• Deutsch
Login

Open Access

  • Home
  • Search
  • Browse
  • Publish
  • FAQ

Refine

Author

  • Hirsch, Julia (8)
  • Walz, Uwe (4)
  • Bienz, Carsten (2)
  • Hirsch, Patricia (1)
  • Karbach, Julia (1)
  • Koch, Iring (1)

Year of publication

  • 2006 (3)
  • 2005 (2)
  • 2009 (1)
  • 2016 (1)
  • 2017 (1)
  • 2019 (1)

Document Type

  • Working Paper (7)
  • Article (1)
  • Report (1)

Language

  • English (8)
  • German (1)

Has Fulltext

  • yes (9)

Is part of the Bibliography

  • no (9)

Keywords

  • Risikokapital (5)
  • Asymmetrische Information (3)
  • Corporate Governance (3)
  • Moral Hazard (3)
  • Venture Capital (3)
  • moral hazard (3)
  • venture capital (3)
  • Öffentliche Ordnung (3)
  • Contract Design (2)
  • Vertrag (2)
+ more

Institute

  • Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (8)
  • Wirtschaftswissenschaften (4)
  • House of Finance (HoF) (2)
  • Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (2)
  • Medizin (1)

9 search hits

  • 1 to 9
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100

Sort by

  • Year
  • Year
  • Title
  • Title
  • Author
  • Author
The dynamics of venture capital contracts (2006)
Bienz, Carsten ; Hirsch, Julia
We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and mixes). Thereby, contract completeness reduces when going from pure milestone financing via mixes to pure round financing. We show that the decision for a specific form of staging is determined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between the contracting parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the development process. To be more precise, parties choose the more complete contracts the lower the entrepreneur's expected bargaining power - the maximum level depending on the predictability of the development process. JEL Classification: G24, G32, D86, D80, G34
Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design approach (2006)
Hirsch, Julia
The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programs, ex ante grants and some types of investment grants depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome. JEL Classification: D82, G24, G32, H25, H81
Why do contracts differ between VC types? : market segmentation versus corporate governance varieties (2006)
Hirsch, Julia ; Walz, Uwe
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. JEL Classification: G24, G32, G34
Governance und Vertragsstrukturen in der deutschen VC Industrie: eine empirische Einschätzung (2009)
Bienz, Carsten ; Hirsch, Julia ; Walz, Uwe
Diese Arbeit analysiert die wesentlichen Elemente der Vertragsstrukturen in der Venture Capital-Industrie. Aufbauend auf einem sehr umfangreichen und detaillierten Datensatz, der die Verträge zwischen Venture Capital-Investoren und deren Portfoliounternehmen abbildet, werden die Kontroll-, Entscheidungs- und Vetorechte einer detaillierten Analyse unterzogen. Dabei zeigt sich eine klare Tendenz in der Entwicklung der Vertragsstrukturen in Deutschland hin zu angelsächsisch strukturierten Verträgen. Dies beinhaltet unter anderem eine verstärkte Verwendung von Kontroll- und Entscheidungsrechten aber auch ein breiteres Spektrum dieser Rechte. Außerdem finden wir eine klare Interaktionen zwischen Kontrollrechten, Cash-Flow Rechten und Liquidationsrechten. Insbesondere ist zu betonen, dass Cash-Flow und Kontrollrechte einerseits und Stimmrechte und Aufsichtsratsanteile andererseits separat alloziiert werden und viele Kontrollrechte als Komplemente und nicht als Substitute zueinander aufgefasst werden müssen. JEL Classification: G24, G32, D86, D80, G34
Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design approach : [Version May 2005] (2005)
Hirsch, Julia
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design approach : [This version February 2005] (2005)
Hirsch, Julia
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
Financial constraints, newly founded firms and the financial crisis (2017)
Hirsch, Julia ; Walz, Uwe
This paper aims to analyze the effects of financial constraints and the financial crisis on the financing and investment policies of newly founded firms. Thereby, the analysis adds important new insights on a crucial segment of the economy. We make use of a large and comprehensive data set of French firms founded in the years 2004-2006, i.e. well before the financial crisis. Our panel data analysis shows that the global financial crisis imposed a shock (mostly demand-driven) on the financing as well as on the investments of these firms. Moreover, we find that financially constrained firms use less external debt financing and invest smaller amounts. They also rely on less trade credit. With regard to bank financing, newly founded firms which are more financially constrained accumulate less bank debt and repay initial bank debt slower than their non-financially constraint counterparts. Finally, we find that financially constrained firms are affected to a smaller degree by the financial crisis than their less financially constrained counterparts.
The financing dynamics of newly founded firms (2016)
Hirsch, Julia ; Walz, Uwe
Little evidence exists on the financing decisions of newly founded firms or on the financing dynamics of these firms over their life cycle. We aim to help filling this gap by investigating the financing dynamics of 2,456 French manufacturing firms founded between 2004 and 2006 through their legally required and reported financial statements. Because we observe significant heterogeneity in the financing decision in the firms' founding year, we focus on analyzing whether these differences widen, persist, or converge by using different convergence concepts. We identify a persistence-cum-convergence pattern. We find the existence of ß-convergence (implying that e.g. firms with lower initial levels of debt accumulate more debt over time) but not of σ-convergence (i.e. we observe an increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of the financing structure). We also show that the dynamics of financing matter for the growth path of the firms.
Putting a stereotype to the test : the case of gender differences in multitasking costs in task-switching and dual-task situations (2019)
Hirsch, Patricia ; Koch, Iring ; Karbach, Julia
According to a popular stereotype, women are better at multitasking than men, but empirical evidence for gender differences in multitasking performance is mixed. Previous work has focused on specific aspects of multitasking or has not considered gender differences in abilities contributing to multitasking performance. We therefore tested gender differences (N = 96, 50% female) in sequential (i.e., task switching) and concurrent (i.e., dual tasking) multitasking, while controlling for possible gender differences in working memory, processing speed, spatial abilities, and fluid intelligence. Applying two standard experimental paradigms allowed us to test multitasking abilities across five different empirical indices (i.e., performance costs) for both reaction time (RT) and accuracy measures, respectively. Multitasking resulted in substantial performance costs across all experimental conditions without a single significant gender difference in any of these ten measures, even when controlling for gender differences in underlying cognitive abilities. Thus, our results do not confirm the widespread stereotype that women are better at multitasking than men at least in the popular sequential and concurrent multitasking settings used in the present study.
  • 1 to 9

OPUS4 Logo

  • Contact
  • Imprint
  • Sitelinks