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- Bank Bailout (1)
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We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US gov- ernment to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP – the government’s ability to ap- point independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury – helped attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments – the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury led to improved bank performance, lower CEO pay, and higher stock market valuations.
We develop a simple theoretical model to motivate testable hypotheses about how peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms compete with banks for loans. The model predicts that (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (iii) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We confront these predictions with data on P2P lending and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates the P2P lenders are bottom fishing when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.
