evaluative senses within the category of nouns Kleparski (1990) provides evidence that if the lexical item contains in its original semantic structure some evaluatively negative elements, these are most frequently:

socially negative elements, e.g.:

harlot (‘person of unsettled life’ > ‘unchaste woman’),
cotquean (‘the housewife of a cot or labourer’s hut’ > ‘coarse, vulgar woman’),

and much less frequently:

aesthetically negative elements, e.g.:

slut (‘untidy, slovenly woman’ > ‘sloppy woman, prostitute’),
slattern (‘untidy, slovenly woman’ > ‘sloppy woman, prostitute’),

or, even less frequently:

behaviourally negative elements, e.g.:

minx (‘mischievous girl’ > ‘unchaste woman’).

³ For more on pejoration within the conceptual domain **FEMLE HUMAN BEING** see, among others, Kleparski (1990, 1997) and Kochman-Haładyj (this volume).

Another observation that has been made is that if an original evaluatively neutral or positively loaded lexical unit begins to combine with evaluatively negative elements, these are most frequently:

socially negative elements, e.g.:

wench ('child' > 'woman, especially unchaste, disreputable or of low social status'),

hussy ('female head of the household' > 'female of low social status' > 'cheeky, disreputable woman'),

girl ('a child of either sex' > 'maid-servant' > 'prostitute' as in, e.g. *girl about* (or of) *the town* and *girl of ease*)),

and less frequently:

aesthetically or behaviourally negative elements, e.g.:

mopsy ('pleasant, pretty person' > 'slatternly, untidy woman' > 'spiteful, unchaste woman'),

quean ('woman' > 'bold, impudent woman') > 1) 'spiteful, unchaste woman'
2) 'effeminate homosexual').

The general observation formulated in Kleparski (1990) is that we may speak of a prevailing tendency for those words which at some stage of their development possess socially negative elements built into their semantic structure to pass into the sphere of behavioural or moral opprobrium, e.g.:

harlot ('person of unsettled life' > 'unchaste woman'),

wench ('child' > 'female of low social status' > 'woman, especially unchaste, disreputable or of low social status'),

hussy ('female head of the household' > 'female of low social status' > 'cheeky, disreputable woman'),

girl ('child of either sex' > 'maid-servant' > 'prostitute' as, e.g. *girl about* (or of) *the town* and *girl of ease*)),

cotquean ('the housewife of a cot or labourer's hut' > 'coarse, vulgar woman').

Furthermore, those lexical items which at some stage of their evolution possess aesthetically or behaviourally negative conceptual elements tend to pass into the sphere of moral opprobrium, e.g.:

minx ('mischievous girl' > 'unchaste woman'),

mopsy ('pleasant, pretty person' > 'slatternly, untidy woman' > 'spiteful, unchaste woman'),

quean ('woman' > 'bold, impudent woman'>1) 'spiteful, unchaste woman'
 2) 'effeminate homosexual'),
slattern ('untidy, slovenly woman' > 'sloppy woman, prostitute'),
slut ('untidy, slovenly woman' > 'sloppy woman, prostitute'),
drab ('dirty, untidy woman' > 'unchaste, disreputable woman').

Within the evaluative scale adopted, Kleparski (1990) stresses that – what the author refers to as moral pejoration – may be treated as the final and most extreme stage in the evaluative evolution in the pejorative direction. Therefore, it is not surprising to find out that this final stage of semantic evolution is reflected in the historical development of the largest subgroup of the domain of **HUMAN BEING**, that is lexical items denoting women, particularly in sexual terms. That this is so is supported by the fact that in many cases, after their association with morally negative elements words associated with the domain **FEMALE HUMAN BEING** tend to associate with such supplementary components as /+ARCHAIC/, /+OBSOLETE/ or /+HISTORICAL/ (see, for example, the historical development of *jade*, *minx*, *drab*, *harlot*, *quean*, *wench*, *cotquean*).

Schultz (1975) observes that even perfectly innocent terms designating women tend to acquire negative elements, at first perhaps slightly disparaging, but after a period of time becoming strongly abusive and ending as a sexual slur. Kleparski (1990:149), however, verifies this observation making it more specific in saying that many words which are negative at present were – at one point of their history – positively loaded, functioning, for example, as terms of endearment, e.g.:

leman ('sweetheart' > 'unlawful mistress'),
mopsy ('pleasant, pretty and beloved person' > 'spiteful, unchaste woman'),
paramour ('beloved one' > 'illicit, especially female partner'),
tart ('sweetheart' > 'unchaste disreputable woman'),
Kitty ('sweetheart' > 'slattern, mistress, prostitute'),
Biddy ('sweetheart' > 'slattern, mistress, prostitute'),
Gill ('sweetheart' > 'slattern, mistress, prostitute'),
Polly ('sweetheart' > 'slattern, mistress, prostitute').

Kleparski (1990) also observes that there is an overwhelming tendency to derive negative meanings from the domain of **ANIMALS** which both he and other analysts give ample supporting evidence in a number of publications dedicated to **zoosemy**, that is animal metaphor (see, for example, Kleparski 2002, Kiełtyka and Kleparski 2005a, 2005b, Kiełtyka 2006, Czapięga 2006). As one of the conclusions emerging from his argument, Kleparski (1990) formulates another observation pertaining to the semantic evolution of such words as:

jade ('horse of inferior breed' > 'disreputable, worthless woman'),
shrew ('shrew mouse' > 'malicious, vexatious woman'),
harlot ('person of unsettled life' > 'unchaste woman'),
paramour ('beloved one' > 'illicit lovers taking the place of a husband or wife'
> 'illicit, especially female partner'),
nag ('inferior or unsound horse' > 'paramour'),
concubine ('male paramour' > 'woman who cohabits unlawfully with a man').

Historically speaking, all these words first combined with negatively loaded elements and then narrowed their meaning and – by associating with the (-MALE) diagnostic component – came to be applied exclusively to women. All in all, the gist of Kleparski's (1990) analysis is that within the category of pejorative developments there seem to emerge four types of pejorative development, which are (see also Kochman-Haładyj, this volume):

1. **neutral > pejoratively loaded sense**, e.g.:

hussy ('female head of the household' > 'unchaste, disreputable woman'),

2. **pejoratively loaded > more pejoratively loaded sense**, e.g.:

harlot ('beggar, vagabond' > 'woman of loose morals') or *drab* ('dirty, untidy woman' > 'unchaste, disreputable woman'),

3. **positively loaded > negatively loaded sense**, e.g.:

quean ('woman' > 'spiteful, unchaste woman') or *nymph* ('young, beautiful woman' > 'prostitute'),

4. **positively loaded > neutral sense**, e.g.:

lady ('woman, especially of high position or noble manners' > 'woman').

To Kleparski (1990) Kiełtyka (2006) and Czapiga (2006) and many other linguists working on evaluative developments the very fact that the quantum of pejorative developments exceeds substantially those of an ameliorative nature constitutes a definitive semantic rule, which – on closer inspection – turns out to be somewhat simplistic. They all agree, however, that semantic derogation of woman-related words does indeed constitute – if not an exceptionless law – then at least a very strong tendency, which with the aid of CA apparatus may be analysed and formalised.

Great Chain of Being Metaphors

Following the cognitive spirit of linguistic analysis, Kiełtyka (2005a, 2005b, 2006) provides convincing evidence in favour of the thesis that semantic change is a cognitively motivated process. Earlier, the idea that semantic alterations seem to have cognitive roots was clearly advocated by, among others, Kardela and Kleparski (1990), Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1992), Kleparski (1996, 1997), Györi (2002) and Grygiel (2004). In particular, Kiełtyka's recent publications (2005a, 2005b, 2006) deserve closer consideration because they show beyond doubt that changes in meaning can be accounted for with the aid of broadly understood metaphor. In his *Towards a Historical Account of English Zoosemy: The Case of Middle English and Early Modern English DOMESTICATED ANIMALS* Kiełtyka (2006) pursues the problem of what has been referred to in the literature of the subject as a historically universal link between the conceptual categories **HUMAN BEING** and **DOMESTICATED ANIMALS** (see, among others, Kleparski 1997:238).⁴ To be more specific, the author discusses the semantic development of a representative number of Mod.E. and E.Mod.E. zoosems linked to the conceptual categories **EQUIDAE**,⁵ **CANIDAE** and **FELIDAE** targeted at the conceptual category **HUMAN BEING**. The analysis carried out clearly demonstrates that these three conceptual categories are particularly abundant in zoosemic developments where evaluative developments and – in particular – pejoration of meaning content is an extremely frequent result.


One element of Kiełtyka's (2006) analytical apparatus for the study of zoosemic metaphorization is the mechanism of the Great Chain of Being (henceforth: GCB) based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth: CMT) the aim of which is to explain conventional patterns of metaphorical conceptualisation. The framework of CMT, with its origins in Lakoff and Johnson (1980), is one of the central areas of research in the field of cognitive linguistics. Within this field, as emphasised by Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999), the notions of **source domains** and **target domains**, **invariance**, **mappings** have become common, though not universal, terminology for discussing the linguistic and conceptual phenomena of metaphor. The mechanism of GCB, which has its origins in CMT, is a model of organisation and perception of reality in that all beings/entities both material and spiritual, form a well-defined hierarchy from the lowest to the highest. Such a framework provides some explanation as to why and how, in natural languages, animal

⁴ Kiełtyka's (2006) analysis of the process of metaphoric developments is, to a great extent, based on what, among others, Kleparski (1997) has initiated. Kleparski (1997) analyses zoosemic extensions relating to the category **FEMALE HUMAN BEING**.

⁵ For a detailed analysis of the conceptual category **EQUIDAE** see Kiełtyka (2005a).

names come to designate human characteristics, and conversely, why animals in different languages are attributed basic human character traits.

As noted by Kiełtyka (2006:65) the theoretical bases of the GCB may be attributed to ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle (cf. Nisbet 1982:35), and it is worth stressing that the GCB has not merely survived to our times but – more importantly – its mechanisms find their reflection in various evolutionary theories and, recently, also in semantic considerations, both synchronic and diachronic. The basic GCB is defined by attributes and behaviours, arranged in a hierarchy. The extended version of the GCB can be represented – after Krzeszowski (1997:68) – in the following manner:



The structure of the GCB is characterised by its bi-directionality which means that within these five levels there are two possible directions of mapping, i.e. upward and downward so the number of all possible metaphors coherent with the GCB is altogether twenty (see Krzeszowski 1997:161). Specifically, ten of these metaphors involve upward mapping, in which the source domain occupies a lower position on the GCB than the target domain, e.g. *This woman is a bitch* (applied contemptuously or opprobriously to a female). The other ten involve downward mapping, in which the source domain occupies a higher position on the GCB than the target domain, e.g. *This dog is loyal and friendly* (where ‘loyal’ and ‘friendly’ are features typical of the human level of the GCB). Krzeszowski (1997:161) formulates the following set of metaphors:

1. <GOD IS A HUMAN BEING>,
2. <GOD IS AN ANIMAL>,
3. <GOD IS A PLANT>,
4. <GOD IS A THING>,
5. <A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL>,
6. <A HUMAN BEING IS A PLANT>,
7. <A HUMAN BEING IS A THING>,
8. <AN ANIMAL IS A PLANT>,
9. <AN ANIMAL IS A THING>,
10. <A PLANT IS A THING>,
11. <A THING IS A PLANT>,
12. <A THING IS AN ANIMAL>,
13. <A THING IS A HUMAN BEING>,

14. <A THING IS (A) GOD>,
15. <A PLANT IS AN ANIMAL>,
16. <A PLANT IS A HUMAN BEING>,
17. <A PLANT IS (A) GOD>,
18. <AN ANIMAL IS A HUMAN BEING>,
19. <AN ANIMAL IS (A) GOD>,
20. <A HUMAN BEING IS (A) GOD>.

As argued by Kiełtyka (2005b, 2006) the number of all possible metaphors coherent with the GCB is altogether twenty, out of which two, i.e. <A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL> and <AN ANIMAL IS A HUMAN BEING> have been analysed in depth by the author. One of the aims pursued in Kiełtyka (2005b, 2006) is to show that certain attributive values can be transferred from a higher level of the GCB to a lower one, e.g. *a faithful, friendly dog*, or from a lower level to a higher one, e.g. *This woman is a bitch* (where being a *bitch* implies being behaviourally and/or morally filthy). For the purpose of his analysis the author proposes a set of the so-called conceptual dimensions such as PROFESSION/SOCIAL FUNCTION, ORIGIN/SOCIAL STATUS, APPEARANCE/PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, BEHAVIOUR/CHARACTER/MORALITY, according to which the process of zoosemic extensions is operative. The example of a metaphor <AN ANIMAL IS A HUMAN BEING>, that is the process which involves the shift in the directionality of mapping from lower to a higher level on the GCB is referred to in Kleparski (1997:239) as **reverse multiple grounding** or – alternatively – **reversed zoosemy** by Grygiel (2005:156). The process may be illustrated with the aid of the following documented cases of semantic evolution: *puppet* originally ‘a contemptuous term for a person’ and secondarily ‘a little dog; a whelp; a puppy’, *holdfast* originally ‘one that holds fast: a stingy or hard-fisted person; a miser’ and – secondarily – ‘a name for a dog that holds tenaciously’ or *girl* attested in the sense ‘young roebuck’.

The conceptual dimension PROFESSION/SOCIAL FUNCTION is, without doubt, closely – if not categorially – linked to the conceptual category **HUMAN BEING**. A representative example here is the case of semantic evolution of *hackney*. The major etymological sources inform us that *hackney* derives from O.F. *haquenée* ‘an ambling horse or mare’. The word was adopted from French in the 14th century and – as the *OED* material shows – its primary meaning was that of ‘a horse of middle size and quality, used for ordinary riding’ (c1330 Tille oBer castels about Bei sent tuye In aneus for doute, ilk on on his *hackneye*). In the 16th century, as argued in Kiełtyka (2005:173), by the process of zoosemy, *hackney* began its metaphorical drift. The secondary meaning the lexical item acquired at that time was ‘one who is used to doing menial or servile work for hire, slave (1546 Whan ought was to

do, I was common *hackney*). Within the model adopted by Kiełtyka (2006) the novel sense is explicable in terms of an entrenchment⁶ relation to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF FUNCTION** [...] with the highlighting of such attributive values as (PERFORMING MENIAL OR SERVILE WORK FOR HIRE)^(FAG)^(SLAVE). At the same time, in the 16th century this lexical item developed another evaluatively charged sense, that is ‘a woman that hires her person, a prostitute’ (1579 Venus ... that taught the woman in Cyprus to set vp a Stewes too hyre out them selues as *hackneies* for gaine) (see also Partridge 2002:518), which clearly means that the word became linked to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive element (PROSTITUTE). Therefore, the term may be said to have remained linked to the conceptual sphere PROFESSION/SOCIAL FUNCTION, but the process of pejoration led to the rise of an even more evaluatively pregnant sense-thread.

The working of the conceptual dimension ORIGIN/SOCIAL STATUS may be illustrated with the historical evolution of the English lexical item *jade*. According to major etymological sources, *jade* is of unknown origin but often assumed to be a doublet of *yaud* (Mod.Icel. *jalda* ‘mare’). The literal historical meaning of the word is ‘horse of inferior breed’ or ‘a ill-conditioned, wearied or worn-out horse’. The lexical item in question functioned in this sense in English since the 14th century to the 19th century (c1386 Be blithe though thou ryde vp-on a *Iade*, What thogh thyn hors be bothe foule and lene...). The original sense range of this lexeme is accountable for in terms of an entrenchment relation to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF PHYSICAL APPEARANCE** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive value (BONY^ILL-CONDITIONED), **DOMAIN OF BEHAVIOUR** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive values (IIL-TEMPERED)^(VICIOUS), **DOMAIN OF FUNCTIONS** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive values (WORTHLESS)^(WORN_OUT) and finally **DOMAIN OF ABUSE** [...] with the highlighting of the value (CONTEMPTIBLE). As argued by Kiełtyka (2005:171), the middle of the 16th century witnessed the rise of a new sense-thread of the word, namely – via zoosemic extension – *jade* came to be applied as a term of reprobation to a woman meaning ‘a low or shrewish woman, wench, termagant, also used playfully, a flirtatious girl like *hussy* or *minx*’ (1560 Such a *jade* she is, and so curst a quean, She would out-scolld the devil’s dame I ween (on this issue see also Mills 1989:128 and Palmatier 1995:215).

⁶ Kiełtyka (2005) explains that the notion of **entrenchment** is understood in the sense of Langacker (1987:58). A lexical category may be said to be entrenched in the attributive path of a given conceptual domain if its semantic pole is related to certain locations within the attributive path of a given domain.

This sense-thread is accountable in terms of an entrenchment relation to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF ORIGIN AND RANK** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive value (OF LOW ORDERS), **DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive value (SHREWISH)^{^(WENCH)^{^(TERMAGANT)}} as well as **DOMAIN OF FUNCTIONS** [...] with highlighting of the attributive value (WORTHLESS) and **DOMAIN OF ABUSE** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive value (CONTEMPTIBLE[^]DESPICABLE). Therefore, as the analysis of the historical evolution of *jade* shows, at the beginning of the E.Mod.E. period the analysed lexical category started to function as a zoosem related to the conceptual zones ORIGIN/SOCIAL STATUS (16th>19th centuries) as well as BEHAVIOUR/CHARACTER (16th>19th centuries).

The working of the conceptual dimension APPEARANCE/PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS may be visualised by the historical evolution of the lexical item *roil*, a word of obscure origin that in the first half of the 16th century used in the sense of ‘an inferior or spiritless horse’ (1523 As it were a gote In a shepe cote ... Therin, lyke a *royle*, Sir Duncan, ye dared). The relevant original sense of the word is explicable in terms of an entrenchment relation to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND APPEARANCE** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive value (SPIRITLESS) and **DOMAIN OF ORIGIN** [...] with the activation of the attributive value (INFERIOR BREED). By the end of the 16th century – by the process of zoosemic extension – *roil* started to be applied with reference to ‘a clumsy or stoutly-built female’ (1533 There is not one crum or droppe of good fashion in all that great *royles* bodie ... catullus ther speaketh of a certaine mayden). The relevant sense is accountable in terms of an entrenchment relation to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND APPEARANCE** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive value (STOUTLY-BUILT)^{^(CLUMSY)}.

The semantic history of the word *mule* illustrates the involvement of the conceptual dimension BEHAVIOR/CHARACTER. As evidenced by the *OED*, this lexical item entered written English at the outset of the 11th century in the sense ‘the offspring of a he-ass and a mare’ (c1000 Ne beo ... é na swylce hors and *mulas*). Apart from this sense, it was also commonly applied in the sense ‘the offspring of a she-ass and a stallion’. Within the analytical framework adopted by Kiełtyka (2005), the relevant sense is explicable in terms of an entrenchment relation to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF FUNCTIONS** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive value (OFFSPRING OF HE-ASS AND A MARE). Following Kiełtyka’s (2005:176) argument, the metaphorical sense that developed towards the close of the 15th century – via zoosemic extension – was that of ‘a strumpet, concubine’ (1494 Ye Cardynall made sharpe processe agayn prestys, yt noressedh *Crysten-moyles*, & rebuked them by open publysshement and otherwise) (see also Partridge 2002:765). The relevant sense

is explicable in terms of an entrenchment relation to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY** [...] with the highlighting of the attributive values (STRUMPET)^(ILLCIT LOVER).

Among other linguists, Kiełtyka's (2005b, 2006) analyses show that there are no traces of equine/canine/feline terms used – metaphorically – exclusively with reference to men in the Mid.E. period. In the majority of cases, even if certain lexical categories historically start as terms used for males, in the process of their historical evolution they develop senses specialised for the conceptual category **FEMALE HUMAN BEING** and – as a result – they frequently end up as epicene terms. Another crucial conclusion drawn from the analyses is the fact that the overwhelming majority of animal terms are pejorative epithets encoding the notion of loose morals and prostitution. Following the line of analysis developed in Kleparski (1990), where moral pejoration is treated as the final and most extreme stage in the evaluative development in the pejorative direction, Kiełtyka (2005:182) argues – along similar lines – that equine, feline, canine and bovine terms used to designate women most frequently reach what Kleparski (1990) labels as the final and most extreme stage in their pejorative development (i.e. moral pejoration). The fact that women become victims of semantic derogation can be readily visualised by noting that what is regarded as typical, standard or even sometimes complementary behaviour for males is perceived as abnormal and highly promiscuous female behaviour. To illustrate this, let us quote Kiełtyka (2005:182) who analyses the historical evolution of *stallion*. Significantly, when applied to men *stallion* functions as a positively charged epithet meaning, 'a virile man', yet in female oriented contexts the word acquires the negatively loaded sense 'a prostitute'.

Blending Theory

Grygiel (2004, 2005) develops yet another cognitively couched approach to diachronic semantic change where meaning alteration is perceived as a by-product of what he terms conceptual blending processes. In his *Towards a Cognitive Theory of Semantic Change: Semantic Development of English Historical Near-Synonyms of MAN/MALE Human Being in Panchronic Perspective* (2005) the author attempts to provide an explanation for semantic change in terms of the theory of online meaning construction known as Conceptual Integration Theory (henceforth: CIT) or Blending Theory (henceforth: BT).⁷ Specifically, his analysis is targeted at the semantic

⁷ The terms *conceptual blending*, *conceptual integration* and *on-line meaning construction* are used interchangeably within BT though they may imply different aspects of the process (see, for example, Coulson 2001).

development of a corpus of English historical near-synonyms related to the conceptual category **MAN/MALE HUMAN BEING**.

The foundations of this novel approach to the analysis of meaning were developed in such works as Fauconnier (1997), Fauconnier and Turner (1994), Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002) and the approach varies significantly from the traditional theory of metaphor. The gist of this framework amounts to saying that a subset of the attributes and relational structure from the source and target domains are imported into a blended space where they can be combined and supplemented with information from background knowledge.⁸ As pointed out by Grygiel (2005:287) conceptual blending is to be understood as a widespread, general and flexible cognitive mechanism which applies over many areas of conceptualisation such as metaphor and metonymy.

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) – the founders of this theory – argue that **conceptual blending** is, in fact, a fundamental aspect of all human experience that is involved in everything from conceptual processing, through the sensation of pain, reception of music to knowledge of cause and effect. The authors refer to conceptual blending as a great mental capacity that gives human beings the ability to coin new concepts and – subsequently – create art, science, religion, culture and language. Grygiel (2005:288) believes that, being an integral part of cognitive science and remaining in line with the main principles of cognitive linguistics, conceptual blending also proves to be the most adequate tool for both describing and understanding the mechanism of semantic change. As noted by Fauconnier (1997:149), *[...] blending is in principle a simple operation, but in practice gives rise to myriad possibilities*. Let us stress that the notion of the conceptual integration network is central to the theory – an array of mental spaces in which the processes of conceptual blending unfold (Fauconnier and Turner 1998). This network consists of two or more **input spaces** structured by information from discrete cognitive domains, a **generic space** that contains structure common to all spaces in the network and a **blended space**, where material from the inputs combines and interacts.

In short, conceptual blending involves three optional processes. To start with, during a stage called **composition**, which is the most straightforward process, structure from input mental spaces fed by information from discrete cognitive domains is selectively projected to a separate mental space called the **blend**. What is important is that during the course of the process the blended space remains connected to the inputs, so that the structural properties of the blend can be mapped back onto the inputs. All this takes place within a generic space that contains more abstract organisation common to all spaces in the network and defines the core cross-space mapping between them. In turn, through **completion** and **elaboration**, the blend develops structure not

⁸ For details see, among others, Coulson (1996, 2001) and Coulson and Petten (2000).

provided by the inputs. Inferences, arguments, and ideas created in the emergent structure of the blend may have effect in cognition, leading us to modify the initial inputs and to change our view of the corresponding situations. **Mental spaces**, on the other hand, are described as partial and temporary representational structures which speakers construct when thinking or talking about a perceived, imagined, past, present or future situation. Accordingly, the process of blending involves the establishment of partial mappings between cognitive models in different spaces in the network, and the projection of conceptual structure from space to space that can assume the basic four-space form presented in *Figure 2*:




Figure 2. The basic four-space integration network (Fauconnier and Turner 2002:46).

Besides this, BT makes use of mental spaces rather than domains and posits that the former depend on the latter. For instance, a BT account of the semantics of the sentence *Her aunt is a bitch* would include the following spaces: an input space representing ‘a woman of loose morals’ or ‘quarrelsome, peevish female’; another input space representing ‘an angry, wrangling and barking dog’; a

mapping between these spaces, specifying that a quarrelsome woman can be understood as a barking dog; a generic space containing elements of shared material the two inputs have in common (ANGRINESS); and the blended space in which ‘a quarrelsome peevish woman’ is referred to as ‘a wrangling and barking dog’.

It must be emphasised that in the four-space model semantic material is projected from both the source and target spaces to the blend (see Grady, Oakly and Coulson 1999). This arrangement contrasts with the simple, unidirectional projection posited by CMT, in which mappings are from source to target. Also, this stands in contrast to GCB mechanism in which mappings are always from source to target, but there are also cases where target may seem to become source, e.g. *gib* (‘a cat’ > ‘an old woman’) vs. *pussy* (‘a girl/woman’ > ‘a cat’).

