Open Access

Konrad Braun, Tobias Waldenmaier

• THIS STUDY DOCUMENTS THE ROLE OF BARGAINING POWER IN THE DETERMINATION OF MORTGAGE RATES BASED ON A UNIQUE ADMINISTRATIVE DATA SET COMPRISING 20,000 MORTGAGE LOAN CONTRACTS. WE USE VARIATION IN THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT TO IDENTIFY THE EXTENT TO WHICH DIFFERENTIAL PRICING IS DUE TO RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER. OUR IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY SEPARATES MARKET POWER FROM OTHER SOURCES OF PRICING DIFFERENTIALS, SUCH AS CREDIT RISK, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, OR OTHER COSTS. THE RESULTS INDICATE THAT BARGAINING POWER DETERMINES THE EXTENT OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION ON OBSERVABLE BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS. A REDUCTION IN LENDER BARGAINING POWER REDUCES THE DISADVANTAGE SUFFERED BY BORROWERS WHO REFINANCE THEIR LOAN AND REDUCES THE ADVANTAGE FOR THOSE WHO HAVE THEIR MAIN BANKING RELATIONSHIP AT ANOTHER BANK. SIMULTANEOUSLY, IT INCREASES THE ADVANTAGE FOR BORROWERS FALLING IN THE WEALTHY/HIGH-INCOME SEGMENT. FURTHER ANALYSES POINT TO SEARCH INCENTIVES AS AN IMPORTANT DRIVER OF THE DIRECTION OF THE EFFECT OF BARGAINING POWER.