Why Bank Money Creation?

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Why Bank Money Creation?*

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Abstract  
We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks’ leverage ratios when providing deposits to make sure they have enough “skin in the game” to opt for loan monitoring. When there is unobservable heterogeneity among banks with regard to their (opportunity) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding. With a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, the gains from higher lending by banks with a high repayment pledgeability outweigh losses from banks which are less diligent in monitoring. Bank-risk assessments, combined with appropriate risk-sensitive capital requirements, can reduce or even eliminate such losses.  

Keywords: monetary system, banking, money creation, loanable funds, capital requirements, leverage constraint, asymmetric information, moral hazard, CBDC  

JEL Classification: E42, E44, E51, G21, G28  

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1 Introduction

The current monetary architecture has often attracted criticism, especially for its “magic money tree”, which allows banks to create money “out of thin air”: they can create claims on the legal tender banknotes in the form of deposits, which are the main source of money in our modern economies and are used by banks to grant loans or purchase assets from non-banks. Concerns that commercial banks then have access to an inexhaustible source of profits, as well as fears about financial stability have triggered so-called “sovereign money” initiatives to abolish this privilege of banks[1]. In parallel, central banks around the globe are considering the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). To what extent such a CBDC would impact commercial banks’ current role in money creation is not clear yet. If a CBDC were to become the dominant medium of exchange and private bank deposits were to be moved into CBDC, banks could lose their money creation privilege and be reduced to simple intermediaries of loanable funds.

In this paper, we examine whether there is an economic rationale for our current two-tier monetary architecture with bank money creation, which essentially works as follows[2]. To a large extent, the money stock available to the public is composed of deposits (electronic private bank money) at commercial banks. Deposits are issued by commercial banks, in particular when they grant loans. Claims arising from interbank deposit flows—when the public makes payments—are settled by reserves (electronic central bank money) issued by the central bank (CB) to commercial banks. Importantly, banking regulation ensures that commercial banks comply with a set of rules such as capital requirements.

We compare this two-tier monetary architecture with bank money creation (henceforth, MC economy) to the corresponding, standard loanable funds economy (henceforth, LF economy), in which banks need to acquire investment goods before they can grant loans to firms for capital investments.

Our main insights are as follows. In the LF economy, it is in the interest of households to limit banks’ leverage ratios when providing deposits to ensure that banks have enough “skin in the game” to monitor their loans. When banks are heterogeneous with regard to the (opportunity) costs of monitoring and when there is asymmetric information between households and banks about these characteristics, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. In contrast, banks in the MC economy can initiate lending by creating bank deposits, without relying on household funding. With a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, the gains from higher lending by banks with a high repayment pledgeability outweigh losses from banks which are less diligent in monitoring. Bank-risk assessments, combined with appropriate risk-sensitive capital requirements, can reduce or even eliminate such losses, since these banks anticipate that high initial lending and

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[1] In 2018, Switzerland voted on the “Vollgeld-Initiative”, which aimed at doing that. See https://www.vollgeld-initiative.ch/english/. The proposal was rejected.

leverage will not pass the regulatory requirements when the risk of their credit portfolio is assessed. If risk-assessment is perfect, the first-best allocation can be achieved in the MC economy.

At a more detailed level, we start with a two-period, two-sector economy with risk-neutral agents as in Gersbach and Rochet (2012, 2017), extended to heterogeneous banks and with asymmetric information of households about individual bank characteristics. Households and bankers are endowed with a capital good, which they supply to firms in two sectors in order to produce a consumption good. In the first sector of the economy, firms have direct access to the capital good through issuing bonds to households. In the second sector, firms can only obtain capital through bank loans. Banks partly finance their loans through their own endowment with capital goods, i.e., through equity, and partly either by household funding (in the LF economy) or by money creation (in the MC economy). Banks are subject to moral hazard in the spirit of Holmström and Tirole (1997). If they monitor loans diligently, their investments are more likely to succeed. If they shirk monitoring, they enjoy private benefits. Banks are heterogeneous regarding the benefits from shirking or, equivalently, regarding their efficiency in monitoring.

In the LF economy, the amount of funding households are willing to provide to banks is limited, since banks’ monitoring incentives decrease proportionally to external financing and thus to the scale of the bank. With heterogeneous banks and asymmetric information between households and banks, households limit funds to banks, such that even the bank with the greatest potential benefits from shirking still monitors. As a consequence, aggregate external financing of banks, and thus aggregate lending by banks, is low. It is, of course, lower than in a first-best world without any frictions and also lower than in a second-best world where the characteristics of a bank are known to households. It turns out that it is inefficiently low since in the MC economy and with the same informational frictions, aggregate bank lending will be higher and closer to the second-best outcome.

In the MC economy, banks do not require household funding to initiate lending. Any loan they hand out simultaneously creates a deposit for the borrower. Firms use the deposits obtained through loans to buy the capital good from households, which are credited with deposits at their bank in return. As firms and households are likely to hold accounts at different banks, the ensuing interbank transactions have to be settled by reserves. Only banks can borrow such reserves from the CB.

As long as the profits on new loans exceed the bank’s funding costs, increasing money creation, and thus leverage, is always profitable for an individual bank in the MC economy, since it increases the bank’s expected return on equity. High leverage, however, implies low monitoring incentives. Hence, the government acting as a bank regulator imposes a leverage constraint. By setting this leverage constraint, the regulator aims to

3Note that our rationale for a maximum leverage ratio, that is, forcing banks to keep enough skin in the game to guarantee a certain level of aggregate monitoring, is different from the systemic-risk
strike an optimal balance between maintaining the banks’ monitoring incentives on the one side and allowing an efficient allocation of capital on the other side. Put differently, the regulator faces a trade-off when deciding on the optimal leverage constraint: a tight constraint incentivizes monitoring, also at banks with a high exposure to moral-hazard, but leads to lower than optimal lending levels for diligent banks. If the regulator sets a sufficiently strict leverage constraint, all banks monitor and the resulting capital allocation is the same as in the LF economy. We show that selecting a somewhat looser leverage constraint improves economic outcomes. It implies that a positive fraction of banks shirks monitoring, but it also leads to a more efficient allocation of capital and, overall, to higher aggregate output than in the LF economy.

We also explore how the allocation in the MC economy can be further improved by risk-sensitive leverage constraints, typically called “capital requirements”. In a scenario where the regulatory authority can perfectly assess the riskiness of a bank’s credit portfolio, it can make use of risk-sensitive leverage constraints and replicate the first-best allocation in the MC economy. The reason is that the regulator will threaten banks with a tight leverage constraint if their credit portfolio turns out to be high-risk, which is the case if they shirk monitoring, but will set a loose leverage constraint for low-risk banks, i.e., banks who monitor. As a consequence, all banks opt for monitoring and capital is allocated efficiently.

2 Broader Implications and Literature

Our analysis also allows to assess whether the standard LF approach, which is typically used in macroeconomic modeling, is a valid shortcut for modeling the banking sectors’ main role within the economy. In contrast to Faure and Gersbach (2022), who show that the LF economy and the MC economy produce equivalent outcomes when considering an environment without moral hazard at bank level, our findings show that this result does not carry over to a setting with heterogeneous banks and financial frictions. An inefficiently low allocation of capital to bank-dependent firms, due to bank-level moral hazard, turns out to be less of a worry in our actual monetary system with bank money creation than what the LF approach would suggest.\footnote{A parallel argument was made by Jakab and Kumhof (2019) within a DSGE approach.} Hence, our results imply that while in many circumstances, using the LF approach may be sufficient, it is not adequate in other circumstances. In particular, if we want to understand the functioning, optimal regulation and policy-making in our current monetary system, one should use the MC approach—and many bells and whistles can be added to the model in future research. We expect that accounting for the dual role of banks as loan providers and money creators
will become more important as this area of research expands.\footnote{5}

We also show that while the MC economy produces higher aggregate output, it is more fragile than the LF economy. This is because the MC economy depends on the regulator correctly setting the leverage constraint or the risk-sensitive leverage constraints. If this is not the case, welfare in the MC economy can be lower than in the LF economy.

The practice of money and loan creation by commercial banks has a long history and has been subject to enduring analyses and debates (Macleod, 1866; Wicksell, 1907; Hahn, 1920; Keynes, 1931; Schumpeter, 1954; Gurley and Shaw, 1960; Tobin, 1963; McLeay et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2018). In modern times, the money banks create is a claim on fiat money which is created by the central bank. Different modeling approaches are pursued and applied to capture this (Skeie, 2008; Jakab and Kumhof, 2019; Wang, 2019; Bolton et al., 2020; Faure and Gersbach, 2021; Piazzesi et al., 2021; Wang, 2021; Li and Li, 2021; Parlour et al., 2022).\footnote{6}

In this paper, we provide a rationale why our current monetary system, in which banks have the privilege to create private money as claims on public fiat money, is advantageous when there is unobservable heterogeneity among banks.

Our paper involves a simple set of reasons why bank deposits as claims on fiat money have a positive value as a medium of exchange. First, firms can only acquire investment goods from households if they obtain loans from banks in the form of bank deposits. Second, households accept the firms’ bank deposits, since they can later use them to acquire the consumption goods produced by firms. Third, firms provide the consumption goods in return for the households’ bank deposits because they need to repay their bank loans. Finally, banks repay their loans from the CB, since they face large penalties in case of default. Hence, all money that was created at the beginning of the economy is destroyed at the end: bank money is destroyed when firms repay their bank loans, CB money is destroyed when banks repay the CB. Our paper is thus a variant of theories that examine under which circumstances fiat money can have positive value in finite-horizon settings (see models and discussions, for instance in Shubik and Wilson, 1977; Dubey and Geanakoplos, 1992, 2003a,b, 2006; Shapley and Shubik, 1977; Shubik and Tsomocos, 1992; Tsomocos, 2003; Bloise and Polemarchakis, 2006; Goodhart et al., 2006).\footnote{7}

The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces the LF economy and solves for equilibrium. Section 4 does the same for the MC economy, taking the regulatory leverage

\footnote{5}{This may also be important in education. As emphasized in an article in The Economist, we should continuously review whether the simplified models we teach depict reality adequately. See “Efforts to modernise economics teaching are gathering steam”, The Economist, March 18th 2021 edition, \url{https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/03/20/efforts-to-modernise-economics-teaching-are-gathering-steam}.}

\footnote{6}{A parallel literature has examined the properties of monetary systems when banks issue banknotes instead of deposits (e.g., Gersbach, 1998; Cavalcanti and Wallace, 1999).}

\footnote{7}{See Huber et al. (2014) for a summary of the reasons why the value of fiat money can be positive in finite and infinite horizon models.}
constraint as given. Section 5 derives the optimal leverage constraint in the MC economy and compares the resulting allocations to those in an LF economy. Section 6 illustrates how bank-risk assessments, combined with risk-sensitive leverage constraints, can further improve outcomes in the MC economy or even achieve first-best. Section 7 concludes. Proofs and supplementary material are relegated to Appendices A and B, respectively.

3 Loanable Funds

3.1 The model

First, we introduce the model in the LF setting. Consider a two-period economy \((t = 1, 2)\) with two types of goods: a capital good and a consumption good. The capital good is used as the sole input factor in firms’ production of the consumption good. Returns are expressed in terms of the consumption good. There are three types of risk-neutral agents: households, bankers and entrepreneurs. All agents are price-takers.

Entrepreneurs run firms but need external financing to realize their projects. In \(t = 1\), households provide capital goods to firms, either through direct financing in the bond market or through indirect financing, which requires intermediation by banks. In \(t = 2\), firms produce and consumption takes place. The total endowment of the capital good in period 1 is normalized to one.

Let us next describe the agents’ roles in more detail.

Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial activity takes place in two separated productive sectors, which differ in production technologies and financing options. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs run firms and have no endowment. Firms in the first sector (the bank-dependent sector, henceforth, “BS”) can only acquire indirect financing via banks. We do not explicitly model why this is the case, but one could think of a firm-level moral hazard problem that requires these firms to obtain external governance from an intermediary. Firms in the BS have access to a risky production technology that yields a constant gross return to scale \(sR_B\), where

\[
s = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if production is successful,} \\
0 & \text{if production fails.} 
\end{cases}
\]  

The probability of success depends on banks’ monitoring efforts (see below). The aggregate amount of capital lent to firms in the BS is denoted by \(K_B\).

Firms within the second productive sector (the frictionless sector, henceforth, “FS”) have sound internal governance and thus have access to direct financing from households through the bond market. The production technology in the FS is characterized by diminishing returns to scale at the aggregate level. There is no productive uncertainty in
the frictionless sector. If we denote the total amount of capital given to firms in the FS by $K_F$, output in terms of the consumption good is given by $g(K_F)$, where $g'(K_F) > 0$, $g''(K_F) < 0$ and $\lim_{K_F \to 0} g'(K_F) = \infty$. Profit maximization entails that households’ gross return $R_F$ per unit of capital invested into the FS is given by $R_F = g'(K_F)$.

Bankers. There is a continuum of bankers indexed by $b \in [\underline{b}, \bar{b}]$. Each banker owns and runs a bank and each bank is endowed with $e$ units of the capital good, i.e., $e$ denotes a bank’s equity, where $0 < e < (\bar{b} - \underline{b})^{-1}$. Aggregate bank equity is $E = (\bar{b} - \underline{b})e$ and thus $0 < E < 1$. Each bank $b$ takes household deposits $d_b$ and promises a per unit repayment $R_D$ in case of success. Hence, the deposit gross rate is $sR_D$. The bank uses acquired household fundings, together with its own equity, to lend an amount $k_b (= d_b + e)$ at gross rate $sR_L$ to firms within the BS. Constant returns to scale imply zero profits for BS firms. Hence, $R_L = R_B$. Note that all returns are stated as gross returns. For the sake of brevity, we will often simply use the term “return”.

Each bank $b$ faces a monitoring decision $\gamma_b \in \{0, 1\}$: it either diligently engages in loan monitoring ($\gamma_b = 1$) or shirks such efforts ($\gamma_b = 0$). If a bank monitors, its borrowing firms’ probability of success in production is given by $\pi$ (with $0 < \pi < 1$). If a bank shirks monitoring, this probability decreases to $\pi - \Delta$ (with $0 < \Delta < \pi$), but the banker enjoys a private benefit $b$ ($> 0$) per unit of lending. Since banks differ with respect to $b$, there is heterogeneity among banks regarding their private benefits from shirking and hence regarding their incentives for moral hazard behavior.

Households. There is a continuum of identical households (HHs), so that we can focus on a representative household. The aggregate amount of capital households are endowed with is $1 - E$. Households maximize consumption in period $t = 2$ by optimally allocating their capital goods between the two productive sectors, i.e., by optimally providing capital either to the FS by buying bonds or to the BS by investing in bank deposits. We will focus on “interior” allocations, where households provide positive amounts of capital to both sectors. In this case, households’ expected returns from bonds and deposits have to equalize.

3.2 Benchmarks

Before solving for the competitive equilibrium of our economy, we consider two benchmark scenarios: (i) the first-best, and (ii) a second-best LF economy characterized by symmetric information about bank characteristics. Throughout the paper, we assume that loan monitoring by banks is economically efficient.

Assumption 1 (Economically efficient monitoring technology)

Let $\Delta R_B \geq \bar{b}$.

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8In case of failure, i.e., for $s = 0$, households’ deposits are lost and the households face a gross rate of return equal to zero. To keep things as simple as possible, there is no deposit insurance.
Assumption 1 states that the additional expected output created if Bank \( b \) monitors compared to if it does not, given by \( \pi R_B k_B - (\pi - \Delta) R_B k_B \), exceeds the bank’s private benefits \( b k_B \) from non-monitoring. As \( b \in [b, \bar{b}] \), this (strictly) applies also for all other banks \( b \).

**Welfare criterion.** Since all agents are risk-neutral, we take expected aggregate output as the welfare criterion for our economy. This specification neglects bankers’ private benefits, which, however, does not affect our main findings. Assumption 1 implies that the first-best requires monitoring efforts by all banks (i.e., \( \gamma_b = 1 \) for all \( b \)), irrespective of whether we account for the bankers’ private benefits or not. With regard to a comparison of the LF and MC economies, which this paper ultimately aims for, an extended welfare criterion that would take bankers’ private benefits into account would only reinforce our results.\(^9\)

In the following Proposition, we characterize the first-best. The first-best values for \( K_B \) and \( K_F \) are denoted by \( K_{FB}^F \) and \( K_{FB}^B \).

**Proposition 1 (First-best)**

*In first-best, \( \gamma_b = 1 \) for all \( b \) and thus the success probability of bank-dependent firms’ projects is \( \pi \). Capital is allocated according to \( K_{FB}^F = (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B) \) and \( K_{FB}^B = 1 - K_{FB}^F \).*

The first-best values \( K_{FB}^B \) and \( K_{FB}^F \) are derived from the fact that capital is allocated efficiently between the two productive sectors and hence the marginal returns equalize, i.e., \( \pi R_B = g'(K_{FB}^F) \), and that all capital is used, i.e. \( K_{FB}^B + K_{FB}^F = 1 \).

**Second-best LF economy.** A detailed analysis of the second-best LF economy is relegated to Appendix B.1. In essence, it works analogously to the analysis of the asymmetric LF economy as provided in Subsection 3.3. There is one important difference, however: with symmetric information on bank characteristics, households can treat different banks differently and thus can incentivize them to monitor on a bank-by-bank basis, i.e., households can stick to funding constraints tailor-made for individual banks. Hence, the drawback related to incentivizing bank monitoring, that is, a potential underallocation of capital to the BS, is minimized (cf. Proposition 2(ii) below).

### 3.3 Equilibrium

We now turn to analyzing the behavior of households, banks and firms in a competitive equilibrium of the LF economy. Since households cannot distinguish between bank types, i.e., \( b \) is unobservable, all banks receive equal amounts of deposits \( d_b = d \), which implies

\(^9\)This is due to the fact that, as we will show, equilibrium in the LF economy entails monitoring by all banks, while there are also non-monitoring banks in the MC economy. Even when neglecting bankers’ private benefits from non-monitoring, welfare is higher in the MC economy (cf. Proposition 6). Thus it would certainly also be higher if we would take these private benefits into account.
that $k_b = k$ is constant across banks. We construct an equilibrium in which all banks monitor. Given a loan amount $k$, Bank $b$ monitors if its expected additional profits when monitoring exceed its private benefits from shirking:

$$
\Delta [R_B k - R_D (k - e)] \geq \overline{bk}.
$$

(2)

Rewriting this condition yields

$$
k (R_D - R_B + \frac{b}{\Delta}) \leq e R_D.
$$

(3)

With Assumption 1 and $k = d + e$, a bank funding its loans solely through equity (i.e., $d = 0$) would always opt for diligent loan monitoring. With positive levels of household funding (i.e., $d > 0$), this is not necessarily the case. Condition (3) gives the maximum incentive-compatible amount of capital that households can provide to Bank $b$. If household deposits $d$ and thereby the loan amount $k$ would exceed the value for which Condition (3) holds with equality, Bank $b$’s additional expected profits from monitoring would fall short of its private benefits from shirking. In other words, the bank would not have enough skin in the game to behave diligently. We call Condition (3) the incentive constraint, which households have to respect if they want all banks to monitor.

Households provide funding to banks only if the expected return on deposits is not lower than the return $R_F$ from bonds issued by firms in the FS. Given that the incentive constraint holds, households’ expected return on deposits is given by $\pi R_D$. Hence, households’ participation constraint for investment in the BS through deposits is given by

$$
\pi R_D \geq R_F.
$$

(4)

In an “interior” allocation in which households actually invest in both bonds and bank deposits, Condition (4) must be satisfied with equality. As we want to focus on such cases, we make the following assumption:

**Assumption 2 (Bank lending exceeds bank equity)**

Let $g'(1 - E) < (\pi - \Delta) R_B$.

Assumption 2 states that the marginal product of capital in the FS falls short of the (expected) marginal product of capital in the BS, as long as the total amount of capital deployed to the BS does not exceed aggregate bank equity $E$. Thereby, the assumption ensures that the amount of capital flowing to the BS exceeds aggregate bank equity $E$. This is independent of whether banks monitor or not, since from Assumption 2 immediately follows also $g'(1 - E) < \pi R_B$.

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10 If the bank with the highest private benefits from shirking, i.e., Bank $\overline{b}$, monitors, then of course all other banks monitor as well.
Together with the Inada condition \( \lim_{K_F \to 0} g'(K_F) = \infty \), Assumption \(^2\) implies that households provide positive amounts of capital to both productive sectors. Hence, their expected returns from bonds and deposits have to equalize, i.e., Condition \(^4\) must be satisfied with equality. Then, substituting Condition \(^4\) into Condition \(^3\), banks maximize profits by solving the following constrained optimization problem:

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_k & \quad \pi R_B k - R_F (k - e), \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad k (R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \delta}{\Delta}) \leq e R_F.
\end{align*}
\]

Note that if all households respect the incentive constraint \(^3\) and thus all banks monitor, a single (price-taking) household has no incentive to deviate by offering an amount of deposits that exceeds the maximum incentive-compatible one. The promised return \( R_D = R_F / \pi \) on risky deposits is such that the household is indifferent between monitored investment in the BS and bonds from the FS. If the household violates Condition \(^3\), it is at risk of depositing at a bank which then no longer monitors. The given return \( R_F / \pi \), however, does not offer a compensation for that risk. Hence, the household is better off adhering to Condition \(^3\) and investing its remaining capital into the FS at rate \( R_F \).

In the following proposition, we first characterize the “all-monitor” equilibrium of the LF economy. The equilibrium values for \( R_F \) and \( K_B \) are denoted by \( R_{LF}^F \) and \( K_{LF}^B \). Furthermore, in part (ii) of the proposition we compare the equilibrium outcomes to those in a second-best LF economy, where the relevant values for \( R_F \) and \( K_B \) are denoted by \( R_{SB}^F \) and \( K_{SB}^B \), and \( \bar{E}^{SB} \) is given according to Expression \((B.3)\) in Appendix B.1.

**Proposition 2 (Deficient bank-funding in the LF economy)**

(i) There is a competitive equilibrium with \( \gamma_b = 1 \) for all \( b \). If bank equity is scarce, i.e., for

\[
E < \bar{E}^{LF} := \frac{\bar{b} [1 - (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B)]}{\Delta R_B},
\]

the constraint in the maximization problem in \((5)\) is binding. Then, the equilibrium return \( R_{LF}^F \) is given by the solution to

\[
R_F = g' \left( 1 - \frac{e R_F (\bar{b} - b)}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \delta}{\Delta}} \right)
\]

and satisfies \( R_{LF}^F < \pi R_B \). It follows that there is underinvestment in the bank-dependent sector, i.e., \( K_{LF}^F < K_{FB}^F \).

(ii) Compared to a second-best LF economy, asymmetric information exacerbate the problem of underinvestment in the bank-dependent sector, i.e., \( E^{LF} > E^{SB} \) and, for \( E < E^{LF} \), \( R_{LF}^F < R_{SB}^F \) (\( \leq R_{FB}^F \)) and \( K_{LF}^F < K_{SB}^F \) (\( \leq K_{FB}^F \)).
The proof is in Appendix A. Proposition 2(i) states that if bank equity is scarce, households are constrained in the incentive-compatible amount of deposits they can provide to banks. As a consequence, the equilibrium spread between the return on investment in BS and FS firms is positive: \( \pi R_B > R_{LF} \). It follows that aggregate bank lending is inefficiently low when compared to the first-best. Also note that for given aggregate bank equity \( E \), Condition (6) is more likely to hold if financial frictions are large, i.e., if \( \overline{b} \) is large. In case that banks hold enough equity such that Condition (6) is violated, the constraint in the maximization problem in (5) is non-binding and the all-monitor equilibrium of the LF economy coincides with the first-best.

Since, according to part (ii) of the proposition, it is \( \overline{E}^{LF} > \overline{E}^{SB} \), the allocation of capital to the BS is more likely to be constrained by banks’ given amount of equity when bank types cannot be observed. This is not surprising, as information asymmetries imply that households cannot provide banks with the proper incentives to monitor on a bank-by-bank basis. Instead, their incentive constraint (3) applies for all banks alike. Therefore, if \( E < \overline{E}^{LF} \), asymmetric information lead to a higher equilibrium spread \( \pi R_B - R_F \) than in a second-best LF economy and exacerbate the problem of underinvestment in the BS.

Uniqueness of equilibrium. Finally, we observe that there can be no other equilibria that involve bank monitoring besides the all-monitor equilibrium established above. To see this, consider a scenario where households provide an amount of bank deposits such that the incentive constraint is met only for banks with \( b \leq \hat{b} \), where \( \hat{b} \in (b, \bar{b}) \), and thus only a fraction of banks monitors. Denote the resulting average success probability of a BS investment by \( \mu \) (< \( \pi \)). To qualify as an equilibrium, it has to be \( \mu R_D = R_F \). But then an individual (price-taking) household would have an incentive to deviate by reducing its amount of deposits, since this would increase the probability that its depositing bank monitors. A given return of \( R_D = R_F/\mu \) would then imply an overcompensation for the risk related to BS investment. Capital that was freed through the reduction of bank deposits could be invested at rate \( R_F \), which is exactly the rate for which the household was indifferent between deposits and FS bonds in the first place. Hence, reducing investment in banks dominates the original investment.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{11}\)There are two caveats to make here. First, we assume that a single household is pivotal to turn one bank from non-monitoring into monitoring by reducing its investment. As long as households invest into a finite number of banks, this is satisfied. Second, there might also be an “all-shirk” equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where all banks shirk. This could happen in the extreme case that households have spread their investments across many banks and provide so much bank capital that it is impossible for an individual household to meet any bank’s incentive constraint by reducing only its own amount of deposits.
4 Money Creation

4.1 The model

We now turn to the MC economy. First, the monetary and regulatory framework of the two-tier monetary architecture is presented. The elements of the model related to the real side of the economy are the same as in the LF setting.

Money in the MC economy comes in two forms, bank deposits and CB reserves. Bank deposits are created when banks grant loans. They are used for payment between non-bank entities. Reserves are held by banks at the CB. They are used to settle interbank transactions. In contrast to the LF economy, banks do not only act as simple intermediaries which collect household deposits and subsequently lend these to firms. Instead, banks create new deposits when they make loans: the amount a firm borrows simultaneously appears on its bank’s balance sheet as a deposit. Firms use these deposits to buy the capital good from households (and from banks). Interbank transactions, which arise from the fact that agents may hold accounts at different banks, are settled by reserves. Banks can obtain reserves either by borrowing in a competitive interbank market or by taking a loan from the CB. Households use the deposits they receive from selling the capital good to buy the consumption good. Firms use the deposits they receive from selling the consumption good to pay back their loans. Finally, banks repay their interbank loans and their loans from the CB. At the beginning, the regulator sets a leverage constraint. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events. We next describe the model in formal terms.

For the moment, we neglect the regulatory leverage constraint, which will be introduced in the next subsection.

**Monetary framework.** With money in the model, we now have to distinguish between real and nominal variables. To be clear in this regard, we use bold fonts to indicate real variables and normal fonts to indicate nominal variables. The BS prices of the capital good and the consumption good are denoted by $p_I$ and $p_C$, respectively. Bank loans to
firms are stated in nominal terms as well. They are denoted by \( l_b \) on the individual level and by \( L_B = \int_b^T l_b \, db \) on the aggregate level. A loan of amount \( l_b \) buys a firm \( l_b/p_I \) units of the capital good. Households sell their capital goods to firms in the FS or BS. The aggregate amount of capital deployed to the FS is denoted by \( K_F \) and yields households a risk-free real return \( R_F K_F \) (in terms of the consumption good). Households sell their remaining capital goods \((1 - K_F - E)\) to BS firms and are credited with deposits of nominal value \((1 - K_F - E)p_I\). Bankers sell their capital goods to BS firms and receive \( e p_I \) deposits each in return. As these are claims on themselves, \( e p_I \) is the nominal amount of each bank’s equity.

**Financial frictions.** For our outcomes in the MC and LF economies to be comparable, we make sure that we consider exactly the same frictions in both settings. In the LF economy, bankers’ private benefits from skipping monitoring efforts were related to real lending \( k_b \). In the MC economy, we relate bankers’ private benefits to nominal lending \( l_b \). Therefore, we have to take the price ratio \( p_C/p_I \) into account, i.e., we assume that a non-monitoring banker enjoys (nominal) private benefits \( (p_C/p_I) b \) per unit of lending \( l_b \).

**CB policy rate.** We denote the gross rate for borrowing from (or depositing at) the CB by \( R_{CB} \). Assume that there is a competitive interbank market and that banks cannot discriminate between deposits owned by households and deposits owned by other banks. Then, a simple no-arbitrage argument establishes Lemma 1.

**Lemma 1 (Deposit rate equals CB policy rate)**

The deposit rate equals the CB policy rate:

\[
R_D = R_{CB}. \tag{8}
\]

**Proof.** Our assumptions with regard to the interbank market immediately imply that the gross interbank rate for borrowing from (or depositing at) other banks has to equal households’ deposit rate \( R_D \). Then, for \( R_{CB} > R_D \), all banks would borrow from other banks in order to deposit the reserves at the CB. This cannot be an equilibrium. On the other hand, for \( R_{CB} < R_D \) every bank would want to take a loan of infinite amount from the CB and subsequently deposit the acquired funds at other banks to generate profits. This can also be no equilibrium.

For \( R_D = R_{CB} \), an individual bank is indifferent between participating in the interbank market and transacting with the CB. Without loss of generality, we assume that it chooses the latter.

**Interbank transactions and CB reserves.** After the capital good has been sold to firms, each bank \( b \) faces one of the following two scenarios: (i) \( l_b < d_b + e p_I \), i.e., deposit inflows exceed deposit outflows, or (ii) \( l_b > d_b + e p_I \), i.e., deposit outflows exceed deposit inflows. Deposit outflows are given by \( l_b \), since the amount of loans bank \( b \) grants to
firms is credited as deposits to the firms’ bank accounts and these deposits leave the bank when the firms acquire the capital good from households with accounts at different banks. Analogously, bank $b$ experiences an inflow of deposits when households with accounts at the bank, as well as the bank itself, sell their capital goods to firms with accounts at different banks. In case (i), the bank holds reserves in the amount of the net inflow of deposits $d_b + e_{p_I} - l_b$ at the CB. In case (ii), the bank has to borrow reserves in the amount of the net outflow of deposits $l_b - d_b - e_{p_I}$ from the CB in order to be able to cover its interbank liabilities.

**Profit function of an individual bank.** Bank $b$’s (nominal) profit function when monitoring $\Pi_\pi$ is given by

$$\Pi_\pi = \pi [R_LL_b - R_DD_b - R_CB(l_b - d_b - e_{p_I})].$$

With probability $\pi$ the investment is successful and the bank receives a return $R_L$ on its loans, pays households a return $R_D$ on their deposits and, depending on whether scenario (i) or (ii) applies, receives or pays a rate $R_CB$ on its CB reserves. With probability $1 - \pi$ the investment fails and profits are zero. Using Equation (8), we can simplify the bank’s profit function to

$$\Pi_\pi = \pi [R_LL_b - R_DD_b - R_CB(l_b - e_{p_I})].$$

(9)

If bank $b$ shirks monitoring, it enjoys private benefits but the success probability of its investment drops to $\pi - \Delta$. In this case, its (nominal) profit function $\Pi_\Delta$ is given by

$$\Pi_\Delta = (\pi - \Delta)[R_LL_b - R_DD(b - e_{p_I})] + b\frac{p_{C_{p_I}}}{p_I}l_b.$$

(10)

**No default against the CB.** When households use their deposits to buy the consumption good, bank $b$ experiences an outflow of deposits equal to $sR_DD_b$. Firms use the funds they receive from households to pay back their loans and bank $b$ receives an amount $sR_LL_b$. Independent of whether it monitors or not, the bank can repay its CB loans, whenever $s = 1$ and

$$R_LL_b - R_DD_b \geq (l_b - d_b - e_{p_I})R_CB.$$

With $R_CB = R_D$, this comes down to

$$l_b(R_D - R_L) \leq R_DE_{p_I}.$$

(11)

We make the following assumption:

**Assumption 3 (No default against the CB)**

*Each bank $b$ respects Condition (11) when deciding on its loan volume $l_b.$*
We note that as long as \( R_L \geq R_D \), Condition (11) always holds.\(^{12}\)

### 4.2 Equilibrium considerations

**Banks’ monitoring decision.** Banks choose the amount of lending they grant to firms and decide whether to exert effort in monitoring or not. Given \( l_b \), bank \( b \) monitors if its expected additional profits when monitoring exceed its private benefits from shirking. From Equations (9) and (10), this is the case exactly if

\[
\Delta[R_L l_b - R_D(l_b - e_{p_I})] \geq b \frac{p_{CI}}{p_{I}} l_b. \tag{12}
\]

Solving for \( b \) yields

\[
b \leq \hat{b} := \frac{p_I}{p_{CI}} \left[ \Delta(R_L - R_D) + \Delta \frac{R_D e_{p_I}}{l_b} \right]. \tag{13}
\]

Intuitively, only banks with sufficiently low opportunity costs of monitoring \( b \) decide to do so. We define \( \hat{b} \) as the threshold value which divides the continuum of banks into a monitoring part \([b, \hat{b}]\) and a non-monitoring part \((\hat{b}, b)\). Whether \( \hat{b} \) will be indeed interior to \([b, \hat{b}]\) or whether extreme cases occur—all or no banks monitor—depends on prices, interest rates and loan volumes.

The regulator can limit banks’ lending volumes via a leverage constraint. To see that such a constraint affects banks’ monitoring decision, we rewrite Inequality (12) as

\[
\frac{l_b}{e_{p_I}} \left[ b \frac{p_C}{p_I} - \Delta(R_L - R_D) \right] \leq \Delta R_D,
\]

where \( \alpha_b \) denotes bank \( b \)'s leverage ratio (i.e., loans over equity). For a leverage ratio equal to one, Assumption \(^1\) implies that all banks monitor. For leverage ratios greater than one, this is not necessarily the case. But even then, banks with \( b \leq (p_I/p_{CI}) \Delta(R_L - R_D) \) always monitor. For \( b > (p_I/p_{CI}) \Delta(R_L - R_D) \), however, bank \( b \) only monitors if its leverage ratio is not too high so that it has enough skin in the game:

\[
\alpha_b \leq \frac{\Delta R_D}{b \frac{p_C}{p_I} - \Delta(R_L - R_D)}. \tag{14}
\]

**Banks’ lending decision.** As long as \( R_L > R_D (= R_{CB}) \), a bank’s profit function is linearly increasing in \( l_b \). This holds true both in case that the bank monitors and its profits are given by \( \Pi_\pi \) according to Equation (9) and in case that the bank shirks and

\(^{12} \)If a bank monitors, \( R_L \geq R_D \) is necessary to provide it with an incentive to lend positive amounts anyway. Non-monitoring banks, however, may have an incentive to lend even for \( R_L < R_D \), as they also enjoy private benefits \( b(p_{CI}/p_I)l_b \). Hence, Condition (11) may not necessarily hold for non-monitoring banks.
its profits are given by $\Pi_\Delta$ according to Equation (10). Hence, as long as the lending rate exceeds the deposit rate, banks lend as much as possible and they are constrained only by a regulatory leverage constraint, which we introduce next.

**Regulatory leverage constraint.** The regulator sets a leverage constraint $\alpha$, which simply specifies an upper limit on banks’ leverage ratios $\alpha_b$. Since the regulator cannot distinguish between bank types, it has to choose a universal constraint. Therefore, it faces a trade-off. Setting a tight leverage constraint ensures that Condition (14) holds for most banks and hence also those with high $b$ monitor, but strongly constrains bank lending and thereby leads to lower-than-optimal lending levels for banks with low $b$ and thus inefficiently low volumes of capital provided to the BS. On the other hand, setting a loose leverage constraint increases banks’ lending capacity and allows bank-dependent firms to acquire funding more easily thereby promoting a more efficient allocation of capital, but also implies that Condition (14) is violated for most banks and hence aggregate monitoring activity is low.

The regulator decides on the leverage constraint at the beginning of $t = 1$, anticipating agents’ equilibrium reactions. We take $\alpha$ as given in the equilibrium analysis and solve for its output-maximizing value in Section 5. Importantly, we restrict attention to regulatory leverage constraints that are binding for all banks $b$, i.e., to values of $\alpha$ for which the banks’ lending rate $R_L$ still exceeds the deposit rate $R_D$, when all banks $b$ leverage up to $\alpha_b = \alpha$. We denote by $\hat{\alpha}$ ($> 1$) the threshold value for $\alpha$, below which the leverage constraint is binding for all banks. Hence, we restrict attention to $\alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha})$. Later on, Lemma 3 will determine $\hat{\alpha}$ and Corollary 2 will show that the optimal leverage constraint lies within this interval.

**Households’ investment decision.** In an interior equilibrium where risk-neutral households hold bonds and deposits, the expected real returns from bonds and deposits have to equalize. Investing one unit of the capital good into the FS (via bonds) gives a certain return $R_F$. Investing one unit of the capital good in the BS (via bank deposits) yields an expected real return $q(p_1R_D/p_C)$, where $q$ gives the average success probability of BS investments:

$$q = \begin{cases} 
\pi & \text{for } \hat{b} \geq \bar{b}, \\
\mu := \pi - \frac{\bar{b} - b}{\bar{b} - \hat{b}} \Delta & \text{for } \bar{b} < \hat{b} < \bar{b}, \\
\pi - \Delta & \text{for } \hat{b} \leq \bar{b}.
\end{cases} \tag{15}$$

For $\hat{b} \geq \bar{b}$ all banks monitor, for $\hat{b} < \bar{b}$ all banks shirk. For values of $\hat{b}$ in between, some banks monitor while others do not. For the relationship between $R_F$ and $R_D$, we obtain

$$R_F = q\frac{p_1R_D}{p_C}. \tag{16}$$

13 As banks’ private benefits from shirking monitoring efforts scale with $l_b$, a non-monitoring bank’s profits are linearly increasing in $l_b$ even if $R_L < R_D$ but still $(\pi - \Delta)(R_L - R_D) + b(p_C/p_I) > 0$. 

16
BS market clearing. Capital and consumption goods markets in the BS clear. For the capital goods market, this implies
\[ K_B = \frac{L_B}{P_I}. \] (17)
For the consumption goods market, it implies:
\[ \frac{q_C R_B K_B}{\text{exp. BS firm supply}} = \frac{(L_B - E_P I)q R_D}{\text{exp. household demand}} + \frac{(L_B - E_P I)q (R_L - R_D)}{\text{exp. bank demand}} + q E_P I R_L. \] (18)

Remember that firms in the BS make zero profits, i.e., banks extract the entire surplus. Simplifying Equation (18) by using Equation (17) yields
\[ \frac{p_C R_B K_B}{p_I} = (p_I K_B - E_P I) R_L + E_P I R_L \]
\[ R_B = \frac{p_I R_L}{p_C}. \] (19)

A competitive equilibrium of the MC economy is then defined as follows.

Definition 1 (Equilibrium of the MC economy)
Given the CB policy rate \( R_{CB} \) and a regulatory leverage constraint \( \alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha}) \), a competitive equilibrium is a BS capital to goods price ratio \( p_I/p_C \), loan and deposit rates \( R_L \) and \( R_D \), a FS capital price \( R_F \), individual bank monitoring decisions \( \gamma_b \) and lending plans \( l_b \), such that

(i) There is no arbitrage possibility using CB reserves;

(ii) given \( p_I/p_C, R_L, R_D \) and \( R_F \), individual lending plans \( l_b \) maximize the expected profit of each bank subject to the leverage constraint \( \alpha \);

(iii) given \( p_I/p_C, R_L, R_D, R_F \) and \( l_b \), each bank optimally decides whether to monitor or not;

(iv) given \( p_I/p_C, R_D \) and \( R_F \), households optimally invest their capital goods;

(v) aggregate demand for capital equals aggregate supply:
\[ K_B = 1 - K_F \quad \text{or} \quad R_F = g'(1 - K_B); \]

(vi) capital and consumption goods markets in the BS clear.

By Lemma (1), (i) determines \( R_D \) according to Equation (8). Since \( \alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha}) \), (ii) immediately implies \( l_b/p_I = \alpha e \) for all banks \( b \), independent from their monitoring decisions. Bank monitoring decisions \( \gamma_b \) and the equilibrium threshold value \( \hat{b} \) result from (iii), and
they determine the average success probability $q$. Conditions (iv)–(vi) then determine $R_F, p_I/p_C$ and $R_L$. We explicitly solve for the equilibrium values in Subsection 4.4.

### 4.3 Special cases

Before we turn to the general case where the regulator fully considers the trade-off between optimal monitoring and capital allocation and thus, as we will see, sets a leverage constraint that implies positive fractions of both monitoring and non-monitoring banks, we briefly discuss the two special cases where the regulator focuses solely on one side of the trade-off and thus sets the leverage constraint $\alpha$ such that either (I) all banks monitor (but the allocation of capital is inefficient), or (II) capital is allocated efficiently (but all banks shirk).

**Special case (I): tight leverage constraint (all monitor)**

To start with, let us take a look at the extreme case where the regulator sets a leverage constraint such that $\gamma_b = 1$ for all $b$. From Condition (14), this constraint would be given by

$$\alpha = \frac{\Delta R_D}{b \frac{p_C}{p_I} - \Delta (R_L - R_D)}.$$  

(20)

Using Equations (19) and (16) with $q = \pi$, Equation (20) becomes

$$\alpha = \frac{R_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \Delta}{\alpha}}.$$  

(21)

The leverage constraint sets an upper limit for bank lending:

$$\frac{l_b}{p_I} \equiv k_b \leq \frac{eR_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \Delta}{\alpha}}.$$  

(22)

We can state the following proposition.

**Proposition 3 (Equilibrium of the MC economy, tight leverage constraint)**

Let the regulatory leverage constraint be given by Equation (21), so that $\gamma_b = 1$ for all $b$. Then, the MC economy yields the same economic outcomes as the LF economy.

As Inequality (22) corresponds to Inequality (A.1) in Appendix A, the proof is straightforward. The question is the following: can the regulator do better by allowing for higher leverage ratios, which, however, imply that some banks won’t monitor?

**Special case (II): loose leverage constraint (effic. alloc. of capital, all shirk)**

Before we turn to the general case and the question of an optimal leverage constraint, we...
briefly take a look at the other extreme case, i.e., the case where the regulator focuses solely on achieving an efficient allocation of capital. For simplicity, assume this implies a leverage constraint $\alpha$ for which all banks shirk, i.e., $\gamma_b = 0$ for all $b$. Then, $q = \pi - \Delta$ and capital is allocated efficiently if the marginal productivities of capital in the BS and FS equalize, i.e., if $(\pi - \Delta)R_B = R_F$. Since $R_F = g'(1 - \alpha E)$, this requires

$$\alpha = 1 - \frac{(g')^{-1} \{(\pi - \Delta)R_B\}}{E}. \quad (23)$$

Although such a loose leverage constraint ascertains an efficient allocation of capital, in Subsections 5.1-5.2 we show that the negative impact on aggregate monitoring activity makes it non-optimal under a simple set of conditions.

We also note that any leverage constraint $\alpha$ greater than the one for which capital is allocated efficiently would certainly not increase (and typically even decrease) expected aggregate output, since banks’ private benefits would potentially induce them to lend even more, resulting in an overallocation of capital to the BS. It follows that not setting any leverage constraint at all can never be optimal.\[^{16}\]

### 4.4 The general case

Consider now the general case where the regulator may set a leverage constraint $\alpha$ that implies positive fractions of both monitoring and non-monitoring banks. We continue to restrict attention to $\alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha})$, which implies $R_L > R_D$ in equilibrium. By Equations (16) and (19), this in turn implies $qR_B > R_F$, that is, the leverage constraint restricts the amount of lending to the BS, such that the (expected) marginal product of capital in the BS exceeds the marginal product of capital in the FS.

From Condition (11), we know that $R_L > R_D$ also implies that banks can always repay the CB (if $s = 1$). Hence, for any regulatory leverage constraint $\alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha})$, it holds that

$$l_b = \alpha e p_I,$$
$$L_B = \alpha E p_I,$$
$$K_B = \alpha E. \quad (24)$$

With $g'(K_F) = R_F$, it follows that

$$R_F = g'(1 - \alpha E). \quad (25)$$

The threshold value $\hat{b}$ for monitoring banks is then given by Expression (13), making use

\[^{15}\]A necessary condition is $b > (p_I/pc)\Delta(R_L - R_D)$, as otherwise some banks always monitor, irrespective of the leverage constraint.

\[^{16}\]In Appendix B.2 we analyze an MC economy without a regulatory leverage constraint in more detail.
of Equations (8) and (19):

\[
\hat{b} = \frac{p_I}{p_C} \left[ \Delta(R_L - R_D) + \frac{\Delta}{\alpha} R_D \right]
\]

\[
= \Delta R_B - \frac{p_I}{p_C} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) \Delta R_{CB}.
\]

Equilibrium BS price ratio. Substituting \(\hat{b}\) into Expression (15) yields \(q\). Substituting \(q\) into Equation (16) yields the equilibrium BS price ratio. For \(q = \pi\), we obtain \(p_I/p_C = R_F/\pi R_{CB}\). For \(q = \pi - \Delta\), we obtain \(p_I/p_C = R_F/[(\pi - \Delta)R_{CB}]\). For \(q = \mu\), we obtain

\[
R_F = \mu \frac{p_I}{p_C} R_{CB}
\]

\[
= \frac{p_I}{p_C} R_{CB} \mu_1 - \left( \frac{p_I}{p_C} \right)^2 R_{CB}^2 \frac{\Delta^2}{\hat{b} - b} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right),
\]

where

\[
\mu_1 := \pi - \frac{\hat{b} - \Delta R_B}{\hat{b} - b} \Delta.
\]

From Expression (15) and Equation (26), \(\mu_1\) corresponds to \(\mu\) evaluated at \(\alpha = 1\). With \(R_F\) given by Equation (25), Equation (27) implicitly determines the equilibrium price ratio. For \(\alpha = 1\), it is \(A = 0\) and we obtain \(p_I/p_C = R_F/(\mu_1 R_{CB})\). For \(\alpha > 1\), Equation (27) is a quadratic equation in \(p_I/p_C\), which we can solve explicitly:

\[
\frac{p_I}{p_C} = \frac{1}{2A} \left( B \pm \sqrt{B^2 - 4A R_F} \right),
\]

with \(A\) and \(B\) as indicated in Equation (27).

Existence. A solution to Equation (27) exists, if the term under the square root function in Equation (29) is non-negative. Denote the value of \(\alpha\) that solves \(B^2 = 4A R_F\) by \(\bar{\alpha}\). Then, as we show in the proof of Lemma 2, a solution to Equation (27) exists for all \(\alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}\).

For \(q = \mu\), \(\alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha})\) and \(\alpha > \hat{\alpha}\), a price ratio that equates households’ expected real returns from both productive sectors does not exist. The reason is the following: With \(R_L > R_D\), which follows from \(\alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha})\), a looser leverage constraint \(\alpha\) implies that banks’ loan supply is higher. BS firms want to use the loans they take to acquire capital from households. Therefore, they need to offer a relative price \(p_I/p_C\) for capital that

\[17\text{For } \hat{b} \geq \bar{b} \text{ and thus } q = \pi, \text{ we end up in Special case (I) from Subsection 4.3. In fact, one can show that the condition } \hat{b} = \bar{b} \text{ is equivalent to Condition (21). For } \hat{b} \leq \bar{b} \text{ and thus } q = \pi - \Delta, \text{ we end up in Special case (II). The condition } \hat{b} = \bar{b} \text{ is equivalent to Condition (A.38).} \]
convinces households to provide it to them, instead of acquiring bonds from FS firms. However, Equation (26) shows that a higher \( p_I/p_C \) decreases \( \hat{b} \) and hence also decreases \( \mu \). Therefore, a higher \( p_I/p_C \) also has an indirect negative effect on households’ expected real return from BS investment, additionally to the direct positive effect. For \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \), the indirect negative effect is so strong that no \( p_I/p_C \) exists for which households sell the desired amount of capital goods to firms in the BS.\(^{18}\)

**Uniqueness.** If a solution to Equation (27) exists, it is typically not unique. From \( B > 0, A > 0, R_F > 0 \), we can infer that any solution must be positive. In what follows, we assume that a solution exists and focus on the one where \( \mu p_I R_{CB}/p_C \) crosses \( R_F \) from below:

\[
\frac{p_I}{p_C} = \frac{1}{2A} \left( B - \sqrt{B^2 - 4AR_F} \right). \tag{30}
\]

The other solution in Equation (29) would imply unintuitive comparative static properties which are in contrast to what we find in Corollary 1. Furthermore, for \( \alpha \to 1^{(+)} \), this solution would be incompatible with \( \hat{b} < \tilde{b} < b \) and thus with \( q = \mu \), as we show in the proof of Lemma 2.

Lemma 2 summarizes our findings on the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price ratio \( p_I/p_C \) that equates the real returns from investing in bonds and bank deposits. The proof is in Appendix A. Lemma 3 in the next section shows how \( \hat{\alpha} \) and \( \bar{\alpha} \) relate to each other.

**Lemma 2 (Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price ratio)**

Let \( q = \mu \) and \( \alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha}) \). Then:

1. An equilibrium price ratio \( p_I/p_C \) exists only for leverage constraints \( \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \), where \( \bar{\alpha} \) denotes the solution to \( B^2 = 4AR_F \), with \( A \) and \( B \) as defined in Equation (27).

2. For \( \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \), the unique admissible equilibrium price ratio \( p_I/p_C \) is given by Equation (30).

Substituting Equation (30) into Equation (26) gives \( \hat{b} \) as an expression of exogenous variables only. In line with intuition, Corollary 1 states that a looser leverage constraint \( \alpha \) implies a smaller equilibrium portion \( \hat{b} \) of monitoring banks and thus also a lower average success probability \( \mu \) for BS investment. Last, the corollary tells that the equilibrium BS real price of capital \( p_I/p_C \) increases in \( \alpha \). This reflects the fact that a looser leverage constraint does not only lead to higher nominal bank-lending volumes, but also to larger amounts of real resources being provided to the bank-dependent sector.

\(^{18}\)The only way for Equation (16) to hold then is that the price ratio rises beyond the value for which \( q \) is capped at \( \pi - \Delta \) (i.e., \( p_I/p_C \) is such that \( \hat{b} \leq \tilde{b} \)), to \( p_I/p_C = R_F/[(\pi - \Delta)R_{CB}] \).
Corollary 1 (Comparative statics with regard to the leverage constraint)
Let \( \alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha}) \). The equilibrium effects of a change in the regulatory leverage constraint are given by:
\[
\frac{\partial \hat{b}}{\partial \alpha} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial (p_I/p_C)}{\partial \alpha} > 0.
\] (31)
The proof is in Appendix A.

We can now establish Lemma 3, which, for \( q = \mu \), determines \( \hat{\alpha} \). Denote by \( \alpha_\mu \) the value of \( \alpha \) that solves \( \mu R_B = R_F \) (if a solution exists).

Lemma 3 (Threshold value for binding leverage constraints)
Let \( q = \mu \). There is an interval \([1, \hat{\alpha})\), for which any \( \alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha}) \) implies \( R_L > R_D \). The threshold value \( \hat{\alpha} \) is given by
\[
\hat{\alpha} = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_\mu & \text{if } \alpha_\mu \text{ exists,} \\
\bar{\alpha} & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\] (32)

Proof. The proof is straightforward. For \( q = \mu \), Equations (16) and (19) imply that \( R_L > R_D \) is equivalent to \( \mu R_B > R_F \). Assumption 2 ensures that \( \mu R_B > R_F \), for \( \alpha = 1 \). As long as \( \mu R_B > R_F \), \( \mu R_B \) is decreasing in \( \alpha \) (cf. Corollary 1), while \( R_F \) is increasing in \( \alpha \) and approaches infinity for \( \alpha \to 1/E \) (cf. Equation (25)). Hence, the Intermediate Value Theorem ensures that there is at most one value of \( \alpha \) for which \( \mu R_B = R_F \)—we denoted this value by \( \alpha_\mu \)—and if \( \alpha_\mu \) exists, it has to be between 1 and \( \bar{\alpha} (< 1/E) \). For all values of \( \alpha \) below \( \alpha_\mu \), it holds that \( \mu R_B > R_F \). If \( \alpha_\mu \) does not exist, it immediately follows that \( \mu R_B > R_F \) for all \( \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \).

5 Optimal Leverage Constraint in the MC Economy

Until now, we have taken the regulatory leverage constraint \( \alpha \) as given. In this section, we find the optimal regulatory leverage constraint, i.e., the value of \( \alpha \) the regulator should choose in order to maximize expected aggregate output. For binding regulatory leverage constraints \( \alpha \in [1, \hat{\alpha}) \), expected aggregate output is given by
\[
Y = qR_B \left( \frac{\bar{\alpha}E}{K_B} + g(1 - \bar{\alpha}E) \right).
\] (33)
As we will see, the optimal leverage constraint typically implies accepting that not all banks monitor (which was the case in the LF economy), in exchange for a more efficient allocation of capital. Substituting the equilibrium price ratio \( p_I/p_C \), given by Equation (A.22), into Equation (26), yields that \( \hat{b} \) is independent of \( R_{CB} \) and thus, from Expression (15), also \( q \) is independent of \( R_{CB} \). From Equation (33), we can then infer that \( Y \) is
independent of the CB policy rate $R_{CB}$. Hence, $R_{CB}$ does affect the price ratio and the nominal rates of return, but it does not affect the real sphere of the economy.

Maximizing $Y$ with respect to $\alpha$ requires the following first-order condition (FOC):

$$qR_B \frac{\partial K_B}{\partial \alpha} + \frac{\partial q}{\partial \alpha} R_B K_B = g'(K_F)E.$$  

Making use of Equations (24) and with $g'(K_F) = R_F$, the FOC comes down to

$$qR_B + R_B \alpha \frac{\partial q}{\partial \alpha} = R_F. \quad (34)$$

Denote output $Y$ by $Y_\pi$, for $q = \pi$, and by $Y_\Delta$, for $q = \pi - \Delta$. Then, the FOC simplifies to $\pi R_B = R_F$ in the former and $(\pi - \Delta) R_B = R_F$ in the latter case. Furthermore, denote output $Y$ by $Y_\mu$, for $q = \mu$, where $\mu$ is given by Expression (15), $\hat{b}$ is given by Equation (26) and $p_I/p_C$ is given by Equation (30). The following subsection focuses on this last case.

5.1 Locally optimal leverage constraint

Denote by $\alpha^*$ the $\alpha$ that solves the FOC (34) with $q$ given by $\mu$. To verify whether $\alpha^*$ indeed (uniquely) maximizes $Y_\mu$, Proposition 4 characterizes $Y_\mu$ as a function of $\alpha$.

Proposition 4 (Locally optimal leverage constraint)

Let $g'''(K_F) > 0$. Then,

(i) $Y_\mu$ is strictly concave in $\alpha \in [1, \bar{\alpha})$, i.e., there is at most one $\alpha \in [1, \bar{\alpha})$ that solves the FOC (34), and if it exists, it constitutes a maximum.

(ii) There is an $\alpha \in [1, \bar{\alpha})$ that solves the FOC (34), iff

$$g'(1 - E) \leq \frac{\mu^2 R_B}{\mu_1 + \frac{\Delta^2 R_B}{\bar{b} - \hat{b}}}. \quad (35)$$

The proof is given in Appendix A. It also shows that the condition $g'''(K_F) > 0$ is sufficient, but not necessary. This condition is met, e.g., by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function of the form $g(K_F) = K_F^\beta$, with $0 < \beta < 1$. Condition (35) ensures that an increase in $\alpha$, starting from $\alpha = 1$, increases $Y_\mu$. A necessary condition for this is $g'(1 - E) < \mu_1 R_B$ (cf. Assumption 2), but it is not sufficient, since one has to take into account that any increase in $\alpha$ negatively affects the average success probability $\mu$.

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19 Which case actually applies depends on whether $\hat{b} \geq \bar{b}$ ($\Rightarrow Y = Y_\pi$), $\hat{b} \leq \bar{b}$ ($\Rightarrow Y = Y_\Delta$) or $\hat{b} < \hat{b} < \bar{b}$ ($\Rightarrow Y = Y_\mu$). As $\hat{b}$ depends on $\alpha$ itself, these conditions depend on $\alpha$ as well. In Subsection 5.2, we provide a set of conditions that ensures that the $\alpha$ that maximizes $Y_\mu$ indeed satisfies $\hat{b} < \hat{b} < \bar{b}$.
If \( g''(K_F) > 0 \) and Condition (35) holds, \( \alpha^* (> 1) \) uniquely maximizes \( Y_\mu \). We then call \( \alpha^* \) the (locally) optimal leverage constraint.

Remember that we restricted attention to leverage constraints that are binding for all banks \( b \), i.e., to values of \( \alpha \) that imply \( R_L > R_D \) and thus belong to the interval \( \alpha \in [1, \tilde{\alpha}) \). Corollary 2 establishes \( \alpha^* \in [1, \tilde{\alpha}) \).

**Corollary 2 (Binding locally optimal leverage constraint)**

Let the conditions of Proposition 4 hold. The leverage constraint \( \alpha^* \) is binding for all banks \( b \), i.e., \( \alpha^* \in [1, \tilde{\alpha}) \).

**Proof.** From Lemma 3, either \( \hat{\alpha} = \alpha_\mu \), if \( \alpha_\mu \) exists, or \( \hat{\alpha} = \tilde{\alpha} \), if \( \alpha_\mu \) does not exist. From Proposition 4(ii) and the accompanying proof, it follows that \( \alpha^* \in [1, \tilde{\alpha}) \). Hence, if \( \hat{\alpha} = \tilde{\alpha} \), the corollary holds. Consider now the case of \( \hat{\alpha} = \alpha_\mu \). From FOC (34), it holds that, at \( \alpha = \alpha^* \),

\[
R_F = \mu R_B \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha^* \partial \mu}{\mu \partial \alpha} \right),
\]

where \( \varepsilon_{\mu, \alpha^*} \) is the elasticity of \( \mu \) with respect to \( \alpha \), evaluated at \( \alpha = \alpha^* \). As long as \( \mu R_B > R_F \), from Corollary 1 and Equation (25), it follows that \( R_F \) is increasing in \( \alpha \), \( \mu R_B \) is decreasing in \( \alpha \) and \( \varepsilon_{\mu, \alpha^*} < 0 \). Then, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, \( \alpha^* \), as given by Equation (36), is smaller than the value of \( \alpha \) that equates \( R_F \) and \( \mu R_B \), i.e., it holds that \( \alpha^* < \alpha_\mu \).

Corollary 2 implies that when choosing the optimal leverage constraint \( \alpha^* \), the regulator accepts that capital is not allocated perfectly efficiently, i.e., that the expected marginal product of capital in the BS exceeds that of the FS, in exchange for higher monitoring activity.

### 5.2 Globally optimal leverage constraint

The last subsection characterized \( \alpha^* \) as the \( \alpha \) that maximizes \( Y_\mu \). In this subsection, we explore a set of conditions that establishes \( \alpha^* \) as the globally optimal leverage constraint.

To do this, we require some additional notation. Denote the \( \alpha \) that solves \( \hat{b} = b \) by \( \alpha_m \) and the \( \alpha \) that solves \( \hat{b} = \tilde{b} \) by \( \alpha_s \), where \( \hat{b} \) is given by Equation (26) with \( p_I/p_C \) according to Equation (30). Since \( \hat{b} \) is strictly decreasing in \( \alpha \) (cf. Corollary 1), it follows that for \( \alpha \leq \alpha_m \), all banks monitor, for \( \alpha \geq \alpha_s \), all banks shirk and for \( \alpha_m < \alpha < \alpha_s \), some banks monitor while some others shirk. Analogously, denote the \( \alpha \) that solves \( (\pi - \Delta)R_B = R_F \), which, for \( q = \pi - \Delta \), is equivalent to \( R_L = R_D \), by \( \alpha_\Delta \).

![](Note that while, for \( \alpha \geq \hat{\alpha} (= \alpha_\mu) \) or, equivalently, for \( \mu R_B \leq R_F \), Corollary 1 is silent on the sign of \( \partial \mu / \partial \alpha \). \( \partial \mu / \partial \alpha \) does not converge to zero for \( \alpha \rightarrow \alpha_\mu \). In fact, \( \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha_\mu} \partial \mu / \partial \alpha \) is strictly smaller than zero.\)
Global output function. Expected aggregate output as a function of the regulatory leverage constraint $\alpha$, with $\alpha \in [1, \infty)$, is denoted by $Y^g$ (henceforth called the “global output function”). For all values of $\alpha$ that imply $R_L \geq R_D$ if banks leverage up as much as possible, $Y^g$ is simply given by $Y$ according to Equation (33).

For all $\alpha$’s that would imply $R_L < R_D$ if banks leveraged up as much as possible, $Y^g$ cannot be determined exactly but is certainly non-increasing (indicated by “↘”). It is non-increasing because any leverage constraint beyond the one for which $R_L$ equals $R_D$ may only induce an overallocation of capital from non-monitoring banks to the BS.

Unfortunately, an explicit expression of $Y^g$ requires tedious case distinctions. The reason is the following. Since $p_I/p_C$, according to Equation (30), exists only for $\alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}$, existence of $\alpha_s$ and $\alpha_\mu$ is not guaranteed. Furthermore, the pattern of $Y^g$ differs, depending on whether $\alpha_s \geq \alpha_\mu$ and whether $\alpha_\Delta \geq \alpha_s$. We perform these case distinctions in detail in Appendix B.3. To illustrate one possible case, assume that both $\alpha_s$, $\alpha_\mu$ exist, and that $\alpha_s < \alpha_\mu$ and $\alpha_\Delta \geq \alpha_s$. Under these assumptions, we can simply state $Y^g$ as

$$
Y^g = \begin{cases} 
Y_\pi & \text{for } 1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m, \\
Y_\mu & \text{for } \alpha_m < \alpha < \alpha_s, \\
Y_\Delta & \text{for } \alpha_s \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_\Delta, \\
\downarrow & \text{for } \alpha > \alpha_\Delta.
\end{cases}
$$

(37)

In fact, in Appendix B.3.2 we derive a necessary and sufficient set of conditions that establishes $\alpha^*$ as the unique leverage constraint that maximizes $Y^g$ in all possible scenarios. This result is summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5 (Globally optimal leverage constraint)**

The leverage constraint $\alpha^*$ implies $\pi - \Delta < \mu < \pi$ and maximizes $Y^g$, if and only if

$$(i) \quad \frac{\partial Y_\mu}{\partial \alpha} \bigg|_{\alpha=\alpha_m} > 0, \quad (ii) \quad Y_\mu(\alpha^*) > Y_\Delta(\alpha_\Delta).$$

(38)

Conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 5 ensure that the globally optimal leverage constraint implies positive fractions of non-monitoring and monitoring banks, respectively.

We can further evaluate Condition (i) of the proposition. By definition, $\alpha_m$ is determined by $\hat{b} = \bar{b}$ and $\alpha = \alpha_m$ implies $q = \pi$. Making use of Equation (26) and $p_I/p_C = R_F/(\pi R_{CB})$ yields that $\alpha_m$ is implicitly given by

$$g'(1 - \alpha_m E) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha_m} \right) = \frac{\pi}{\Delta} (\Delta R_B - \bar{b}).$$

(39)

---

21 We assume that banks leverage up as much as possible also for $R_L = R_D$. At least for non-monitoring banks, this is obviously the case because of private benefits from lending.

22 For a more detailed explanation, see Appendix B.3, Remark 2.
From Equation (34), \( \left( \frac{\partial Y}{\partial \alpha} \right)_{\alpha = \alpha_m} > 0 \) and thereby Condition (i) holds, iff

\[
\pi R_B - g'(1 - \alpha_m E) > -R_B \alpha_m \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} \bigg|_{\alpha = \alpha_m},
\]

(40)
i.e., if, at \( \alpha = \alpha_m \), the benefits of a more efficient allocation of capital resulting from a marginal increase in \( \alpha \) (as given by the l.h.s.) outweigh the associated drawback from lower monitoring activity (as given by the r.h.s.).

We next provide a set of normalizing assumptions which allows us to assess the conditions stated in Proposition 5 further, without having to refer to different cases from the case distinctions in Appendix B.3.

**Corollary 3 (Normalization)**

Let the following conditions jointly hold:

\[
\bar{b} = \Delta R_B, \quad b = \Delta R_B E / \left[ 1 - (g')^{-1} \{ (\pi - \Delta) R_B \} \right], \quad \Delta \leq 0.5\pi^{23}
\]

(41)

Then,

(i) \( \alpha_s \) and \( \alpha_\mu \) exist and it holds that \( \alpha_m = 1 \) and \( \alpha_s = \alpha_\Delta = \alpha_\mu \).

(ii) \( \alpha^* \in (\alpha_m, \alpha_s) \) maximizes \( Y_g \), if, additionally,

\[
g'(1 - E) < \frac{\pi^2 R_B}{\pi + \frac{\Delta R_B}{\Delta R_B - b} \Delta}.
\]

(42)

The proof is given in Appendix A. The first two conditions in the set of conditions in (41) normalize the interval \([b, \bar{b}]\), such that \( \alpha_m = 1 \) and \( \alpha_s = \alpha_\Delta = \alpha_\mu \). The third condition ensures that \( \alpha_s \) and \( \alpha_\mu \) exist. Part (ii) of the corollary tells us that the set of conditions in (41), combined with Condition (42), constitutes a simple set of sufficient closed-form conditions solely in exogenous variables that implies that Conditions (i)–(ii) in Proposition 5 are satisfied.

### 5.3 Numerical examples

To get a better understanding of how the regulatory leverage constraint \( \alpha \) affects output \( Y_g \), we consider the following four numerical examples where parameters are chosen such that: (i)–(ii) the set of conditions in Corollary 3 holds; (iii) the set of conditions in Corollary 3 does not hold, but the two conditions in Proposition 5 hold; (iv) the set of conditions in Proposition 5 does not hold. For all examples, assume the production

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\( \Delta \leq 0.5\pi^{23} \)

Note that, from Equation (23),

\[
E / \left[ 1 - (g')^{-1} \{ (\pi - \Delta) R_B \} \right] = 1 / \alpha_\Delta,
\]

which, under Assumption 2, is smaller than one. Hence, the set of conditions in (41) satisfies \( b < \bar{b} \).
function to be Cobb-Douglas: \( g(K_F) = K_F^\beta \), with \( \beta = 0.7 \). The other parameter values are given within Figure 2

**Examples (i)–(ii).** As ensured by the set of conditions in Corollary 3 Examples (i)–(ii) show the expected results: \( \alpha^* \) maximizes \( Y^g \) (see Figure 2). The output function \( Y^g \) is smooth for \( \alpha \in [1, \alpha_s] \) and shows a kink at \( \alpha = \alpha_s \), as \( q \) is capped at \( \pi - \Delta \) beyond this point. Furthermore, output is declining for \( \alpha > \alpha_s \) and \( \alpha^* \) maximizes \( Y^g \). The “LF Economy” line shows output in the all-monitor equilibrium of the LF economy. Two notable differences between Examples (i) and (ii) are the following. First, while in Example (i), output in the MC economy exceeds output in the LF economy for all \( \alpha \), this is not the case in Example (ii). And second, while in Example (i), output at \( \alpha_s \) exceeds output at \( \alpha_m \), in Example (ii), it is the other way round. Also note, as explained before, that output for \( \alpha > \alpha_s (\alpha = \alpha_m = \alpha_\Delta) \) is dashed, as we cannot determine how exactly it behaves beyond this point. What we can say, however, is that it is certainly non-increasing.

Although this is not shown in Figure 2, we can also calculate output in the first-best and in a second-best LF economy, which in Example (i) yields values of 2.0259 and 2.0255, respectively.\(^{24}\) Of course, output in the MC economy falls short of output in the first-best. As we can see, this is also the case when compared to the second-best. We also check whether the MC economy would still be inferior to the second-best if we included banks’ private benefits from shirking into our welfare criterion (in addition to accounting for expected aggregate output). We find that this is indeed the case, for all \( \alpha \). The same holds true in Examples (ii)–(iv).

**Example (iii).** As Example (iii) violates the set of conditions in Corollary 3 we obtain \( \alpha_m > 1 \) as well as an output function that is increasing for a marginal increase in \( \alpha \), starting from \( \alpha_s \). For values of \( \alpha \) below \( \alpha_m \), \( q \) is capped at \( \pi \) and thus the slope of the output function is steeper, since an increasing \( \alpha \) leads to a more efficient allocation of capital without decreasing the success probability \( q \). A second kink in the output function shows at \( \alpha_s \), above which all banks shirk and \( q \) is capped at \( \pi - \Delta \). Note that \( \alpha_\mu \) does not exist. For \( \alpha \)’s in between \( \alpha_s \) and \( \alpha_\Delta \), the only effect at work when increasing \( \alpha \) is a more efficient allocation of capital, so that the slope of the output function becomes positive. Still, output for all \( \alpha \)’s beyond \( \alpha_s \) stays lower than output at \( \alpha = \alpha^* \). Hence \( \alpha^* \) still globally maximizes output, which again emphasizes that Corollary 3 gives a set of conditions that is sufficient, but not necessary, for the conditions in Proposition 5 to hold. Also note that while at \( \alpha^* \), output in the MC economy exceeds output in the LF economy, for \( \alpha \geq \alpha_s \), it is the other way round.

**Example (iv).** Example (iv) is similar to Example (iii), but now also the second condi-

\(^{24}\)FS returns are given by \( R^{FB}_F = 2 \) and \( R^{SB}_F \approx 1.88 \), which translate into an allocation of capital to the BS of \( K^{FB}_B \approx 0.97 \) and \( K^{SB}_B \approx 0.96 \), respectively. In comparison, the equilibrium amount of capital allocated to the BS is only \( K_B \approx 0.69 \) in the MC economy with \( \alpha = \alpha^* \).
Figure 2: Output \( Y^g \) as a function of the regulatory leverage constraint \( \alpha \)

(i) \[ \pi = 0.80, \ \Delta = 0.3, \ R_B = 2.50, \ R_{CB} = 1.75, \ \bar{b} \approx 0.044, \ \overline{b} = 0.75, \ E = 0.05. \]

(ii) \[ \pi = 0.70, \ \Delta = 0.3, \ R_B = 2.00, \ R_{CB} = 1.75, \ \bar{b} \approx 0.084, \ \overline{b} = 0.60, \ E = 0.05. \]

(iii) \[ \pi = 0.75, \ \Delta = 0.3, \ R_B = 2.00, \ R_{CB} = 1.75, \ \bar{b} = 0.150, \ \overline{b} = 0.48, \ E = 0.05. \]

(iv) \[ \pi = 0.70, \ \Delta = 0.3, \ R_B = 2.25, \ R_{CB} = 1.75, \ \bar{b} = 0.300, \ \overline{b} = 0.60, \ E = 0.05. \]

Note: Output for values of \( \alpha \) that would imply \( R_L < R_D \) if banks leveraged up as much as possible is dashed, as we cannot readily state exactly how it behaves in this area.
tion in Proposition 5 is violated. Hence, increasing $\alpha$ beyond the point where all banks shirk can lead to output levels that exceed output at $\alpha = \alpha^*$. In this case, $\alpha^*$ may still be a local maximum, but it does not globally maximize output anymore. Output in the MC economy exceeds welfare in the all-monitor LF economy, both at $\alpha^*$ and at $\alpha_\Delta$.

5.4 Comparing the MC economy to the LF economy

We can now compare aggregate outcomes in the MC economy to those in the LF economy. Proposition 6 states our main result.

**Proposition 6 (Why bank money creation?)**

Let the conditions given in Proposition 5 hold. Then, the MC economy with a regulatory leverage constraint $\alpha^*$ features greater expected aggregate output than the LF economy.

Corollary 3 gives a simple set of sufficient conditions for the conditions stated in Proposition 5. The proof of Proposition 6 follows from our previous results. According to Proposition 3, the MC economy and the all-monitor LF economy do equally well for a leverage constraint $\alpha = \alpha_m$. Hence, if the conditions of Proposition 5 hold, output in the MC economy with a leverage constraint $\alpha^*$ (with $\alpha_m < \alpha^* < \alpha_s$) clearly exceeds output in the LF economy. Figures 2 (i)–(iii) illustrate the result. Note that the introduction of a regulatory leverage constraint in the LF economy would not offer any scope for improvement, since households restrict bank deposits such that all banks monitor anyway.

Although output in the MC economy exceeds output in the LF economy, it obviously falls short of the first-best and, as the numerical examples in Subsection 5.3 indicate, it usually also falls short of output in the second-best LF economy. Therefore, while the MC economy can alleviate the problem of asymmetric information on bank characteristics by striking an optimal balance on the trade-off between high aggregate monitoring and an efficient allocation of capital, it usually cannot solve the problem altogether. The reason why we cannot generally say that the MC economy always falls short of the second-best LF economy is that it is possible to come up with specific counterexamples, which typically involve that the allocation of capital to the BS is strongly constrained by households’ limitations on bank funding in the all-monitor equilibrium of the LF economy, even if bank characteristics are observable. In such cases, bank money creation’s ability to alleviate the inefficiencies in the allocation of capital that arise from market-imposed

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25 As explained in Footnote 11, we cannot strictly rule out an all-shirk equilibrium in the LF economy. Such an all-shirk LF economy, however, would certainly also fare worse than the MC economy: while an all-shirk equilibrium of the LF economy could easily be replicated in the MC economy by setting the appropriate $\alpha$ with $\alpha \geq \alpha_s$, under the conditions of Proposition 6 it is optimal not to do so but instead to set $\alpha = \alpha^*$, with $\alpha^* < \alpha_s$.

26 At most, such a leverage constraint could strictly rule out an all-shirk equilibrium and thus establish the all-monitor equilibrium as the unique equilibrium of the LF economy.
leverage constraints in the LF economies even trumps the second-best LF economy’s advantage of symmetric information and tailor-made monitoring incentives.\footnote{Accounting for banks’ private benefits from shirking would further increase the scope for cases in which welfare in the MC economy even exceeds that of the second-best LF economy.}

**Unobservable bank heterogeneity and the superiority of the MC economy.** The reason why the MC economy with an appropriately set leverage constraint is superior to the LF economy in our model is unobservable heterogeneity among banks, combined with agents’ price-taking behavior.\footnote{If all banks were the same, also the MC economy could only either achieve an all-monitor or an all-shirk equilibrium. If banks were heterogeneous, but their types observable, households in the LF economy could incentivize banks to monitor on a bank-by-bank basis (cf. Appendix B.1). The MC economy could achieve exactly the same by setting appropriate bank-individual leverage constraints, which typically—i.e., if the allocation of capital to the BS is not “overly constrained” and \( \Delta \) is not “too small”—should also be optimal.}

In essence, unobservable bank-heterogeneity is the reason why the differing sequence of events in the LF economy, compared to the MC economy, is important. In the LF economy, the first step in banking intermediation is that households provide funding to banks. Because of asymmetric information, households cannot distinguish between banks and thus, according to Condition (3), they strongly restrict the amount of capital they provide to all of them to ensure that the banks have the incentives to monitor. In contrast, the first step in the MC economy is that banks can initiate lending on their own, being restricted only by the regulatory leverage constraint. Price-taking households do not take into account how the amount of capital goods they sell to BS firms affects banks’ incentive constraint (14) for monitoring.

Finally, we note that the regulator sets the optimal leverage constraint in the MC economy by taking into account how a change of this constraint will affect the banks’ monitoring decisions, capital prices and the allocation of capital in the economy. In particular, the regulator not only takes into account how channeling more funds to the BS may decrease monitoring incentives, but also how it may lead to a more efficient allocation of capital in the economy. In the LF economy, price-taking households can only take into account how changing their investment may affect the banks’ monitoring incentives, but they are, of course, not concerned about capital allocation in the economy and capital price changes.

### 5.5 On the fragility of bank money creation’s benefits

As we have shown, output in the MC economy with \( \alpha = \alpha^* \) exceeds output in the LF economy (cf. Proposition \[6\]). However, while equilibrium in the LF economy is formed only through market mechanisms, the MC economy requires a well informed regulator who is willing and able to enforce a leverage constraint \( \alpha^* \). This renders the optimal outcome in the MC economy fragile.
Figure 3: Fragility in the MC economy

In Figures 2 (ii)–(iv), one can see that while the MC economy at $\alpha = \alpha^*$ is superior to the LF economy, this is not true for all $\alpha$. In (iii), for instance, the MC economy’s output at $\alpha = \alpha^* \approx 4.8$ is well above that of the LF economy, but not too far from it, at $\alpha \approx 6.8$, it is well below. Similarly, a leverage constraint $\alpha < \alpha_m (\approx 1.8)$ would also make the MC economy worse off than the LF economy. Even if the set of conditions in Corollary 3 holds, Figure 2 (ii) shows that welfare in the MC economy is not necessarily greater than in the LF economy for all $\alpha$. Thus, the regulator needs precise knowledge about all relevant economic fundamentals to accurately set the optimal leverage constraint. If that is not the case or if the regulator sets the leverage constraint wrong for other reasons, output in the MC economy may as well fall short of output in the LF economy.

**Discontinuities and non-existence of equilibrium.** An extreme example for this fragility appears when we examine the case where $\alpha_{\mu}$ and $\alpha_s$ do not exist (this is possible only if the set of conditions in (41) is violated). Figure B.1 in Appendix B.3 already illustrates that in this case, the equilibrium price ratio is discontinuous in $\alpha$ at $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$. As we can see in Figures 3 (i)–(ii), this discontinuity in the equilibrium price ratio translates into a “jump” in the output function $Y^g$ at $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$. Let us focus on (i) first. The output function is smooth for $\alpha \in [1, \bar{\alpha}]$ and implies positive fractions of both monitoring and non-monitoring banks. For $\alpha$ marginally greater than $\bar{\alpha}$, however, all banks shirk and output suddenly drops from $Y_{\mu}$ to $Y_{\Delta}$. Since $\alpha_{\Delta} > \bar{\alpha}$, $Y^g$ is given by $Y_{\Delta}$ for $\alpha \in (\bar{\alpha}, \alpha_{\Delta}]$. 

Note: Figures (i)–(ii): Output for $\alpha$’s that would imply $R_L < R_D$ if banks leveraged up as much as possible is dashed, as we cannot readily state how exactly it behaves in this area.

Note: Figure (ii): The function $\gamma$ is “greyed out” for $\alpha \in [\alpha_{\Delta}, \bar{\alpha}]$, since $Y$ is given by $Y_{\mu}$ in this area and hence $Y_{\Delta}$ is not operative there.

Note: Figure (i): $\pi = 0.8, \Delta = 0.5, R_B = 3, R_{CB} = 1.75, b \approx 0.330, b = 1.5, E = 0.05$. Figure (ii): $\pi = 0.8, \Delta = 0.5, R_B = 3, R_{CB} = 1.75, b \approx 0.066, b = 1.5, E = 0.05$. 

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Figure 3 (i) is a showcase example for the fragility of bank money creation’s benefits: while the MC economy is clearly superior to the LF economy at $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$, this is already reversed for a leverage constraint only marginally higher.

Figure 3 (ii) depicts the special situation where equilibrium may cease to exist for a leverage constraint greater than $\bar{\alpha}$. As $\alpha \Delta < \bar{\alpha}$, we would obtain $R_L < R_D$ for $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}$ if banks still leveraged up as much as possible. For $R_L < R_D$, however, banks in fact may want to lend less than possible, either because lending no longer benefits them or because they wouldn’t be able to repay the CB. Hence, there might not be an equilibrium where banks’ actual leverage ratios are higher than $\bar{\alpha}$, even if they were allowed to lend up to an $\alpha$ greater than $\bar{\alpha}$. But banks’ actual leverage ratios also cannot be equal to or smaller than $\bar{\alpha}$, because for $\alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}$, $R_L > R_D$, and hence (price-taking) banks lend as much as possible.\footnote{The reason why it is $R_L > R_D$ for $\alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}$ is that $Y^g$ is given by $Y_\mu$ for $\alpha \in [\alpha_m, \bar{\alpha}]$ and $\alpha_\mu$ does not exist.}

6 Bank-risk Assessment and Risk-sensitive Capital Requirements

While Proposition 6 shows that economic outcomes in the MC economy are superior to those in the LF economy, they still fall short of the first-best and the second-best. In this section, we show how it is possible to further improve outcomes in the MC economy by combining bank-risk assessments with risk-sensitive capital requirements.

Assume that the regulator delegates these assessments to the CB, which performs them at the end of period $t = 1$ (see Figure 4) and immediately informs the regulator of the results.
6.1 Perfect risk assessment

As the benchmark case, assume that bank-risk assessment perfectly reveals the default probability of each bank’s loans: \(1 - \pi\) or \(1 - (\pi - \Delta)\). Observing these probabilities, the regulator can perfectly infer whether the bank monitored or not. For simplicity, assume that risk assessment is costless. Then, at the beginning of period \(t = 1\), the regulator can announce that:

(i) high-risk banks, i.e. banks with default probability \(1 - (\pi - \Delta)\), have to comply with a maximum leverage ratio of \(\alpha = \alpha_m\), and

(ii) low-risk banks, i.e. banks with default probability \(1 - \pi\), have to comply with a maximum leverage ratio of \(\alpha = \alpha_\pi\), where \(\alpha_\pi\) is implicitly given by \(\pi R_B = R_F\), which yields

\[
\alpha_\pi = \frac{1 - (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B)}{E}.
\]  

At the same time, the regulator also announces that the CB will assess all banks’ risk types and control their compliance, with the respective leverage constraints at the end of period \(t = 1\). In case of non-compliance, the regulatory authority announces that it will levy a large penalty, which banks want to avoid by all means (in the medium- to long-run, these banks would also be forced to de-leverage). We assume that the regulatory authority can commit to its statements and, hence, this announcement is credible.

With (i), all banks decide to monitor. They know that if they don’t, they will have to comply with a leverage constraint for which they would have been better off monitoring in the first place. With all banks monitoring, (ii) sets the leverage constraint such that capital is allocated efficiently. Hence, we can state the following proposition.

**Proposition 7 (Bank-risk assessment and risk-sensitive leverage constraints)**

*Suppose that the CB can perfectly assess the default risk of the banks’ credit portfolios. Then, first-best can be achieved in the MC economy by introducing risk-sensitive leverage constraints \(\alpha_m\) and \(\alpha_\pi\) for high-risk and low-risk banks, respectively.*

Interestingly, we achieve first-best despite the fact that the regulator cannot observe individual bank types. The threat of a sufficiently strict leverage constraint for high-risk (i.e., non-monitoring) banks already ensures that all banks have an incentive to monitor. The reason why this results in a first-best scenario, and hence is even superior to the second-best LF economy, is that the strict leverage constraint \(\alpha = \alpha_m\) only serves as a threat but never actually has to be put into effect. In contrast, households in the second-best LF economy incentivize bankers to monitor by actually limiting the amount of deposits they provide, which results in an inefficient allocation of capital between the BS and the FS, at least if bank equity is scarce, cf. Proposition B.1.
6.2 Imperfect risk assessment

In the benchmark case above, we assumed that the CB can (a) perfectly assess a bank’s credit risks, and then (b) perfectly infer whether the bank monitored or not. Of course reality shows a noisier picture. If the effect of monitoring efforts on credit risks is not entirely deterministic, (b) is no longer possible. Naturally, we would still expect a correlation, but inference would be imperfect.

Even worse, if risk assessment is imperfect and hence (a) is violated, banks could have an incentive to first skip monitoring efforts and then try to deceive the CB into believing that they are in fact low-risk. Such behavior does not even have to be illegal: balance sheet window-dressing, for instance, is both within the law and common among banks (see, e.g., Allen and Saunders, 1992; Shaffer and Yang, 2010). Disguising credit risk by re-packaging loans into structured products was common bank practice in the run-up of the financial crisis of 2007-08. All of this can generate a situation where banks are often misclassified as low-risk, while in fact they are not. The problem with risk-sensitive capital requirements as stated above then would be that banks that are perceived as low-risk face only a leverage constraint $\alpha = \alpha_c$. As $\alpha = \alpha_c$ is the optimal leverage constraint for banks perceived as low-risk and as it is obviously looser than the optimal leverage constraint $\alpha^*$ without bank-risk assessments, this implies that risk-sensitive capital requirements could backfire and in fact worsen outcomes in an MC economy if banks can easily deceive risk assessments.

Underestimated bank credit risks were widely considered as one of the main causes for the financial crisis of 2007-08. Hence, many new regulations have been put in place since then. For instance, Basel III introduced generally stricter capital requirements. Furthermore, regulators and central banks have invested in better capabilities in bank-risk assessment and stress-testing. We can thus assume that while bank-risk assessments certainly are still imperfect, they now tend to be less prone to failure. Taking this into account, bank-risk assessments, combined with risk-sensitive capital requirements might not result in first-best as in the benchmark case, but could still contribute to further improvements in an MC economy.

7 Conclusion

We develop a model to illustrate the merits of a monetary system with bank money creation over an economy with banks as simple intermediaries of loanable funds. In the presence of bank heterogeneity and potential bank-level moral hazard, the fact that banks do not need household funding to initiate lending leads to higher lending volumes, a more efficient allocation of capital and, under a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, to higher economic output overall. Bank-risk assessments, combined with risk-sensitive
capital requirements, can improve outcomes further and, under certain conditions, even achieve the first-best allocation.

Policy-wise, we provide a rationale for bank money creation and thus offer an argument against proposals to abolish this privilege for banks. In this regard, our findings also matter for the ongoing discussion on the introduction of CBDCs. In particular, central banks should be careful in which precise manner such a digital currency would be implemented, so that the benefits of private money creation in our current two-tier monetary system are not lost. With regard to economic modeling, the differing outcomes in the MC and LF economies suggest that the standard LF approach to banking should not be considered a simple short-cut to the MC approach in settings with heterogeneous banks and financial frictions at bank level.
References


A Proofs

Proof of Proposition 2. Part (i). Let $R_F - \pi R_B + \bar{b}/\Delta > 0$, otherwise the constraint in the maximization problem in (5) never binds. Then, rewriting this constraint yields

$$k \leq \frac{eR_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\bar{b}}{\Delta}}. \quad (A.1)$$

Banks’ objective function in the maximization problem in (5) is linear in $k$. This implies that banks lend as much as possible if $\pi R_B > R_F$, they do not lend at all if $\pi R_B < R_F$ and they lend an arbitrary amount if $\pi R_B = R_F$. As we focus on equilibria where positive amounts of capital are provided to the bank-dependent sector, let $\pi R_B \geq R_F$. We distinguish two cases: (i) $R_F = \pi R_B$, and (ii) $R_F < \pi R_B$.

Case (i). Assume that $R_F = \pi R_B$. Then, Condition (A.1) is given by

$$k \leq \frac{\Delta eR_B}{\bar{b}}. \quad (A.2)$$

For the aggregate economy, this implies

$$K_B \leq \frac{\Delta eR_B}{\bar{b}}(\bar{b} - \bar{b}). \quad (A.3)$$

Hence, an equilibrium with $R_F = \pi R_B$ is consistent with Condition (A.1) if and only if

$$e \geq \frac{K_B \bar{b}}{\Delta R_B(\bar{b} - \bar{b})}.$$ 

Since $K_B = 1 - K_F$, $K_F = (g')^{-1}(R_F)$ and $E = (\bar{b} - \bar{b})e$, we can restate this condition in exogenous variables only:

$$E \geq \frac{\bar{b}(1 - (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B))}{\Delta R_B}. \quad (A.4)$$

Since $g'(\cdot)$ is strictly monotonically decreasing, the inverse $(g')^{-1}(\cdot)$ exists. If Condition (A.4) holds, the incentive constraint (A.1) is non-binding at $R_F = \pi R_B$. Hence, in this case, $R_F = \pi R_B$ constitutes the equilibrium value of $R_F$.

Case (ii). Assume that $R_F < \pi R_B$. Then, as much capital as possible flows into the BS, i.e., Condition (A.1) is binding:

$$k = \frac{eR_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\bar{b}}{\Delta}}. \quad (A.5)$$

In aggregate, this implies

$$K_B = \frac{eR_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi}{\Delta}(\bar{b} - \bar{b})}. \quad (A.6)$$
Using $K_B = 1 - K_F$ and $g'(K_F) = R_F$, this yields

$$R_F = g'\left(1 - \frac{eR_F(\bar{b} - \underline{b})}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta}}\right).$$  \hfill (A.7)

As the l.h.s. is linearly increasing in $R_F$, and one can show that the r.h.s. is strictly monotonically decreasing in $R_F$, there is a unique value of $R_F$ that solves this equation (see the Auxiliary Lemma A.1 below). For $\pi R_B > R_F$, the l.h.s. evaluated at $R_F = \pi R_B$ has to be greater than the r.h.s. evaluated at $R_F = \pi R_B$:

$$\pi R_B > g'\left(1 - \frac{\Delta eR_B(\bar{b} - \underline{b})}{\bar{b}}\right).$$

Solving for $e$ and using $E = (\bar{b} - \underline{b})e$ yields Condition (6). If this condition holds, there is a value of $R_F (< \pi R_B)$ that solves Equation (A.7) and hence constitutes the equilibrium value of $R_F$.

**Auxiliary Lemma A.1**

There is a unique value of $R_F$ that solves Equation (A.7) and satisfies $R_F > \pi R_B - (\pi \bar{b}/\Delta)$.

**Proof.** We prove Auxiliary Lemma A.1 by using the Intermediate Value Theorem. The l.h.s. of Equation (A.7) is linearly increasing in $R_F$. Next, we show that the r.h.s. of Equation (A.7) is decreasing in $R_F$. Let

$$f(R_F) \equiv \frac{ER_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta}}.$$  \hfill (A.8)

Then, since $g''(\cdot) < 0$, the r.h.s. of Equation (A.7) is decreasing in $R_F$ if and only if $f(R_F)$ is decreasing in $R_F$. This is the case, iff

$$\frac{E}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta}} \left[1 - \frac{R_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta}}\right] \leq 0.$$  \hfill (A.9)

As assumed at the beginning of the proof to Proposition 2, $R_F - \pi R_B + \pi \bar{b}/\Delta > 0$. Assumption 1 implies that $-\pi R_B + \pi \bar{b}/\Delta \leq 0$ and thus, from Equation (A.5), ensures that $k \geq e$ and, in aggregate, $K_B \geq E$. Then, from Equation (A.6) we also obtain $R_F/(R_F - \pi R_B + \pi \bar{b}/\Delta) \geq 1$. It follows that Inequality (A.9) holds.

Finally, note that the r.h.s. of Equation (A.7) goes to infinity for $R_F$ to $[\pi R_B - (\pi \bar{b}/\Delta)]/(1 - E) (> \pi R_B - (\pi \bar{b}/\Delta))$ from above. Therefore, an $R_F (> \pi R_B - (\pi \bar{b}/\Delta))$ that solves Equation (A.7) exists.

**Part (ii).** From the definitions of $\bar{E}^{LF}$ and $\bar{E}^{SB}$ in Propositions 2(i) and B.1 respec-
tively, $E^{LF} > E^{SB}$, iff
\[ \bar{b}\left(1 - (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B)\right) > \frac{1 - (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B)}{\Delta R_B (\ln \bar{b} - \ln \bar{b})}. \]

This reduces to
\[ \frac{\bar{b}}{\bar{b} - \bar{b}} > \left( \ln \left( \frac{\bar{b}}{\bar{b}} \right) \right)^{-1}, \]
\[ \ln \left( \frac{\bar{b}}{\bar{b}} \right) - \frac{\bar{b} - \bar{b}}{\bar{b}} > 0. \quad (A.10) \]

This holds for all $\bar{b} > \bar{b}$, as $\lim_{\bar{b} \to \bar{b}} \varphi(\bar{b}) = 0$ and $\varphi'(\bar{b}) = (\bar{b} - \bar{b})/\bar{b}^2 > 0$.

From Equations (B.11) and (A.7), for $R^{LF}_F$ to be smaller than $R^{SB}_F$ it is sufficient that, for given $R_F$,
\[ g' \left\{ 1 - \frac{eR_F(\bar{b} - \bar{b})}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}} \right\} < g' \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Delta}{\pi} eR_F \left[ \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta} \right) \right] - \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta} \right) \right\}. \quad (A.11) \]

This simplifies to
\[ \frac{\bar{b} - \bar{b}}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}} < \frac{\Delta}{\pi} \frac{\ln R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}}. \quad (A.12) \]

Denoting $\bar{x} := R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}$ and $\bar{x} := R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}$, Inequality (A.12) turns into
\[ \ln \frac{\bar{x}}{\bar{x}} > \frac{\bar{x} - \bar{x}}{\bar{x}}. \quad (A.13) \]

Since $\bar{b} > \bar{b}$, it is $\bar{x} > \bar{x} > 0$. For $\bar{x} \to \bar{x}$, both sides of Inequality (A.13) approach zero. For $\bar{x} \to \bar{x}$, the l.h.s. goes to infinity, the r.h.s. approaches one. For all $\bar{x} > \bar{x}$ in between, the l.h.s. “increases faster” than the r.h.s.:
\[ \frac{\partial \ln(\bar{x}/\bar{x})}{\partial \bar{x}} = \frac{1}{\bar{x}} > \frac{1}{\bar{x}} - \frac{\bar{x} - \bar{x}}{\bar{x}^2} = \frac{\partial(\bar{x} - \bar{x})/\bar{x}}{\partial \bar{x}}. \quad (A.14) \]

Hence, Inequality (A.13) holds, and it is $R^{LF}_F < R^{SB}_F$. With $g(K_F)$ exercising diminishing returns to scale and $g'(K_F) = R_F$, it immediately follows that $K^{LF}_F > K^{SB}_F$. As $K_B = 1 - K_F$, this in turn implies $K^{LF}_B < K^{SB}_B$. 

**Proof of Lemma 2.** From $\alpha < \alpha$ follows that Expression (24) applies and thus also Equations (25)–(29) apply.

**Part (i).** Whether a solution to Equation (27) exists, depends on whether $B^2 - 4AR_F \geq$
0. This is the case, iff

\[
R_{CB}^2 \mu_1^2 - 4R_{CB}^2 \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \right) R_F \geq 0
\]

\[
\mu_1^2 \geq 4 \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} g'(1 - \alpha E) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \right).
\] (A.15)

For \( \alpha \to 1^{(+)} \), the r.h.s. goes to zero and Condition (A.15) obviously holds. For \( \alpha \to 1/E \), the r.h.s. goes to infinity (as \( g'(0) = \infty \)) and the inequality does not hold. As the l.h.s. is independent of \( \alpha \) and the r.h.s. is strictly increasing in \( \alpha \), by the Intermediate Value Theorem there is exactly one value of \( \alpha \) in \((1, 1/E)\) for which Condition (A.15) holds with equality. If we denote this value by \( \alpha = \bar{\alpha} \), a solution exists for all \( \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \) and it does not exist for all \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \).

**Part (ii).** Substituting the second solution in Equation (29), i.e.,

\[
\frac{p_I}{p_C} = \frac{1}{2A} \left( B + \sqrt{B^2 - 4AR_F} \right),
\] (A.16)

into \( \hat{b} \), yields

\[
\hat{b} = \Delta R_B - \frac{\bar{b} - b}{2\Delta} \left( \mu_1 + \sqrt{\mu_1^2 - \frac{4AR_F}{R_{CB}^2}} \right).
\] (A.17)

For \( \alpha \) approaching one from above, \( A \to 0^{(+)} \). Using this and substituting \( \mu_1 \) as defined in Expression (28) into Equation (A.17) yields

\[
\lim_{\alpha \to 1^{(+)}} \hat{b} = \bar{b} - \frac{\bar{b} - b}{\Delta} \pi.
\] (A.18)

It follows that, for \( \alpha \to 1^{(+)} \), \( \hat{b} > b \) requires \( \pi - \Delta < 0 \), which can never be the case by assumption. Hence, \( p_I/p_C \) as given by Equation (A.16) is not an admissible solution to Equation (29). The only admissible solution to Equation (29), and thus the equilibrium price ratio, is then given by Equation (30).

Note that, besides the argument just made, the solution for \( p_I/p_C \) as given by Equation (A.16) would also imply that \( \mu(p_I/p_C)R_{CB} \) crosses \( R_F \) from above, which in turn would yield unintuitive comparative static properties that are in contrast to what we find in Corollary 1.

**Proof of Corollary 1.** We first show that \( \hat{b} \) is decreasing in \( \alpha \). For \( q = \pi \) or \( q = \pi - \Delta \), the equilibrium price ratio \( p_I/p_C \) is obviously increasing in \( \alpha \), since \( \partial R_F/\partial \alpha > 0 \) by Equation (25). Hence, in these cases, from Equation (26) we immediately see that \( \hat{b} \) is decreasing in \( \alpha \). For \( q = \mu \), plugging the equilibrium price ratio given by Equation (30)
into Equation (26) yields

\[ \dot{b} = \Delta R_B - \frac{\bar{b} - b}{2\Delta} \left( \mu_1 - \sqrt{\mu_1^2 - \frac{4AR_F}{R_{CB}^2}} \right). \]  

(A.19)

As \( \mu_1 \) is independent of \( \alpha \), and \( A \) as well as \( R_F \) are increasing in \( \alpha \), we see that \( \dot{b} \) is decreasing in \( \alpha \).

With Expression (15), \( \partial \mu / \partial \alpha < 0 \) follows immediately from \( \partial \dot{b} / \partial \alpha < 0 \). With regard to the equilibrium price ratio, we already assessed \( \partial (p_I/p_C) / \partial \alpha > 0 \) for \( q = \pi \) or \( q = \pi - \Delta \). For \( q = \mu \), total differentiation of Equation (27) yields

\[ \frac{d}{d\alpha} \left( \frac{p_I}{p_C} \right) = \frac{R^2_{CB} \left( \frac{p_I}{p_C} \right)^2 \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \frac{1}{\alpha^2} - E g''(1 - \alpha E)}{R_{CB} \left( \pi - \Delta \frac{\bar{b} - R_B}{\bar{b} - b} \right) - 2 \frac{p_I}{p_C} R^2_{CB} \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} (1 - \frac{1}{\alpha^2})}. \]  

(A.20)

As \( g''(\cdot) < 0 \), the numerator is always positive. Hence, \( \partial (p_I/p_C) / \partial \alpha > 0 \), if

\[ R_{CB} \mu_1 - 2 \frac{p_I}{p_C} R^2_{CB} \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) > 0. \]  

(A.21)

From Equation (30), the equilibrium price ratio \( p_I/p_C \) is given by

\[ \frac{p_I}{p_C} = \frac{\mu_1 - \sqrt{\mu_1^2 - 4RF \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)}}{2R_{CB} \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} (1 - \frac{1}{\alpha^2})}. \]  

(A.22)

Then, Inequality (A.21) holds, if

\[ \mu_1 R_{CB} - \left( \mu_1 R_{CB} - R_{CB} \sqrt{\mu_1^2 - 4RF \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)} \right) > 0 \]

\[ \sqrt{\mu_1^2 - 4RF \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)} > 0. \]  

(A.23)

This either holds or an equilibrium price ratio consistent with \( q = \mu \) does not exist in the first place (cf. Appendix A). Hence, \( p_I/p_C \) is increasing in \( \alpha \). ~

Proof of Proposition 4. We first prove Part (i) of the Proposition by showing that \( Y_\mu \) is strictly concave in \( \alpha \). After that, we proceed with a proof for Part (ii).

Part (i). From Equation (33), we obtain

\[ \frac{\partial^2 Y_\mu}{\partial \alpha^2} = E \left[ R_B \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} + R_B \left( \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} + \alpha \frac{\partial^2 \mu}{\partial \alpha^2} \right) + E g''(K_F) \right]. \]  

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This is smaller than zero, if
\[ 2R_B \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} + \alpha R_B \frac{\partial^2 \mu}{\partial \alpha^2} + E g''(K_F) < 0. \]  
(A.24)

We first calculate \( \partial \mu / \partial \alpha \). From the definition of \( \mu_1 \) in Equation (28) and the definition of \( \mu \) in Expression (15), with \( \hat{b} \) given by Equation (26), we obtain
\[
\mu = \mu_1 - \frac{\Delta R_B}{b - \hat{b}} \Delta + \frac{\hat{b}}{b - \hat{b}} \Delta,
\]
\[
\mu = \mu_1 - \frac{\Delta^2}{b - \hat{b}} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) R_{CB} \frac{p_I}{p_C}. \]  
(A.25)

Substituting \( p_I / p_C \) from Equation (A.22) into Equation (A.25) yields
\[
\mu = \frac{1}{2} \mu_1 + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{\mu_1^2 - 4RF \frac{\Delta^2}{b - \hat{b}} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)} \]

and thereby
\[
\Psi = 2\mu - \mu_1. \]  
(A.27)

By taking the derivative of \( \mu \), given by Equation (A.26), with respect to \( \alpha \) and making use of Equation (A.27), we obtain
\[
\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\Delta^2}{b - \hat{b}} \left( -\frac{RF}{\alpha^2(2\mu - \mu_1)} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) \frac{E g''(K_F)}{2\mu - \mu_1} \right). \]  
(A.28)

From Expression (A.28), we can also calculate \( \partial^2 \mu / \partial \alpha^2 \):
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \mu}{\partial \alpha^2} = \frac{\Delta^2}{b - \hat{b}} \left( \frac{E g''(K_F)}{\alpha^2(2\mu - \mu_1)} + \frac{RF}{\alpha^4(2\mu - \mu_1)^2} \left[ 2\alpha(2\mu - \mu_1) + 2\alpha^2 \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} \right] \right) +
\]
\[
+ \frac{\Delta^2}{b - \hat{b}} E \left\{ -E g'''(K_F) \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}}{2\mu - \mu_1} + g''(K_F) \left[ \frac{1}{\alpha^2(2\mu - \mu_1)} - \frac{2(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}) \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha}}{(2\mu - \mu_1)^2} \right] \right\}. \]  
(A.29)

Substituting Expression (A.29) into the l.h.s. of Condition (A.24), we obtain
\[
2R_B \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} + \frac{\Delta^2}{b - \hat{b}} R_B \left\{ \frac{2RF}{\alpha^2(2\mu - \mu_1)} + \frac{2RF}{\alpha(2\mu - \mu_1)^2} \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} + \frac{E g''(K_F)}{\alpha(2\mu - \mu_1)} + \alpha E \Phi \right\} +
\]
\[
+E g''(K_F). \]
Substituting Expression (A.28) into the first term and simplifying yields

\[
\frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} R_B \left\{ 2 \left(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\right) E g''(K_F) + \frac{2R_F}{\alpha(2\mu - \mu_1)^2} \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} + \frac{E g''(K_F)}{\alpha(2\mu - \mu_1)} + \alpha E \Phi \right\} + \\
E g''(K_F);
\]

\[
\frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} R_B \left\{ \frac{(2\alpha - 1) E g''(K_F)}{\alpha(2\mu - \mu_1)} + \frac{2R_F}{\alpha(2\mu - \mu_1)^2} \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} + \alpha E \Phi \right\} + E g''(K_F). \tag{A.30}
\]

With \(g''(K_F) > 0\) by assumption, \(\alpha \geq 1\), \(g''(\cdot) < 0\), \(\partial \mu / \partial \alpha < 0\) and, from Equations (A.26)-(A.27), \(2\mu - \mu_1 > 0\), all terms in Expression (A.30) are negative. Hence, Condition (A.24) holds.

**Part (ii).** Next, we prove Part (ii) of the Proposition. The r.h.s. of the FOC (34), given by \(R_F (= g'(1 - \alpha E))\), is increasing in \(\alpha\) since we assume \(g''(\cdot) < 0\). From the proof of Part (i) immediately follows that the l.h.s. of FOC (34) is decreasing in \(\alpha\). Then, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is an \(\alpha \in [1, \bar{\alpha}]\) that solves the FOC (34), if, at \(\alpha = 1\), the l.h.s. of the FOC (34) is greater than the r.h.s. and, for \(\alpha \to \bar{\alpha}\), the l.h.s. of the FOC (34) is smaller than the r.h.s. The first part of this holds true if, at \(\alpha = 1\),

\[
\mu_1 R_B E + R_B E \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial \alpha} \geq g'(1 - E) E. \tag{A.31}
\]

At \(\alpha = 1\), Equation (26) yields \(\hat{b} = \Delta R_B\). Then, Condition (A.31) holds, if

\[
\mu_1 R_B E - R_B E R_{CB} \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \left[ \frac{\partial (p_I/p_C)}{\partial \alpha} \left(1 - \frac{1}{1}\right) + \frac{1}{1^2} \frac{p_I}{p_C} \right] \geq g'(1 - E) E;
\]

\[
\mu_1 R_B - R_B R_{CB} \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \frac{p_I}{p_C} \geq g'(1 - E). \tag{A.32}
\]

The price ratio \(p_I/p_C\) is implicitly determined by Equation (27). For \(\alpha = 1\), the solution is uniquely given by

\[
\frac{p_I}{p_C} = \frac{g'(1 - E)}{\mu_1 R_{CB}}.
\]

Plugging this into Condition (A.32) yields

\[
\mu_1 R_B - R_B \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - b} \frac{g'(1 - E)}{\mu_1} \geq g'(1 - E). \tag{A.33}
\]

This holds, if

\[
\mu_1^2 R_B - \left( \mu_1 + \frac{\Delta^2 R_B}{\bar{b} - b} \right) g'(1 - E) \geq 0, \tag{A.34}
\]

which can be rewritten as Condition (35) in the text.

What is left to show is that the l.h.s. of the FOC (34) is smaller than the r.h.s for
$\alpha \to \bar{\alpha}$. This is the case, if

$$ R_B \left[ \mu - \frac{\Delta^2}{\bar{b} - \bar{b}} R_{CB} \left( \frac{p_I}{p_C} \frac{1}{\alpha^2} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\alpha}} \right) \frac{\partial (p_I/p_C)}{\partial \alpha} \right) \right] - R_F < 0. \quad (A.35) $$

For $\alpha \to \bar{\alpha}$, the price ratio given in Equation (A.22) simplifies to

$$ \frac{p_I}{p_C} = \frac{\mu_1}{2R_{CB}\Delta^2 (1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\alpha}})}. \quad (A.36) $$

From Equation (A.20), the derivative of the price ratio with respect to $\alpha$, “evaluated” at $\alpha \to \bar{\alpha}$, is given by

$$ \frac{\mu_1}{4\Delta^2\bar{b}^2 (1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\alpha}})^2} - E\gamma''(1 - \bar{\alpha}E) $$

$$ = \frac{R_{CB}\mu_1 - (R_{CB}\mu_1)^(-)}{0^{(+)}} = \infty. \quad (A.37) $$

It follows that the l.h.s. of Condition (A.35) goes to minus infinity, for $\alpha \to \bar{\alpha}$, and thus Condition (A.35) holds. ■

**Proof of Corollary 3.** Part (i). Since, for $\alpha = 1$, $\hat{b} = \Delta R_B$, setting $\bar{b} = \Delta R_B$, which constitutes the first condition in the set of conditions in (41), implies $\alpha_m = 1$. Also note that, for $\alpha > 1$, it holds that $\hat{b} < \bar{b} (= \Delta R_B)$.

To see that $\alpha_s = \alpha_\Delta$, note that $\alpha_\Delta$ is given by Equation (23). From Condition (14), using Equation (19) and Equation (16), with $q = \pi - \Delta$, the leverage constraint beyond which all banks shirk is given by

$$ \alpha_s = \frac{R_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta)R_B + \frac{(\pi - \Delta)b}{\Delta}}. \quad (A.38) $$

By definition, $\alpha = \alpha_\Delta$ implies $R_F = (\pi - \Delta)R_B$. Hence, $\alpha_\Delta$ as given by Equation (23) falls together with $\alpha_s$ as given by Equation (A.38), iff

$$ \frac{1 - (g')^{-1} \{(\pi - \Delta)R_B\}}{E} = \frac{\Delta R_B}{1 - (g')^{-1} \{(\pi - \Delta)R_B\}}, \quad (A.39) $$

which constitutes the second condition in the set of conditions in (41). Furthermore, at $\alpha = \alpha_s$ it obviously holds that $\mu = \pi - \Delta$ and thus, from the definitions of $\alpha_\Delta$ and $\alpha_\mu$,
follows that $\alpha_s = \alpha_\Delta$ implies $\alpha_s = \alpha_\mu$.

Last, we show that the third condition in the set of conditions in (41) implies $\alpha_s \leq \bar{\alpha}$ and thus ensures the existence of $\alpha_s$\footnote{In combination with the second condition, this also ensures the existence of $\alpha_\mu$.}. To see this, remember that, from Condition (A.15), $\bar{\alpha}$ is implicitly given by

$$g'(1 - \bar{\alpha}E) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\alpha}} \right) = \frac{\mu_1^2}{4 \bar{\alpha}^2 - \bar{\Delta}}.$$  \hfill (A.40)

Furthermore, $\alpha_s$ is implicitly given by $\hat{b} = b$, which, using Equation (26) and $p_I/p_C = R_F/\mu R_{CB}$, can be written as\footnote{Note that of course $\mu = \pi - \Delta$ at $\alpha = \alpha_s$, if $\alpha_s$ exists. To check whether $\alpha_s$ exists in the first place, however, we have to take into account how $\mu$ depends on $\alpha$.}

$$g'(1 - \alpha_sE) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha_s} \right) = \frac{\mu}{\Delta} (\Delta R_B - b).$$  \hfill (A.41)

As $g'(1 - \alpha E)(1 - 1/\alpha)$ is monotonically increasing in $\alpha$ and as $\mu$ is monotonically decreasing in $\alpha$ and $\mu_1 = \pi$ for $\Delta R_B = b$, it is $\alpha_s \leq \bar{\alpha}$ exactly if it holds that, at $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$,

$$\frac{\mu}{\Delta} (\bar{b} - b) \leq g'(1 - \bar{\alpha}E) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\alpha}} \right),$$  \hfill (A.42)

which, with Equation (A.40), simplifies to

$$\mu \leq \frac{1}{4} \frac{\pi^2}{\Delta}.$$  \hfill (A.43)

From Equation (A.26) we know that $\mu = \frac{1}{2} \mu_1 + \frac{1}{2} \Psi$ and from Condition (A.15) follows that $\Psi = 0$, at $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$. Hence, Condition (A.43) simplifies to

$$\frac{1}{2} \pi \leq \frac{1}{4} \frac{\pi^2}{\Delta},$$

$$\Delta \leq \frac{1}{2} \pi.$$  \hfill (A.44)

**Part (ii).** From Part (i), $\alpha_s = \alpha_\mu$ and $\alpha_m = 1$. The former implies that increasing $\alpha$ beyond $\alpha^*$ can never maximize $Y^g$. This is because $\alpha^*$ maximizes $Y^g$ within $\alpha_m \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_\mu$ and $Y^g$ is certainly non-increasing for $\alpha > \alpha_\mu$, since increasing $\alpha$ beyond $\alpha_\mu$ may only result in an overallocation of capital to the BS. It follows that Condition (ii) of Proposition 5 holds\footnote{See Appendix B.3.2 for more details.}. As $\alpha_m = 1$, substituting $\bar{b} = \Delta R_B$ and $\mu_1 = \pi$ into Condition (35) in Proposition 4 shows that Condition (42) implies Condition (i) of Proposition 5. \hfill \blacksquare
B Supplementary Material

B.1 Second-best LF economy

In this Appendix we analyze a second-best LF economy characterized by symmetric information about individual bank types, i.e., an LF economy where banks’ (heterogeneous) private benefits \( b \) from shirking are observable by households.

Analogously to the asymmetric information case in Subsection 3.3, we construct an equilibrium in which all banks monitor. To ensure that this is the case, by an analogous argument as the one given for Equation (3), the amount of capital households provide to bank \( b \) has to satisfy

\[
k_b(R_D - R_B + \frac{b}{\Delta}) \leq eR_D. \tag{B.1}
\]

Assumption 1 together with \( k_b = d_b + e \) implies that Condition (B.1) holds for \( d_b = 0 \). The maximum incentive-compatible amount of deposits households can provide to bank \( b \) is given by the value of \( d_b \) for which Condition (B.1) holds with equality. Together with households’ participation constraint \( \pi R_D \geq R_F \), which under Assumption 2 has to hold with equality, we can write bank \( b \)'s optimization problem as follows:

\[
\max_{k_b} \pi R_B k_b - R_F (k_b - e) \\
\text{s.t. } k_b (R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}) \leq eR_F. \tag{B.2}
\]

Note that if all households respect the incentive constraint (B.1) and thus all banks monitor, a single (price-taking) household has no incentive to deviate. With banks monitoring, the promised return \( R_D \) on risky deposits accounts for a default probability of \( 1 - \pi \) compared to the safe return \( R_F \) from an investment in bonds. For \( R_D = R_F / \pi \) (> \( R_F \)), households are indifferent between investing in monitored bank deposits or bonds. Violating the incentive constraint by investing a larger amount in deposits would imply non-monitoring by banks, in which case the given return \( R_F / \pi \) on deposits would be insufficient to compensate for the higher risk of default. Hence, such a deviation is incompatible with optimal household behavior.

In the following proposition, we characterize the all-monitor equilibrium of the LF economy with symmetric information. The equilibrium values for \( R_F \) and \( K_B \) are denoted by \( R_{SB}^* \) and \( K_{SB}^* \).

Proposition B.1 (Equilibrium in the LF economy with symmetric information)

There is a competitive equilibrium in which all banks monitor. If bank equity is scarce, i.e., for

\[
E < E_{SB}^* := \frac{1 - (g^{-1}πR_B)}{ΔR_B(\ln \bar{b} - \ln \underline{b})}(\bar{b} - \underline{b}), \tag{B.3}
\]

the constraint in the maximization problem in (B.2) is binding. Then, the equilibrium...
return \( R_F^{SB} \) is given by the solution to

\[
R_F = g \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Delta}{\pi} e R_F \left[ \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta} \right) - \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta} \right) \right] \right\} \tag{B.4}
\]

and satisfies \( R_F^{SB} < \pi R_B \). It follows that there is underinvestment in the bank-dependent sector, i.e., \( K_B^{SB} < K_B^{FB} \).

The proof is below. The proposition states that since households make sure that banks have enough skin in the game to opt for monitoring, scarce bank equity may imply that households constrain the amount of deposits they provide. As a consequence, the equilibrium spread between the return on investment in BS and FS firms is positive: \( \pi R_B > R_F^{SB} \). It follows that, compared to the first-best, aggregate bank lending in the second-best LF economy is inefficiently low. If banks hold enough equity such that Condition (B.3) does not hold, the constraint in (B.2) is non-binding and the all-monitor equilibrium of the second-best LF economy coincides with the first-best.

Finally, making the analogous argument as in the LF economy with asymmetric information (cf. Subsection 3.3), one can show that there can be no other equilibria that involve bank monitoring besides the all-monitor equilibrium established above. Also the caveats that apply are the same as in the asymmetric information case (cf. footnote 11).

**Proof of Proposition B.1.** Let \( R_F - \pi R_B + \pi b/\Delta > 0 \), otherwise the constraint in (B.2) never binds. Then, we obtain

\[
k_b \leq \frac{e R_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}} \tag{B.5}
\]

Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2(i), we focus on equilibria where positive amounts of capital are deployed to the BS and thus let \( \pi R_B \geq R_F \). We distinguish two cases: (i) \( R_F = \pi R_B \), and (ii) \( R_F < \pi R_B \).

**Case (i).** Assume that \( R_F = \pi R_B \). Then, Condition (B.5) is given by

\[
k_b \leq \frac{\Delta e R_F}{\pi b} \tag{B.6}
\]

With \( K_B = \int_{b_0}^{b_5} k_b db \), for the aggregate economy we obtain

\[
K_B \leq \frac{\Delta}{\pi} e R_F \int_{b_0}^{b_5} \frac{1}{b} db = \frac{\Delta}{\pi} e R_F (\ln b_5 - \ln b_0). \tag{B.7}
\]

Hence, an equilibrium with \( R_F = \pi R_B \) is consistent with Condition (B.5) if and only if

\[
e \geq \frac{K_B}{\Delta R_B (\ln b_5 - \ln b_0)}.
\]
Knowing that $K_B = 1 - K_F$, $K_F = (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B)$ and $E = (\bar{b} - \underline{b})e$, we can restate this condition in exogenous variables only:

$$E \geq \frac{1 - (g')^{-1}(\pi R_B)}{\Delta R_B(\ln \bar{b} - \ln \underline{b})}(\underline{b} - \bar{b})\tag{B.8}$$

If Condition $\text{(B.8)}$ holds, the incentive constraint $\text{(B.5)}$ is non-binding at $R_F = \pi R_B$. Hence, in this case, $R_F = \pi R_B$ constitutes the equilibrium value of $R_F$.

Case (ii). Assume that $R_F < \pi R_B$. Then, as much capital as possible flows into the BS sector, that is, Condition $\text{(B.5)}$ binds:

$$k_b = \frac{eR_F}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \underline{b}}{\Delta}}\tag{B.9}$$

In aggregate, this implies

$$K_B = eR_F \int_\underline{b}^\bar{b} \frac{1}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta}} db = \frac{\Delta}{\pi} eR_F \left[ \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta} \right) - \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \underline{b}}{\Delta} \right) \right] .\tag{B.10}$$

Using $K_B = 1 - K_F$ and $g'(K_F) = R_F$, this yields

$$R_F = g' \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Delta}{\pi} eR_F \left[ \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta} \right) - \ln \left( R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi \underline{b}}{\Delta} \right) \right] \right\} .\tag{B.11}$$

As the l.h.s. is linearly increasing in $R_F$ and one can show that the r.h.s. is monotonically decreasing, there is a value of $R_F$ that solves this equation (see the Auxiliary Lemma $\text{B.1}$ below). For $\pi R_B > R_F$, the l.h.s. evaluated at $R_F = \pi R_B$ has to be already greater than the r.h.s. evaluated at $R_F = \pi R_B$. Hence,

$$\pi R_B > g' \left\{ 1 - \Delta eR_B \left[ \ln \left( \frac{\pi \bar{b}}{\Delta} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\pi \underline{b}}{\Delta} \right) \right] \right\} = g' \left\{ 1 - \Delta eR_B \left[ \ln \bar{b} - \ln \underline{b} \right] \right\} .\tag{B.12}$$

Solving for $e$ and using $E = (\bar{b} - \underline{b})e$ yields Condition $\text{(B.3)}$. If this condition holds, there is a value of $R_F (\sim \pi R_B)$ that solves Equation $\text{(B.11)}$ and hence constitutes the equilibrium value of $R_F$.

**Auxiliary Lemma B.1**

*There is a unique value of $R_F$ that solves Equation $\text{(B.11)}$ and satisfies $R_F > \pi R_B - (\pi b/\Delta)$.*

**Proof.** We prove Auxiliary Lemma $\text{B.1}$ by using the Intermediate Value Theorem. The l.h.s. of Equation $\text{(B.11)}$ is linearly increasing in $R_F$. Next, we show that the r.h.s. of
Equation (B.11) is decreasing in $R_F$. Let
\[
h(R_F) \equiv R_F \ln \left( \frac{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}}{R_F - \pi R_B + \frac{\pi b}{\Delta}} \right).
\]

Then, since $g''(\cdot) < 0$, the r.h.s. of Equation (B.11) is decreasing in $R_F$ if and only if $h(R_F)$ is decreasing in $R_F$. This is the case, iff
\[
\ln \left( \frac{\bar{x}}{\bar{x}} \right) + R_F \frac{\bar{x}}{\bar{x}} \left( \frac{1}{\bar{x}} - \frac{\bar{x}}{\bar{x}} \right) \leq 0,
\]
with $\bar{x} := R_F - \pi R_B + \pi b / \Delta$ and $\bar{x} := R_F - \pi R_B + \pi b / \Delta$. We know that $\bar{x} > \bar{x} > 0$. Under Assumption 1, Equation (B.9) implies $k_b \geq e$, from which in turn follows that $R_F / \bar{x} \geq 1$. Hence, for Condition (B.13) to hold, it is sufficient that
\[
\ln \left( \frac{\bar{x}}{\bar{x}} \right) - \frac{\bar{x} - \bar{x}}{\bar{x}} \leq 0.
\]

For $\bar{x} \to \bar{x}$, both terms on the l.h.s. of Inequality (B.14) approach zero. For all $\bar{x} > \bar{x}$, the second term “increases faster” than the first term:
\[
\frac{\partial \ln(\bar{x}/\bar{x})}{\partial \bar{x}} = \frac{1}{\bar{x}} < \frac{1}{\bar{x}} = \frac{\partial(\bar{x} - \bar{x})}{\partial \bar{x}}.
\]

Hence, Inequality (B.14) holds.

Finally, note that since $g'(0) = \infty$, the r.h.s. of Equation (B.11) goes to infinity if we approach the $R_F$ that solves $(\Delta / \pi)eR_F \ln(\bar{x}/\bar{x}) = 1$ from above. This $R_F$ is greater than $\pi R_B - (\pi b / \Delta)$, as for $R_F \to \pi R_B - (\pi b / \Delta)$ from above we would have $\ln(\bar{x}/\bar{x}) \to \infty$. Hence, an $R_F (\pi R_B - (\pi b / \Delta))$ that solves Equation (B.11) exists.

**B.2 MC economy without a leverage constraint**

In this Appendix we analyze an MC economy without a regulatory leverage constraint. For simplicity, assume that $b$ is such that all banks shirk in the absence of such a constraint.

Let us first briefly consider the hypothetical case where banks would not care about default against the CB. Then, $R_D < R_L + \bar{b}(p_C/p_I)/(\pi - \Delta)$ could not be an equilibrium, since Bank $\bar{b}$ would want to lend an infinite amount. Furthermore, $R_D > R_L + \bar{b}(p_C/p_I)/(\pi - \Delta)$ could not be an equilibrium either, since then aggregate bank lending would be zero. Hence, equilibrium would require $R_D = R_L + \bar{b}(p_C/p_I)/(\pi - \Delta)$, which, by using Equations (16) and (19), we can also write as $R_F = (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b}$. It follows that Bank $\bar{b}$ would lend some positive amount and all other banks lend zero since $R_F (\pi - \Delta) R_B + b$ for all $b < \bar{b}$.
In our model, lending is constrained even without a regulatory leverage constraint, because we assume that banks avoid default against the CB (cf. Assumption 3). Then, for \( R_L < R_D \), Assumption 3 implies Condition (11), which in turn puts the following lending constraint on banks:

\[
l_b \leq \frac{R_D e p_I}{R_D - R_L}.
\]

Using Condition (16), with \( q = \pi - \Delta \), and Equation (19), yields

\[
\frac{l_b}{p_I} \leq \frac{e R_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta) R_B},
\]

for \( R_F > (\pi - \Delta) R_B \). We distinguish three cases: (i) \( R_F = (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b} \), (ii) \( (\pi - \Delta) R_B + b \leq R_F < (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b} \), and (iii) \( R_F < (\pi - \Delta) R_B + b \).

In Case (i), Condition (B.17) yields

\[
k_b \leq \frac{e R_F}{\bar{b}} \quad \text{for } b = \bar{b},
\]

\[
k_b = 0 \quad \text{for } b < \bar{b}.
\]

As we can see, only Bank \( \bar{b} \) is indifferent with respect to its amount of lending, while all other banks are better off simply investing their equity in the FS.

In Case (ii),

\[
k_b = \frac{e R_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta) R_B} \quad \text{for } b = \bar{b},
\]

\[
k_b \leq \frac{e R_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta) R_B} \quad \text{for } b < \bar{b}.
\]

In Case (iii),

\[
k_b = \frac{e R_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta) R_B} \quad \text{for all } b.
\]

In Case (i), we obtain \( k_{\bar{b}} = K_B \). Knowing that \( K_B = 1 - (g')^{-1}(R_F) \), it is then easy to show that \( R_F = (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b} \), if

\[
e \geq \bar{b} \left[ 1 - (g')^{-1} \left( (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b} \right) \right] / (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b}.
\]

---

33 The absence of a leverage constraint is incompatible with an equilibrium that entails \( R_L \geq R_D \), as, in this case, banks’ credit supply would be infinite.

34 Assumption 2 still implies that \( K_B \) exceeds \( E \). To see this, note that Assumption 2 can be rewritten as \( 1 - E > (g')^{-1} \left( (\pi - \Delta) R_B \right) \). Furthermore, \( R_F = (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b} \) implies \( K_F = (g')^{-1} \left( (\pi - \Delta) R_B + \bar{b} \right) \), which under Assumption 2 falls short of \( 1 - E \) since \( (g')^{-1} \) is a decreasing function. From \( K_F < 1 - E \) immediately follows \( K_B > E \).
An assessment of Case (ii) is not easily possible. Hence, if equity \( e \) is in between the r.h.s of Inequality \((B.23)\) and the r.h.s of Inequality \((B.21)\), we cannot readily characterize the exact equilibrium value of \( R_F \).

From Case (iii), it is easy to show that \( R_F \) is implicitly determined by

\[
R_F = g' \left( 1 - \frac{e(b - b)R_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta)R_B} \right), \tag{B.22}
\]

if

\[
e < b \left[ 1 - (g')^{-1} \left\{ (\pi - \Delta)R_B + b \right\} \right]/(\bar{b} - b) \left[ (\pi - \Delta)R_B + b \right]. \tag{B.23}
\]

If Condition \((B.23)\) holds, there is a unique value of \( R_F \) \((< (\pi - \Delta)R_B + b)\) that solves Equation \((B.22)\) and hence constitutes the equilibrium value of \( R_F \) (see the Auxiliary Lemma \(B.2\) below).

**Auxiliary Lemma B.2**

*There is a unique value of \( R_F \) that solves Equation \((B.22)\) and satisfies \( R_F > (\pi - \Delta)R_B \).*

**Proof.** We prove Auxiliary Lemma \(B.2\) by using the Intermediate Value Theorem. The l.h.s. of Equation \((B.22)\) is linearly increasing in \( R_F \). Next, we show that the r.h.s. of Equation \((B.22)\) is decreasing in \( R_F \). Let

\[
l(R_F) = \frac{ER_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta)R_B}. \tag{B.24}
\]

Then, since \( g''(\cdot) < 0 \), the r.h.s. of Equation \((B.22)\) is decreasing in \( R_F \) if and only if \( l(R_F) \) is decreasing in \( R_F \). This is the case, iff

\[
\frac{E}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta)R_B} \left[ 1 - \frac{R_F}{R_F - (\pi - \Delta)R_B} \right] \leq 0. \tag{B.25}
\]

We know that \( R_F - (\pi - \Delta)R_B > 0 \). Since in Case (iii) it is \( K_B \geq E \), from the aggregate version of Equation \((B.20)\) we also get \( R_F / (R_F - (\pi - \Delta)R_B) \geq 1 \). Hence, Inequality \((B.25)\) holds.

Finally, note that the r.h.s. of Equation \((B.22)\) goes to infinity for \( R_F \) to \([(\pi - \Delta)R_B]/(1 - E) \geq (\pi - \Delta)R_B \) from above. Hence, an \( R_F \) \((> (\pi - \Delta)R_B)\) that solves Equation \((B.22)\) exists.

**B.3 The global output function \( Y^g \)**

In this Appendix, we take a closer look at global aggregate output \( Y^g \) as a function of \( \alpha \). As we explain below, this involves case distinctions as performed in Subsection \(B.3.1\), In Subsection \(B.3.2\) we follow up by deriving a set of conditions that establishes \( \alpha^* \) as the
globally optimal leverage constraint. We thereby provide a proof for Proposition 5 in the text. To start with, there are three important remarks to make.

**Remark 1.** The first remark is that explicitly determining $Y^g$ requires case distinctions. The reason is threefold: (i) since $p_I/p_C$ according to Equation (30) exists only for $\alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}$, existence of $\alpha_s$ and $\alpha_\mu$ is not guaranteed; if they do exist, then (ii) it matters whether $\alpha_s < \alpha_\mu$ or $\alpha_s > \alpha_\mu$; and (iii) it matters whether $\alpha_\Delta \leq \alpha_s$ or $\alpha_\Delta > \alpha_s$.

The reason why (ii) is relevant is that out of $\alpha_s$ and $\alpha_\mu$, only $\min\{\alpha_s, \alpha_\mu\}$ is “operative” with regard to the global output function $Y^g$. What we mean by “operative” is the following. For $\alpha > \alpha_s$, global output $Y^g$ is not given by $Y_\mu$ and, hence, if $\alpha_\mu > \alpha_s$, then $\alpha_\mu$ is irrelevant (i.e., “not operative”) with regard to $Y^g$. For $\alpha > \alpha_\mu$, banks may decide not to leverage up as much as possible (see Remark 2) and, hence, if $\alpha_s > \alpha_\mu$, then $\alpha_s$ no longer is the value for $\alpha$ at which the last bank stops monitoring (i.e., $\alpha_s$ is “not operative”).

If $\alpha_\mu$ is not operative, then (iii) matters as well. If $\alpha_\Delta \geq \alpha_s$, then $\alpha_\Delta$ is operative and global output $Y^g$ is given by $Y_\Delta$ for $\alpha_s \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_\Delta$. If $\alpha_\Delta < \alpha_s$, then $\alpha_\Delta$ is not operative, since $Y^g$ is not given by $Y_\Delta$ for $\alpha < \alpha_s$.

**Remark 2.** The second remark is that we do not know exactly how $Y^g$ behaves for regulatory leverage constraints that would imply $R_L < R_D$ if banks leveraged up as much as possible. Assume that $\alpha_\mu$ exists and is operative. Then, we obtain $R_L < R_D$ for bank leverage ratios beyond $\alpha_\mu$. Hence, we do not know exactly how $Y^g$ behaves for $\alpha > \alpha_\mu$. Some banks may stop leveraging up as much as possible if the regulator sets a leverage constraint looser than $\alpha_\mu$. Since non-monitoring banks enjoy private benefits that scale with lending, they may want to continue to lend as much as possible even for $R_L < R_D$. But even they may eventually lose their incentive to lend as the spread $R_D - R_L$ becomes large. Furthermore, the constraint that banks have to be able to repay the CB applies (cf. Assumption 3).

While do not know exactly how $Y^g$ behaves for $\alpha > \alpha_\mu$, we can still say one important thing in this regard. With $\alpha_\mu$ being operative, capital is already allocated efficiently at $\alpha = \alpha_\mu$ and increasing $\alpha$ beyond $\alpha_\mu$ may result in an overallocation of capital to the BS. Hence, it certainly holds that $Y^g$ is non-increasing for all $\alpha > \alpha_\mu$. Of course this also implies that when $\alpha_\mu$ exists and is operative, the $\alpha$ that globally maximizes $Y^g$ cannot exceed $\alpha_\mu$.

