The pitfalls of central clearing in the presence of systematic risk

  • Through the lens of market participants' objective to minimize counterparty risk, we provide an explanation for the reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding of the benefits and potential pitfalls with respect to a single market participant's counterparty risk exposure when moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three elements can render central clearing harmful for a market participant's counterparty risk exposure regardless of the number of its counterparties: 1) correlation across and within derivative classes (i.e., systematic risk), 2) collateralization of derivative claims, and 3) loss sharing among clearing members. Our results have substantial implications for the design of derivatives markets, and highlight that recent central clearing reforms might not incentivize market participants to clear derivatives.

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Author:Christian Kubitza, Loriana PelizzonORCiDGND, Mila Getmansky Sherman
Parent Title (English):SAFE working paper series ; No. 235
Series (Serial Number):SAFE working paper series (235)
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Year of Completion:2018
Year of first Publication:2018
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2018/11/22
Tag:Central Clearing; Collateral; Counterparty Risk; Derivatives; Loss Sharing; Margin; OTC markets; Systematic Risk
Issue:November 8, 2018
Page Number:73
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht