No. 640

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The Role of Labor-Income Risk in Household Risk-Taking *

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June 28, 2020

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* We thank the Editor, Richard Rogerson, and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. We also thank Zvi Bodie, Chris Carroll, Jerome Detemple, Will Dobbie, Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Luigi Guiso, Wei Huang, Michael Haliassos, Ben Iverson, Rajnish Mehra, Benjamin Moll, Michaela Pagel, Kjetil Storesletten, Manuel Santos, Alex The loudis, Motohiro Yogo, and participants of the HFCS ECB Workshop, NHH-UiO Workshop for Economic Dynamics, Oslo, Household-Finance Conference of the Central Bank of Luxembourg, Inequality/Social-Welfare Winter-School Conference in Canazei, and seminar participants in Goethe U Frankfurt, DIW, Duisburg, Venice, and Jilin, for helpful discussions, suggestions, and remarks. We thank the Nottingham School of Economics for financial support (project A911A8). Koulovatianos also thanks the Center for Financial Studies (CFS) in Frankfurt, for their hospitality and financial support.
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Abstract

In fifteen European countries, China, and the US, stocks and business equity as a share of total household assets are represented by an increasing and convex function of income/wealth. A parsimonious model fitted to the data shows why background labor-income risk can explain much of this risk-taking pattern. Uncontrollable labor-income risk stresses middle-income households more because labor income is a larger fraction of their total lifetime resources compared with the rich. In response, middle-income households reduce (controllable) financial risk. Richer households, having less pressure, can afford more risk-taking. The poor take low risk because they avoid jeopardizing their subsistence consumption.

Keywords: background risk, household-portfolio shares, business equity, subsistence consumption, wealth inequality

JEL classification: G11, D91, D81, D14, D11, E21
1. Introduction

Figure 1 shows household-portfolio shares of stocks and business equity, plotted per household-income category. In fifteen European-Union (EU) countries, China, and the US, risky asset shares are an increasing and convex function of household resources; as a household becomes richer, its shares of risky assets increase in an accelerating manner. The pattern demonstrated by Figure 1 is the same as patterns reported in recent studies using administrative data from Sweden and Norway.\(^1\)

Figure 1: Portfolio share on risky assets by income categories (per equivalent adult and before tax)

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\(^1\) See Appendix A for an explanation of the data used in Figure 1.

\(^2\) For the increasing and convex patterns of risk-taking in Sweden, see Bach, Calvet, and Sodini (2016, Figures 3 and 4), who present the mean returns of household risky assets and their standard deviations; for Norway, see Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino, and Pistaferri (2016, Figure 1).
That risk-taking is an increasing and convex function of household resources in all these countries raises a natural question. Is there a common reason why rich households undertake so much financial risk, while poor and middle-income households hesitate to do that? We seek to find an answer, focusing on the role of household background income risk.

Piketty (2014, p. 349, Figure 10.6) shows that, over time, the wealthiest become wealthier relative to the rest. Explaining Figure 1 may contribute to a better understanding of these wealth-distribution dynamics. Nevertheless, this paper focuses only on explaining the risk-taking pattern of households, putting special emphasis on what explains the behavior of middle-class households, using a cross-section of the wealth distribution as an exogenous input to the explanation. Specifically, we suggest a perpetual-growth household-portfolio model that uses the same utility function for all households, as in Achury et al. (2012). We extend the Achury et al. (2012) framework by adding ( uninsurable) labor-income risk and by distinguishing the examined asset classes between stocks and business equity.

We insert prices and wealth/income data from single-time cross sections of household-finances surveys as exogenous inputs into our model, in order to endogenize household risk-taking decisions. The fitting of our model to the risk-taking data reveals one common mechanism. Middle-income households reduce financial risk-taking because they try to cope with the high risk pressure caused by background income risk in their lifetime resources.

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4 The pioneering study asking why the rich take more risk than other households, using a single utility function, is Wachter and Yogo (2010), who suggest that the rich invest more in risky assets because they are risking losses in mostly luxury consumption (an idea implicit in Browning and Crossley, 2000). Achury et al. (2012) introduce subsistence consumption to a simple Merton (1969, 1971) model, suggesting that the poor do not invest in risky assets because they are strongly averse to losing their subsistence consumption. The importance of distinguishing stocks from business equity in household-portfolio analysis has been corroborated by results in Heaton and Lucas (2000b), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Polkovnichenko (2003), and more recently in Palia, Qi, and Wu (2014), and Kartashova (2014). Christelis, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2013), and Badarinza, Campbell, and Ramadorai (2016), analyze the importance and the cross-country differences of the role of private business equity among other household choices.
Middle-income households have this higher background-risk pressure because, in most countries, income is a bigger fraction of their lifetime resources (e.g., see Figure 2 for the US). In contrast, rich households, in which income is a smaller fraction of their lifetime resources, can afford to take more financial risk. The poor avoid financial risk because they do not want to risk their subsistence consumption. While in this paper the wealth distribution is exogenous, we believe that our findings can help future research on endogenizing wealth distributions and on modeling and explaining their dynamics.

![Figure 2: Income-asset ratio (US data)](image)

**Figure 2** Income-asset ratio (US data)

2. Model

2.1 Observable budget-constraint characteristics

2.1.1 Income process

At any instant, $t \in [0, \infty)$, a household receives a labor income stream, $y(t)$, that evolves according to the geometric process

$$\frac{dy(t)}{y(t)} = \mu_y dt + \sigma_y dz_y(t), \tag{1}$$

This mechanism is closely supported by the empirical findings of Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2018, Figure 3, and Table 8, Panel B) in Norway.

As non-detrended models seem most promising for fitting risk-taking data, a future-research venue to follow may be the modeling ideas of birth/death processes that enable the coexistence of endogenous growth and stationary distributions in Jones (2018).
with $\sigma_y > 0$, $\mu_y \geq 0$, with $z_y(t)$ being a Brownian motion, and for a given initial $y(0) = y_0 > 0$.

### 2.1.2 Asset returns

The household also possesses an initial stock of financial wealth, $a_0 \in \mathbb{R}$, and has the potential to invest this wealth in a risk-free asset with return $r_f$, and also in two risky assets, stocks, denoted by “$s$”, and business equity, denoted by “$b$”. The price of risky asset $i \in \{s, b\}$, denoted by $p_i(t)$, is governed by the process

$$\frac{dp_i(t)}{p_i(t)} = R_i dt + e_i \sigma dz^T(t),$$

in which $z(t) \equiv [z_s(t) \ z_b(t)]$ is a row vector of Brownian motions. The $2 \times 2$ matrix $\sigma$ is derived from the decomposition of the covariance matrix, $\Sigma$, which refers exclusively to risks of the two risky assets, $s$ and $b$. In particular, $\Sigma = \sigma \sigma^T$. Finally, $e_i$ is a $1 \times 2$ vector in which the value 1 is in position $i \in \{s, b\}$, while all other elements are zero.

Notice the equivalence between the continuous-time representation in (1) and its discrete-time permanent-income hypothesis counterpart in Carroll (1992, 1997). In particular, Carroll (1992, p. 65) uses a discrete-time stochastic framework in which income, $Y_t$, following his notation, is governed by

$$\ln(Y_t) = \ln(P_t) + \ln(V_t),$$

where $P_t$ denotes the permanent-labor-income component which obeys

$$\ln(P_{t+1}) = \ln(G) + \ln(P_t) + \ln(N_{t+1}),$$

and in which $\ln(N_t) \sim N(0, \sigma^2_N)$, i.i.d. over time. Combining these two equations leads to,

$$\ln(Y_{t+1}) - \ln(Y_t) = \ln(G) + \ln(\varepsilon_{t+1}),$$

in which $\ln(\varepsilon_{t+1}) = \ln(N_{t+1}) + \ln(V_{t+1}) - \ln(V_t)$. Given the assumption that $\ln(N_t)$ and $\ln(V_t)$ are independent, which is stated in Carroll (1992, p. 70), it follows that $\ln(\varepsilon_{t+1}) \sim N(0, \sigma^2_N + 2\sigma^2_V)$, i.i.d. over time. After applying Itô’s Lemma on (1) and stochastically integrating over a time interval $[t, t + \Delta t]$ for all $t \geq 0$ and any $\Delta t \geq 0$, we obtain,

$$\ln[y(t + \Delta t)] - \ln[y(t)] = \left(\mu_y - \frac{\sigma^2_y}{2}\right) \Delta t + \sigma_y [z_y(t + \Delta t) - z_y(t)].$$

Setting $\Delta t = 1$, $\mu_y - \sigma^2_y/2 = \ln(G)$, and $\sigma^2_y = \sigma^2_N + 2\sigma^2_V$, makes equations (3) and (2) coincide.
2.1.3 Correlation between labor-income growth and asset returns

Labor income is correlated with risky asset through the correlation coefficient $\rho_{yi}$. Specifically,

$$z_y(t) = \sqrt{1 - \rho_{y,s}^2 - \rho_{y,b}^2} z_0(t) + \rho_{y,s} z_s(t) + \rho_{y,b} z_b(t) \quad ,$$

in which $z_0(t)$ is also a Brownian motion. If $\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1$, then labor-income risk is uninsurable. If, instead, $\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 \neq 1$, then labor risk can be eliminated by trading financial assets. We analyze the data using the general and empirically plausible case of uninsurable labor-income risk ($\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 \neq 1$). Nevertheless, one of the contributions of this paper is the derivation of a closed-form solution for the special case with insurable labor-income risk ($\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1$). That particular closed-form solution helps us in dealing with the technical problems of calibrating household-portfolio models with infinitely-lived agents, explained in Appendix B.

Below we provide more details on our solution approach.

The evolution of assets is governed by the budget constraint,

$$da(t) = \left\{ \left\{ \phi(t) R^T + \left[ 1 - \phi(t) 1^T \right] r_f \right\} a(t) + y(t) - c(t) \right\} dt + a(t) \phi(t) \sigma dz^T(t) \quad ,$$

in which $R = [R_s \ R_b]$ is a row vector containing all mean asset returns and $\phi(t) = [\phi_s(t) \ \phi_b(t)]$ is a row vector containing the chosen fraction of financial wealth invested in risky asset $i$, for all $i \in \{s, b\}$ at any time $t \geq 0$ ($A^T$ denotes the transpose of any matrix $A$). In addition, there is a borrowing constraint, $a \geq a$. We impose short-selling restrictions on risky-asset trading and on risk-free asset trading, i.e., $\phi(t) \in [0, 1]$.

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9 Empirical studies on background risk, such as Guiso, Jappelli, Terlizzese (1996), Angerer and Lam (2009), and Bonaparte, Korniotis, and Kumar (2014), indicate that uninsurability is the empirically relevant case.

10 Two early studies numerically solving infinitely-lived-agent household portfolio models and explaining calibration difficulties are Hallassos and Michaelides (2002, 2003).
2.2 Preferences

The problem faced by a household is to maximize its lifetime expected utility subject to constraints (6) and (1). Our utility specification involves a small, yet influential step away from the continuous-time formulation and parameterization of recursive “Epstein-Zin-Weil” preferences, suggested by Duffie and Epstein (1992a,b).\footnote{For the discrete-time version of Epstein-Zin-Weil utility function without subsistence consumption see Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989).} In particular, we use a subsistence-consumption level $\chi$, defining expected utility as,

$$J(t) = E_t \left[ \int_t^{\infty} f(c(\tau), J(\tau)) \, d\tau \right],$$  

(7)

in which $f(c, J)$ is a normalized aggregator of continuation utility, $J$, and current consumption, $c$, with

$$f(c, J) \equiv \rho (1 - \gamma) \cdot J \cdot \left\{ \frac{c - \chi}{[(1 - \gamma)J]^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right\}^{\frac{1 - \frac{1}{\eta}}{\gamma}} - 1,$$

(8)

and in which $\chi \geq 0$ and $\rho, \eta, \gamma > 0$.\footnote{If $\gamma = 1/\eta$, then expected utility converges to the case of time-separable preferences with hyperbolic-absolute-risk-aversion (HARA) momentary utility. If $\chi = 0$ (standard formulation), then $\eta$ denotes the household’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution and $\gamma$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Notice that Koo (1998) has provided theoretical analysis to a model that is similar to ours but he has restricted his attention to the constant-relative-risk aversion utility function using time-separable preferences without subsistence consumption. Other notable analyses with time-separable preferences are Duffie et al. (1997) and Henderson (2005).}

2.3 Solution Approach

In equilibrium, continuation utility, $J^*(t)$, is a value function depending on the household’s assets and labor income. We denote this value function by $V(a(t), y(t))$, therefore, $J^*(t) = V(a(t), y(t))$ for all $t \geq 0$. With infinitely-lived households and constraints with time-invariant state-space representation, the optimization problem of the households falls in the category of stationary discounted dynamic programming. Therefore, the time index is
dropped from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) which is given by,

\[
0 = \max_{c \geq x, \phi_s, \phi_h \in [0,1]} \left\{ f(c, V(a, y)) + \left\{ \phi R^T + (1 - \phi 1^T) r_f \right\} a + y - c \right\} \cdot V_a(a, y)
\]

\[
+ \frac{1}{2} \mu^2 \phi \sigma \sigma^T \phi^T \cdot V_{aa}(a, y) + \mu_y y \cdot V_y(a, y)
\]

\[
+ \frac{1}{2} (\sigma_y y)^2 \cdot V_{yy}(a, y) + \sigma_y a y \phi \sigma \rho_y^T \cdot V_{ay}(a, y) \right\}, \quad (9)
\]

subject to \( a \geq a \), in which \( V_x \) and \( V_{xm} \) denote the first and second partial derivatives with respect to variable(s) \( x, m \in \{a, y\} \), and \( \rho_y = [\rho_{y,s}, \rho_{y,b}] \) is a row vector containing all correlation coefficients between each of asset returns and the income process. Finally, \( r_f \) denotes the return of investment in the risk-free asset.

We use a recursive numerical method (Chebyshev-polynomial projections) in order to solve HJB equation (9). There are two crucial technical concerns. First, calibrating the model is not straightforward so as to guarantee that the maximization problem is well-defined. Second, even for a well-calibrated model, a good initial guess on the value function \( V \) is needed. Regarding the second concern, we emphasize that our parameterizations imply growing income, \( y \), and wealth, \( \alpha \). It is well-known that recursive dynamic programming techniques need careful calibration and first guesses in endogenous-growth environments.

To address these concerns we provide a closed-form solution for the special case of insurable labor-income risk. Based on that closed-form solution we can use minimum-distance

Calibrating the variance-covariance matrix of asset returns is especially challenging. In Appendix B we provide a simple example that demonstrates why value functions are fragile in household-portfolio models and also sensitive to the choice of the variance-covariance matrix of asset returns.

A key paper that establishes dynamic-programming existence results with endogenous growth is Alvarez and Stokey (1998). The preferences we employ here differ from the preferences considered in Alvarez and Stokey (1998), because of non-homotheticity, but much of the analysis therein should go through for modified consumption \( \tilde{c} = c - \chi \) and Duffie and Epstein (1992a,b) preferences.
fitting to calibrate that particular special case to the data and to derive a first guess for the
value function $V$. Then, proceeding in small steps, i.e., changing parameter values gradually
(for example, the homotopy approach in Eaves and Schmedders, 1999), we solve the prob-
lem given by equation (9), re-optimizing the parameters of the uninsurable labor-income-risk
case by minimum-distance fitting.

2.3.1 A special case: insurable labor-income risk ($\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1$)

The first-order conditions of the problem expressed by (9) are

$$f_c(c, V(a, y)) = V_a(a, y),$$ (10)

$$\phi^T = (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} (R^T - r_f 1^T) \frac{V_a(a, y)}{-a \cdot V_{aa}(a, y)} - \sigma_y \frac{y}{a} (\rho_{y} \sigma^{-1})^T \frac{V_{ay}(a, y)}{V_{aa}(a, y)}.$$ (11)

Subject to two loose parametric assumptions and assumptions on the initial conditions, the
optimal vector of portfolio shares is given by (see Appendix C, Proposition 1),

$$\phi^* = \Phi(a, y) = \frac{1}{\gamma} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{\alpha}{r_y a}\right)$$

$$+ \left[\frac{1}{\gamma} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} - \sigma_y \rho_{y} \sigma^{-1}\right] \frac{y}{r_y a},$$ (12)

with $r_y \equiv r_f - \mu_y + \sigma_y (R - r_f 1) (\rho_{y} \sigma^{-1})^T$. Moreover, in Appendix C, Proposition 1,
we show that consumption is given by $c = \chi + \xi (a + y/r_y - \chi/r_f)$ for some $\xi > 0$. The
term $y/r_y$ is the present value of expected lifetime labor earnings at time $t \geq 0$, using the

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15In this special case we focus on interior solutions. Section 1.3 in our Online Computational Appendix A
discusses how we ensure that consumption is above subsistence and how we treat borrowing constraints in
our applications.

16Although closed-form solutions are rare, there are remarkably many studies reporting closed-form solutions
on portfolio choice and techniques for discovering such solutions. Examples include Merton (1973), Bodie
et al. (2009) and Detemple and Rindisbacher (2005, 2010).
risk-adjusted discount factor \( r_y \). Therefore, the sum \((a + y/r_y)\) equals the present value of total expected lifetime resources. The term \( \chi/r_f \) is the present value of lifetime subsistence needs which uses the risk-free rate as its discount factor. In light of these observations, the term \((a + y/r_y - \chi/r_f)\) equals the discretionary expected lifetime resources.

The most complicated analytical aspect of determining the dependence of portfolio shares, \( \phi \), on total asset holdings, \( a \), and income, \( y \), is the role played by the variance-covariance matrix of risky assets. Specifically, the covariance matrix is,

\[
\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_s^2 & \rho_{s,b} \sigma_s \sigma_b \\
\rho_{s,b} \sigma_s \sigma_b & \sigma_b^2
\end{bmatrix},
\]

in which \( \sigma_i \) is the standard deviation of asset \( i \in \{s,b\} \), while \( \rho_{i,j} \) denotes the correlation coefficient between two risky assets \( i,j \in \{s,b\} \). In the special case of insurable labor-income risk, the stochastic structure of the problem with \( N = 2 \) involves three volatility parameters, \( \sigma_s \), \( \sigma_b \), and \( \sigma_y \); and two correlation coefficients, \( \rho_{s,b} \) and \( \rho_{y,s} \), since correlation \( \rho_{y,b} \) can be deduced from the labor-risk-insurability constraint \( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1 \). As demonstrated in Appendix B, optimal portfolio choices, and even the existence of a solution to the portfolio-choice problem, are sensitive to the variance-covariance parameters used. In addition, there

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\( ^{17} \)Since labor income is insurable, the effective discount factor, \( r_y \), which is used to calculate the present value of expected lifetime labor earnings, involves three opportunity-cost ingredients. These ingredients are the risk-free rate, \( r_f \), the trend of income, \( \mu_y \), and a term involving the excess returns and risks of other assets, \((R - r_f \mathbf{1}) (\sigma^{-1})^T \). In addition, \( r_y = r_f - \mu_y + \sigma_y (R - r_f \mathbf{1}) (\sigma^{-1})^T \rho_y^T \), takes into account the correlations of income with the risky assets, \( \rho_y \), and income volatility, \( \sigma_y \). In particular, notice that \( y(t) = y_0 \cdot e^{(\mu_y - \sigma_y^2/2)t + \sigma_y z_y(t)} \) (see equation (1)) while equation (5) combined with the condition \( \rho_y \rho_y^T = 1 \) gives \( z_y(t) = \rho_y \cdot \mathbf{z}^T(t) \).

\( ^{18} \)To see why the discount factor of lifetime subsistence needs is the risk-free rate alone, consider the special case of a household with minimum assets, \( a \), such that \( a + y/r_y = \chi/r_f \), i.e. total expected lifetime resources equal subsistence needs (in slight violation of Assumption 1). In this special case, equation (12) implies that the household holds a portfolio of risky assets, \( \phi^* \cdot a = -\sigma_y y/r_y \rho_y \sigma^{-1} \) which enables it to perfectly insure against labor-income risk. In this way, the equilibrium consumption profile of such a household is \( c^*(t) = \chi \) for all \( t \geq 0 \). So, the ability to insure against labor-income risk enables the household to avoid consumption fluctuations and to meet the condition \( c(t) \geq \chi \) with equality at all times. Since this special household does not have any opportunity left for fluctuations in total income through its savings behavior (its total income is equal to \( \chi \) for all \( t \geq 0 \)), its intertemporal opportunity cost is determined solely by the risk-free rate \( r_f \).
is no perfect agreement in the literature regarding business-equity returns, its riskiness and correlations with other risky variables.\footnote{See, for example, the difference between Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Kartashova (2014).} For these reasons, the careful calibration procedure of our model is likely to suggest values for $R_b$, $\sigma_b$, $\rho_{s,b}$, and $\rho_{b,y}$, that work in practice and that also open new questions for the empirical literature about business-equity returns.

### 2.3.2 Replicating the convexity pattern of risk-taking under insurable labor-income risk ($\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1$)

In Appendix D, we show that the exact solution described by (12) can be summarized by,

$$\phi_i^* = \kappa_{0,i} - \kappa_{1,i} \frac{1}{a} - \kappa_{2,i} \frac{y}{a}, \quad i \in \{s, b\},$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

in which $\kappa_{2,i}$ is the coefficient most directly related to the role of labor-income risk in explaining the main household risk-taking pattern depicted by Figure 1.\footnote{We provide the exact formulas of $\kappa_{0,i}$, $\kappa_{1,i}$, and $\kappa_{2,i}$ of equation (13) in Appendix D.} Specifically, if we switch off the role of income in equation (13) by setting $\kappa_{2,i} = 0$, then with $\kappa_{1,i} > 0$ risk-taking is an increasing but concave function in wealth, failing to reconcile the empirical pattern of Figure 1.\footnote{This problem, that $\phi_i$ is a concave function of wealth, is also prevalent in Achury et al. (2012, p. 120, Figure 1).} Therefore, trying values of $\kappa_{2,i} \neq 0$ is necessary for matching the data.

Considering $\kappa_{2,i} \neq 0$ in equation (13), stylized empirical features concerning income and wealth distributions play a particular role. Specifically, as the income distribution is less dispersed and less skewed compared to the wealth distribution, the income-to-asset ratio, $y/a$ decreases in total household resources on average. This feature is conveyed by the pattern of Figure 2, which also shows that $y/a$ is quite high for middle-class households. Considering a value with $\kappa_{2,i} < 0$ would add this high amount of $y/a$ that characterizes middle-income households to $\phi_i$, making middle-income households take more risk. Therefore, $\kappa_{2,i} < 0$ would contribute to strengthening the concave pattern that is already implied by the term $\kappa_{1,i}/a.$
Instead, $\kappa_{2,i} > 0$ is consistent with a reduced value of $\phi_i$ for middle-income households.

Reducing the value of $\phi_i$ for middle-income households is necessary for replicating the observed pattern of risk-taking: that $\phi_i$ is increasing and convex in lifetime household resources, $a + y/r_y$. So, we call $\kappa_{2,i}$ “the convexity factor”, emphasizing that $\kappa_{2,i} > 0$, is the only way to match the risk-taking pattern observed in the data.

The intuition behind a positive value of $\kappa_{2,i}$ is based on labor-income-risk diversification incentives. Middle-income households whose income, $y$, is a big fraction of their lifetime resources, $a + y/r_y$, choose to take less controllable financial risk in order to cope with the high uncontrollable labor-income risk carried by $y$. On the contrary, for richer households, $y$ is a smaller fraction of their lifetime resources, so they can afford to add financial risk to their total lifetime resources.

That labor-income risk diversification is a crucial mechanism driving the positivity of the “convexity factor” $\kappa_{2,i}$ is obvious from a concise version of its formula. Specifically, a concise way to express $\kappa_{2,i}$, $i \in \{s, b\}$ (proved in Appendix D) is given by,

$$
\kappa_{2,s} = -\left[ \frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \frac{\sigma_s}{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \cdot \left( \frac{R_s - r_f}{\sigma_s} - \rho_{s,b} \frac{R_b - r_f}{\sigma_b} \right) + \frac{\rho_{s,b} \sigma_s}{\sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} Cov(y, b) - Cov(y, s) \right] \frac{1}{r_y \sigma_s^2},
$$

(14)

and

$$
\kappa_{2,b} = -\left[ \frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \frac{\sigma_b}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \left( \frac{R_b - r_f}{\sigma_b} - \rho_{s,b} \frac{R_s - r_f}{\sigma_s} \right) - Cov(y, b) \right] \frac{1}{r_y \sigma_b^2 \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}}.
$$

(15)

Both equations (14) and (15) convey that, apart from comparisons between the Sharpe ratios of the two risky assets, $\kappa_{2,i}$ can become negative if the covariances of labor-income risk and risky-asset returns, $Cov(y, b)$ and $Cov(y, s)$, are high. In other words, with sufficiently low covariance of labor-income risk and risky-asset returns, diversification of background labor-income risk is possible. With $\kappa_{2,i} > 0$, $i \in \{s, b\}$, the cross-sectional effect of labor-
income-risk diversification is that middle-income households (with higher \( y/a \)) will reduce their portfolio risk-taking more than rich households.

In this special case of \( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1 \) with \( \text{[13]} \) being the closed-form solution to the model, background labor-income risk is fully insurable. Nevertheless, the motive of choosing lower financial risk in order to cope with background risk is present, no matter if labor-income risk is ultimately fully insurable or not. In the next section we demonstrate that even if background labor-income risk is uninsurable \( (\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 \neq 1) \), the exact formulas of \( \kappa_{0,i}, \kappa_{1,i}, \) and \( \kappa_{2,i} \) of equation \( \text{[13]} \) are a reasonable “first-try” approximation of the true solution of the model, and that \( \kappa_{2,i} > 0 \) holds in all calibration exercises leading to a risk-taking pattern that is increasing and convex in income/wealth. Therefore, even under uninsurable labor-income risk, the motive of reducing background labor-income risk is the key reason behind the strong reluctance of middle-income households to undertake financial risk; this is the predominant mechanism behind replicating the observed pattern, that risk-taking is increasing and convex in household resources.

3. Fitting the Model to the Data

Our goal is to use, (i) exogenous asset-price processes, (ii) exogenous labor-income growth processes, (iii) a single exogenously given cross section of after-tax labor income, and (iv) a single exogenously given cross section of assets, in order to match the corresponding cross section of risk-taking, the pattern given by Figure 1. After this pattern-matching goal is accomplished through minimum-distance calibration, we proceed to calculating the “convexity parameter”, \( \kappa_{2,i}, i \in \{s,b\} \), in order to check if it has the anticipated positive sign. In this way we can verify the validity of the proposed model mechanism, that the middle class tries to hedge background labor-income risk by not taking more asset risk. Naturally, we are
interested in examining setups beyond the case of insurable labor-income risk ($\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1$).

Table 1: Income and wealth distributions (data) inserted into the model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Income Category</th>
<th>After-tax Income per Equivalent Adult</th>
<th>Total Assets per Equivalent Adult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US (in 2007 USD)</td>
<td>less than 20%</td>
<td>9,226</td>
<td>85,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20% - 39.9%</td>
<td>17,828</td>
<td>139,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40% - 59.9%</td>
<td>28,188</td>
<td>210,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60% - 79.9%</td>
<td>41,474</td>
<td>327,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80% - 89.9%</td>
<td>58,864</td>
<td>511,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90% - 100%</td>
<td>175,025</td>
<td>2,452,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (in 2012 EUR)</td>
<td>less than 20%</td>
<td>7,244</td>
<td>97,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20% - 39.9%</td>
<td>13,152</td>
<td>11,8113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40% - 59.9%</td>
<td>17,751</td>
<td>158,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60% - 79.9%</td>
<td>23,485</td>
<td>206,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80% - 89.9%</td>
<td>30,526</td>
<td>299,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90% - 100%</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>519,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN (in 2011 CNY)</td>
<td>less than 20%</td>
<td>5,501</td>
<td>146,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20% - 39.9%</td>
<td>11,508</td>
<td>175,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40% - 59.9%</td>
<td>18,943</td>
<td>283,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60% - 79.9%</td>
<td>30,695</td>
<td>451,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80% - 89.9%</td>
<td>48,104</td>
<td>806,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90% - 100%</td>
<td>169,870</td>
<td>1,793,764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data of the after-tax income and wealth distributions that we use in our calibration are given by Table 1. The data construction follows the construction of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) Chartbooks.\footnote{Our calibration exercise, relying on tabular income categories is the same as in Achury et al. (2012).} After ranking the adult-equivalent individuals of the households participating in the household-finances surveys according to their pre-tax income, we distinguish the pre-tax income category bins. Then we compute the after-tax levels of the cutoff values of the income bins and we report them to Table 1, together with
the corresponding asset values of these income-bin categories. The portfolio shares ($\phi$’s) that correspond to a certain income category bin are the averages of the adult-equivalent individuals of each income-category bin.\footnote{We do not report the values of $\phi$’s in Table 1, as these appear in figures of the model’s goodness-of-fit to the data below. We use after-tax incomes because it is plausible to assume that all consumption and savings decisions rely on disposable income.}

A crucial remark is that \textit{the numbers reported in Table 1 are the exact numbers we insert in the calibrated model in order to capture the actual income and wealth distributions as initial conditions to our model.} We do so, because our model is similar to this in Achury et al. (2012), which is a \textit{perpetual-growth partial equilibrium model without a stationary distribution}, for an appropriate choice of parameters.\footnote{The central message in Achury et al. (2012), is that risk-taking and savings can be increasing in household resources only if all income/wealth classes of the economy are growing over time (see Achury et al., 2012, p. 113, Corollary 1 and Proposition 4). Therefore, parameters are selected so that all income/wealth classes grow over time (see Achury et al., 2012, p. 112, Proposition 3). Given the presence of subsistence consumption, the perpetually growing distribution leads to a non-stationary wealth distribution with growing variance over time (see Achury et al., 2012, p. 113, Eq. 3).} Our model is an extension of the Achury et al. (2012) framework that includes uninsurable labor-income risk. Selecting parameters that lead to average growth of all income classes (e.g., $\mu_y > 0$), implies that a stationary distribution does not exist.\footnote{The labor-income shock is an ex-ante identical idiosyncratic-risk component across households. There are parameter-value choices, notably $\mu_y = 0$, i.e., 0-growth labor-income process, and $\rho > r_f$, that make the model have a stationary wealth distribution. We do not make such parameter-value choices, suggesting a growing wealth distribution. New techniques in Achdou et al. (2020) show how one can study wealth-distribution dynamics in heterogeneous-agent models. However, computing such dynamics are beyond the scope of this paper.} Therefore, as in Achury et al. (2012), we insert the income-category-bin cutoff points proxying the actual wealth/income distributions as they appear in Table 1, \textit{as initial conditions to our model, i.e., as constant numbers}.\footnote{For example, our model-implied portfolio shares ($\phi$’s) that correspond to a certain income category characterized by $(a = 9, 226, y = 85, 519)$ in Table 1, under insurable risk ($\rho^2_{y,s} + \rho^2_{y,b} = 1$) are given by $\Phi(9, 226, 85, 519)$, following formula \ref{eq:1} for specific calibration values. On the contrary, models such as Wachter and Yogo (2010), use parameters that lead to a stationary wealth distribution and the model-implied levels of $\phi$ are computed through Monte-Carlo simulations (see Wachter and Yogo, 2010, p. 3951, Table 8).}
3.1 Calibration

Our calibration strategy follows two steps. In the first step we calibrate the model using the empirically implausible special case of insurable labor-income risk \((\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1)\). In this special case the closed-form solution given by (13) allows us to use minimum-distance techniques in order to find the calibrating parameters that best fit the data. Using these initial calibrating parameters, we take the second step, which is to gradually change parameter values while employing recursive numerical methods in order to solve equation (9) for the general case of uninsurable-labor-income risk \((\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 \neq 1)\). For every recursive solution to the uninsurable labor-income-risk version based on equation (9), we re-calibrate model parameters through minimum-distance fitting as well.

Table 2 provides all calibrating parameters in two cases: the case of insurable labor-income risk \((\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1)\), and a plausibly calibrated case of uninsurable labor-income risk in which \(\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.75\). Figure 3 shows the goodness of fit of our calibrated model to the data, for \(\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1\), while Figure 4 shows the goodness of fit when \(\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.75\).

In Figure 3, we use the closed-form solution given by (12), without imposing any short-selling constraints. Fitting data to the case of fully insurable labor-income risk is empirically implausible, but it takes our first calibration-strategy step. This step is to quickly find parameter values (in the columns of Table 2 under \(\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1\)), that place the model in a useful calibration ballpark for the plausible case of non-insurable labor-income risk and borrowing/short-selling constraints.

Regarding the uninsurable labor-income-risk case in Figure 4, the calibrated parameters

\(^{27}\)In Appendix B we explain why portfolio-choice models with infinitely-lived agents have fragile value functions. This fragility motivates using special cases with closed-form solutions as starting points in calibration. \(^{28}\)The practice of starting from calibrated parameters of a well-behaved solution in order to change parameter values in a gradual, step-by-step fashion, is the homotopy approach, explained in Garcia and Zangwill (1981), and also in Eaves and Schmedders (1999). All recursive numerical methods, including a full explanation of how borrowing constraints are treated numerically, appear in our Online Computational Appendix.
used are those reported in Table 2 (under $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.75$). We have imposed all borrowing/subsistence and short-selling constraints in this case, in the process of best-fitting the data through a minimum-distance algorithm. Therefore, the parameter values appearing in Table 2 reflect all these constraints. Our borrowing constraint is $a \geq a = 0$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Calibrated Parameters across Model Specifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_f$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{sy}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{sb}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{by}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP adjusted 2007 USD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Figure 4 we compare imposing the short-selling constraints ($\phi_i \in [0, 1], i \in \{s, b\}$), versus not imposing them ($\phi_i \in (-\infty, \infty), i \in \{s, b\}$). We do not see a big quantitative difference by this comparison, because our model is not detrended (as, e.g. in Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003, or Wachter and Yogo, 2010).  

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29Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), is related to our work because they use infinitely-lived households, as we do Wachter and Yogo (2010), is a study with finite lives, but related to ours because of its focus on explaining that risk-taking is increasing in resources). There are two ingredients in detrending a household-finance model. First, the rate of time preference is higher than the risk-free rate ($\rho > \gamma_f$ – setting rates of time preference quite high, is a consequence of detrending a model, when risk-aversion coefficients are
Figure 3 – Benchmark calibration of the special case of the model with insurable labor-income risk \((\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1)\), using the closed-form solution. “CN” denotes China. All income categories are derived from actual data.

The key driving force of growing resources in our partial-equilibrium model, is that the rate of time preference, \(\rho\), is quite low, in most cases lower than the risk-free rate (see Table 2), and the income process is not detrended \((\mu_y = 0)\). Detrended household-finance models with a stationary distribution (calibrated under \(\rho > r_f\)), where poor households exhibit predominantly negative growth and can hit the borrowing constraint with high probability, higher than 1, see e.g., King, Plosser and Rebelo, 2002, p. 97). Second, the income process is detrended (in the language of our model, this means that average growth rate of labor income would be zero \((\mu_y = 0)\). In a lifecycle model, as in Wachter and Yogo (2010), the permanent-income component of lifecycle incomes matters for portfolio choice, so setting \(\mu_y = 0\) does not fully describe models like Wachter and Yogo (2010).
and try to leverage \((\phi_i > 1, i \in \{s, b\})\), as in in Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003, or Wachter and Yogo, 2010). Instead, in our model, poor households that foresee more possibilities for growth, may tend to short-sell stocks \((\phi_i < 0, i \in \{s, b\})\), which justifies the comparison of switching short-selling constraints on and off in Figure 4, mostly for the poor. We explain these points in Section 3.2 below, and, in more detail, in Appendix E.

Figure 4 – Calibration of the general version of the model with uninsurable labor-income risk \((\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.75)\). “CN” denotes China. All income categories are derived from actual data.

We emphasize again that, as our partial-equilibrium model with growing resources does

\(^30\)For the case of business equity in the EU, the difference between switching on and off the short-selling constraint is very small (see Panel B2 in Figure 4).
not have a stationary distribution, \textit{Figures 3 and 4 do not report after-tax income categories of a simulated income/wealth distribution} (unlike, e.g., Wachter and Yogo, 2010). Instead, we have inserted the income and asset values appearing in Table 1 into the risk-taking decision rules of the model. In Figures 3 and 4, we only refer to the after-tax income percentiles for simplicity.

Although we ultimately rely on minimum-distance techniques, we need to anchor some parameter values in order to start implementing a minimum-distance approach to find fitting values for different parameters. Setting labor-income risk, $\sigma_y$, equal to 12.0\%, is within the ballpark of a standard parametrization motivated by micro data (see, for example, Gomes and Michaelides (2003 p. 736) for details).\footnote{In Europe, labor protection regulation reduces labor-income fluctuations; therefore, we pick more moderate values, while Chinese labor-income fluctuations resemble those in the US. In the US, we set the mean labor-income growth to 1.7\%, and we use different values for Europe and China, reflecting the real-economy growth experiences of the two economic regions and population-aging trends.}

In Europe, our stock returns, $R_s$, and their volatility, $\sigma_s$, are close to their long-term values of 8\% and 19\% (see Guvenen, 2009, Table II, p. 1725) and close to the values 6\% and 18\% used by Gomes and Michaelides (2003). Our calibration exercise worked better by giving the risk-free rate, $r_f$, a rather generous 3.70\%, compared to the standard value close to 2\% (see, for example, Gomes and Michaelides (2003) and Guvenen (2009)). While our implied equity premium is rather low (3.3\%), it is not uncommon in the household-finance literature to consider such values. For example, an equity premium of 2.5\% is within the
range of values examined by Gomes and Michaelides (2003). European stock markets have similar features, so our calibrating values for $R_s$, $\sigma_s$, and $r_f$ in the EU area are similar to those in the US. In China, however, which is an emerging market, the stock returns from the Shanghai A-Share Index (using data from 1992-2013), $R_s$ and $\sigma_s$ are 11% and 76% in the data, so we picked numbers around 13% and 59% in our calibration.

A crucial preference parameter that we can calibrate based on survey data, is subsistence consumption, $\chi$. The monthly amount of USD 120 that we use for all economic regions (slightly higher for the EU) is within the range of survey evidence of monthly subsistence consumption reported by Koulovatianos et al. (2007, 2019), ranging between USD 111 and 302.

After anchoring the values of all parameters above, $R_s$, $\sigma_s$, $r_f$, $\mu_y$, $\sigma_y$, and $\chi$, we perform minimum-distance fitting in order to match portfolio shares, $\phi_s$ and $\phi_b$, observed in the data, using our closed-form formulas from Appendix D. Our minimum-distance exercise then implies a number of parameters for business equity that best match the data.

Interesting and robust are the implications that the mean and standard deviation of business-equity returns, $R_b$ and $\sigma_b$, are 11.1% and 30% in the US. The value $R_b = 11.1\%$ is not far from the average estimates in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002, Table 4, p. 756), and Kartashova (2014, Table 5, p. 3308). Regarding our model’s implication that $\sigma_b = 30\%$, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002, p. 765) mention: “[…] the annual standard deviation of the smallest decile of public firm returns is 41.1 percent. A portfolio of even

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32 Details on the Chinese stock-market data can be provided by the authors upon request.

33 Econometric studies such as those of Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Ogaki and Zhang (2001), and Donaldson and Pendakur (2006) do not reject the existence of subsistence consumption levels. Yet, issues of econometric model specification affect the robustness of subsistence estimates. Here, we rely on estimates from surveys regarding living standard comparisons across households; an adult needs an annual amount of approximately 3,000 US dollars in order to just survive. Our calibration in this paper refers to US dollars in year 2007. For the survey evidence see Koulovatianos et al. (2007, 2019) who use data from six countries derived by using the survey method first suggested by Koulovatianos et al. (2005), finding annual subsistence costs per person between 1,300-3,600 US dollars.
smaller private firms is likely to be as volatile.” It can be difficult to estimate idiosyncratic risks borne by a household. Unobservable limitations in outside options, such as frictions in relocating a business if other family incomes could increase by relocating, imperfect insurance from theft, etc., may justify that a value for \( \sigma_b \) in the order of 30\% may still be low. In China, Bai, Hsieh and Qian (2006, Figure 12, p. 85) indicate returns to capital by province that, in most cases, range between 20–60\%. In an emerging economy such as China, private business-equity returns should range well above these return figures, therefore we pick values around 65\% for \( R_b \) in China. Similarly, as indicated in Bai, Hsieh and Qian (2006, Figure 13, p. 86), returns to capital across provinces are also very volatile. Picking \( \sigma_b = 90\% \) for China is a natural choice, keeping the Sharpe ratio of private business equity about twice as much as the Sharpe ratio of stock returns in the US which is 30\% in the data (see Guvenen, 2009, Table II, p. 1725). Given the inter-country differences in the EU area, its lack of deep capital-market integration compared with the US, and the emerging-market features of private business in peripheral EU countries, the values of \( R_b \) and \( \sigma_b \) of 23\% and 37\% are reasonable (and comparable with the ranges estimated by Kartashova, 2014, Table 5, p. 3308, for the US).

Regarding the correlation between labor income shocks and stock returns, \( \rho_{y,s} \), our implied value is 41.4\% in the case of uninsurable labor-income risk under \( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.75 \). In our Online Appendix we find that the raw correlation coefficient \( \rho_{y,s} \) is 51\% for college graduates and 32\% for the total population using annual frequency, similar to Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, Maenhout (2001, Table 11.1 p.449). The corresponding microeconometric evidence on this correlation is rare due to the availability of long time series panel data, which might induce a finite sample bias problem when estimating the correlation. Davis and Willen (2000) have estimated this correlation, and offer estimates between 0 and 0.3. In
our sensitivity analysis (Appendix E Table E.1), we reduce $\rho_{y,s}$ to around 0.3 in the case of uninsurable labor-income risk under $\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.50$. The value $\rho_{y,s} = 0.3$ has been used also in Gomes and Michaelides (2003 p. 736)\textsuperscript{34}

The associated value for $\rho_{y,b}$ satisfying the relationship $\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.75$ is 76.1%. This high correlation between business equity and family income may be plausible as a large fraction of households have family businesses and tend to employ family members. In the EU and in China, the correlation of $\rho_{y,b}$ is similarly high.

Finally, in all our calibration exercises, the correlation between stock returns and business-equity returns, $\rho_{s,b}$, is always close to zero, in all economic regions. This robust implication of the model agrees with evidence in Palia, Qi, and Wu (2014, Table 2, p. 1702), in which the mean of $\rho_{s,b}$, is close to zero and the median is zero for the US. Apparently, the multitude of regional and idiosyncratic risks added to private business equity contribute to generating this trivial correlation between stock returns and business-equity returns.

### 3.2 Borrowing, subsistence, and short-selling constraints

In all simulations, we have imposed the constraints $c \geq \chi$, and $a \geq a = 0$, i.e., we have placed a borrowing limit. As stressed above, in the beginning of Section 3, our calibrating parameters imply positive growth of all income/wealth categories on average. Nevertheless, there is idiosyncratic labor-income risk that may drive some households close to hitting a constraint such as $c \geq \chi$. In Achury et al. (2012, p. 112, eq. 6), it has been shown that, with model parameters guaranteeing positive growth, the evolution of the state variables is such that $c(t) \geq \chi$ at all times. This is also true in our model, for the case of fully insurable labor-

\textsuperscript{34}Hall (2017, Figure 2, p. 307) suggests that stock-market risks and labor-income risks related to unemployment may be strongly correlated. Beyond idiosyncratic labor-income risks, the correlation $\rho_{y,s}$ that households have in mind must be influenced by these aggregate low-frequency linkages between the stock market and the labor market.
income risk \((\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1)\) without short-selling constraints, because the term \((a + y/r_y - \chi)\) follows a geometric Brownian motion\(^{35}\). As consumption satisfies \(c - \chi = \xi (a + y/r_y - \chi)\) with \(\xi > 0\) (see Appendix D), in the full-insurability case \(c(t) > \chi\) at all times. The constraint \(c(t) \geq \chi\) is not binding in the case of non-insurable labor-income risk, because aggregator of continuation utility, \(J, f(c, J)\), given by (8) is such that \(f_c(c, J)\) satisfies an Inada condition.

In the cases of \((\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.75)\) and \((\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.5)\), see Appendix E), despite that the property that \((a + y/r_y - \chi)\) follows a geometric Brownian motion does not hold \(a > a = 0\) does not bring any computational restrictions, apart from stressing a mild quantitative role of short-selling constraints \((\phi_i \in [0, 1], i \in \{s, b\})\), that we explain in Appendix E. Specifically, in Appendix E, we examine the case of \(\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1\) and explain why, in our model, that is calibrated so that household resources grow over time on average, poor households mildly tend to short-sell stocks. This contrasts non-perpetual-growth models with a stationary wealth distribution (see, for example, Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003, and Wachter and Yogo, 2010), which are concerned with the case where very poor people close to the borrowing constraint, \(a\), try to leverage, tending to violate the constraint \(\phi_i \leq 1\)\(^{36}\).

3.3 Detecting the underlying mechanism under uninsurable labor-income risk: is \(\kappa_2 > 0\)?

Our discussion in Section 2.3.2 above made a specific point. In the context of insurable background labor-income risk, the exact solution given by equation (13) implies that the only way to achieve the convexity feature in the risk-taking pattern of Figure 1 is to have

\(^{35}\)A proof of this property, which is responsible for the form of the value function in Appendix D, can be provided upon request.

\(^{36}\)In Appendix E, and in more detail, in Online Computational Appendix A, Section 1.3, and especially in Section 1.3.1 therein, we explain why a low rate of time preference, especially setting \(\rho < r_f\), is crucial for having endogenous growth and for this mild quantitative role of borrowing and short-selling constraints that our model exhibits.
\( \kappa_{2,i} > 0, \ i \in \{s, b\} \). Therefore, we called \( \kappa_{2,i}, \ i \in \{s, b\} \), “the convexity factor”.

Although in the case of uninsurable labor-income risk \((\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 \neq 1)\) equation (13) is invalid, Figure 4 uses (13) and demonstrates a feature that is important for distinguishing the underlying risk-taking incentives and mechanism. The dotted lines of Figure 4 use the parameter values corresponding to the case of \( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.75 \) in Table 2, after imputing these parameter values into the formula of equation (13), and specifically in equations (14) and (15). Figure 4 shows that this wrongly applied closed-form solution, represented by the dotted lines, is a good approximation of the true solution, which is shown by the dashed lines of Figure 4. Given this close approximation, reporting the value of \( \kappa_{2,i} \) even in the case of \( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.75 \) is a good way to reveal the underlying mechanism of risk-taking. Specifically, having \( \kappa_{2,i} > 0 \) is sufficient to show that middle-class households take less financial risk because they try to relieve themselves from the high level of background-income risk that they have to bear.

Table 3: The calibrated “convexity factor” \( \kappa_{2,i} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 )</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa_{2,s} )</td>
<td>( \kappa_{2,b} )</td>
<td>( \kappa_{2,s} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1.069</td>
<td>1.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( \kappa_{2,i} \) in eqn. (13).

Table 3 presents the values of the “convexity factor”, \( \kappa_{2,i}, \ i \in \{s, b\} \), for all model simulations in Figures 3 and 4. In all three countries/economic regions and in all cases, \( \kappa_{2,i} \) is strictly positive, reconfirming the role of background-income risk in household risk-taking suggested in this paper.37

37The goodness of fit of our model even in the case of \( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1 \) is consistent with the findings of Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) for lifecycle portfolio-choice models.
There is recent evidence supporting our model’s mechanism regarding the role of background-income risk in household risk-taking. Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2018) use administrative data from Norway to identify background risk. In a regression of household risk-taking against background risk and wealth, they find a negative coefficient against background risk and a positive coefficient between risk-taking and the interaction term of background risk and lagged wealth (see Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri, 2018, Table 8, Panel B therein). These findings support the interpretation of $\kappa_{2,i} > 0$ from equations (14) and (15): diversification of background income risk is the motivation behind decreasing portfolio shares, $\phi_i$. In addition, middle-class and poor households bear high background risk (see Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri, 2018, Figure 3). This evidence supports our model’s interpretation of a key feature of middle-income households: that the main reason these households bear higher background-labor income risk is their higher income-to-asset ratios, $y/a$.

Importantly, our model can also replicate saving rates of the rich and the poor within the ranges suggested by Dynan et al. (2004). These saving rates are also increasing in household resources.\footnote{These saving-rate results can be provided by the authors upon request.}

3.4 Sensitivity analysis and discrete-time applications

In Appendix E we perform a sensitivity analysis by further relaxing the relationship linking $\rho_{y,s}$ with $\rho_{y,b}$. Specifically, we consider $\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.5$. The main message is that our mechanism prevails, although the goodness of fit worsens in some cases. Our benchmark case with $\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 0.75$ seems to be a good representation of the data at least at the level of the model’s abstraction and parsimony.

In Appendix F, we perform another important extension. We translate our model to its discrete-time counterpart (all details appear in Online Computational Appendix B). This is
an essential exercise, because decisions under uncertainty in continuous-time models take into
account only two moments of Brownian-motion shocks. On the contrary, decisions under un-
certainty in discrete-time models take into account higher moments of random shocks. Due to
this difference between the discrete-time and the continuous-time settings, continuous-time-
model parameters that fit data targets well are not appropriate for the discrete-time model.
Yet, parameters from the closed-form solution of the continuous-time setting that best fit the
data serve as an ideal starting point in a homotopy approach for calibrating and solving the
discrete-time model (see Garcia and Zangwill, 1981, and in Eaves and Schmedders, 1999).
The optimal continuous-time parameters put the discrete-time model in the area of well-
behaved solutions, with a well-defined value function of the portfolio-choice model. Using
the continuous-time parameters with diversifiable labor-income risk as a starting guess, we
recursively solve the discrete-time model with diversifiable labor-income risk. This solution
of the discrete-time model with diversifiable labor-income risk is the initial value of the ho-
motopy process toward the final goal which is the undiversifiable labor-income risk version
with data-compatible correlation parameters.

4. **Conclusion**

Developing household-finance models is crucial for understanding the determinants of sav-
ing and risk-taking choices of households. In addition, models can serve as tools for policy
evaluation, as long as they can be described by deep, policy-invariant parameters. Neverthe-
less, since early on, household-finance modeling has stumbled upon difficulties in reconciling
the data, landing, in some cases, more puzzles than answers. For example, Haliassos and
Michaelides (2003), have stressed that according to standard savings/portfolio-choice models
with infinitely-lived agents, poorer households should be leveraging, which opposes what the
data say. Such modeling difficulties, have led to more “behavioral” modeling approaches, such as introducing habits (see, for example, Gomes and Michaelides, 2003), distinguishing households according to different structural preference parameters (see, for example, Guvenen, 2009), or to adding more and more features to models, such as lifecycle patterns (see, for example, Gomes and Michaelides, 2005, and Wachter and Yogo, 2010), and Bayesian learning (see, for example, Chang et al. 2018). While we agree that such extensions are important venues to explore, here we step back and further investigate the main suggestion of Achury et al. (2012): avoiding to work with detrended models and adding subsistence consumption, can provide parsimonious rational-expectations models with one utility function, that can replicate risk-taking and savings patterns observed in the data.

In Achury et al. (2012), replicating that risk-taking increases as household resources increase, relies on two ingredients: (a) positive endogenous growth of household resources on average, and (b) subsistence consumption. In the current paper we retained these two ingredients and we took two essential steps further. First, using data from many countries, we showed that middle-class households hesitate to take more risk compared to the rich (convex increasing risk-taking pattern in resources). Second, retaining a parsimonious framework, we introduced uninsurable labor-income risk and we demonstrated why it plays a crucial role in explaining this convex pattern. Uncontrollable labor-income risk stresses middle-income households more because labor income is a larger fraction of their total lifetime resources compared with the rich. Therefore, middle-income households reduce (controllable) financial risk in order to deal with this pressure. This reasoning agrees with some of the mechanics in the model proposed by Chang et al. (2018), but our model proposes that growing household resources play a more crucial role than age-dependent expectations and financial fragility.

---

39 This ubiquitous pattern has also been documented by research using administrative data, that are free from sampling error, by Bach, Calvet, and Sodini (2016) in Sweden, and by Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino, and Pistaferri (2016) in Norway.
other lifecycle features.

Our endogenous-growth model cannot deliver a stationary wealth distribution. Therefore, in this study, we only inserted prices and wealth/income data from single-time cross sections of household-finance surveys as exogenous inputs into our model, in order to endogenize household risk-taking decisions. We think that risk-taking patterns are crucial in explaining wealth distributions and their dynamics, but we recommend avoiding the use of detrended models with endogenous portfolio choice and endogenous stationary wealth distributions.\footnote{In two survey articles, Benhabib and Bisin (2018), and Benhabib, Bisin, and Luo (2017) stress that it is promising to have higher stochastic idiosyncratic returns in order to explain the thickness of the upper tail of the wealth distribution. Achdou et al. (2020, Section 5), offer new continuous-time computational techniques for endogenizing portfolio-choices and wealth/distribution applications, but still use detrended models.}

A future-research venue to follow may be the modeling ideas of birth/death processes that enable the coexistence of endogenous growth and stationary distributions in Jones (2018). While Jones (2018) uses birth-and-death processes in the context of Schumpeterian growth, these processes can be applied to household-portfolio models in order to capture finite lives and lifecycle-income dynamics. A key message from Jones (2018) is that an endogenous-growth approach can replicate the thickness of the upper tail of the wealth distribution, that standard heterogeneous-agent models, e.g., Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), and Krusell and Smith (1998) cannot replicate, based also on the related analysis by Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011, 2015).\footnote{The key mechanism for matching this upper tail is heterogeneous growth rates, that the rich grow faster than the poor, but with a birth/death process that leads to stationarity (see Jones, 2018, p. 1802). A well-calibrated household-finance model with endogenous growth implies that the resources of the rich grow faster on average, as their selected portfolios have higher average returns.} Constructing models with endogenous risk-taking decisions that combine key endogenous-growth features with birth-death processes capturing lifecycle household features, may set a promising research agenda both in household finance and in the literature that models the wealth distribution as an equilibrium outcome of market activity.
5. Appendix A – Explaining the data used in Figure 1

The data sources for the US are the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), referring to year 2007 (before the crisis), for the EU it is the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) in year 2013, and for China it is the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) in year 2013 as well. The household-income categorization in Figure 1 follows the convention proposed by the SCF Chartbook in the US and in the EU (see, Bucks et al. 2009, and European Central Bank, 2013): income categories include both labor income and capital income.

In Bach, Calvet, and Sodini (2016, see Figures 3 and 4) in which they present the mean returns of household risky assets and their standard deviations in Sweden, and also in Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino, and Pistaferri (2016, Figure 1 therein), the wealth percentiles they employ include young and old households. We do the same mixing of young and old households in the income categories we use in Figure 1. This descriptive strategy abstracts from lifecycle effects in household risk-taking. Table A.1 shows that the average and median ages corresponding to each income category do not exhibit a strong age bias, varying only slightly across income categories (the EU survey excludes pensioners and, unlike the US and the EU survey, the Chinese survey has not oversampled from the richest population group). The indication that ages are almost symmetrically distributed around the means of our income categories provides confidence that we can search for fundamental common reasons on why the rich/poor distinction leads to such a common risk-taking pattern depicted by in Figure 1.

For the US we use data before the subprime crisis of 2008, whereas for EU countries and China we use the databases from 2013, that also enable comparisons across EU countries. US household-portfolio data include direct stockholding, mutual funds, and retirement accounts.
EU data include only direct stockholding and mutual funds, which is one reason that EU portfolio shares are lower compared to the US. Chinese data include direct stockholding, mutual funds and some other indirect stockholding data, such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). In Online Data Appendices we provide details about our data sources, and database structure and quality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Category</th>
<th>US Mean</th>
<th>US Median</th>
<th>EU Mean</th>
<th>EU Median</th>
<th>China Mean</th>
<th>China Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 20%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 40%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 60%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 – 80%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 – 90%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 – 100%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.1: Average and median age by income category

6. Appendix B – Why value functions of household-portfolio models are fragile

Value-function fragility arises even in the simplest partial-equilibrium C-CAPM models with infinitely-lived agents. In order to see the problem, consider the simplest Merton (1969, 1971) model in discrete time. Consumption and portfolio shares of $n$ risky assets, $\{\phi_{i,t}\}_{i=1}^n$, are chosen throughout an infinite horizon $t = 0, 1, \ldots$, in order to maximize $E_0 \left( \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t c_t^{1-\gamma} / (1 - \gamma) \right)$, with $\gamma > 0$, $\gamma \neq 1$, $\beta \in (0, 1)$, subject to $a_{t+1} = R_{p,t} a_t - c_t$, in which $a$ is the value of total assets, $c$ is consumption, and $R_{p,t} \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_{i,t-1} R_{i,t} + (1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_{i,t-1}) R_f$, in which $R_f$ is the gross risk-free rate and $R_{i,t}$ is the gross return of risky
asset $i$, with $R_{i,t}$ being i.i.d. over time for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$. This model has a simple analytical solution, in which optimal portfolio shares are constant over time, $\phi^* = \{\phi^*_{i,t} = \phi^*_i\}_{i=1}^n$ for all $t$, solving the $n \times n$ system of equations given by,

$$E_t \left[ (R_{p,t+1|\phi^*})^{-\gamma} (R_{j,t+1} - R_f) \right] = 0, \quad j = 1, \ldots, n,$$

in which

$$R_{p,t+1|\phi^*} \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n \phi^*_i R_{i,t+1} + \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^n \phi^*_i\right) R_f.$$

The value function of this problem is

$$V(a) = \left\{1 - \left\{\beta E_t \left[ (R_{p,t+1|\phi^*})^{1-\gamma} \right] \right\}^{1/\gamma}\right\}^{-\gamma} a^{1-\gamma} \frac{1}{1-\gamma}. \quad (17)$$

Equation (17) implies that the value function $V(a)$ is well-defined only if

$$E_t \left[ (R_{p,t+1|\phi^*})^{1-\gamma} \right] < \frac{1}{\beta}. \quad (18)$$

Yet, as (16) indicates, the nonviolation of (18) is sensitive to asset-return covariance-matrix parameters. Slight changes in this variance-covariance matrix can influence optimal portfolio choices, $\phi^*$ in ways that can cause a failure of (18) and non-existence of $V(a)$.

To summarize, once the ex-post portfolio choice is imposed on the effective household-specific return, the value function may no longer be well-defined if some parameters are changed (violation of the transversality condition). One source of parameter sensitivity is the covariance matrix among different risky assets. Even for solving this simple model, educated calibration guesses on parameters are required. Simpler cases with analytical solutions can serve as a guide for discovering calibrating parameters that overcome this non-existence problem. These specific calibrated parameters can indicate the “ballpark” within which more complicated models can be solved numerically.
7. Appendix C – Derivation of the closed-form solution for insurable labor-income risk \((\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1)\)

We make two technical assumptions that enable us to secure interiority of solutions and analytical tractability. The rationale behind these assumptions becomes more obvious after the statement of Proposition 1, so we provide intuition at a later point.

**Assumption 1**  *Initial conditions are restricted so that,*

\[
a_0 + \frac{y_0}{r_y} > \frac{\chi}{r_f}.
\]

**Assumption 2**  *The parameter restriction,*

\[
\frac{1}{\eta} > 1 - \frac{\rho}{r_f + \frac{\nu}{\gamma}}, \quad \text{with} \quad \nu \equiv (R - r_f 1) \left(\sigma \sigma^T\right)^{-1} (R^T - r_f 1^T),
\]

*holds.*

Proposition 1 provides the formulas of the analytical solution to the model.

**Proposition 1**

If \(\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1\), short selling is allowed, and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the solution to the problem expressed by the HJB equation given by (9) is a decision rule for portfolio choice given by (12), and a decision rule for consumption,

\[
e^* = C(a, y) = \xi \left( a + \frac{y}{r_y} - \frac{\chi}{r_f} \right) + \chi,
\]

*in which*

\[
\xi = \rho \eta + (1 - \eta) r_f - \frac{(\eta - 1) \nu}{2 \gamma},
\]
while the value function is given by,

\[
V(a, y) = \rho^{-\eta 1/\gamma} \xi^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + \frac{y}{r_y} - \frac{\chi}{r_f}}{1 - \gamma} \right)^{1-\gamma}.
\]

**Proof of Proposition 1**

We make a guess on the functional form of the value function, namely,

\[
V(a, y) = b (a + \psi y - \omega)^{1-\gamma}, \tag{21}
\]

which implies,

\[
V_a(a, y) = b (a + \psi y - \omega)^{-\gamma}, \tag{22}
\]

and also

\[
f_c(c, V(a, y)) = \rho b^{1-\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} (a + \psi y - \omega)^{1-\gamma} (c - \chi)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}. \tag{23}
\]

From (22), (23) and (10) it is,

\[
c = \rho b^{-\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} (a + \psi y - \omega) + \chi. \tag{24}
\]

Similarly, calculating the appropriate partial derivatives and substituting them in (11), gives,

\[
\phi^T = \frac{1}{\eta} (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} (R^T - r_f 1^T) \left( 1 + \psi \frac{y}{a} - \frac{\omega}{a} \right) - \sigma y \frac{y}{a} (\rho \sigma^{-1})^T. \tag{25}
\]

Substituting (24), (21), (8), (25), and all derivatives stemming from (21) into the HJB given by (9) results in,

\[
\rho b (a + \psi y - \omega)^{1-\gamma} = \rho b^{-\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} (a + \psi y - \omega)^{1-\gamma} + b (a + \psi y - \omega)^{-\gamma} \left\{ \frac{1}{\eta} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} (R^T - r_f 1^T) (a + \psi y - \omega) - \right.\]

\[
\left. - \frac{1}{\eta} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} (R^T - r_f 1^T) (a + \psi y - \omega)^{1-\gamma} \right\}.
\]
\[-\sigma_y \psi_y \rho_y \sigma^{-1} \left( R^T - r_f 1^T \right) + r_f a + y - \rho^y b^{-\eta \frac{1}{1-\gamma}} (a + \psi y - \omega) \right) - \\
\frac{\gamma}{2} a^2 b (a + \psi y - \omega)^{\gamma-1} \left\{ \frac{1}{\gamma} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} \left( 1 + \psi \frac{y}{a} - \frac{\omega}{a} \right) - \sigma_y \frac{\psi y}{a} \rho_y \sigma^{-1} \right\} \times \\
\times \sigma \sigma^T \left\{ \frac{1}{\gamma} (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} \left( R^T - r_f 1^T \right) \left( 1 + \psi \frac{y}{a} - \frac{\omega}{a} \right) - \sigma_y \frac{\psi y}{a} \left( \rho_y \sigma^{-1} \right)^T \right\} + \\
+ \psi b (a + \psi y - \omega)^{-\gamma} \mu_y y - \frac{\gamma}{2} b \psi^2 (\sigma y)^2 (a + \psi y - \omega)^{-\gamma-1} - \gamma \sigma_y a y b \psi (a + \psi y - \omega)^{-\gamma-1} \times \\
\times \left\{ \frac{1}{\gamma} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} \left( 1 + \psi \frac{y}{a} - \frac{\omega}{a} \right) - \sigma_y \frac{\psi y}{a} \rho_y \sigma^{-1} \right\} \sigma \rho_y^T. \quad (26)\]

After some algebra, (26) leads to,

\[
\rho - \frac{1}{\eta} \rho^y b^{-\eta \frac{1}{1-\gamma}} - \frac{1}{2\gamma} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} \left( R^T - r_f 1^T \right) = r_f \frac{a + \psi \mu_y \left( R - r_f 1 \right) \left( (\rho \sigma^{-1})^T \right) y - \chi}{r_f} \\
+ \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{\sigma y \psi y}{a + \psi y - \omega} \right)^2 \left( \rho_y \rho_y^T - 1 \right). \quad (27)\]

Since we have assumed that \( \rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1 \), i.e., \( \rho_y \rho_y^T = 1 \), the last term of the right-hand side in (27) vanishes. Moreover, we set

\[
\omega = \chi / r_f \quad (28)\]

and

\[
\psi = \frac{1 + \psi \left[ \mu_y - \sigma_y (R - r_f 1) \left( \rho_y \sigma^{-1} \right)^T \right]}{r_f}, \quad (29)\]

which gives

\[
\psi = 1 / r_y. \quad (30)\]

After substituting (29) into (27) we obtain

\[
\rho - \frac{1}{\eta} \rho^y b^{-\eta \frac{1}{1-\gamma}} - \frac{1}{2\gamma} (R - r_f 1) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} \left( R^T - r_f 1^T \right) = r_f. \quad (31)\]
Solving (31) for $\rho^\eta b^{-\eta(1-1/n)/(1-\gamma)}$ gives,

$$\rho^\eta b^{-\eta(1-1/n)/(1-\gamma)} = \xi,$$  \hspace{1cm} (32)

in which $\xi$ is given by equation (20). Moreover, substituting (30) and (28) into (25) leads to (12). Substituting formulas (30) and (28) in (21) reveals that Assumption 1 is both necessary and sufficient in order that $V(a,y)$ be well-defined. From (20) the requirement that $\xi > 0$ is equivalent to the condition given by Assumption 2 in order to guarantee that, under Assumption 1 and equation (19), $c \geq \chi$ for all $(a,y)$, completing the proof.

\[\square\]

8. Appendix D – Characterization of portfolio shares

Proof of the form of equation (13) and of formulas (14) and (15)

The decomposition of matrix $\Sigma$ is

$$\Sigma = \sigma \sigma^T = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_s & 0 \\ \rho_{s,b} \sigma_b & \sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_s & \rho_{s,b} \sigma_b \\ 0 & \sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \end{bmatrix},$$

with

$$\sigma^{-1} = \frac{1}{\sigma_s \sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} & 0 \\ -\rho_{s,b} \sigma_b & \sigma_s \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\sigma_s} & 0 \\ -\rho_{s,b} \sigma_b & \frac{1}{\sigma_s \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\sigma_s} & 0 \\ -\rho_{s,b} & \frac{1}{\sigma_s \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \end{bmatrix}. \hspace{1cm} (33)$$

Therefore, (33) implies,

$$\rho_y \sigma^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} \rho_{y,s} & \rho_{y,b} \\ \rho_{y,b} \sigma_b & \rho_{y,b} \sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\sigma_s} & 0 \\ -\rho_{s,b} \sigma_b & \frac{1}{\sigma_s \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \end{bmatrix},$$

or,

$$\rho_y \sigma^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\rho_{y,s}}{\sigma_s} & \frac{\rho_{y,b} \rho_{s,b}}{\sigma_s \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \\ \frac{\rho_{y,b}}{\sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}}} & \frac{\rho_{y,b}}{\sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}}} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\sigma_s} & 0 \\ -\rho_{s,b} \sigma_b & \frac{1}{\sigma_s \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \end{bmatrix}. \hspace{1cm} (34)$$
Notice that since,

\[ \Sigma^{-1} = (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} = \frac{1}{\sigma_s^2 \sigma_b^2 (1 - \rho_{s,b}^2)} \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_b^2 & -\rho_{s,b} \sigma_s \sigma_b \\ -\rho_{s,b} \sigma_s \sigma_b & \sigma_s^2 \end{bmatrix}, \]

after some algebra, the term \((1/\gamma)(\mathbf{R} - r_f \mathbf{1}) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1}\) in (12) is,

\[ \frac{1}{\gamma} (\mathbf{R} - r_f \mathbf{1}) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{R_{s-r_f}}{\sigma_s} & \frac{R_{b-r_f}}{\sigma_b} \\ -\rho_{s,b} \frac{R_{b-r_f}}{\sigma_b} & -\rho_{s,b} \frac{R_{s-r_f}}{\sigma_s} \end{bmatrix} \right]. \quad (35) \]

From equation (12) we obtain,

\[
\begin{bmatrix} \phi_s \\ \phi_b \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{\gamma} (\mathbf{R} - r_f \mathbf{1}) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_{0,s} & \kappa_{0,b} \\ \kappa_{1,s} & \kappa_{1,b} \end{bmatrix} - \frac{1}{r_y} \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma} (\mathbf{R} - r_f \mathbf{1}) (\sigma \sigma^T)^{-1} - \sigma_y \rho_y \sigma^{-1} \right] \begin{bmatrix} \kappa_{2,s} \\ \kappa_{2,b} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (36)
\]

Equation (36) demonstrates the functional form of equation (13). After combining (35) and (34) with (36), and after substituting the constraint \(\rho_{y,s}^2 + \rho_{y,b}^2 = 1\), we obtain all coefficients of equation (13), namely,

\[
\begin{align*}
\kappa_{0,s} &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \frac{R_{s-r_f} - \rho_{s,b} R_{b-r_f}}{\sigma_s} \\
\kappa_{1,s} &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \frac{R_{s-r_f} - \rho_{s,b} R_{b-r_f}}{\sigma_s} \frac{\chi}{r_f} \\
\kappa_{2,s} &= -\left[ \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \frac{R_{s-r_f} - \rho_{s,b} R_{b-r_f}}{\sigma_s} - \sigma_y \left( \frac{\rho_{y,s}}{\sigma_s} - \sqrt{1 - \rho_{y,s}^2} \right) \frac{1}{r_y} \right], \quad (37)
\end{align*}
\]
and,

\[
\kappa_{0,b} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \cdot \frac{R_{b} - r_f}{\sigma_b} - \frac{R_{s} - r_f}{\sigma_s} \cdot \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2} \cdot \frac{\rho_{s,b} R_{b} - r_f}{\sigma_b} \cdot \frac{\chi}{r_f} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{1 - \rho_{y,s}^2}}{\sigma_y \sqrt{1 - \rho_{s,b}^2}} \cdot \frac{1}{r_y} .
\]

(38)

Equations (37) and (38) prove their concise versions given by (14) and (15).

9. Appendix E – The role of short-selling/borrowing constraints and sensitivity analysis

The formula given by equation (13) in the main body of the paper, holds only in the case of full-insurability \((\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1)\) of labor-income risk and without any short-selling constraints \((\phi_i \in (-\infty, \infty), i \in \{s, b\})\). Nevertheless, in Figure 4, we have used the same formula as an approximation to the case of uninsurability of labor-income risk \((\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.75)\), despite that the calibrating parameters behind Figure 4 (see Table 2), have been obtained through minimum-distance fitting of the HJB equation (9) in the main body of the paper, with short-selling constraints \((\phi_i \in [0, 1], i \in \{s, b\})\). While using formula (13) in Figure 4 is wrong, equation (13) is still informative. First, it is not far from explaining the data, and it can reveal some of the mechanics of the model. Specifically, Table E.1, shows that, using the calibrated parameter values in Table 2, all factors of equation (13), \(\phi_i^* = \kappa_{0,i} - \kappa_{1,i}/a - \kappa_{2,i} \cdot y/a\), for \(i \in \{s, b\}\), are strictly positive, i.e.,

\[
\kappa_{0,i}, \kappa_{1,i}, \kappa_{2,i} > 0 , \text{ for } i \in \{s, b\} ,
\]

(39)

both in the full-insurability case \((\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1)\) and in the case with \((\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.75)\).
Table E.1: The calibrated $\kappa_{0,i}$, $\kappa_{1,i}$, $\kappa_{2,i}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\rho_{ss}^2 + \rho_{sb}^2$</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\kappa_{0,s}$</td>
<td>$\kappa_{0,b}$</td>
<td>$\kappa_{1,s}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>9944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>2183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>2583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\kappa_{0,i}$, $\kappa_{1,i}$, $\kappa_{2,i}$ in eqn. (13), using calibrating values from Table 2

In our simulations, we consider a no-borrowing constraint, $a \geq g = 0$, which is standard in much of the literature, and a non-negative level of (after-tax/transfer) income, $y > 0$. Since the dynamics of $y$ are driven by a geometric Brownian motion (see equation (1)), $y > 0$ is guaranteed. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider positive values for $y$, and $a$, which, based on equation (13) and inequality (39), imply

$$\frac{\partial \phi_i^*}{\partial y} = -\frac{\kappa_{2,i}}{a} < 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \phi_i^*}{\partial a} = \frac{\kappa_{1,i} + \kappa_{2,i} y}{a^2} > 0, \text{ for } i \in \{s, b\}. \quad (40)$$

We also emphasize the key features of our calibration revealed by Table 2, that the rate of time preference, $\rho$, is low, and $\mu_y > 0$. In the case of the US and the EU, $\rho < r_f$, while in the case of China, $\rho$ is slightly higher than $r_f$, but the high rates of stock and business return in China reveal that some risk-taking leads to growing resources over time. Standard household-portfolio models in the literature focus on detrended data, assuming $\rho > r_f$, which implies that the poor decumulate resources. In our model, household resources grow for most households (see Online Computational Appendix A, Section 1.3). This means that the bulk of expansion-path probability masses imply richer households with low $y/a$ ratios and poor households with high $y/a$ ratios, mostly because of very low values of $a$.

When $a$ is very high, equation (13) and inequality (40) imply that $\phi_i^* \rightarrow \kappa_{0,i}$, $i \in \{s, b\}$. Table E.1 shows that $\kappa_{0,i}$, $i \in \{s, b\}$ in all countries, is calibrated to values below 100%. Therefore, our model is calibrated so that risk-taking shares do not exceed 100% for high levels of resources. When $a$ is very low, equation (13) and inequality (40) imply that $\phi_i^*, i \in \{s, b\}$...
\{s, b\}, can go to negative values. This consideration, can make the short-selling constraints 
\(\phi_i \in [0, 1], i \in \{s, b\}\) quantitatively important.

Figure E.1 – Demonstration of the small quantitative importance of short-selling constraints, in the version of the model with insurable labor-income risk \(\rho_{y, a}^2 + \rho_{y, b}^2 = 1\).

“CN” denotes China. All income categories are derived from actual data.

Figure E.1 focuses on the case of full-insurability of labor-income risk \(\rho_{y, a}^2 + \rho_{y, b}^2 = 1\) using the calibrating parameters from Table 2. Figure E.1 reveals that the quantitative importance of the short-selling constraints \(\phi_i \in [0, 1], i \in \{s, b\}\) is not high. Nevertheless, what Figure E.1 confirms, is that the short-selling constraint is more important for the poor income classes. Yet, unlike household-finance models using detrended data (e.g., Haliassos
and Michaelides, 2003), the short-selling constraint in households with growing resources biases the risk-taking shares of the poor upward, and not downward.

Another crucial message of Figure E.1 is that our Chebyshev-polynomial algorithm fits the closed-form solution very well. This reveals that our numerical-approximation approach is reliable.

We now conduct a sensitivity analysis, by repeating the quantitative investigations conveyed by Table 2 and Figure 4, for $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.50$ as a robustness check. The corresponding calibration parameters across different economic regions are provided in Table E.2, while Figure E.2 demonstrates the minimum-distance fit of the model to the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table E.2: Calibrated Parameters across Model Specifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_f$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{ys}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{yb}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{sy}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{by}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 2007 USD (ppp adjusted)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in Figure 4, our minimum-distance fitting complies with the short-selling constraints.
\( \phi_i \in [0, 1], i \in \{s, b\} \). The dotted line shows the closed form solution using equation (13). Unsurprisingly, with \( \rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.50 \), we find wider distances between the Chebyshev approximation and the closed form solution than Figure 4 in main body of the paper. Nevertheless, the parameters achieved under the closed-form solution still behave well used as the starting initial guess for calibrating the “true” model when labor income risk is uninsurable.

Figure E.2 – Calibration of the general version of the model with uninsurable labor-income risk \( (\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.50) \). “CN” denotes China. All income categories are derived from actual data.

In our Online Computational Appendix C, based on Panel-Study-of-Income-Dynamics (PSID) income data and Standard and Poors (S&P) stock-index data, we present evidence
that empirical estimates of $\rho_{ys}$ range between 32-51%.

In brief, the closed-form solution has served as a useful calibration guide even for $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.50$, allowing us to understand which parameter combinations can achieve satisfactory data fitting. Trying the closed-form solution formula leads to an informative approximation of the true solution (Chebyshev polynomial) depicted by Figure E.2. Although for $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2$ far away from 1 the closed-form solution is mathematically incorrect, it seems that the closed-form formula is directly useful for understanding the underlying role of background labor-income risk in risk-taking. Specifically, Table E.3 presents the values of the “convexity factor” again, in comparison with the $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1$ case (see Table 3). Again, in all three countries/economic regions, $\kappa_{2,i}$ is strictly positive, demonstrating that the positive value of $\kappa_{2,i}$ is necessary for the model, especially for fitting the increasing and convex risk-taking pattern in household resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2$</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_{2,s}$</td>
<td>$\kappa_{2,b}$</td>
<td>$\kappa_{2,s}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1.069</td>
<td>1.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\kappa_{2,i}$ in eqn. (13).

\[42\] This numerical proximity between risky asset shares derived by the closed-form solution and the numerical solution in the case of uninsurable labor-income risk, may be sensitive to changes in parameter values. Yet, such an investigation is beyond the scope of the present study.
10. Appendix F – Extension to a Discrete-time analysis

For the discrete-time analogue to the continuous-time version of the model with two risky assets, using Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW) preferences, the Bellman equation is

\[
V(a_t, y_t) = \max_{c_t \geq 0, \phi^s_t, \phi^b_t \in [0,1]} \left\{ \frac{(1 - \beta) (c_t - \chi)^{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}} + \beta \left\{ (1 - \gamma) E_t \left[ V(R_{p,t+1}a_t + y_t, \ y_{t+1}) \right] \right\}^{\frac{1}{1 - \gamma}}}{1 - \gamma} \right\},
\]

in which,

\[
R_{p,t+1} \equiv (R^s_{t+1} - r_f) \phi^s_t + (R^b_{t+1} - r_f) \phi^b_t + r_f,
\]

and with,

\[
\ln(y_{t+1}) - \ln(y_t) = \mu_y + \varepsilon_{y,t+1} + \varepsilon_{y,t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_y),
\]

\[
\ln(P_{s,t+1}) - \ln(P_{s,t}) = R_s + \varepsilon_{s,t+1} + \varepsilon_{s,t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_s),
\]

\[
\ln(P_{b,t+1}) - \ln(P_{b,t}) = R_b + \varepsilon_{b,t+1} + \varepsilon_{b,t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_b),
\]

where \(P_{s,t}\) and \(P_{b,t}\) denote the stock price and the business equity price in period \(t\), while,

\[
\frac{\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_{s,t+1}, \varepsilon_{y,t+1})}{\sigma_s \sigma_y} = \rho_{ys},
\]

\[
\frac{\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_{b,t+1}, \varepsilon_{y,t+1})}{\sigma_b \sigma_y} = \rho_{yb},
\]

\(^{43}\)See Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989).
Cov \left( \varepsilon_{s,t+1}, \varepsilon_{b,t+1} \right) \over \sigma_s \sigma_b = \rho_{sb} \ , \quad (48)

\begin{align*}
R_t^s & \text{ in equation } (42) \text{ is given by,} \\
R_t^s & = e^{R_s + \varepsilon_{s,t}} \ , \quad (49)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
R_t^b & \text{ in equation } (42) \text{ is given by,} \\
R_t^b & = e^{R_b + \varepsilon_{b,t}} \ , \quad (50)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
y_t & \text{ is given by,} \\
y_t & = e^{R_y + \varepsilon_{y,t}} \ , \quad (51)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
a_t & \geq a = 0
\end{align*}

and \((a_0, y_0, \phi_0)\) are given.

The computational algorithm is fully explained in our Online Computational Appendix B. In the interest of brevity, we only use the US case as an illustrating example here. In Panel A1/A2 of Figure F.1 we can see that trying the best-fitting parameters of the continuous-time model (directly from the closed form solution, see Table 2), does not lead to a good match of the discrete-time model to the data. We report the calibrating values in Table F.1 that match the discrete-time model to the risky-asset-holding data (Panel A1/A2 of Figure F.1) as \(\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1\). In Panel B1/B2 of Figure F.1 we show that the parameter values used in the case of \(\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1\) cannot match the data for \(\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 \in \{0.75, 0.50\}\), indicating that further re-parameterization is needed. We re-calibrate the model and show the goodness of fit of the model against the data in Panels C1/C2 and D1/D2 of Figure F.1, with the corresponding calibrated parameters presented in Table F.1. An important message here is that the guidance we have had from the continuous-time model allows us

\footnote{We have achieved this goodness of fit through a trial-and-error approach but using the continuous-time calibration parameters that correspond to the closed form solution as the starting guess.}
to get in the ballpark of best-matching parameters to data, achieving our calibration goals through a homotopy approach.

Table F.1: Calibrated Parameters in Discrete Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^2_{ys} + \rho^2_{yb}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Closed-form)</td>
<td>(discrete time)</td>
<td>(discrete time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_y$</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_y$</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_f$</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_s$</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_b$</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_s$</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_b$</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{sy}$</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{sb}$</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>3.316</td>
<td>5.750</td>
<td>6.417</td>
<td>7.963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.971</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.970</td>
<td>0.970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in 2007 USD)

$\chi$ | 1437 | 1800 | 1800 | 1800 |
Figure F.1 US - Discrete-time numerical simulations, using exponential projection on the model with two risky assets. All income categories are derived from actual data.
REFERENCES


Online Computational Appendices

for

The Role of Labor-Income Risk in Household Risktaking

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This version: May 17, 2020

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1. Appendix A – Simulating the continuous-time model

1.1 Algebraic manipulations

The first-order conditions of the problem expressed by equation (9) in the main body of the paper are,

\[ f_c(c, V(a, y)) = V_a(a, y), \quad (A.1) \]

\[ \phi^T = (\sigma^T)^{-1} \left( R^T - r_f 1^T \right) \frac{V_a(a, y)}{-a \cdot V_{aa}(a, y)} - \frac{y}{\alpha} \left( \rho y \sigma^{-1} \right)^T \frac{V_{ay}(a, y)}{V_{aa}(a, y)}. \quad (A.2) \]

Based on equation (8) in the paper,

\[ f_c(c, V) = \rho \left( (1 - \gamma) V \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\delta}} (c - \chi)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}. \quad (A.3) \]

In order to make notation somewhat easier to follow, set,

\[ \theta \equiv \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\eta}}{1 - \gamma}. \quad (A.4) \]

Combining (A.4) with (A.3) we obtain,

\[ f_c(c, V) = \rho \left( (1 - \gamma) V \right)^{1 - \theta} (c - \chi)^{\theta (1 - \gamma) - 1}. \quad (A.5) \]

Combining (A.5) with (A.1) gives,

\[ c^* = C(a, y) = \chi + \left\{ \rho^{-1} V_a^* \cdot \left[ (1 - \gamma) V^* \right]^{\theta - 1} \right\}^{\frac{1}{\theta (1 - \gamma) - 1}}, \quad (A.6) \]

in which \( V^* \) is the fixed point of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation given by equation (10) in the paper. From equation (9) in the paper,

\[ f(c^*, V^*) = \frac{\rho}{\theta (1 - \gamma)} (c^* - \chi)^{\theta (1 - \gamma) \left[ (1 - \gamma) V^* \right]^{1 - \theta} - \frac{\rho}{\theta} V^*. \quad (A.7) \]

Finally, (A.2) implies,

\[ (\phi^*)^T = (\sigma^T)^{-1} \left( R^T - r_f 1^T \right) \frac{V_a^*}{-a \cdot V_{aa}^*} - \frac{y}{\alpha} \left( \rho y \sigma^{-1} \right)^T \frac{V_{ay}^*}{V_{aa}^*}. \quad (A.8) \]
The max operator on the right-hand side of the HJB equation which is given by (10) in the paper, can be discarded at the fixed point, $V^*$. Using equations (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8), we can incorporate the optimizers $\phi^*$ and $c^*$ in the HJB equation, in order to obtain,

$$1 = \left\{ \frac{\rho}{\theta (1 - \gamma)} (c^* - \chi) \theta^{(1-\gamma)} [(1 - \gamma) V^*]^{1-\theta} + \left\{ [\tilde{\phi} R^T + (1 - \tilde{\phi}^* 1^T) r_f] a + y - c^* \right\} \cdot V^*_a 

+ \frac{1}{2} a^2 \tilde{\phi}^* \sigma \sigma^T (\tilde{\phi}^*)^T \cdot V^*_a + \mu_y y \cdot V^*_y 

+ \frac{1}{2} (\sigma_y y)^2 \cdot V^*_y + \sigma_y a y \tilde{\phi}^* \sigma^T \cdot V^*_y \right\} / \left( \frac{\rho}{\theta} V^* \right), \quad (A.9)$$

where $\tilde{\phi}^* \equiv \min \{ \max \{ \phi^*, 0 \}, 1 \}$, with some abuse of notation, as the min and max operators are applied to each element of vector $\phi^*$, in order to impose the short-selling constraints ($\phi_i \in [0, 1], \ i \in \{s, b\}$). Equation (A.9) is a second-order (bivariate) partial differential equation, which we solve numerically. Yet, the numerical solution of partial differential equations can be challenging in terms of numerical accuracy, rounding problems, or error-accumulation problems. For example, in a slightly alternative version of equation (A.9), the term $(\rho/\theta) V^*$ would be on the left-hand side of (A.9); in the present version of (A.9) we have divided both sides of that alternative version by the term $(\rho/\theta) V^*$; we have done so, because, for successful calibrating parameter values of the model, the numerical values of $V^*$ are often small numbers in the order of $10^{-15}$; such small-valued functions $V^*$ usually neglect convergence criteria, and a resolution of this problem is to normalize the HJB equation, as we did in (A.9).
1.2 Chebyshev-polynomial approximation

The Chebyshev-approximated function we use has the form,

\[ V(a, y) \approx \sum_{i=0}^{N_1} \sum_{j=0}^{N_1} \theta_{ij} T_i(X(a)) T_j(X(y)), \]  
(A.10)

in which \( T_j(x) \) is the Chebyshev polynomial of degree \( j \in \{0, 1, \ldots\} \), given by,

\[ T_j(x) = \cos(j \cdot \arccos(x)), \]  
(A.11)

with,

\[ T'_j(x) = \frac{\partial \cos(j \cdot \arccos(x))}{\partial x} = j \frac{\sin(j \cdot \arccos(x))}{\sqrt{1-x^2}}, \]  
(A.12)

\[ T''_j(x) = \frac{\partial^2 \cos(j \cdot \arccos(x))}{\partial x^2} = \frac{1}{1-x^2} \left[ x \cdot \frac{j \cdot \sin(j \cdot \arccos(x))}{\sqrt{1-x^2}} - j^2 \cdot \cos(j \cdot \arccos(x)) \right], \]

and based on formulas (A.11) and (A.12) we have the concise formula for the second derivative,

\[ T''_j(x) = \frac{1}{1-x^2} [x \cdot T'_j(x) - j^2 \cdot T_j(x)]. \]  
(A.13)

Regarding functions \( X(a) \) and \( X(y) \) in (A.10), notice that the domain of \( T_j(x) \) is \([-1, 1]\).

Thanks to linearity properties of vector spaces it is straightforward to implement the Chebyshev projection method to values \( a \in [a, \bar{a}] \) and \( y \in [y, \bar{y}] \) through the linear transformation,

\[ X(z) = \frac{2}{\bar{z} - \tilde{z}} \cdot z - \frac{\bar{z} + \tilde{z}}{\bar{z} - \tilde{z}}, \]  
(A.14)

in which \( a \) and \( y \) are the smallest values of the grids for \( a \) and \( y \), while \( \bar{a} \) and \( \bar{y} \) are the largest values of \( a \) and \( y \).

1.2.1 Forming the endogenous Chebyshev grids

Chebyshev polynomials can avoid accumulating rounding errors as the polynomial degree of the approximating function increases. While using state-space grids, this ability stems from
the “discrete-orthogonality properties” of Chebyshev polynomials. These properties hold at specific gridpoints on the interval \([-1, 1]\), at values \(x_k\), such that \(T_n(x_k) = 0\), \(k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\), with,\(^1\)

\[
\tilde{x}_k = \cos \left( \frac{2k - 1}{2n} \pi \right), \quad k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}.
\]  

(A.15)

Using \(m\) gridpoints for each dimension, \(a\) and \(y\), the \(m \times 1\) vector which is computed by (A.15) is denoted by \(\tilde{x}\), and it is called the “Chebyshev nodes”. In order to project the gridpoints given by \(\tilde{x}\) back onto variables \(a\) and \(y\), use the inverse transformation of (A.14), in order to create the corresponding \(m \times 1\) vectors, \(a_{\text{grid}} = \tilde{a}\), and \(y_{\text{grid}} = \tilde{y}\), namely,

\[
\tilde{a} = A(\tilde{x}) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tilde{x} + 1}{\tilde{a} - a} \right) + a,
\]  

(A.16)

and

\[
\tilde{y} = Y(\tilde{x}) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\tilde{x} + 1}{\tilde{y} - y} \right) + y.
\]  

(A.17)

### 1.2.2 Best-fitting the two-dimensional Chebyshev polynomial to a known function

Let’s assume that we have an \(m_a \times 1\) grid for \(a\), \(\tilde{a}\), calculated using (A.16), and an \(m_y \times 1\) grid for \(y\), \(\tilde{y}\), calculated using (A.17). Any known function, \(V(a, y)\), can map the grid of Chebyshev nodes (discretized domain) to an \(m_a \times m_y\) matrix, \(\tilde{V}\), defined as,

\[
\tilde{V} = \left[ \tilde{v}_{k, \ell} \right] = \left[ V(\tilde{a}_k, \tilde{y}_\ell) \right] = \left[ V(A(\tilde{x}_{a,k}), Y(\tilde{x}_{y,\ell})) \right], \quad k \in \{1, \ldots, m_a\}, \quad \ell \in \{1, \ldots, m_y\},
\]  

(A.18)

in which \(A(\cdot)\) and \(Y(\cdot)\) are given by (A.16) and (A.17). Let’s also assume that the Chebyshev polynomial degree for dimension \(a\) is \(\nu_a\), and \(\nu_y\) for dimension \(y\). In order to achieve a best Chebyshev polynomial fitting of the functional form given by (A.10) on the elements of

\(^1\)This error-minimizing property of gridpoints \(\{x_k\}_{k=1}^n\) with \(T_n(x_k) = 0\) can be proved formally. See, for example, Judd (1992) and further references therein.
matrix $\hat{V}$, we minimize least-squares residuals. The formulas for the optimal Chebyshev-approximation estimator $\hat{\theta}_{i,j}$ are given by (see, for example, Heer and Maußner, 2005, Ch. 8, p. 441),

$$\hat{\theta}_{0,0} = \frac{1}{m_am_y} \sum_{k=1}^{m_a} \sum_{\ell=1}^{m_y} \hat{v}_{k,\ell}$$  \quad (A.19)  

$$\hat{\theta}_{i,0} = \frac{2}{m_am_y} \sum_{k=1}^{m_a} \sum_{\ell=1}^{m_y} \hat{v}_{k,\ell} T_i(\bar{x}_{a,k})$$  \quad (A.20)  

$$\hat{\theta}_{0,j} = \frac{2}{m_am_y} \sum_{k=1}^{m_a} \sum_{\ell=1}^{m_y} \hat{v}_{k,\ell} T_j(\bar{x}_{y,\ell})$$  \quad (A.21)  

$$\hat{\theta}_{i,j} = \frac{4}{m_am_y} \sum_{k=1}^{m_a} \sum_{\ell=1}^{m_y} \hat{v}_{k,\ell} T_i(\bar{x}_{a,k}) T_j(\bar{x}_{y,\ell})$$  \quad (A.22)  

for $i \in \{1, ..., \nu_a - 1\}$ and $j \in \{1, ..., \nu_y - 1\}$. For convenience, we can summarize the optimal-fitting conditions given by equations (A.19) through (A.22) using some particular matrix arrays.

Consider the matrices,

$$T_a(X(\bar{a})) = T_a(\bar{x}_a) = \begin{bmatrix} T_0(\bar{x}_{a,1}) & T_1(\bar{x}_{a,1}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}(\bar{x}_{a,1}) \\ T_0(\bar{x}_{a,2}) & T_1(\bar{x}_{a,2}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}(\bar{x}_{a,2}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ T_0(\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) & T_1(\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}(\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) \end{bmatrix}$$  

and

$$T_y(X(\bar{y})) = T_y(\bar{x}_y) = \begin{bmatrix} T_0(\bar{x}_{y,1}) & T_1(\bar{x}_{y,1}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_y-1}(\bar{x}_{y,1}) \\ T_0(\bar{x}_{y,2}) & T_1(\bar{x}_{y,2}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_y-1}(\bar{x}_{y,2}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ T_0(\bar{x}_{y,m_y}) & T_1(\bar{x}_{y,m_y}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_y-1}(\bar{x}_{y,m_y}) \end{bmatrix}$$

Notice that $T_a(\bar{x}_a)$ is of size $m_a \times \nu_a$, while $T_y(\bar{x}_y)$ is an $m_y \times \nu_y$ matrix. Consider also the
two matrices,

\[
I_{ma} = \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{1}{ma} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \frac{2}{ma} & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & \frac{2}{ma}
\end{bmatrix},
\]

and

\[
I_{my} = \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{1}{my} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \frac{2}{my} & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & \frac{2}{my}
\end{bmatrix},
\]

with \(I_{ma}\) being of size \(\nu_a \times \nu_a\), and with \(I_{my}\) being of size \(\nu_y \times \nu_y\).

The \(\nu_a \times \nu_y\) matrix \(\hat{\Theta}\) that contains all Chebyshev coefficients \(\hat{\theta}_{ij}\) for \(i \in \{0, \ldots, \nu_a - 1\}\) and \(j \in \{0, \ldots, \nu_y - 1\}\), as these are given by the optimal-fitting conditions (A.19) through (A.22), are summarized by,

\[
\hat{\Theta} \equiv \arg\min_\Theta \sum_{k=1}^{ma} \sum_{\ell=1}^{my} \left[ T_a(\bar{x}_{a,k}) \cdot \Theta \cdot T_y(\bar{x}_{y,\ell})^\top - \bar{V}_{k,\ell} \right]^2 = I_{ma} \cdot T_a(\bar{x}_a)^\top \cdot \bar{V} \cdot T_y(\bar{x}_y) \cdot I_{my},
\]

in which \(T_a(\bar{x}_{a,k})\) and \(T_y(\bar{x}_{y,\ell})\) are the \(k\)-th and \(\ell\)-th row of matrices \(T_a(\bar{x}_a)\) and \(T_y(\bar{x}_y)\).

Finally, notice the matrix array,

\[
\bar{V} = T_a(\bar{x}_a) \cdot \hat{\Theta} \cdot T_y(\bar{x}_y)^\top,
\]

which is easy to verify from the expression given by (A.23) and the Chebyshev discrete-orthogonality conditions, which imply,

\[
T_a(\bar{x}_a) \cdot I_{ma} \cdot T_a(\bar{x}_a)^\top = I_{(ma \times ma)} \quad \text{and} \quad T_y(\bar{x}_y) \cdot I_{my} \cdot T_y(\bar{x}_y)^\top = I_{(my \times my)},
\]

and in which \(I_{(ma \times ma)}\) and \(I_{(my \times my)}\) are identity matrices of size \(ma \times ma\) and \(my \times my\).
1.2.3 Computing all partial derivatives efficiently, and dealing with the small values of the indirect utility function

Let

\[ A \equiv T_a (X (\bar{a})) , \quad \text{and} \quad Y \equiv T_y (X (\bar{y})) . \]  \hfill (A.25)

Let also,

\[ A_1 \equiv \frac{\partial T_a (X (\bar{a}))}{\partial a} = \frac{2}{\bar{a} - a} T_a' (X (\bar{a})) , \]  \hfill (A.26)

with,

\[ T_a' (X (\bar{a})) = T_a' (\bar{x}) = \begin{bmatrix} T_0' (\bar{x}_{a,1}) & T_1' (\bar{x}_{a,1}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}' (\bar{x}_{a,1}) \\ T_0' (\bar{x}_{a,2}) & T_1' (\bar{x}_{a,2}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}' (\bar{x}_{a,2}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ T_0' (\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) & T_1' (\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}' (\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) \end{bmatrix} \]  \hfill (A.27)

in which \( T_j' (x) \) is computed using (A.12). Notice that the term \( 2/ (\bar{a} - a) \) is the result of applying the chain rule of differentiation on \( T_a (X (a)) \), in which \( X (a) \) is given by (A.14).

Similarly,

\[ A_2 \equiv \frac{\partial^2 T_a (X (\bar{a}))}{\partial a^2} = \left( \frac{2}{\bar{a} - a} \right)^2 T_a'' (X (\bar{a})) , \]  \hfill (A.28)

with,

\[ T_a'' (X (\bar{a})) = T_a'' (\bar{x}) = \begin{bmatrix} T_0'' (\bar{x}_{a,1}) & T_1'' (\bar{x}_{a,1}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}'' (\bar{x}_{a,1}) \\ T_0'' (\bar{x}_{a,2}) & T_1'' (\bar{x}_{a,2}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}'' (\bar{x}_{a,2}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ T_0'' (\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) & T_1'' (\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) & \cdots & T_{\nu_a-1}'' (\bar{x}_{a,m_a}) \end{bmatrix} \]  \hfill (A.29)

in which \( T_j'' (x) \) is computed using (A.13). We also produce matrices \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \), in accordance with formulas (A.26), (A.27), (A.28), and (A.29).
For reasonable calibrating parameters, the numerical values of $V(a, y)$ are often small numbers in the order of $10^{-15}$. The problem is that such small-valued functions circumvent loops with tight convergence criteria. In order to deal with this problem, we normalize $V(a, y)$, through the transformation,

$$
V(a, y) \equiv \frac{\tilde{V}(a, y)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}.
$$

(A.30)

Using (A.24), for any estimator $\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}$, during the $n$-th iteration of a recursive process, we approximate the value of $\tilde{V}(a, y)$ by,

$$
\tilde{V}^{(n)}(a, y) \simeq A\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T.
$$

(A.31)

According to (A.30) and (A.31),

$$
V^{(n)}(a, y) \simeq \frac{[A\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T]^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}.
$$

(A.32)

The transformation given by (A.32) allows us to achieve Chebyshev-polynomial coefficients (contained in matrix $\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}$) with values large enough for implementing a recursive numerical method that searches for a fixed point for matrix $\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}$.

Using (A.32), the partial derivatives $V^{(n)}_a$ and $V^{(n)}_y$ are given by,

$$
V^{(n)}_a(a, y) \simeq \left(A\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T\right)^{-\gamma}A_1\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T,
$$

(A.33)

and

$$
V^{(n)}_y(a, y) \simeq \left(A\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T\right)^{-\gamma}A\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y_1^T.
$$

(A.34)

Using (A.33) and (A.34), we obtain,

$$
V^{(n)}_{aa}(a, y) \simeq \left(A\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T\right)^{-\gamma}\left[-\gamma\left(A\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T\right)^{-1}\left(A_1\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T\right)^2 + A_2\hat{\Theta}^{(n)}Y^T\right],
$$

(A.35)
\[ V_{yy}^{(n)}(a, y) \simeq \left( \hat{A}^{(n)} Y^T \right)^{-\gamma} \left[ -\gamma \left( \hat{A}^{(n)} Y^T \right)^{-1} \left( \hat{A}^{(n)} Y_1^T \right)^2 + \hat{A}^{(n)} Y_2^T \right], \quad (A.36) \]

and

\[ V_{ay}^{(n)}(a, y) \simeq \left( \hat{A}^{(n)} Y^T \right)^{-\gamma} \left[ -\gamma \left( \hat{A}^{(n)} Y^T \right)^{-1} \left( \hat{A}_1^{(n)} Y^T \right) \left( \hat{A}^{(n)} Y_1^T \right) + \hat{A}_1^{(n)} Y_1^T \right]. \quad (A.37) \]

### 1.2.4 Matrix array for computing all functions of the HJB equation using nonlinear regression techniques

Matrices described by equations (A.30) through (A.37) use the matrix array,

\[
V(a, y) \simeq V_{\text{matrix}} \equiv V_{m_y \times m_y} \equiv \begin{bmatrix}
V(a_1, y_1) & V(a_1, y_2) & \cdots & V(a_1, y_{m_y}) \\
V(a_2, y_1) & V(a_2, y_2) & \cdots & V(a_2, y_{m_y}) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
V(a_{m_a}, y_1) & V(a_{m_a}, y_2) & \cdots & V(a_{m_a}, y_{m_y})
\end{bmatrix}. \quad (A.38)
\]
For $V_{matrix}$ in (A.38) we use the $(m_a \cdot m_y) \times 1$ vector array,

\[
V_{vector\_array} = (m_a \cdot m_y) \times 1
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
V(a_1, y_1) \\
V(a_2, y_1) \\
\vdots \\
V(a_{m_a}, y_1) \\
\vdots \\
V(a_1, y_2) \\
V(a_2, y_2) \\
\vdots \\
V(a_{m_a}, y_2) \\
\vdots \\
V(a_1, y_{m_y}) \\
V(a_2, y_{m_y}) \\
\vdots \\
V(a_{m_a}, y_{m_y})
\end{bmatrix}
\]

(A.39)

The array in (A.39) can be achieved by matching two $(m_a \cdot m_y) \times 1$ vectors,

\[
\tilde{a}_{grid\_long} = \mathbf{1}_{(m_y \times 1)} \otimes \tilde{a},
\]

(A.40)

which corresponds to $m_y$ stacked vectors $\tilde{a}$, and

\[
\tilde{y}_{grid\_long} = \tilde{y} \otimes \mathbf{1}_{(m_a \times 1)},
\]

(A.41)

which is $m_y$ stacked vectors of size $m_a \times 1$, with each $m_a \times 1$ vector having $m_a$ identical elements, $m_a$ times each element of $\tilde{y}$, stacked in the order of elements of $\tilde{y}$. 

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Using the vector array in (A.39), we express all matrices described by equations (A.30) through (A.37), using the Matlab command “\texttt{reshape}”, and we use all partial derivatives in the same \((m_a \cdot m_y) \times 1\) vector array in order to express \(c^*\) and \(\phi^*\) according to equations (A.6) and (A.8).

1.3 Ensuring that consumption is above subsistence and treatment of borrowing constraints

The functional form of utility that we use satisfies an Inada condition as \(c \rightarrow \chi\), which is obvious from (A.3). This is the reason that equation (A.6) holds. The RHS of (A.6) has a simple interpretation: as long as \(V^*\) is well-defined, it is guaranteed that \(c > \chi\). Notice that the first-order condition given by (A.1) holds even if there is a borrowing constraint \(a \geq b\). The presence of a borrowing constraint, \(a \geq b\), does not affect (A.2) either. In order to implement \(a \geq b\), all we need to do is to ensure that the deterministic part of the budget constraint is nonnegative when \(a = b\), i.e.

\[
\left[ \bar{\phi}^* R^T + (1 - \bar{\phi}^* 1^T) r_f \right] b + y - c^* \geq 0 .
\]

(A.42)

Inserting (A.42) into (A.9) is achieved by the modified version of (A.9),

\[
1 = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\rho}{\theta (1 - \gamma)} (c^\star - \chi)^{\theta(1-\gamma)} [(1 - \gamma) V^*]^{1-\theta} + \\
+ \max \left\{ \left[ \bar{\phi}^* R^T + (1 - \bar{\phi}^* 1^T) r_f \right] a + y - c^* , \ 0 \right\} \bigg|_{a=b} \cdot V^*_a \\
+ \frac{1}{2} a^2 \bar{\phi}^* \sigma \sigma^T (\phi^*)^T \cdot V^*_a + \mu_y y \cdot V^*_y \\
+ \frac{1}{2} (\sigma_{yy})^2 \cdot V^*_y + \sigma_{yy} \bar{\phi}^* \sigma \rho_y^T \cdot V^*_y \bigg) \left( \frac{\rho}{\theta} V^* \right),
\end{cases}
\]

(A.43)

using an indicator function in order to implement the conditionality operator \((\cdot)|_{a=b}\). The presence of the term \(\max \left\{ \left[ \bar{\phi}^* R^T + (1 - \bar{\phi}^* 1^T) r_f \right] a + y - c^* , \ 0 \right\} \bigg|_{a=b} \cdot V^*_a\) in (A.43) has not
affected our results, as we had strictly positive saving rates in all our calibration exercises. Notably, our borrowing constraint is \( b = a = 0 \). As we have inserted initial values of wealth in the model across income groups of stockholders with initial wealth USD 85,519 or above, this borrowing constraint has not played a substantial quantitative role. For these levels of wealth, and for all gridpoints of dimension \( y \), households seem to choose predominantly interior solutions with positive saving rates, at least for the volatility range of our calibrated stock returns. This property originates from having calibrating values with \( \rho < r_f \) (even in the case of China, where \( \rho > r_f \), all average portfolio returns are higher than \( \rho \) in equilibrium). To see why calibrating values such that \( \rho < r_f \) play a crucial role, in Section 1.3.1 below, we provide a fully solved deterministic savings/consumption framework that is the backbone of our model. This framework lends intuition that explains why our results differ from models calibrated with \( \rho > r_f \).

### 1.3.1 A simple deterministic model with a borrowing limit: \( \rho > r_f \) versus \( \rho < r_f \)

Consider a deterministic model of savings with constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) preferences. Let the consumption/savings problem be denoted by \( P_d \), and defined as,

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{(c(t),a(t))_{t \geq 0}} & \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{c(t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} dt \\
\text{subject to:} & \\
\dot{a}(t) &= r_f a(t) + w - c(t), \\
a(t) &\geq a \\
given & a_0 > a \\
\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-r_f t} a(t) &= 0
\end{align*}
\]

in which \( \gamma, \rho, r_f, w > 0 \) are all constant, and \( a \geq -w/r_f \) is a constant denoting the borrowing constraint for assets, \( a(t) \). Problem \( P_d \) is the backbone of canonical household-finance
models, as, for example, the Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) model. In this section we show that this problem $P_d$ has a closed-form solution if $\rho < r_f$ and an exact solution if $\rho > r_f$, with the latter case requiring the help of a numerical solver, as it involves a non-linear equation in one variable. These solutions will provide us with useful insights about the relationship between the calibrating value of the rate of time preference and the role of the borrowing limit.

The first-order conditions of the problem imply,

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[ r_f - \rho + \frac{\mu(t)}{\lambda(t)} \right],$$  \hfill (A.44)

where $\lambda(t)$ and $\mu(t)$ are the Lagrange multipliers on the equality and inequality constraints of problem $P_d$ respectively. The complementary-slackness conditions are,

$$[\mu(t) \geq 0 \ \& \ \ a(t) \geq a \ \& \ \mu(t)[a(t) - a] = 0] .$$  \hfill (A.45)

Combining (A.44) and (A.45) leads to,

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{1}{\gamma} (r_f - \rho) , \ \text{for all } a(t) > a .$$  \hfill (A.46)

As it is typical for infinite-horizon stationary discounted dynamic programming problems, and as we prove, the optimal-consumption decision rule, $C$, defined as,

$$c^*(t) = C(a(t)) ,$$  \hfill (A.47)

is a time-invariant and strictly increasing function in $a(t)$, i.e.,

$$C''(a(t)) > 0, \ \text{for all } a(t) > a .$$  \hfill (A.48)

For all times $t \geq 0$ for which $a(t) > a$, equation (A.46) implies that $\dot{c}(t) > 0$ if and only if $r_f > \rho$. Combining this property with equations (A.46) and (A.48), we obtain,

$$\dot{a}(t) \overset{>}{=} 0 \Leftrightarrow r_f \overset{>}{=} \rho .$$  \hfill (A.49)
Based on (A.49), we proceed to examining the two separate cases of interest regarding the relationship between parameters $r_f$ and $\rho$.

**The case of $\rho < r_f$** The borrowing constraint places only a lower limit on $a$. Therefore, (A.49) implies that the solution to problem $P_d$ is interior if and only if $r_f \geq \rho$. To find the decision rule $C(a)$, start from equation (A.46), which is an elementary first-order linear differential equation, with solution,

$$c(t) = e^{\frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)t}c(0), \text{ for all } a(t) > a.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.50)

Substituting (A.50) into the budget constraint, we obtain

$$\dot{a}(t) = r_f a(t) + w - e^{\frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)t}c(0).$$ \hspace{1cm} (A.51)

Using an integrating coefficient on (A.51),

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-r_ft} [\dot{a}(t) - ra(t)] dt = \int_0^\infty e^{-r_ft} dt - c(0) \int_0^\infty e^{-[r_f - \frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)]t} dt,$$

which implies,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-r_ft}a(t) - a(0) = \left[ \frac{w}{r_f} - \frac{1}{r_f - \frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)}c(0) \right].$$

and results in,

$$c(0) = \left[ r_f - \frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho) \right] \left[ a(0) + \frac{w}{r_f} \right].$$ \hspace{1cm} (A.52)

Without loss of generality, we can consider that equation (A.52) holds not only for time instant 0, but for all time instants $t \geq 0$. Therefore, (A.52) implies,

$$c(t) = \xi \cdot \left[ a(t) + \frac{w}{r_f} \right],$$ \hspace{1cm} (A.53)

where

$$\xi = r_f - \frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho),$$

and assume that parameters $\gamma, \rho, r_f$ are such that $\xi > 0$.  

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**The case of** $\rho > r_f$  
In this case, (A.49) implies that, after some time, $a(t)$ will shrink so much that it will eventually hit the borrowing limit, $a$ and it will stay there forever, i.e., $a$ is an "absorbing barrier". Let,

$$T^* = T(a_0),$$

be the "optimal hitting time". Notice that at time $T^*$,

$$\dot{a}(T^*) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad c(T^*) = r_f a + w,$$

which is a consequence of the budget constraint. From (A.50) we have,

$$c(T^*) = e^{\frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)T^*} c(0).$$

Combining (A.55) and (A.56) we obtain,

$$r a + w = e^{\frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)T^*} a_0,$$

which implies,

$$T^* = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)} \ln \left( \frac{r_f a + w}{c_0} \right).$$

Using again an integrating coefficient on equation (A.51),

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \left[ \dot{a}(t) - r_f a(t) \right] dt = w \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} dt - \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} c(t) dt$$

which implies in this case,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-rt} a(t) - a_0(t) = \frac{w}{r_f} - c(0) \left[ e^{-\frac{r_f}{\gamma}(r_f - \rho)t} \right]_0^{T^*} - e^{-r_f T^*} \left( r_f a + w \right) \int_{T^*}^\infty e^{-r_f t} dt,$$

simplifying to,

$$c(0) = \frac{\xi}{1 - e^{-\xi T^*}} a(0) + \frac{w}{r_f} - e^{-r_f T^*} \left( a + \frac{w}{r_f} \right).$$
Because $\xi = r_f - \frac{1}{\gamma} (r_f - \rho)$, notice that $\frac{1}{\gamma} (r_f - \rho) = r_f - \xi$. Therefore, (A.57) can be re-written as,

$$T^* = \frac{1}{r_f - \xi} \ln \left[ \frac{r_f a + w}{c(0)} \right]$$ (A.59)

From (A.59) we can see that,

$$e^{-r_f T^*} = \left[ \frac{c(0)}{r_f a + w} \right]^{\frac{r_f}{r_f - \xi}}$$, (A.60)

and

$$e^{-\xi T^*} = \left[ \frac{c(0)}{r_f a + w} \right]^{\frac{\xi}{r_f - \xi}}$$ (A.61)

Substituting (A.60) and (A.61) into (A.58) we obtain,

$$c(0) = \xi \frac{a(0) + \frac{w}{r_f} - \left( a + \frac{w}{r_f} \right) \left[ \frac{c(0)}{r_f a + w} \right]^{\frac{r_f}{r_f - \xi}}}{1 - \left[ \frac{c(0)}{r_f a + w} \right]^{\frac{\xi}{r_f - \xi}}}$$ (A.62)

and notice that, without loss of generality, we can consider that equation (A.62) holds not only for time instant 0, but for all time instants $t \in [0, T^*)$, giving,

$$c^*(t) = \xi \frac{a(t) + \frac{w}{r_f} - \left( a + \frac{w}{r_f} \right) \left[ \frac{c^*(t)}{r_f a + w} \right]^{\frac{r_f}{r_f - \xi}}}{1 - \left[ \frac{c^*(t)}{r_f a + w} \right]^{\frac{\xi}{r_f - \xi}}}$$ (A.63)

The nonlinear expression given by (A.63) gives the optimal decision rule of consumption, $c^*(t)$, as an implicit function of $a(t)$, $c^*(t) = C(a(t))$.

**Summary of results, comparison, and implications** The above derivations can be summarized by the following optimal decision rule,

$$C(a) = \begin{cases} \xi \left( a + \frac{w}{r_f} \right), & \text{if } \rho \leq r_f \\ \text{implicit function solving (A.63)}, & \text{if } \rho > r_f \end{cases}$$ (A.64)
In Figure O.A.1, we depict the solution given by (A.64) for parameter values, $\gamma = 2$, $w = 0.1$ and $r_f = 4\%$, while the borrowing limit is $\underline{a} = 0$. The solid line in both Panels A.1 and B.1 of Figure O.A.1, correspond to a high value for $\rho$, $\rho = 5\% > r_f$, and we can see that, in this case, the consumption rate, $C(a) / (r_f a + w)$, is always higher than 100% for $a > \underline{a}$, which implies that the saving rate is always negative, except when assets hit the borrowing limit, becoming zero permanently. In a detrended stochastic model with $\rho > r_f$ and idiosyncratic risk driven by $w$ being random, this property of negative savings holds for the (temporarily) poor, while the (temporarily) rich can have positive savings in an exchange economy, but the saving rate retains the same shape as in panel B.1 of Figure O.A.1, being only shifted upward.

**Figure O.A.1** Consumption rates and saving rates using the solution given by (A.64)
On the contrary, when \( \rho < r_f \) (in the numerical example depicted by Figure O.A.1 we have set \( \rho = 3\% \)), the saving rate is always flat and strictly positive (see Panel B.1 in Figure O.A.1). Importantly, the borrowing limit does not change the saving behavior. In a non-detrended stochastic model with \( \rho < r_f \) and risk driven by \( w \) being random, while the flat line of Panel B.1 in Figure O.A.1 moves randomly up and down, it is still positive and the borrowing limit will not play a substantial quantitative role in computing the stochastic decision rule for consumption. It turns out that even in the presence of subsistence consumption, asset-return uncertainty and portfolio choice, the borrowing constraint does not play a big quantitative role when \( \rho < r_f \), at least for the volatility range of our calibrated stock returns. Random stock returns can alter this key relationship between \( \rho \) and asset returns that we explained in this section, but it seems that they do not play a large quantitative role within our calibration.

### 1.4 The recursive algorithm

Using the HJB equation (equation (A.9)), we perform iterations on \( \Theta \), using the Matlab command “\texttt{nlinfit}” which is designed in order to solve nonlinear minimum least-squares econometric models. The inputs of “\texttt{nlinfit}” are a (nonlinear econometric) model, a matrix of regressors, and a vector of model parameters that need to be estimated. In order to match the input structure of the “\texttt{nlinfit}” Matlab procedure, we compute all the above \((m_a \cdot m_y) \times 1\) vectors corresponding to equations (A.30) through (A.37) and also to (A.6) and (A.8), and we use equation (A.9) in order to produce a Matlab m-file “\texttt{HJB.m}” with inputs \( \bar{a}_{\text{grid}\_long} \), \( \bar{y}_{\text{grid}\_long} \) and \( \Theta_{\text{vector}} \equiv \text{reshape}(\Theta, \nu_a \cdot \nu_y, 1) \), which is an \((\nu_a \cdot \nu_y) \times 1\) vector resulting from stacking all columns of \( \Theta \). This “\texttt{HJB.m}” function defines the model to be estimated, and we also create an \((m_a m_y) \times 2\) matrix with columns consisting of vectors \( \bar{a}_{\text{grid}\_long} \) and \( \bar{y}_{\text{grid}\_long} \), which is the regressor matrix.
1.5 The importance of a good first guess

The initial guess is the $\hat{\Theta}^{(0)}$ which corresponds to the closed-form solution given by Proposition 1 in the paper, for the special case $\rho_y \rho_y^T = 1$. When $\rho_y \rho_y^T = 1$ holds, the performance of the algorithm is satisfactory, since $\hat{\Theta}^{(0)} = \hat{\Theta}_{\text{vector}}$ in one iteration.

We perform iterations for the version of the model with two risky assets, for cases in which $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1$, and also for cases in which $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 < 1$. We compute the decision rules of the model for $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 \in \{0.5, 0.75\}$, taking gradual steps down from $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 1$ to $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.75$, and then from $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.75$ to $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{yb}^2 = 0.5$. In each case, we use the solution found in the previous step as a first guess in the “nlinfit” Matlab procedure, finding that this strategy is stable and efficient. Typically, setting $\nu_a = \nu_y = 3$, and $m_a = m_y = 20$, performs satisfactorily well, producing all results plotted in Figure 5 of the paper in about 13.5 seconds on a state-of-the-art laptop.

1.6 Dealing with the nonlinear relationship between assets and income across income categories in the data

Panel C of Figure 4 shows that, after ranking households according to their after-tax adult-equivalent income, $a$ and $y$ are linked through a nonlinear relationship in the data. This nonlinear relationship is not reflected by the two grids, $\bar{a}$ and $\bar{y}$. This failure of reflecting the nonlinear relationship occurs because grids $\bar{a}$ and $\bar{y}$ should be consistent with Chebyshev nodes, in order to ensure that discrete-orthogonality conditions hold accurately. Discrete-orthogonality conditions are a necessary requirement for good performance of the Chebyshev approximation. The fact that grids $\bar{a}$ and $\bar{y}$ do not reflect the nonlinear relationship in the data means that we cannot directly select matrix elements from the resulting matrix

$$\Phi = \left[\begin{array}{c} \phi_{k,\ell} \\ \phi_{a,k}^{(0)} \\ \phi_{y,\ell}^{(0)} \end{array} \right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} \Phi \left( \bar{a}_k, \bar{y}_\ell \right) \\ \Phi \left( A \left( \bar{x}_{a,k} \right), Y \left( \bar{x}_{y,\ell} \right) \right) \end{array} \right], \quad k \in \{1, \ldots, m_a\}, \quad \ell \in \{1, \ldots, m_y\},$$
of the code in order to report them in Figure 5. In order to deal with this issue, we first interpolate the \( a_{data} \) and \( y_{data} \) data observations that correspond to the six income categories in panel C of Figure 4 in order to capture the nonlinear relationship in that figure, say

\[
y_{data} = g(a_{data}) ,
\]

using the “spline”-interpolation option of Matlab’s “interp1” routine; specifically, we produce an \( m_a \times 1 \) vector, called \( y^{nl} \), that uses \( \bar{a} \) as the interpolation domain, so,

\[
y^{nl} = g(\bar{a}) .
\]

In order to produce Figure 5, the goal is to report portfolio shares which are consistent with

\[
\phi^* = \Phi(\bar{a}, g(\bar{a})) .
\]

So, for all \( k \in \{1, ..., m_a\} \), fix an \( \bar{a}_k \) gridpoint and define the function,

\[
\tilde{\phi}_k(y) \equiv \Phi(\bar{a}_k, y) ,
\]

using the “spline”-interpolation option of Matlab’s “interp1” routine, using gridpoints \( \bar{y} \) that correspond to the \( k \)-th row of matrix \( \bar{\Phi} \) as the domain, and the \( m_y \times 1 \) vector \( [\Phi(\bar{a}_k, \bar{y})]^T \) as the image of function \( \tilde{\phi}_k(y) \). So,

\[
\phi_k^* \equiv \Phi(\bar{a}_k, g(\bar{a}_k)) = \left\{ \Phi(\bar{a}_k, y) \mid \tilde{\phi}_k^{-1}(y) = y^{nl}_k \right\} ,
\]

in which \( y^{nl}_k \) corresponds to the \( k \)-th element of vector \( y^{nl} \), defined by (A.65), fills in a new \( m_a \times 1 \) vector, \( \phi^* \). Vector \( \phi^* \) contains the values that we report in Figure 5, after interpolating the pair \( (y^{nl}, \phi^*) \) and projecting this interpolation on the \( 6 \times 1 \) vector \( y_{data} \), using the “spline”-interpolation option of Matlab’s “interp1” routine.
2. Appendix B – Simulating the discrete-time model (2 risky assets)

2.1 Statement of the Problem

The household solves,

\[ V(a_t, y_t) = \]

\[ = \max_{\alpha \geq \chi, \phi^s_t, \phi^b_t \in [0,1]} \left\{ \frac{(1 - \beta) (c_t - \chi)^{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}} + \beta \{ (1 - \gamma) E_t [V(R_{p,t+1}a_t + y_t - c_t, y_{t+1})] \}^{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 - \gamma} \right\}^{\frac{1 - \gamma}{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}}} \]

(B.1)

in which,

\[ R_{p,t+1} \equiv (R^s_{t+1} - r^f) \phi^s_t + (R^b_{t+1} - r^f) \phi^b_t + r^f \]

(B.2)

and with,

\[ \ln (y_{t+1}) - \ln (y_t) = \mu_y + \varepsilon_{y,t+1}, \varepsilon_{y,t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_y) \]

(B.3)

\[ \ln (P_{s,t+1}) - \ln (P_{s,t}) = R_s + \varepsilon_{s,t+1}, \varepsilon_{s,t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_s) \]

(B.4)

\[ \ln (P_{b,t+1}) - \ln (P_{b,t}) = R_b + \varepsilon_{b,t+1}, \varepsilon_{b,t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_b) \]

(B.5)

where \( P_{s,t} \) and \( P_{b,t} \) denote the stock price and the business equity price in period \( t \), while,

\[ \frac{Cov(\varepsilon_{s,t+1}, \varepsilon_{y,t+1})}{\sigma_s \sigma_y} = \rho_{ys} \]

(B.6)

\[ \frac{Cov(\varepsilon_{b,t+1}, \varepsilon_{y,t+1})}{\sigma_b \sigma_y} = \rho_{yb} \]

(B.7)

\[ \frac{Cov(\varepsilon_{s,t+1}, \varepsilon_{b,t+1})}{\sigma_s \sigma_b} = \rho_{sb} \]

(B.8)

\( R^s_t \) in equation (B.2) is given by,

\[ R^s_t = e^{R_s + \varepsilon_{s,t}} \]

(B.9)
\( R^b_t \) in equation (B.2) is given by,
\[
R^b_t = e^{R^b + \varepsilon_{b,t}}, \quad (B.10)
\]
y_t is given by,
\[
y_t = e^{\mu_y + \varepsilon_{y,t}}, \quad (B.11)
\]
and \((a_0, y_0, \phi_0)\) are given.

The problem stated by (B.1) is the discrete-time analogue to the continuous-time version of the model with two risky assets (here we focus on stock-market portfolio holdings and business equity holdings). Notice that in this case of two risky assets, the condition for insurability (diversifiability) of labor-income risk becomes \( \rho^2_{ys} + \rho^2_{bs} = 1 \), so labor-income risk is uninsurable if \( \rho^2_{ys} + \rho^2_{bs} \notin \{-1, 1\} \). Let,
\[
\theta \equiv \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\eta}}{1 - \gamma},
\]
which transforms (B.1) into,
\[
V(a_t, y_t) =
\]
\[
= \max_{c_t \geq \chi, \phi \in [0,1]} \left\{ (1 - \beta) (c_t - \chi)^{(1-\gamma)\theta} + \beta \{ (1 - \gamma) E_t [V(R^p_{t+1}a_t + y_t - c_t, y_{t+1})] \}^\theta \right\}^{\frac{1}{\theta}}.
\]

### 2.2 Necessary conditions

Applying the envelope theorem on (B.12),
\[
V_a(a_t, y_t) = \frac{\partial [RHS \text{ of eq. (B.12)}]}{\partial a_t}, \quad (B.13)
\]
while the first-order conditions of (B.12) with respect to \( c_t \) give,
\[
(1 - \beta) (c_t - \chi)^{(1-\gamma)\theta - 1} \left\{ (1 - \beta) (c_t - \chi)^{(1-\gamma)\theta} + \beta \{ (1 - \gamma) E_t [V(a_{t+1}, y_{t+1})] \}^\theta \right\}^{\frac{1}{\theta} - 1} =
\]
In equilibrium, the optimal sequence \( \{ (c_t^*, \phi_t^{s*}, \phi_t^{b*}, x_{t+1}) \}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) satisfies the Bellman equation given by (B.12), so, after discarding the max operator, (B.12) gives,

\[
\begin{align*}
(1 - \beta) (c_t^* - \chi)^{(1-\gamma)^{\theta}} + \beta \{ (1 - \gamma) E_t [ V (a_{t+1}^*, y_{t+1}) ] \}^\theta &= [(1 - \gamma) V (a_t, y_t)]^\theta.
\end{align*}
\]  

(B.15)

Combining equations (B.15) and (B.14) we obtain,

\[
(1 - \beta) (c_t^* - \chi)^{(1-\gamma)^{\theta-1}} [(1 - \gamma) V (a_t, y_t)]^{\theta-1} = \frac{\partial [RHS \ of \ eq. \ (B.12)]}{\partial a_t}.
\]  

(B.16)

Therefore, combining (B.13) with (B.16) we obtain,

\[
c_t^* = C (a_t, y_t) = \chi + \left\{ \frac{1}{1 - \beta} V_a (a_t, y_t) [(1 - \gamma) V (a_t, y_t)]^{\theta-1} \right\}^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}.
\]  

(B.17)

Equation (B.17) is crucial for solving the model numerically using value-function iteration. Equation (B.17) states that, once we have a guess for the value function, \( V (a, y) \), we immediately have a closed-form solution for the decision rule, \( C (a, y) \), which depends only on \( V (a, y) \) and \( V_a (a, y) \). So, if we use a projection method for approximating \( V (a, y) \), then we can immediately incorporate the formula given by (B.17) into the RHS of the Bellman equation. Most importantly, equation (B.17) helps in the direct computation of portfolio shares, directly from the first-order condition with respect to \( \phi^s \) and \( \phi^b \).

The first-order condition with respect to \( \phi^s \) implies,

\[
E_t \left[ V_a (R_{p,t+1} a_t + y_t - c_t, y_{t+1}) (R_{t+1}^s - r^f) \right] = 0,
\]

and the first-order condition with respect to \( \phi^b \) implies,

\[
E_t \left[ V_a (R_{p,t+1} a_t + y_t - c_t, y_{t+1}) (R_{t+1}^b - r^f) \right] = 0.
\]
the detailed version of which is,

\[
E_t \left\{ V_a \left( \left[ (R^s_{t+1} - r^r) \phi_t^s + (R^b_{t+1} - r^r) \phi_t^b + r^r \right] a_t + y_t - C(a_t, y_t) , y_{t+1} \right) \right\} = 0 .
\]

Therefore, based on (B.18), the decision rules for the portfolio share \( \phi_t^{s*} = \Phi(a_t, y_t) \) and \( \phi_t^{b*} = \Phi(a_t, y_t) \), are the implicit functions that solve,

\[
\begin{align*}
    h^s(\phi_t^s, \phi_t^b, a_t, y_t) &= 0, \\
    h^b(\phi_t^s, \phi_t^b, a_t, y_t) &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(B.18)

2.3 Algorithm: Value-Function Iteration

2.3.1 Overview

We use an initial guess on the value function \( V \) defined by (B.12), \( V^{(0)} \). Then we utilize the contraction-mapping property of the Bellman equation described by the recursion,

\[
V^{(j+1)}(a_t, y_t) =
\]

\[
= \max_{\alpha_t \geq \chi, \phi_t^s, \phi_t^b \in [0,1]} \left\{ \left( 1 - \beta \right) (c_t - \chi)^{1-\gamma} \phi_t^s + \beta \left\{ \left( 1 - \gamma \right) E_t \left[ V^{(j)} \left( R_{p,t+1} a_t + y_t - c_t , y_{t+1} \right) \right] \right\} \phi_t^b \right\} .
\]

(B.19)

in order to generate a Cauchy sequence \( \{ V^{(j)} \}_{j=0}^{\infty} \) with \( V^{(j)} \to V^* \), which is a typical value-function iteration approach. The key issue in value-function iteration approaches is how one numerically implements the max operator on the right-hand side (RHS) of the Bellman equation. In order to perform maximization on the RHS of (B.19), we solve the first-order conditions given by (B.17) and (B.18), in each step of the recursive procedure, which relies on
(the typically incorrect) value function $V^{(j)}$. For deriving the decision rule for consumption, $C^{(j)}(a, y)$ which is conditional upon the value function $V^{(j)}(a, y)$, equation (B.17) provides an explicit formula,

$$
C^{(j)}(a_t, y_t) = \chi + \left\{ \frac{1}{1 - \beta} V^{(j)}(a_t, y_t) \left[ (1 - \gamma) V^{(j)}(a_t, y_t) \right]^{\theta - 1} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1 - \gamma \theta - 1}}. \quad (B.20)
$$

The formula $C^{(j)}(a_t, y_t)$ can be substituted directly into the RHS of (B.19), but we do not have an analytical expression for the decision rule $\Phi^{(j)}_{i \in (s, b)}(a_t, y_t)$. In order to compute

$$
\Phi^{(j)}_{i \in (s, b)}(a_t, y_t) \equiv \left\{ \phi_{i \in (s, b)} \mid h^{(j)}_{i \in (s, b)}(\phi, a, y) = 0 \right\},
$$

we need to numerically solve,

$$
h^{(j)}_{i \in (s, b)}(\phi_{i \in (s, b)}, a, y) = 0,
$$

in which,

$$
h^{(j)}_{i \in (s, b)} \left( \phi_{i \in (s, b)}, a_t, y_t \right) \equiv E_t V^{(j)}_a \left( \left[ (R^s_{t+1} - r^f) \phi_t^s + (R^b_{t+1} - r^f) \phi_t^b + r^f \right] a_t + y_t - C^{(j)}(a_t, y_t), y_{t+1} \right) \left( R^i_{t+1} - r^f \right).
$$

Both in (B.21), and in RHS of (B.19), there is an expectations operator, $E_t (\cdot)$, that needs to be computed. This computation of the expectations operator is discussed in a separate subsection below.

Another technical necessity in (B.21) is how to compute $V^{(j)}_a(a, y)$, the partial derivative of the value function. In order to achieve this derivative computation, we employ a simple exponential-projection method which approximates functions using,

$$
f(a, y) \simeq \hat{f}(a, y) \equiv e^{\sum_{i=0}^{\nu} \sum_{j=0}^{\nu} \xi_{ij} [\ln(a)]^i [\ln(y)]^j}. \quad (B.22)
$$

An advantage of this $\hat{f}(x)$ approximation given by (B.22), is that we can take explicit derivatives, namely,

$$
f_a(a, y) \simeq \hat{f}_a(a, y) = \hat{f}(a, y) \sum_{i=0}^{\nu} \sum_{j=0}^{\nu} \xi_{ij} \frac{[\ln(a)]^{i-1} [\ln(y)]^j}{a}.
$$

(B.23)
For values of parameter $\gamma > 1$, the mapping $m(\cdot) = (\cdot)^{(1-\gamma)} / (1 - \gamma)$, which is applied on the RHS of (B.19), is known to give negative values. This property, of having negative values for the RHS of (B.19), is inherited by the value function on the LHS of (B.19) as well. Yet, the exponential-projection technique we suggest in (B.22), can only match positive values. In order to tackle this problem, we use the transformation,

$$V(a, y) = \frac{[\tilde{V}(a, y)]^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \Leftrightarrow \tilde{V}(a, y) = [(1 - \gamma)V(a, y)]^{1/\gamma}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.24)

A consequence of the transformation given by (B.24) is,

$$V^*(a, y) = \left[\tilde{V}(a, y)\right]^{-\gamma} \tilde{V}_a(a, y).$$ \hspace{1cm} (B.25)

So, we create a Matlab m-file, named “Vtilde.m”, which implements the exponential approximation

$$\tilde{V}(a, y) \approx e^{\sum_{i=0}^{\nu} \sum_{j=0}^{\nu} \xi_{ij}[\ln(a)]^i[\ln(y)]^j},$$ \hspace{1cm} (B.26)

on any grid for the state variables, $a$ and $y$.

Using this projection approach, we take a first guess on the value function, $\tilde{V}^{(0)}$, and we obtain an estimate of the vector $\left\{\left\{\xi^{(0)}_{i,k}\right\}_{i=0}^{\nu} \right\}_{k=0}^{\nu}$ through the “nlinfit” command in Matlab. Our first guess, $\tilde{V}^{(0)}$, uses the calibrating parameters that we have found in continuous time, and the continuous-time functional form for the value function, $V(a, y)$ for the special case in which $\rho_{ys}^2 + \rho_{y\theta}^2 = 1$.

Using the recursive procedure described above, through (B.19) we generate a sequence of coefficients $\left\{\left\{\xi^{(j)}_{i,k}\right\}_{i=0}^{\nu} \right\}_{j=0}^{\infty}$, with $\lim_{j \to \infty} \left\{\left\{\xi^{(j)}_{i,k}\right\}_{i=0}^{\nu} \right\}_{k=0}^{\nu} = \left\{\left\{\xi^{*}_{i,k}\right\}_{i=0}^{\nu} \right\}_{k=0}^{\nu}$, in which

$$V^*(a, y) \simeq \frac{e^{(1-\gamma)\sum_{i=0}^{\nu} \sum_{j=0}^{\nu} \xi_{ij}[\ln(a)]^i[\ln(y)]^j}}{1 - \gamma},$$

in which $V^*(a, y)$ solves (B.12).
2.3.2 Approximating the joint density for the stochastic process for the returns (stock equity and business equity) and the labor-income growth

In equations (B.3), (B.4), (B.5), (B.7) and (B.8) above, we have mentioned that the model’s three shocks $\varepsilon_s$, $\varepsilon_b$ and $\varepsilon_y$ are distributed so that,

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\varepsilon_y \\
\varepsilon_s \\
\varepsilon_b
\end{pmatrix} \sim N
\begin{pmatrix}
0 \\
0 \\
0
\end{pmatrix},
\begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_y^2 & \rho_{ys}\sigma_y\sigma_y & \rho_{yb}\sigma_y\sigma_b \\
\rho_{ys}\sigma_y\sigma_y & \sigma_s^2 & \rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b \\
\rho_{yb}\sigma_y\sigma_b & \rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b & \sigma_b^2
\end{bmatrix}
$$

(B.27)

We want to compute a joint-probability matrix in order to describe the joint density of shocks,

$$s_{\text{shock}} \equiv R_s + \varepsilon_s, \quad b_{\text{shock}} \equiv R_b + \varepsilon_b \quad \text{and} \quad y_{\text{shock}} \equiv \mu_y + \varepsilon_y,$$

(B.28)

first, we creat a partition of $(\varepsilon_y)$ and $(\varepsilon_s, \varepsilon_b)$ to reduce the above trivariate normal system into a conditional univariate normal and an unconditional bivariate normal system conveniently,

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
y_{\text{shock}} \\
s_{\text{shock}}, b_{\text{shock}}
\end{pmatrix} \sim N
\begin{pmatrix}
\mu_y \\
[R_s, R_b]^T
\end{pmatrix},
\begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_y^2 & [\rho_{ys}\sigma_y\sigma_y, \rho_{yb}\sigma_y\sigma_b]^T \\
[\rho_{ys}\sigma_y\sigma_y, \rho_{yb}\sigma_y\sigma_b]^T & \begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_s^2 & \rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b \\
\rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b & \sigma_b^2
\end{bmatrix}
\end{bmatrix}
$$

(B.29)

to simplify (B.29), we have

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
y_{\text{shock}} \\
R_{\text{shock}}
\end{pmatrix} \sim N
\begin{pmatrix}
\mu_y \\
R
\end{pmatrix},
\begin{bmatrix}
\Sigma_{11} & \Sigma_{12} \\
\Sigma_{21} & \Sigma_{22}
\end{bmatrix}
$$

(B.30)
where

\[
\mathbf{R}_{\text{shock}} = [s_{\text{shock}}, b_{\text{shock}}]^T
\]
\[
\mathbf{R} = [R_s, R_b]^T
\]
\[
\Sigma_{11} = \sigma_y^2
\]
\[
\Sigma_{12} = [\rho_{ys}\sigma_s\sigma_y, \rho_{yb}\sigma_y\sigma_b]
\]
\[
\Sigma_{21} = [\rho_{ys}\sigma_s\sigma_y, \rho_{yb}\sigma_y\sigma_b]^T
\]
\[
\Sigma_{22} = \begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_s^2 & \rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b \\
\rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b & \sigma_b^2
\end{bmatrix}
\]

the joint density of \((y_{\text{shock}}, s_{\text{shock}}, b_{\text{shock}})\) could be written as the product of conditional density of \(y_{\text{shock}}\) on \((s_{\text{shock}}, y_{\text{shock}})\) and the unconditional joint density of \((s_{\text{shock}}, y_{\text{shock}})\). For the conditional density of \(y_{\text{shock}}\) on \((s_{\text{shock}}, y_{\text{shock}})\), we have

\[
(y_{\text{shock}} | \mathbf{R}_{\text{shock}} = [R_s^j, R_b^k]^T) \sim N(\bar{\mu}, \Sigma)
\]

where

\[
\bar{\mu} = \mu_y + [\rho_{ys}\sigma_s\sigma_y, \rho_{yb}\sigma_y\sigma_b]^{-1} \left( \sigma_s^2 \rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b \begin{bmatrix} \rho_{ys}\sigma_s\sigma_y \\ \rho_{sb}\sigma_s\sigma_b \end{bmatrix} \right) \left( [R_s^j, R_b^k]^T - [R_s, R_b]^T \right)
\]

\[
\bar{\Sigma} = \Sigma_{11} - \Sigma_{12} \Sigma_{22}^{-1} \Sigma_{21}
\]

the unconditional distribution is given by

\[
\phi(y_{\text{shock}}, \mathbf{R}_{\text{shock}}) = \phi(y_{\text{shock}} | \mathbf{R}_{\text{shock}}) \cdot \phi(\mathbf{R}_{\text{shock}})
\]

based on the stochastic structure given by (B.27). The joint density of \((s_{\text{shock}}, b_{\text{shock}})\) is this of a bivariate normal with,

\[
\phi(s_{\text{shock}}, b_{\text{shock}}) = \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma_s\sigma_b\sqrt{1 - \rho_{sb}^2}} \times
\]
\[ s_{\text{shock}} \text{ conditional upon } b_{\text{shock}} \text{ is also normally distributed with,} \]
\[
s_{\text{shock}} | b_{\text{shock}} \sim N \left( R_s + \frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma_b} \rho_{sb} (b_{\text{shock}} - R_b), (1 - \rho_{sb}^2)\sigma_s^2 \right), \]

so,
\[
\phi(s_{\text{shock}}, b_{\text{shock}}) = \phi(s_{\text{shock}} | b_{\text{shock}}) \cdot \phi(b_{\text{shock}}), \tag{B.35}
\]
in which
\[
\phi(b_{\text{shock}}) = \frac{1}{\sigma_b \sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left[ -\frac{(b_{\text{shock}} - R_b)^2}{2\sigma_b^2} \right],
\]
Now, we have
\[
\phi(y_{\text{shock}}, R_{\text{shock}}) = \phi(y_{\text{shock}} | R_{\text{shock}}) \cdot \phi(R_{\text{shock}}) = \phi(y_{\text{shock}} | R_{\text{shock}}) \cdot \phi(s_{\text{shock}} | b_{\text{shock}}) \cdot \phi(b_{\text{shock}}), \tag{B.36}
\]
since \( b_{\text{shock}} \sim N(R_b, \sigma_b^2) \). In order to calculate \( \phi(y_{\text{shock}} | R_{\text{shock}}), \phi(s_{\text{shock}} | b_{\text{shock}}) \) and \( \phi(b_{\text{shock}}) \), we use the fact that,
\[
\frac{y_{\text{shock}} | R_{\text{shock}} - \bar{\mu}}{\sum} \sim N(0, 1),
\]
\[
\frac{s_{\text{shock}} | b_{\text{shock}} - \left[ R_s + \frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma_b} \rho_{sb} (b_{\text{shock}} - R_b) \right]}{\sigma_b \sqrt{1 - \rho_{sb}^2}} \sim N(0, 1),
\]
and \( \frac{b_{\text{shock}} - R_b}{\sigma_b} \sim N(0, 1) \),

and we then use (B.36) in order to compute \( \phi(y_{\text{shock}}, R_{\text{shock}}) \) in matrix form. So, if the grid for \( s_{\text{shock}} \) is an \( m_s \times 1 \) vector, for \( b_{\text{shock}} \) is an \( m_b \times 1 \) and the grid for \( y_{\text{shock}} \) is an \( m_y \times 1 \) vector, then let the joint-probability matrix
\[
M_{sby} \equiv [M_{sby,klm}] = [\phi(s_{\text{shock},k}, b_{\text{shock},l}, y_{\text{shock},m})], \tag{B.37}
\]

29
For specifying the grids for $s_{\text{shock}}$, $b_{\text{shock}}$ and $y_{\text{shock}}$, we split the continuum into equispaced intervals, and then we proceed to calculating the probabilities associated with the midpoint of each interval, using Matlab’s built-in calculator for the normal density (the command “normcdf”, which calculates cumulative probabilities for a standard normal).

Because the support of normally distributed variables is $(-\infty, \infty)$, we need to choose an upper and lower level of the support for $s_{\text{shock}}$, $b_{\text{shock}}$ and $y_{\text{shock}}$. For a standard normal notice that, in Matlab, “normcdf(-3)=0.0013”, “normcdf(-10)=7.6199e-24”, “normcdf(-12)=1.7765e-33”, with the latter being a negligible number. In order to avoid accumulating errors (numbers such as $10^{-33}$ tend to create this error-accumulation problem), for the lowest gridpoint of $s_{\text{shock}}$ (same for $b_{\text{shock}}$ and $y_{\text{shock}}$) called “$r_{\text{min}}$”, we use

$$s_{\text{shock}}_{\text{min}} = R_s + \sigma_s \cdot (-3.5)$$

and for the largest gridpoint we use

$$s_{\text{shock}}_{\text{max}} = R_s + \sigma_s \cdot (3.5)$$

in which $-3.5$ is a calibrating parameter related to the standard normal, ensuring that the support of $s_{\text{shock}}$ does not have probability kinks at its endpoints, or that there is no error-accumulation problem (after plotting both the joint density function of $\phi(y_{\text{shock}}, R_{\text{shock}})$, and individual density functions, we have concluded that the value “normcdf(-3.5)=2.3263e-04” works best.

### 2.4 Computing the portfolio share that satisfies the first-order conditions: applying the expectations operator

First, we choose grids for $a$ and $y$ calculated in accordance with the nonlinear relationship between $a$ and $y$ in the data (see Panel C in Figure 4 and the expression $y_{\text{data}} = g(a_{\text{data}})$ given
by (A.65)). So, we generate two \( n \times 1 \) vectors, \( a_{\text{grid}}\) and \( y_{\text{grid}}\), that satisfy \( y_{\text{grid}} = g(a_{\text{grid}})\). Consider that we are at the \( j \)-th iteration of the value-function iteration method, using \( V^{(j)} \) for all calculations. At this stage we want to compute the function \( h^{(j)}(\phi^s_t, a_t, y_t) \) based on (B.18), and a concern is how to apply the expectations operator in that function (similar also for \( h^{(j)}(\phi^b_t, a_t, y_t) \)). Using a loop, for each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \), we express function \( h^{(j)}(\phi^s_t, a_t, y_t) \) in equation (B.18) as,

\[
\begin{align*}
\sum_{k=1}^{m_s} \sum_{l=1}^{m_b} \sum_{m=1}^{m_y} M_{sb y, k l m} & \left\{ V^{(j)}_a \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{s\text{shock},k} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \right) \phi^s_t + \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{b\text{shock},l} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \right) \phi^b_t + r^f \right\} a_{\text{grid},i} + y_{\text{grid},i} \\
& - C \left( \begin{pmatrix} a_{\text{grid},i} \end{pmatrix}, y_{\text{grid},i} \right) \frac{\partial}{\partial a_t} \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{s\text{shock},k} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \right) \phi^s_t + \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{b\text{shock},l} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \right) \phi^b_t + r^f \right) \right\} = 0 , \quad (B.38)
\end{align*}
\]

function \( h^{(j)}(\phi^b_t, a_t, y_t) \) in equation (B.18) as,

\[
\begin{align*}
\sum_{k=1}^{m_s} \sum_{l=1}^{m_b} \sum_{m=1}^{m_y} M_{sb y, k l m} & \left\{ V^{(j)}_a \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{s\text{shock},k} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \phi^s_t + \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{b\text{shock},l} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \phi^b_t + r^f \right) \right\} a_{\text{grid},i} + y_{\text{grid},i} \\
& - C \left( \begin{pmatrix} a_{\text{grid},i} \end{pmatrix}, y_{\text{grid},i} \right) \frac{\partial}{\partial a_t} \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{s\text{shock},k} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \right) \phi^s_t + \left( \begin{pmatrix} e^{b\text{shock},l} - r^f \end{pmatrix} \right) \phi^b_t + r^f \right) \right\} = 0 , \quad (B.39)
\end{align*}
\]

in which \( V^{(j)}(\cdot) \) is given by (B.25) for a given vector of coefficients \( \left\{ \{ c_{i,k}^{(j)} \}_{i=0}^{\nu} \right\}_{k=0}^{\nu} \). The expression given by (B.38) and (B.39) defines a system of two functions \( h^{(j)}(\phi^s, a_{\text{grid},i}, y_{\text{grid},i}) \) and \( h^{(j)}(\phi^b, a_{\text{grid},i}, y_{\text{grid},i}) \), for each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). We use Matlab’s “fsolve” routine in order to solve the nonlinear equation system \( h^{(j)}(\phi^s, a_{\text{grid},i}, y_{\text{grid},i}) = 0 \) and \( h^{(j)}(\phi^b, a_{\text{grid},i}, y_{\text{grid},i}) = 0 \), so,

\[
\phi^{s(j)}(a_{\text{grid},i}, y_{\text{grid},i}) = \{ \phi^s | h^{(j)}(\phi^s, \phi^b, a_{\text{grid},i}, y_{\text{grid},i}) = 0 \} \quad \text{for all } i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} , \quad (B.40)
\]
and

\[ \phi^{b(j)}(a_{grid,i}, y_{grid,i}) = \{ \phi^b | h^{(j)}(\phi^s, \phi^b, a_{grid,i}, y_{grid,i}) = 0 \} \quad \text{for all } i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}. \quad (B.41) \]

### 2.5 Performing value-function iteration

Here we use the Bellman equation given by (B.19) in order to perform value function iteration. We use (B.40), (B.41) and (B.17) in order to incorporate \( \phi^{s(j)}(a_t, y_t) \), \( \phi^{b(j)}(a_t, y_t) \) and \( C^{(j)}(a_t, y_t) \) into the RHS of (B.19). One difficulty is the computation of the expectations term on the RHS of (B.19). We use,

\[
E_t \left[ V^{(j)}(R_{p,t+1} + y_t - c_t, y_{t+1}) \right] = 
\sum_{k=1}^{m_a} \sum_{\ell=1}^{m_b} \sum_{m=1}^{m_y} M_{sby,k\ell m} \left\{ V^{(j)} \left( \begin{bmatrix} e^{s_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^s_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^s_t + \begin{bmatrix} e^{b_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^b_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^b_t + r^f \right) \right\} a_{grid,i} \\
+ y_{grid,i} - C \left( \begin{bmatrix} a_{grid,i} \\ y_{grid,i} \\ y_t \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} e^{y_{shock}} \\ y_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} \right) \left( \begin{bmatrix} e^{s_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^s_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^s_t + \begin{bmatrix} e^{b_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^b_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^b_t + r^f \right) \right\}, \quad (B.42)
\]

\[
E_t \left[ V^{(j)}(R_{p,t+1} + y_t - c_t, y_{t+1}) \right] = 
\sum_{k=1}^{m_a} \sum_{\ell=1}^{m_b} \sum_{m=1}^{m_y} M_{sby,k\ell m} \left\{ V^{(j)} \left( \begin{bmatrix} e^{s_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^s_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^s_t + \begin{bmatrix} e^{b_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^b_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^b_t + r^f \right) \right\} a_{grid,i} \\
+ y_{grid,i} - C \left( \begin{bmatrix} a_{grid,i} \\ y_{grid,i} \\ y_t \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} e^{y_{shock}} \\ y_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} \right) \left( \begin{bmatrix} e^{s_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^s_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^s_t + \begin{bmatrix} e^{b_{shock,k}} - r^f \\ R^b_{t+1} \\ k \end{bmatrix} \phi^b_t + r^f \right) \right\}. \quad (B.43)
\]

Because the curvature of the value function is more profound at low income/wealth levels, we adjust the grids for \( a \) and \( y \) so that they are more dense at low income/wealth levels. This strategy allows us to obtain efficient approximations even with 35 gridpoints for \( a_{grid} \).
and \( y_{grid} \) in total (e.g., raising the number of gridpoints to 150 does not make an essential difference). Convergence in value function and/or coefficients \( \{\{\xi_{i,k}\}_{i=0}^{\nu}\}^{\nu}_{k=0} \), is usually achieved in about 5 minutes for each model parameterization in Figure F.1 of Appendix F in the paper. Producing all graphs in Figure F.1 takes about 30 minutes on a state-of-the-art laptop.

### 2.6 Ensuring that consumption is above subsistence and treatment of borrowing constraints

The utility function we use satisfies an Inada condition as \( c \to \chi \), which is obvious from (B.14). The RHS of (B.17) has the interpretation that, as long as \( V^* \) is well-defined, \( c > \chi \) is guaranteed. In order to implement a borrowing constraint of the form \( a_{t+1} \geq b \) we modify (B.19) as,

\[
V^{(j+1)}(a_t, y_t) = \max_{(c_t, \phi_{t+1})} \left\{ \left(1 - \beta\right)(c_t - \chi)^{(1-\gamma)\theta} + \beta \left(1 - \gamma\right) E_t \left[ V^{(j)} \left( \max \{ R_{p,t+1} a_t + y_t - c_t, b \} \big| a_{t+1} \geq b, \ y_{t+1} \} \right] \right\}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \right.
\]

\[
(B.44)
\]

using an indicator function in order to implement the conditionality operator \( (\cdot)|_{a_{t+1} \geq b} \). As in our continuous-time analysis, the presence of the borrowing constraint has not affected our results. For our borrowing constraint \( b \geq a \), at this level of wealth \( (a) \), and for all gridpoints for \( y \), households chose interior solutions.
3. Appendix C – Calculating the correlation coefficient between risky-asset returns and labor-income growth

3.1 Labor-income dynamics: PSID 1970-2009

We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1970 - 2009 in order to estimate the labor-income growth component that cannot be explained by household-demographic characteristics such as age, marital status, household composition, and some other (perhaps unobservable) family characteristics, such as cultural background, peer effects, etc. This labor-income growth component is our data proxy for variable $y_{\text{shock}}$, as defined by (B.3) and (B.28). The main estimation procedure follows Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005). Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) restrict their sample to households headed by males. Unlike them, we keep households with both males and females as a household head, since we focus on explaining stockholding data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), in which we have not distinguished the gender of household heads. To single out the retirement behavior, which is abstract away from our model, we keep a subsample by eliminating retirees, nonrespondents and students.

Our definition of labor income is relatively inclusive in terms of fiscal transfers and government benefits, in order to focus on the pure absence of self-insuring potential against labor-income risk. We define labor income as total reported labor income plus unemployment compensation, workers compensation, social security, supplemental social security, other welfare, child support, and total transfers (mainly help from relatives). These calculations have been made for both the head of household and if a spouse is present we drop zero-income observations. We also deflate labor income using the Consumer Price Index, with 1992 as the base year.

We regress the logarithm of labor income on dummies for age, family fixed effects, marital
status, and household composition. Using fixed-effect estimation, the econometric-model specification is,

\[ y_{i,t} = \alpha + \mu_i + X_{i,t}\beta + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad \Rightarrow \quad y_{i,t} \equiv \ln(Y_{i,t}) \]  

(C.1)
in which \( X_{i,t} \) is the set of control variables. In order to explore the error structure further, we generate the residual from the above fitted model (C.1),

\[ \hat{\varepsilon}_{i,t} = y_{i,t} - \hat{y}_{i,t} \quad \text{(C.2)} \]

Combining (C.1) and (C.2), we formulate the cross-sectional mean of the unexplained part of the labor-income growth rate \( \Delta y_t \), as

\[ y_{\text{shock}} \equiv \Delta \hat{y}_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \Delta \hat{y}_{i,t}}{N} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\varepsilon}_{i,t} - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\varepsilon}_{i,t-1}}{N} \]  

(C.3)

which \( y_{\text{shock}} \) is the labor-income-shock concept that we use in the theoretical model.

### 3.2 Risky-asset returns

For generating the time series of risky-asset returns, we use the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) stock-market index from 1970 to 2009, and calculate S&P-index returns as annual averages. The formula of the variable proxying \( s_{\text{shock}} \) in our theoretical model is,

\[ s_{\text{shock}} = \frac{\text{S&P Index}_t}{\text{S&P Index}_{t-1}} - 1 \]  

(C.4)
3.3 Correlation coefficient between risky-asset returns and labor-income growth

Table C.1 gives the correlation coefficient between $y_{shock}$ and $s_{shock}$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>College Graduates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$corr(y_{shock}, s_{shock})$</td>
<td>31.89%</td>
<td>50.78%</td>
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</table>

Table C.1

For the full sample, the correlation coefficient is about 32%. Because stockholders tend to have higher educational level, we also focus on college graduates by restricting the PSID-sample to college graduates, finding a higher number, which is about 51%.
REFERENCES


1. Data

The Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) is a joint project of all central banks of the Eurosystem. HFCS includes detailed household-level data on various aspects of household balance sheets and related economic and demographic variables, including income, pensions, employment, gifts and measures of consumption.

HFCS provides country-representative data, which have been collected in 15 euro area members for a sample of more than 62,000 households. These 15 countries are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland.

For each country we consider only household heads between age 25 and 65 years old, which retained 42,553 households from the original sample. In addition, we also dropped households with zero income (215 observations).

The HFCS survey uses a multiple stochastic imputation strategy to recover the missing value or the non-responding households. It provides five imputed values (replicates) for every missing value corresponding to a variable.¹ We calculate the multiple imputed mean and

¹A detailed description of the imputation procedure applied in the HFCS is given in chapter 6 of
standard deviation of our targeted variables (gross income and portfolio share on stocks) in Table 1. In Table 2, we calculate the mean of portfolio share on stocks for all Eurosystem countries, classifying by income category across the income distribution.

2. Definition of Variables

1. Stock Equity (direct and indirect stockholding excluding any pension accounts.)
   
   - Publicly Traded Stocks.
   
   - Mutual Funds: it includes funds predominately in equity, bonds, money market instruments, real estate, hedge funds and other fund types. The share of stock holding is adjusted conditional on fund types.\(^2\)

2. Total Financial Assets: it includes deposits (sight accounts, saving accounts), investments in mutual funds, bonds, investments held in non-self-employment private businesses, publicly traded shares, managed investment accounts, money owed to households as private loans, other financial assets (options, futures, index certificates, precious metals, oil and gas leases, future proceeds from a lawsuit or estate that is being settled, royalties or any other), private pension plans and whole life insurance policies. However, current value of public and occupational pension plans is not included.

3. Total Income: it is measured as gross income and is defined as the sum of labor and non-labor income for all household members. Labor income is collected for all household members aged 16 and older, other income sources are collected at the household level.

   In some countries, as gross income is not well known by respondents it is computed the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey methodological report for the first wave. (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other)

\(^2\) Note: stockholding from any public and occupational pension plans or individual retirement accounts are not included in our calculation.
from the net income given by the respondent. Specifically, the measure for gross income includes the following components: employee income, self-employment income, income from pensions, regular social transfers, regular private transfers, income from real estate property (income received from renting a property or land after deducting costs such as mortgage interest repayments, minor repairs, maintenance, insurance and other charges), income from financial investments (interest and dividends received from publicly traded companies and the amount of interest from assets such as bank accounts, certificates of deposit, bonds, publicly traded shares etc. received during the income reference period less expenses incurred), income from private business and partnerships and other non-specified sources of income.3

4. Weight: weights are assigned in order to normalize the sample to representative-sampling standards. 4

5. Income Percentiles: they are generated from the variable “total income”.

3. Portfolio Share of Stockholding

We define the portfolio share of stockholding for income group \( j \) of country \( k \) as,

\[
\phi^j_k = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{N^k_j} \text{Stock}_{i,j,k}}{\text{Total Financial Assets}_{i,j,k}}
\]

where \( N^k_j \) is the amount of households within income group \( j \) of country \( k \).

3 See section 9.2.4 of the Methodological Report in details on the collection of income variables in various countries.

4 All statistics in this document are calculated using the household weight provided. Within each country, the sum of estimation weights equals the total number of households in the country, so that the sum of weights in the whole dataset equals the total number of households in the 15 countries participating in the 1st wave of the survey.
REFERENCES


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>Income Percentiles</th>
<th>Gross Income (EUR)</th>
<th>Gross Income(s.e.)</th>
<th>Portfolio Share on Stocks</th>
<th>Portfolio Share on Stocks(s.e.)</th>
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<td>6.19%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI 60</td>
<td>44,594.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI 80</td>
<td>61,658.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.06%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI 100</td>
<td>105,894.09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.87%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 20</td>
<td>13,363.59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 40</td>
<td>23,818.85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 60</td>
<td>33,383.88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 80</td>
<td>45,058.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.24%</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 100</td>
<td>87,867.95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.78%</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR 20</td>
<td>9,343.90</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR 40</td>
<td>18,067.57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR 60</td>
<td>25,897.98</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR 80</td>
<td>36,438.48</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>0.0058</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR 100</td>
<td>68,567.06</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT 20</td>
<td>10,963.57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT 40</td>
<td>21,951.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT 60</td>
<td>31,572.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT 80</td>
<td>44,861.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT 100</td>
<td>84,829.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.81%</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU 20</td>
<td>23,090.13</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>0.0071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU 40</td>
<td>45,705.58</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>1.39%</td>
<td>0.0070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU 60</td>
<td>68,371.82</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>% Increase</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>99,800.81</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
<td>0.0067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>210,510.78</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7,749.43</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14,410.10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21,843.21</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3.55%</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>32,611.60</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55,681.82</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>6.91%</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15,827.96</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32,431.63</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
<td>0.0061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43,275.19</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>1.51%</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>57,456.25</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>91,322.43</td>
<td>1316</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,634.04</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11,801.17</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16,916.69</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24,892.49</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55,466.72</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,976.53</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12,617.03</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>5.82%</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22,103.94</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>5.93%</td>
<td>0.0063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>31,954.13</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>5.86%</td>
<td>0.0263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60,898.29</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>7.27%</td>
<td>0.0187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,215.67</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9,139.51</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12,591.09</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16,646.84</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30,152.51</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: s.e. stands for the multiple imputed standard errors.

Source: European Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2013
Table 2: Portfolio Share on Stocks by Income Percentile (EU mean)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Income Percentiles</th>
<th>Portfolio Share on Stocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro System Countries</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.779%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.308%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.828%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3.422%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.258%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2013
Online Data Appendix B: Chinese Household Finance Survey – 1st Wave 2013

Sylwia Hubar, Christos Koulovatianos, Jian Li

1. Data

The China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) is conducted by the survey and research center for China Household Finance, which is based at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. This survey is the only nationally representative survey in China that has detailed information about household finance and assets, including housing, business assets, financial assets, and other household assets. In addition, the survey also provides information about income and expenditures, social and commercial insurance, and more.

We use the 1st survey that was conducted in summer 2011 with a sample size of 8,438 households and 29,500 individuals, which covers 21 provinces (including the autonomous regions) and 4 Municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing). This survey employs a stratified 3-stage probability proportion to size (PPS) random sample design, which is necessary to ensure that the survey is nationally representative\(^1\).

We consider only household heads between age 25 years old and 65 years old, which retained 6,952 households. In addition, we have dropped households with zero income (226 observations).

\(^1\) Details about the sampling design could refer http://www.chfsdata.org/detail-14,15.html.
2. **Definition of Variables**

1. Stock Equity (direct and indirect stockholding excluding any pension account)
   - Publicly Traded Stocks.
   - Non Publicly Traded Stocks.
   - Mutual Funds: it includes funds predominatly in equity, bonds, money market instruments, also includes mixed strategy funds and other types.
   - Financial Products (categorized as Wealth Management Products)

2. Total Financial Assets: it comprises total balance of demand deposits, total balance of time deposits, stocks (public traded and non-public traded), bonds, mutual funds, derivatives, warrants, other financial derivatives, financial products, foreign currency assets, gold, cash at home and other type of liquid assets.

3. Total Income: it includes income from all sources (salary, interest, dividend, compensations, transfers etc).

4. Weight: weights are assigned in order to normalize the sample to representative-sampling standards, the weight variable in the data is “swgt”.

5. Income Percentiles: they are generated from variable “total income”.

3. **Portfolio Share of Stockholding**

We define the portfolio share of stockholding for income group $j$ as,

$$
\phi_j = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{N_j} \frac{\text{Stock}_{i,j}}{\text{Total Financial Assets}_{i,j}}}{N_j}
$$
where $N_j$ is the amount of households within income group $j$. Table 1 shows the detailed information of portfolio share on stocks across the income distribution, together with information on total asset holding and total financial-asset holding.

REFERENCES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>Income Percentiles</th>
<th>Portfolio Share on Stocks (%)</th>
<th>Gross Income (CNY)</th>
<th>Total Assets (CNY)</th>
<th>Total Financial Assets (CNY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.443</td>
<td>4,220.57</td>
<td>396,191.75</td>
<td>23,482.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.273</td>
<td>16,367.13</td>
<td>275,096.63</td>
<td>16,263.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.150</td>
<td>30,631.76</td>
<td>440,228.28</td>
<td>27,103.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5.414</td>
<td>52,124.18</td>
<td>594,769.38</td>
<td>37,879.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11.860</td>
<td>208,030.73</td>
<td>1,810,124.50</td>
<td>167,894.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chinese Household Finance Survey 1st Wave 2013
Online Data Appendix C: US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2007

Sylwia Hubar, Christos Koulovatianos, Jian Li

1 Description of Variables (Source: Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2007)

1. Stock Equity (Direct and Indirect Stockholding):

   (a) **Direct stockholding**
   - Publicly Traded Stocks.

   (b) **Stockholding through mutual funds**
   - Saving and Money Market Accounts.
   - Mutual Funds.
   - Annuities, Trusts and Managed Investment Accounts.

   (c) **Stockholding through Retirement Accounts**
   - IRA/KEOGH Accounts.
   - Past Pension Accounts.
   - Current Benefits and Future Benefits from Pensions.

2. Business Equity:

   - Actively Managed Business.
   - Non-Actively Managed Business.

3. **Total Assets**: Assets of all categories covered in the SCF 2007 database (stocks, business equity, bonds, saving and checking accounts, retirement accounts, life insurance, primary residence, and other residential real estate, nonresidential real estate, vehicles, artwork, jewelry, etc.).

4. **Total Income**: Income from all sources (salary, interest, dividend, compensations, transfers etc).
5. **Weight**: Weights are assigned in order to normalize the sample to representative-sampling standards (see the section “Analysis Weights” in the “Codebook for the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances”).\(^1\)


7. **Equivalence Scales**: The equivalence scale is \(\sqrt{n}\) in which \(n\) is the number of household members. This equivalence-scale measure approximates the standard OECD equivalence scales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentile</th>
<th>Total Labor Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>20,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>36,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>59,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>98,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>140,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Full sample in 2007 USD. Data in the survey is in 2006 USD, which is adjusted according to the CPI-U table (U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index). The 2006-2007 average to average change is 2.84%.

---

\(^1\)The “Codebook for the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances” is downloadable from [http://federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2007documentation.htm](http://federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2007documentation.htm)
2 Matching Data with Descriptive Statistics in the SCF 2007 Chartbook

To show that our database is constructed in a reliable way, we compare key statistics with those reported in the SCF2007 Chartbook. Our robustness checks are:

- **Matching median values of key variables in the SCF 2007 chartbook:**
  The reason for choosing medians instead of means in order to perform a robustness check is that median values capture more information regarding a variable's distribution. In addition, mean values can be substantially affected by outliers. Indeed, our database matches median values in the SCF2007 chartbook.

- **Matching median values of each income group in the SCF 2007 chartbook:**
  Our database generated should match the income benchmark in small differences by income quintile or decile, which is a more demanding task. Our results are listed in the following tables demonstrate that the matching is satisfactory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>SCF2007 Chartbook</th>
<th>Our Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Asset</td>
<td>221.5</td>
<td>221.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock Equity</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Equity</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: **Median Values of Pre-Tax Family Income for All Families, Classified by Income Percentile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Percentile</th>
<th>SCF2007 Chartbook</th>
<th>Our Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%-39.9%</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%-59.9%</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%-79.9%</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%-89.9%</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>114.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%-100%</td>
<td>206.9</td>
<td>209.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Full sample, in thousands of 2007 US dollars. Data in the survey are in 2006 US dollars. We adjusted them according to the CPI-U table (U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index). 2006-2007 Average to Average change is 2.84%.

Table 4: **Median Values of Total Assets for Families with Positive Asset Holdings, Classified by Income Percentile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Percentile</th>
<th>SCF2007 Chartbook</th>
<th>Our Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%-39.9%</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%-59.9%</td>
<td>183.5</td>
<td>182.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%-79.9%</td>
<td>343.1</td>
<td>345.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%-89.9%</td>
<td>567.5</td>
<td>561.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%-100%</td>
<td>1358.4</td>
<td>1355.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Full sample, in thousands of 2007 US dollars.
Table 5: Median Values of Different Asset Types for Families with Positive Asset Holdings by Income Percentile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Percentile</th>
<th>SCF2007 Chartbook</th>
<th>Our Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stocks</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%-39.9%</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%-59.9%</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%-79.9%</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%-89.9%</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%-100%</td>
<td>219.6</td>
<td>379.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Full sample, in thousands of 2007 US dollars.
3 Portfolio Shares of Risky Assets

Portfolio shares of risky assets are calculated by income groups. For each income group we have the formula,

\[ SHARE_i = \frac{\sum_k \frac{SHARE_{k,n}}{N}}{K}, \]

in which \( n \) is the observation number, \( k \) is the imputation number and \( i \) is the risky-asset type. Final results are shown in the following tables. SCF weights are not shown in the above formula but have been included in the calculation. The comparison between Tables 6 and 7 justifies why we did not restrict the full sample into a particular age range such as household heads aged between 25-59 years old. Demographic or life-cycle biases seem to play a rather mild role, so we have chosen to utilize the entirety of the information provided by the SCF 2007 database in our calibration exercises.
Table 6: Portfolio Share on Risky Assets by Income Percentile (Full Sample per Equivalent Adult)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Percentile</th>
<th>Risky Assets (%)</th>
<th>General Information</th>
<th>Tax Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stocks</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Total Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>9.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%-39.9%</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>19.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%-59.9%</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>32.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Notes: Full sample, in thousands of 2007 US dollars.
Table 7: Portfolio Share on Risky Assets by Income Percentile (Age group 25-59 per Equivalent Adult)

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Notes: Age group 25-59, in thousands of 2007 US dollars.
References


Online Data Appendix D: Effective Tax Rates in the US, EU and China

Sylwia Hubar, Christos Koulovatianos, Jian Li

In this Appendix, we report the effective tax rates in the US, EU and China. For the US, we report two different measures in Table 1 of this Appendix below: (a) the effective tax rate generated by using the NBER Taxsim module, where the corresponding benefits are excluded, and (b) the effective tax rate, including social benefits. In the paper we have used the effective tax rate generated by the NBER Taxsim module. As we have not included any social benefits in our model, excluding these benefits is the correct way of calculating the effective tax rate. The same logic applies to the calculation of the tax rates for the EU and China.

Regarding the calculation of the EU tax rates, we first collect the tax rates for each European country, using “Taxes in Europe Database v3” (see details in Table 2). Then, we average the tax rate for each income category across European countries. We show the EU effective tax rate in Table 1.

For China, we have retrieved the corresponding tax rate from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (details appear in Table 1).
### Table 1: Effective Tax Rate in US, EU and China

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Note: For US, we use the effective tax rate generated by NBER Taxsim which excludes the corresponding benefits. For EU, we use the average effective tax rate across European countries (see details in Table 2). For China, we apply the NBSC tax table.
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Table 2: Effective Tax Rate in EU Countries
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