Next, consider a scenario where $\alpha_\mu$ does not exist or is not operative. Then, if $\alpha_\Delta$ is operative, we obtain $R_L < R_D$ for bank leverage ratios beyond $\alpha_\Delta$ and, hence, cannot exactly tell how $Y^g$ behaves for $\alpha > \alpha_\Delta$. Still, by the same argument as above, we certainly know that $Y^g$ is non-increasing for all $\alpha > \alpha_\Delta$. If $\alpha_\Delta$ is not operative, we cannot exactly specify $Y^g$ for $\alpha > \alpha_s$, but again we can be certain that $Y^g$ is non-increasing for all $\alpha > \alpha_s$ (if $\alpha_s$ exists).
Case 2(a) and 3(a) are similar to the ones above. The only difference is that for Case 2(b) we have
\[ \alpha > \alpha \]
and for Case 3(b) we have \[ \alpha < \alpha \] at some point. The reason is that \[ \alpha \]
behaves, we do know that \[ \alpha \]
exists, Lemma 3 translates to \[ \alpha^* < \alpha \]. Furthermore, we then know that \[ \alpha^* \leq \alpha \], since \[ R_F \] is increasing in \[ \alpha \] and \[ m \] is increasing in \[ \alpha \]. If \[ \alpha^* \] exists, we can also note that \[ Y_\pi > Y_\Delta \] for any given \[ \alpha < \alpha^* \], \[ Y_\mu < Y_\Delta \] for any given \[ \alpha > \alpha^* \], and \[ Y_\mu = Y_\Delta \] at \[ \alpha = \alpha^* \]. The reason is that \[ m > \pi - \Delta \] for \[ \alpha < \alpha^* \], \[ m < \pi - \Delta \] for \[ \alpha > \alpha^* \], and \[ m = \pi - \Delta \] at \[ \alpha = \alpha^* \]. Similarly, note that \[ Y_\pi \] is concave and is maximum at \[ \alpha = \alpha^* \]. As \[ m = \pi \] at \[ \alpha = \alpha_m \], it is also \[ Y_\mu = Y_\pi \] at \[ \alpha = \alpha_m \].

### B.3.1 Case distinction

As made clear by Remark 1 above, an explicit characterization of \( Y^g \) requires case distinctions. Table B.1 summarizes the eight different cases we have to account for. Let us go through these cases one by one. Figure B.2 summarizes the results.

**Cases 1(a) and 1(b).** Both cases entail that \( \alpha_s \) and \( \alpha_\mu \) exist, with \( \alpha_s < \alpha_\mu \). As \( \alpha_\mu \) is not operative, \( Y^g = Y_\mu \) for \( \alpha_m < \alpha < \alpha_s \). Case 1(a) additionally assumes \( \alpha_\Delta \geq \alpha_s \), which implies that \( Y^g = Y_\Delta \) for \( \alpha_s \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_\Delta \). From Remark 2, it immediately follows that while for leverage ratios beyond \( \alpha_\Delta \), it is not readily possible to say how exactly \( Y^g \) behaves, we do know that \( Y^g \) is non-increasing for all \( \alpha > \alpha_\Delta \). Case 1(b) assumes \( \alpha_\Delta < \alpha_s \). Again, Remark 2 implies that we cannot readily tell how exactly \( Y^g \) behaves for \( \alpha > \alpha_s \), but we do know that \( Y^g \) is non-increasing for all \( \alpha > \alpha_s \).

**Cases 2(a) and 2(b).** These two cases are similar to the ones above. The only difference is that instead of assuming \( \alpha_\mu \) to exist but not be operative, we now look at the case where \( \alpha_\mu \) does not exist at all. The consequences with regard to the pattern of \( Y^g \) are the same.

**Cases 3(a) and 3(b).** Next, assume that neither \( \alpha_s \) nor \( \alpha_\mu \) exists. It follows that \( Y^g = Y_\mu \) for \( \alpha_m < \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \). Interestingly, \( Y^g \) is discontinuous at \( \alpha = \bar{\alpha} \) and suddenly drops from \( Y_\mu \) to \( Y_\Delta \). \(^{35}\)

\[^{35}\text{We know that } Y^g \text{ drops down (and does not jump up) from } Y_\mu \text{ to } Y_\Delta \text{ at } \alpha = \bar{\alpha}. \text{ The reason is that since } \mu > \pi - \Delta \text{ for all } \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}, \text{ it is also } Y_\mu > Y_\Delta \text{ for any given } \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}.\]

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Case 1(a)</th>
<th>Case 2(a)</th>
<th>Case 3(a)</th>
<th>Case 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_s, \alpha_\mu ) exist</td>
<td>( \alpha_s ) exists, ( \alpha_\mu ) do not exist</td>
<td>( \alpha_s ) exists, ( \alpha_\mu ) do not exist</td>
<td>( \alpha_s ) exists, ( \alpha_\mu ) do not exist</td>
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<tr>
<td>( \alpha_s &lt; \alpha_\mu )</td>
<td>( \alpha_\Delta \geq \alpha_s )</td>
<td>( \alpha_\Delta &gt; \bar{\alpha} )</td>
<td>( \alpha_s \geq \alpha_\mu )</td>
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<td>( \alpha_\Delta \geq \alpha_s )</td>
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<td>( \alpha_\Delta \geq \bar{\alpha} )</td>
<td>( \alpha_s \geq \alpha_\mu )</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table B.1: Case distinction with regard to the global output function \( Y^g \)
Figure B.1: Discontinuities in the equilibrium price ratio in Cases 3(a) and 3(b)

To show this, Figures B.1 (i)–(ii) illustrate the determination of the equilibrium price ratio $p_I/p_C$, which is implicitly given by $R_F = q(p_I/p_C)R_{CB}$. With $q = \mu$, this yields Equation (27). For $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$, there is an equilibrium price ratio $p_I/p_C$ that solves Equation (27) and implies $\pi - \Delta < \mu < \pi$. In Figure B.1 (i), this is illustrated by the fact that the blue curve touches the green line within the triangle area spanned by “rhs_m” and “rhs_s”. In contrast, in Figure B.1 (ii) where $\alpha$ just marginally exceeds $\bar{\alpha}$ (all else being equal), such an equilibrium price ratio does not exist, i.e., the blue curve does not touch the green line any more. Instead, for the r.h.s. of $R_F = q(p_I/p_C)R_{CB}$ to equal the l.h.s., $p_I/p_C$ now has to increase beyond the value for which $q$ is capped at $\pi - \Delta$. Then, $p_I/p_C$ solves $R_F = (\pi - \Delta)(p_I/p_C)R_{CB}$. It follows that the equilibrium price ratio is discontinuous in $\alpha$ at $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$.

As we can see from Figure 3 (i)–(ii) in the text, this discontinuity in the equilibrium price ratio translates into a sudden drop in the output function $Y_g$ at $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}$. In Case 3 (a), which assumes $\alpha_{\Delta} > \bar{\alpha}$, we obtain $Y^g = Y_{\Delta}$ for $\bar{\alpha} < \alpha \leq \alpha_{\Delta}$. Case 3 (b) assumes $\alpha_{\Delta} \leq \bar{\alpha}$, so following Remark 2, we cannot readily tell how exactly $Y^g$ behaves for $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}$, but, we do know that $Y^g$ is non-increasing for all $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}$.

Cases 4 and 5. In Case 4, both $\alpha_s$ and $\alpha_{\mu}$ exist, with $\alpha_s \geq \alpha_{\mu}$. It follows that $\alpha_{\mu}$ is operative. Then, Remark 2 tells that although we do not know exactly how $Y^g$ behaves for $\alpha > \alpha_{\mu}$, we certainly know that $Y^g$ is non-increasing for $\alpha > \alpha_{\mu}$. Case 5 is similar to Case 4. The only difference is that instead of assuming that $\alpha_s$ exists with $\alpha_s \geq \alpha_{\mu}$, we
Figure B.2: Case distinctions with regard to the global output function $Y^g$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases 1(a) and 2(a):</th>
<th>Cases 1(b) and 2(b):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| $Y^g = \begin{cases} 
Y_\pi & \text{for } 1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m \\
Y_\mu & \text{for } \alpha_m < \alpha < \alpha_s \\
Y_\Delta & \text{for } \alpha_s \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_\Delta \\
\downarrow & \text{for } \alpha > \alpha_\Delta 
\end{cases}$ | $Y^g = \begin{cases} 
Y_\pi & \text{for } 1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m \\
Y_\mu & \text{for } \alpha_m < \alpha \leq \alpha_s \\
\downarrow & \text{for } \alpha > \alpha_s 
\end{cases}$ |

Case 3(a):

$Y^g = \begin{cases} 
Y_\pi & \text{for } 1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m \\
Y_\mu & \text{for } \alpha_m < \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \\
Y_\Delta & \text{for } \bar{\alpha} < \alpha \leq \alpha_\Delta \\
\downarrow & \text{for } \alpha > \bar{\alpha} 
\end{cases}$

Case 3(b):

$Y^g = \begin{cases} 
Y_\pi & \text{for } 1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m \\
Y_\mu & \text{for } \alpha_m < \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \\
\downarrow & \text{for } \alpha > \bar{\alpha} 
\end{cases}$

Cases 4 and 5:

$Y^g = \begin{cases} 
Y_\pi & \text{for } 1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m \\
Y_\mu & \text{for } \alpha_m < \alpha \leq \alpha_\mu \\
\downarrow & \text{for } \alpha > \alpha_\mu 
\end{cases}$

Note: “\downarrow” indicates that $Y^g$ is non-increasing in the respective range of $\alpha$.

assume that $\alpha_s$ does not exist at all. The consequences with regard to the pattern of $Y^g$ are the same.

**B.3.2 Establishing $\alpha^*$ as the globally optimal leverage constraint**

We next provide a proof for Proposition 5 by deriving a set of conditions that establishes $\alpha^*$ (i.e., the $\alpha$ that maximizes $Y_\mu$) as the globally optimal leverage constraint. To do this, we first have to ascertain that $\alpha^*$ belongs to an interval for $\alpha$ where the global output function $Y^g$ and $Y_\mu$ coincide, i.e., we have to ascertain that $\alpha^*$ implies $\mu < \pi$ and $\mu > \pi - \Delta$. If $\alpha_s$ exists and is operative, these two conditions translate to (i) $\alpha^* > \alpha_m$ and (ii) $\alpha^* < \alpha_s$. Since $Y_\mu$ is strictly concave (cf. Proposition 4), these conditions further translate to

\[ (i) \quad \frac{\partial Y_\mu}{\partial \alpha} \Big|_{\alpha=\alpha_m} > 0, \quad (ii) \quad \begin{cases} 
\frac{\partial Y_\mu}{\partial \alpha} \Big|_{\alpha=\alpha_s} < 0 & \text{if } \alpha_s \text{ exists,} \\
\frac{\partial Y_\mu}{\partial \alpha} \Big|_{\alpha=\alpha(-)} < 0 & \text{otherwise.} 
\end{cases} \quad (B.26) \]

Second, we have to make sure that $\alpha^*$ maximizes $Y^g$. This requires

\[ (i) \quad \max_{1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m} Y_\pi < Y_\mu(\alpha^*), \quad (ii) \quad \begin{cases} 
\max_{\alpha \geq \alpha_s} Y_\Delta < Y_\mu(\alpha^*) & \text{if } \alpha_s \text{ exists,} \\
\max_{\alpha \geq \alpha} Y_\Delta < Y_\mu(\alpha^*) & \text{otherwise.} 
\end{cases} \quad (B.27) \]

36 If $\alpha_s$ exists but is not operative (Case 4), or if $\alpha_s$ does not exist but $\alpha_\mu$ exists and thus $\bar{\alpha}$ is not operative (Case 5), then, as explained later in this section, Conditions (B.26)(ii) and (B.27)(ii) always hold anyway.
Condition (B.26)\(^{(i)}\) is necessary and sufficient for \(\alpha^* > \alpha_m\) in all eight cases discussed above. At the same time, Condition (B.26)\(^{(i)}\) already implies that Condition (B.27)\(^{(i)}\) holds. The reason is that for \(\partial Y_\mu / \partial \alpha|_{\alpha = \alpha_m} > 0\), the amount of capital provided to the BS is inefficiently low at \(\alpha = \alpha_m\) and thus \(\max_{1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_m} Y_\pi = Y_\pi(\alpha_m) (= Y_\mu(\alpha_m))\).

We next evaluate Conditions (B.26)\(^{(ii)}\) and (B.27)\(^{(ii)}\) case by case and thereby show that we can actually come up with a single condition which, together with Condition (B.26)\(^{(i)}\), is necessary and sufficient to establish \(\alpha^*\) as the globally optimal leverage constraint in all eight cases. This condition is:

\[
Y_\Delta(\alpha^*_\Delta) < Y_\mu(\alpha^*).
\]  

(B.28)

Cases 1(a) and 2(a). We start with two cases where \(\alpha_s\) exists and is operative. As also \(\alpha_\Delta\) is operative, Conditions (B.26)\(^{(ii)}\) and (B.27)\(^{(ii)}\) are needed to establish \(\alpha^*\) as the globally optimal leverage constraint. Since \(\max_{\alpha \geq \alpha_s} Y_\Delta = Y_\Delta(\alpha_\Delta)\), Condition (B.27)\(^{(i)}\) comes down to Condition (B.28).

Furthermore, we can show that Condition (B.28) in fact already implies Condition (B.26)\(^{(ii)}\). We use a proof by contradiction. Assume \(\partial Y_\mu / \partial \alpha|_{\alpha = \alpha_s} \geq 0\). We know that \(Y_\Delta > Y_\mu\) for any given \(\alpha > \alpha_s\). As concavity of \(Y_\mu\) with respect to \(\alpha\) and \(\partial Y_\mu / \partial \alpha|_{\alpha = \alpha_s} \geq 0\) jointly imply \(\alpha^* \geq \alpha_s\), we obtain \(Y_\Delta(\alpha^*) \geq Y_\mu(\alpha^*)\). Since \(Y_\Delta\) is maximum at \(\alpha = \alpha_\Delta\), it follows that \(Y_\Delta(\Delta) \geq Y_\mu(\alpha^*)\), which contradicts Condition (B.28).

Cases 1(b) and 2(b). Again, \(\alpha_s\) exists and is operative. As \(\alpha_\Delta < \alpha_s\), i.e., \(\alpha_\Delta\) is not operative, it holds that \(\partial Y_\Delta / \partial \alpha < 0\) for any \(\alpha \geq \alpha_s\) and we obtain \(\max_{\alpha \geq \alpha_s} Y_\Delta = Y_\Delta(\alpha_s)\). It follows that Condition (B.27)\(^{(ii)}\) always holds. This is because it simplifies to \(Y_\Delta(\alpha_s) < Y_\mu(\alpha^*)\), and we know that \(Y_\Delta(\alpha_s) = Y_\mu(\alpha_s)\) and that \(\alpha^*\) maximizes \(Y_\mu\). Condition (B.26)\(^{(ii)}\) always holds as well. The reason is that as \(Y_\mu > Y_\Delta\) for any given \(\alpha < \alpha_s\) and \(Y_\mu < Y_\Delta\) for any given \(\alpha > \alpha_s\), \(Y_\mu\) crosses \(Y_\Delta\) from above at \(\alpha = \alpha_s\), which, as \(\partial Y_\Delta / \partial \alpha|_{\alpha = \alpha_s} < 0\), implies \(\partial Y_\mu / \partial \alpha|_{\alpha = \alpha_s} < 0\).

Hence, in Cases 1(b) and 2(b), Condition (B.26)\(^{(i)}\) alone is necessary and sufficient to establish \(\alpha^*\) as the globally optimal leverage constraint. We can still impose Condition (B.28), as it is simply without effect, i.e., it always holds anyway. This is because \(Y_\mu > Y_\Delta\) for any given \(\alpha < \alpha_s\), and we know that \(\alpha^*\) maximizes \(Y_\mu\) as well as that, in Cases 1(b) and 2(b), it holds that \(\alpha_\Delta < \alpha_s\).

Cases 3(a) and 3(b). Now, \(\alpha_\mu\) and \(\alpha_s\) do not exist. Since \(\alpha^* < \bar{\alpha}\) and \(Y_\mu\) is concave, Condition (B.26)\(^{(ii)}\) always holds. In Case 3(a) \(\alpha_\Delta\) is operative, i.e., \(\alpha_\Delta > \bar{\alpha}\). Then, \(\max_{\alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}} Y_\Delta = Y_\Delta(\alpha_\Delta)\) and thus Condition (B.27)\(^{(ii)}\) comes down to Condition (B.28).

In Case 3(b), \(\alpha_\Delta\) is not operative. Hence, \(\partial Y_\Delta / \partial \alpha < 0\) for all \(\alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}\) and we obtain \(\max_{\alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}} Y_\Delta = Y_\Delta(\bar{\alpha})\). Condition (B.27)\(^{(ii)}\) then simplifies to \(Y_\Delta(\bar{\alpha}) < Y_\mu(\alpha^*)\), which always holds since we know that \(Y_\Delta(\bar{\alpha}) \leq Y_\mu(\bar{\alpha})\) and that \(\alpha^* < \bar{\alpha}\) maximizes \(Y_\mu\). We can still impose Condition (B.28), as it is without effect, i.e., it always holds anyway.

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This is because $Y_\mu > Y_\Delta$ for any given $\alpha < \bar{\alpha}$, and we know that $\alpha_\Delta < \bar{\alpha}$ and that $\alpha^*$ maximizes $Y_\mu$.

**Cases 4 and 5.** Remember that $Y_\mu$ is strictly concave, with its maximum at $\alpha = \alpha^*$, and that Lemma 3 implies $\alpha^* < \alpha_\mu$. Then, if $\alpha_\mu \leq \alpha_s$ as in Case 4, i.e. $\alpha_\mu$ is operative, Condition (B.26)(ii) always holds. In Case 5, where $\alpha_s$ does not exist, Condition (B.26)(ii) always holds as well, since the existence of $\alpha_\mu$ implies $\alpha_\mu \leq \bar{\alpha}$. Condition (B.27)(ii) always holds in both cases, since we know that $\alpha_\Delta \leq \alpha_\mu$ and thus $\max_{\alpha \geq \alpha_s} Y_\Delta = Y_\Delta(\alpha_s)$ in Case 4, and $\max_{\alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}} Y_\Delta = Y_\Delta(\bar{\alpha})$ in Case 5. Note that the fact that there can be no $\alpha > \alpha^*$ that globally maximizes output also immediately follows from Remark 2 above, which says that if $\alpha_\mu$ is operative, $Y^g$ is non-increasing for all $\alpha > \alpha_\mu$.

So while in both cases, Condition (B.26)(i) alone is necessary and sufficient to establish $\alpha^*$ as the globally optimal leverage constraint, we can still impose Condition (B.28), as it is without effect, i.e., it always holds anyway. This is because we know that $\alpha_\Delta \leq \alpha_\mu$, that $\alpha^*$ maximizes $Y_\mu$, and that in Cases 4 and 5 it is $Y_\Delta < Y_\mu$ for any given $\alpha \leq \alpha_\mu$. 

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