An illustrative example of the way Grygiel (2005) analyses the historical evolution of lexical items is his explanation of the pejorative development of *harlot*, the word of Romance provenance introduced into English in the 13th century. Its historically primary sense ‘lad, young fellow’, which was clearly anchored in the conceptual category **BOY/YOUNG MAN**, integrated with the mental space <SERVANT> belonging to the conceptual domain OCCUPATION/PROFESSION. This, as Grygiel (2005:175) emphasises, formed the basis of a series of modifications, and the senses of ‘man’ as well as ‘beggar’, ‘vagabond’, ‘villain’, ‘low fellow’ and ‘knave’ could develop as a result of the subsequent conceptual blending operations. In fact, all of these senses can be discerned in Mid.E. texts, yet it is hardly possible – if at all possible – to say which of them were directly transferred from O.F. and which were blended anew. For example, the meaning ‘male servant’, is first attested at the beginning of the 14th century while the last *OED* quotation with the lexical item employed in the sense comes from the mid 16th century, as shown in the examples provided by Grygiel (2005:175):

13.. Pen ðe *harlot* with haste helded to ðe table.

1536 He repudiate his nobil queen.. and gart his vicious *harlotis* deforce hir.

Since the mental space <SERVANT> could be associated with the mental space <VILLAIN> blending operations took place and the word *harlot* acquired a number of novel senses. As the *OED* informs us, from the 13th century to the 17th century *harlot* was primarily used in such senses as ‘vagabond, beggar, rogue, knave’. Grygiel (2005:176) stresses that later on this meaning did not disappear from the English lexical system entirely, but rather the semantic structure of this item became conceptually modified and – in the 16th–17th centuries – *harlot* started to be commonly employed in the sense ‘a man of loose morals’, ‘fornicator’, as well as a general term of opprobrium or insult. Note at

this point that the semantic development of *harlot* confirms Kleparski's (1990:89) earlier observation that semantic structures associated with socially negative elements tend to pass into the sphere of moral or behavioural opprobrium.

Grygiel (2005:176) goes on to say that the sense 'servant' could be easily modified in the course of conceptual blending to 'man, male human being'. It is not surprising, then, that *harlot* acquired the meaning 'fellow' although its use in the sense is limited only to two *OED* quotations.⁹ As a near-synonym of *man* related to the conceptual category MAN/MALE HUMAN BEING, *harlot* could very easily become integrated not only with the conceptual domain OCCUPATION/PROFESSION, but also with the domain FOOL/STUPID PERSON. For Grygiel (2005:176) it seems that the blending of the three conceptual domains contributed to the rise of the sense path 'itinerant jester, buffoon, or juggler' as shown in the following quotations:

a1340 Hoppyng & daunnceyng of tumblers and *herlotis*, and oþer spectakils.

c1380 Mynstrel and jozelour, tumbler and *harlot*, wole not take of þe puple before þat þei han shewid þer craft.

In Mod.E. the word has lost much of its earlier currency, and today it is used as a stylistically tinted synonym for *prostitute*. According to Mills (1989:115) however, although *harlot* is rarely used in the 20th century except in archaic register it still echoes the connotations of 'rascal', which make it less opprobrious than the unambiguous *whore* or *prostitute*. The first instances provided in the *OED* of *harlot* being used to designate 'loose woman' date from the middle of the 15th century.¹⁰ Grygiel (2005:176) claims that the change of meaning took place as a result of conceptual blending where highlighted areas within the conceptual categories MAN/MALE HUMAN BEING and WOMAN/FEMALE HUMAN BEING became mapped and projected into the blend and conceptual elements 'character: unchaste' and 'physical attributes: weak' acted as integration triggers. Earlier, Kleparski (1990, 1997) demonstrates that similar examples of pejoration in the semantics of terms referring to young, innocent persons, young males and – in particular – females of all ages are found across languages at all stages of their history. Extralinguistically, one may say that the semantic developments of this type also show a somewhat unpleasant side of the human character, which glorifies strength and power and holds in contempt the weak, the gentle and the female.

⁹ **c1386** He [Somonour] was a gentil *harlot* and a kynde A better felawe sholde men noht fynde//a1634 That is an *harlot*. Prithee be musical and let us taste The sweetness of thy voice.

¹⁰ For example: **1432-50** The *harlottes* at Rome were callede *nonariæ*.

Evaluation

The three approaches to the study of meaning alterations will be compared in this section by looking at their relative merits and weaknesses. One of the obvious advantages of the CA account is that it can capture, in a formalised way, the type of change a particular lexical item has undergone (see Kardela and Klepanski 1990:16). Thus, for instance, in the case of *quean* one can trace the semantic evolution of the word from its first attested appearance till present day times, making use of the material compiled by etymological and historical dictionaries. The analysis then can be claimed to rest on solid empirical foundations. Another significant feature of the componential approach to the study of semantic change is that it allows the possibility of visualising the domain relations between the original and derived meanings. Therefore, it is enough to refer to the semantic structure of such lexical items as, say, *woman* and *wench* (see Kardela and Klepanski 1990:16) to state that the latter is a hyponym of the former while *woman* is a superordinate category to *wench*. Consider the componentially defined semantics of the two lexical items:

<i>woman</i>	<i>wench</i>
+CONCRETE	+CONCRETE
+ANIMATE	+ANIMATE
+HUMAN	+HUMAN
+ADULT	+ADULT
-MALE	-MALE
	{UNCHASTE
	DISREPUTABLE}

Note that the semantic composition of features for *woman* is more general and hence inclusive of the semantics of *wench*, since the latter possesses all the features of the former plus some more specific elements (in this instance {UNCHASTE^DISREPUTABLE}) (cf. Klepanski 1986:83). However, perhaps the most important merit of componential account is that it allows us to trace and – potentially – predict certain tendencies and directional paths in the semantic evolution of words. For example, as argued in Klepanski (1990), pejorative development within the conceptual category HUMAN BEING involves four different stages of evolution, that is:

- 1) social pejoration,
- 2) aesthetic pejoration,
- 3) behavioural pejoration,
- 4) moral pejoration.

The directional path governing pejorative developments within the conceptual category HUMAN BEING is illustrated by Kleparski (1990) in the following manner:




Figure 3. Successive stages in the evaluative development discernible in the semantic evolution within HUMAN BEING (Kleparski 1990:167).

A practical application of the law may be illustrated by tracing the historical development of the lexical item *quean* and its subsequent semantic changes as presented by Kleparski (1990). *Quean* is of Germanic origin and in the O.E. period it was used to mean ‘woman’, which Kleparski (1990) formalises by means of the following conceptual formula: +HUMAN^(+ADULT)^(-MALE). This stage may be related to the middle part, marked by 0, in the diagram above as the sense of the word at this stage is evaluatively neutral. From the early Mid.E. period *quean* came to be used in the meaning of ‘bold, impudent woman’ receiving a behaviourally negative component ({BOLD^IMPUDENT}). Kleparski (1990:100) claims that it was in the 16th century that the process of moral pejoration affected the semantic structure of *quean* which resulted in the meaning ‘spiteful, unchaste woman’.

In search of amendment to the tendency formulated in Kleparski (1990), Kiełtyka (2006:40) postulates that the operation of a gradual four-staged pejoration of terms related to HUMAN BEING proposed by Kleparski (1990) should be extended especially when we take into consideration the development of other sections of English lexicon, for instance DOMESTICATED ANIMALS. Basing on his analysis of zoosemic developments, Kiełtyka (2006:40) claims that – apart from the types distinguished in Kleparski (1990) – we may speak of:

[...] *social/utilitarian pejoration*, e.g. *hilding* ‘a contemptible, worthless person, a good-for-nothing’; *moral pejoration*, e.g. *colt* ‘a lascivious fellow; a cunning fellow’; *aesthetic pejoration*, e.g. *horse* ‘an ugly-looking person’, as well as *pejoration involving other cases, not linked to those mentioned*, e.g. *mare* ‘a contemptible woman’.

Accordingly, as Kiełtyka (2006:40) emphasizes, the componential interpretation of semantic alterations does not merely involve acquisition or elimination of components, as was the case with the traditional categories of *specialisation* and *generalisation*, but rather evaluative developments involve both quantitative and qualitative alterations. On the other hand, critics of the CA approach stress the fact that the establishment of a boundary between denotational and connotational meaning seems to be the endemic failure of any componential approach, which stems from the choice of the very components that are denotational in nature. However, as argued in Kardela and Kleparski (1990:19), from the fact that connotational-denotational analyses are not undertaken in componential approaches, it does not follow that they cannot be carried out within this framework at all, and [...] *the long and venerable tradition of such analysis within the “traditional” approach to lexicography does not preclude such a possibility*. Another apparent disadvantage of CA is – according to Geeraerts (1988:230) – that it fails to account for the relation between lexical items in the same semantic domain such as, for example, Kleparski’s (1986) *boor*, *peasant*, *farmer* either from the semasiological or onomasiological point of view.

Broadly speaking, the distinction between **semasiology** and **onomasiology**¹¹ is that the former consists in analysing the semantic relations between words “from form to meaning”, while the latter concentrates on analysing the relation from the opposite direction, that is “from meaning to form” (see Kardela and Kleparski 1990:19). In other words, while semasiology addresses the question *What do words mean?*, its counterpart aims to provide an answer to the question *What names are ascribed to things?* Referring to the literature on the subject (see, for example, Geeraerts (1988:227)) we see that in the course of analysing polysemous lexical items it is essential not only to account for the existence of all its senses (the semasiological aspect), but also it is necessary to examine how a given concept can be encapsulated by means of different, often emotionally laden variants (the onomasiological aspect). Consider in this respect, Kleparski’s (1986) analysis of *boor* – one of the historical synonyms of *peasant* – used to convey the idea that farmers are uncouth, rough people as opposed to *rustic*, employed as if a less offensive name for a farmer is intended. Geeraerts (1988:227) accounts for the necessity to incorporate the semasiology-onomasiology distinction in semantic analysis in the following way:

[...] *explanation of prototypicality should not restrict itself to the semasiological perspective (in which each category is considered on its own) but that the onomasiological point of view (in which it studied how several items may express similar or identical concepts) should be taken into account as well.*

¹¹ According to Štekauer (1996:150-153), the semasiological approach proceeds from form to meaning and involves the study of polysemy and homonymy while the onomasiological approach proceeds from meaning to form and involves synonymy, antonymy and hyponymy.

Turning our attention to cognitive accounts of semantic change, Kiełtyka (2006:55) stresses that one of the undeniable advantages of cognitive approach over the componential approach is that the former brings to the fore the role of metaphorisation processes in the mechanism of semantic developments. Naturally, one is fully justified in saying that the metaphorical nature of language is the main concern of the broadly understood cognitive spirit of linguistic analysis represented here by both Grygiel (2005) and Kiełtyka (2005). In great many publications, such as, among others, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Turner (1989) the ubiquity of metaphor in natural language is stressed. For practitioners of cognitive linguistics it is evident that metaphors – being grounded in experience – shape our fundamental perception of the world, and as such they must play a crucial role in semantic shifts (see Kardela and Klepanski 1990:24). Metaphorisation can thus be regarded according to, among others, Kiełtyka (2006:55), as the driving force behind the phenomenon of semantic change.

Exploring the relationship between CMT and BT and the phenomena they address Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999) point to similarities and differences existing between the two frameworks. They do not treat them, however, as competing but rather as largely complementary theories since they tackle different aspects of one and the same metaphoric conceptualisation. In particular, the cross-domain relationships which have been identified by CMT researchers shape and constrain the more complex process of conceptual blending. Following the line of reasoning supported by, among others, Grygiel (2005:115) *not every type of semantic change may be classified as a case of metaphor while blending seems general enough to include all forms of sense developments, also those involving metaphorical and metonymical extensions.*

In a similar vein, the directional paths of both conceptual blending and semantic change appear to be equally unpredictable. As in the case of meaning variation, in conceptual blending it would be unjustified to suppose that from two inputs a certain blend must result or that a specific blend must arise at such-and-such a place and time. What is more, CMT defines metaphor as a strictly directional phenomenon, while in BT any space can be modified at any moment in the construction of the integration network. Note that various theories of metaphor and analogy have typically focused on the cases where projection is one-way (from a source to a target). However, the fact that the process of semantic evolution is frequently bi- and sometimes even multi-directional was noticed earlier (see, among others, Klepanski 1997:238).

Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999) emphasise the fact that CMT posits projection between two mental representations traditionally referred to as domains. According to Grygiel (2005), this property is especially useful in explaining more complex instances of semantic change as in the case of O.E. *wæpnedbearn* where the blend requires three input spaces: <WEAPON>

<MALE>, <CHILD> to arrive at the meaning ‘boy’, although it might be argued that the meaning construction took place in successive stages.

Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999) argue that – in spite of the fact that both CMT and BT put great emphasis on inferential structure between conceptual domains and are in a certain sense complementary – it is only BT that allows for the possibility of an emergent structure containing elements that did not appear in either of the inputs. The same authors claim that in the case of a well-worn metaphor *This surgeon is a butcher*, the direct projection from the source domain of butchery to the target domain of surgery cannot by itself explain a crucial element of the statement meaning *The surgeon is incompetent*. By contrast, in BT the blend develops an emergent structure of its own. The incongruity of the butcher’s means with the surgeon’s ends leads to the central inference that the butcher is incompetent.

It seems that the same holds true for most cases of semantic change where many additional inferences would remain unaccounted for if the theoretical framework chosen for the linguistic analysis was CMT instead of BT. Contrary to Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999), Grygiel (2005) believes that BT should not be limited to novel, unique, or short-lived meanings, but can be successfully applied to the study of broadly understood semantic change that leads to both abrupt and ephemeral alterations, as well as to gradual and synchronically imperceptible sense developments. Note that although the process of conceptual blending has been demonstrated to be useful in the analysis of semantic change, its exact mechanism still appears somewhat speculative. As Grygiel (2005:283) puts it:

One of the difficulties is that there is often more than one way to interpret what and how particular mental spaces became integrated to produce a given sense and what the exact nature of various connections between them is. Also, we are unable to reconstruct all, both objective and subjective, factors as well as circumstances that participated or exerted some influence when a particular change of meaning was taking place. As a consequence, the integration networks might be idealised generalisations referring to groups of examples rather than individual cases.

However, while BT does not provide a detailed description of how abstract information represented in the inputs is accommodated in the blended space, it offers – according to Grygiel (2005:284) – hypotheses as to how certain inferences are invoked and shows that imagination is a principled process which lies at the heart of both meaning construction and meaning change.

Conclusion

To conclude, it must be emphasised that each of the analytical methods outlined above has its own merits and weaknesses but – above all – its own unquestionable contribution to the theory and practice of diachronic semantic

phenomena. Note that we have merely sketched the three partially overlapping approaches to historical semantics which does not mean, however, that other approaches are not employed. For instance, the work of Hughes (1974, 1978) and Mills (1989) may be said to represent an approach which may be labelled a **socio-cultural** perspective. Hughes (1978:294) analyses the historical evolution of *harlot* and objects to its derivation from the proper name *Arlette*, the mother of William the Conqueror since from the early 13th century the word developed the negatively loaded senses ‘vagabond, beggar, rogue, rascal’, and the process of sexual specialisation and moral deterioration set in only some two centuries later. So, as in many other cases of pejorative evolution, the word *harlot* – at the final stage of pejorative downfall – specialised to denote female species exclusively. In most general terms, one may say that those whose aim is to provide socio-cultural accounts of semantic alterations attempt to give evidence that language is an index of a society in all its aspects and semantic developments may only be comprehensible by reference to the cultural, historical and social background. Such attempts usually tackle, among others, the complex and fascinating subject of **female derogation** syndrome trying to show that it is a result of great social upheavals but they do it from completely different positions than those assumed by, among others, Kleparski (1990, 1997), Grygiel (2005) and Kiełtyka (2006).

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