Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
Filtern
Dokumenttyp
- Bericht (3) (entfernen)
Sprache
- Englisch (3)
Volltext vorhanden
- ja (3)
Gehört zur Bibliographie
- nein (3)
Schlagworte
- Bank (1)
- Firmenkundengeschäft (1)
- Fremdkapital / Kredit / Bank / Finanzierung / Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung / Theorie (1)
- Hedging / Strategie / Volatilität / Stochastischer Prozess / Theorie (1)
- Internationaler Kreditmarkt (1)
- Pythagorean theorem (1)
- Stochastic volatility (1)
- Unternehmen (1)
- active management (1)
- incomplete markets (1)
Institut
135
Tractable hedging - an implementation of robust hedging strategies : [This Version: March 30, 2004]
(2004)
This paper provides a theoretical and numerical analysis of robust hedging strategies in diffusion–type models including stochastic volatility models. A robust hedging strategy avoids any losses as long as the realised volatility stays within a given interval. We focus on the effects of restricting the set of admissible strategies to tractable strategies which are defined as the sum over Gaussian strategies. Although a trivial Gaussian hedge is either not robust or prohibitively expensive, this is not the case for the cheapest tractable robust hedge which consists of two Gaussian hedges for one long and one short position in convex claims which have to be chosen optimally.
141 , vers
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank.
074
Structural positions are very common in investment practice. A structural position is defined as a permanent overweighting of a riskier asset class relative to a prespecified benchmark portfolio. The most prominent example for a structural position is the equity bias in a balanced fund that arises by consistently overweighting equities in tactical asset allocation. Another example is the permanent allocation of credit in a fixed income portfolio with a government benchmark. The analysis provided in this article shows that whenever possible, structural positions should be avoided. Graphical illustrations based on Pythagorean theorem are used to make a connection between the active risk/return and the total risk/return framework. Structural positions alter the risk profile of the portfolio substantially, and the appeal of active management – to provide active returns uncorrelated to benchmark returns and hence to shift the efficient frontier outwards – gets lost. The article demonstrates that the commonly used alpha – tracking error criterion is not sufficient for active management. In addition, structural positions complicate measuring managers’ skill. The paper also develops normative implications for active portfolio management. Tactical asset allocation should be based on the comparison of expected excess returns of an asset class to the equilibrium risk premium of the same asset class and not to expected excess returns of other asset classes. For the cases, where structural positions cannot be avoided, a risk budgeting approach is introduced and applied to determine the optimal position size. Finally, investors are advised not to base performance evaluation only on simple manager rankings because this encourages managers to take structural positions and does not reward efforts to produce alpha. The same holds true for comparing managers’ information ratios. Information ratios, in investment practice defined as the ratio of active return to active risk, do not uncover structural positions.