Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

  • We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the low- incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production.

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Author:Kevin BauerORCiDGND, Michael Kosfeld, Ferdinand von Siemens
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-615464
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3890904
Parent Title (English):SAFE working paper ; No. 318
Series (Serial Number):SAFE working paper series (318)
Publisher:SAFE
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2021
Year of first Publication:2021
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2021/07/30
Issue:July 20, 2021
Page Number:38
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universit├Ątspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht