Asymmetric social norms

  • Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.

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Metadaten
Author:Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-427221
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2897466
Parent Title (English):SAFE working paper series ; No. 162
Series (Serial Number):SAFE working paper (162)
Publisher:SAFE
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2017
Year of first Publication:2017
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2017/01/31
Tag:cooperation; repeated games; social dilemmas
Issue:January 10, 2017
Page Number:15
HeBIS-PPN:400130270
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
JEL-Classification:C Mathematical and Quantitative Methods / C6 Mathematical Methods and Programming
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht