Open Access

The expansion of actors and instruments in sovereign debt markets through bond financing generated a coordination problem among bondholders during the debt restructuring process. There is a risk that an individual bondholder will be passive or act against the restructuring slowing down or even precluding the process of restructuring even though it is in the general interest of bondholders as a group, not to mention the population of the country experiencing the shortage of funds for public welfare. In particular, the disruptions to sovereign debt restructuring by frivolous litigation is considered as one of the main threats. This dissertation is the first major study devoted to sovereign bonds structured through a trust arrangement and the promising features that such a legal structure possesses for an effective and efficient sovereign debt restructuring. It provides a comprehensive inquiry into the evolution of the mechanisms to coordinate creditors, with a focus on bondholders and institutional frameworks which facilitated this coordination. It examines intriguing primary sources from League of Nations archives and provides in-depth case studies on the functionality of the trustees in sovereign bond restructurings performed by Argentina in 2016 and Ecuador in 2008. Assessing the utility of trust arrangements to address coordination problems, this thesis is driven by the puzzle: How to better balance (i) the need for smooth sovereign debt restructurings, which by definition entails some losses for creditors, with (ii) bondholders’ legitimate interests? What approach can be used in constructing a legal and institutional framework for trustees to promote the best interest of the bondholders in sovereign debt restructuring? As a solution, it seems that incentives for bond trustees to pursue debt sustainability will achieve both goals. In this regard, recognition of the concept of debt sustainability, being in substance the IMF and WB debt sustainability assessment, as the best interest of bondholders in sovereign debt restructuring is beneficial from multiple aspects. It enables a bond trustee to excel in its role as a guardian of bondholders by following the best interest of bondholders in exercising its discretion. Moreover, it fosters an equilibrium between the interests of private creditors and a state taking into account its socio-political aspects.

Matthias Goldmann und Grygoriy Pustovit: Ein „Sandbox"-Ansatz für die Finan.zaufsicht könnte ein Anfang sein

While the debate about the needs and merits of cryptocurrency regulation is ongoing, the unprecedented price hikes of cryptocurrencies towards the end of 2017 triggered a somewhat unexpected sort of regulation in the form of public statements by governments and financial supervisors. It kicked in rather quickly and turned out to be much more effective than imagined. These interventions can be identified as one of the main factors that drove asset prices down, thereby preventing destabilizing bubbles. The experience of the supervisory response to the cryptocurrency bubble of the past months keeps important insights for any prospective regulation of cryptocurrencies. First, public statements are a highly effective regulatory tool in the short term as they manage market expectations, a fact which is well-known as forward guidance in monetary policy. So far, the legal framework in the EU takes insufficient account of the regulatory role of public statements. Second, regulation needs to keep up with the incredible speed of fintech innovations. Some regulators addressed the challenge by adopting a ‘sandbox’ approach. However, the ‘sandbox’ approach clearly calls for international cooperation. To achieve a balance between safety and innovation, international cooperation should emulate the experimental character of sandboxes. One could conceive of a ‘sandbox for regulators’, an arrangement which would facilitate the exchange of information on regulatory initiatives among authorities but also the coordination of communication and forward guidance.