Talent discovery, layoff risk and unemployment insurance

  • In talent-intensive jobs, workers’ quality is revealed by their performance. This enhances productivity and earnings, but also increases layoff risk. Firms cannot insure workers against this risk if they compete fiercely for talent. In this case, the more risk-averse workers will choose less quality-revealing jobs. This lowers expected productivity and salaries. Public unemployment insurance corrects this inefficiency, enhancing employment in talent-sensitive industries, consistently with international evidence. Unemployment insurance dominates legal restrictions on firms’ dismissals, which penalize more talent-sensitive firms and thus depress expected productivity. Finally, unemployment insurance fosters education, by encouraging investment in risky human capital that enhances talent discovery.

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Metadaten
Author:Marco Pagano, Luca Picariello
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-473902
URL:https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3274341
Parent Title (English):Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 603
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (603)
Publisher:Center for Financial Studies
Place of publication:Frankfurt, M.
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2018
Year of first Publication:2018
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2018/11/02
Tag:layoff risk; talent, learning; unemployment insurance
Issue:2 October 2018
Page Number:42
HeBIS-PPN:439736412
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht