Bank rescues and bailout expectations: the erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis : [version august 2013]

  • We show that market discipline, defined as the extent to which firm specific risk characteristics are reflected in market prices, eroded during the recent financial crisis in 2008. We design a novel test of changes in market discipline based on the relation between firm specific risk characteristics and debt-to-equity hedge ratios. We find that market discipline already weakened after the rescue of Bear Stearns before disappearing almost entirely after the failure of Lehman Brothers. The effect is stronger for investment banks and large financial institutions, while there is no comparable effect for non-financial firms.

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Metadaten
Author:Florian HettGND, Alexander Schmidt
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-331634
URL:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365686
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2365686
Parent Title (German):SAFE working paper series ; No. 36
Series (Serial Number):SAFE working paper series (36)
Publisher:SAFE
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2013
Year of first Publication:2013
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2014/02/28
Tag:Bailout; Implicit Guarantees; Market Discipline; Too-Big-To-Fail
Issue:version august 2013
Page Number:45
HeBIS-PPN:348861532
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universit├Ątspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht