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Optimal trend inflation
(2017)
We present a sticky-price model incorporating heterogeneous Firms and systematic firm-level productivity trends. Aggregating the model in closed form, we show that it delivers radically different predictions for the optimal inflation rate than canonical sticky price models featuring homogenous Firms:
(1) the optimal steady-state inflation rate generically differs from zero and,
(2) inflation optimally responds to productivity disturbances.
Using micro data from the US Census Bureau to estimate the inflation-relevant productivity trends at the firm level, we find that the optimal US inflation rate is positive. It was slightly above 2 percent in the year 1986, but continuously declined thereafter, reaching about 1 percent in the year 2013.
Zur Reform der Einlagensicherung: Elemente einer anreizkompatiblen Europäischen Rückversicherung
(2020)
Bankeinlagen bis 100.000 Euro sind de jure überall im Euroraum gleichermaßen vor Verlusten geschützt. De facto hängt der Wert dieser gesetzlichen Haftungszusage unter anderem von der Ausstattung des nationalen Sicherungsfonds und der relativen Größe des Bankensektors in einer Volkswirtschaft ab. Um die Homogenität des Einlagenschutzes zu gewährleisten und die Bankenunion zu vollenden, bedarf es einer einheitlichen europäischen Einlagensicherung. Die bestehende implizite Risikoteilung im Euroraum ist ordnungspolitisch nicht wünschenswert. Ferner kann eine explizite und glaubwürdige Zweitsicherung Fehlanreize zur Übernahme exzessiver Risiken verhindern, bevor es zum Schadensfall kommt. Daher plädiert dieser Beitrag für ein zweistufiges, streng subsidiär organisiertes Rückversicherungsmodell: Nationale Erstversicherungen würden einen festgeschriebenen Teil, die europäische Rückversicherung nachrangig den Rest der Deckungssumme besichern. Die Rückversicherung gewährt diese Liquiditätshilfen in Form von Kassenkrediten. Weil die Haftung auf nationaler Ebene verbleibt, werden Risiken geteilt aber nicht vergemeinschaftet. Marktgerechte Prämien müssen nicht nur das individuelle Risikogewicht einer Bank sondern auch länderspezifische Risikofaktoren berücksichtigen. Zuletzt braucht der Rückversicherer umfangreiche Aufsichtsrechte, um die Zahlungsfähigkeit der Erstversicherer mit Hinblick auf die nationalen Haftungspflichten jederzeit sicherzustellen.
Motivated by the observation that survey expectations of stock returns are inconsistent with rational return expectations under real-world probabilities, we investigate whether alternative expectations hypotheses entertained in the asset pricing literature are consistent with the survey evidence. We empirically test (1) the notion that survey forecasts constitute rational but risk-neutral forecasts of future returns, and (2) the notion that survey fore- casts are ambiguity averse/robust forecasts of future returns. We find that these alternative hypotheses are also strongly rejected by the data, albeit for different reasons. Hypothesis (1) is rejected because survey return forecasts are not in line with risk-free interest rates and because survey expected excess returns are predictable. Hypothesis (2) is rejected because agents are not al- ways pessimistic about future returns, instead often display overly optimistic return expectations. We speculate as to what kind of expectations theories might be consistent with the available survey evidence.
We analytically characterize optimal monetary policy for an augmented New Keynesian model with a housing sector. In a setting where the private sector has rational expectations about future housing prices and inflation, optimal monetary policy can be characterized without making reference to housing price developments: commitment to a 'target criterion' that refers to inflation and the output gap only is optimal, as in the standard model without a housing sector. When the policymaker is concerned with potential departures of private sector expectations from rational ones and seeks to choose a policy that is robust against such possible departures, then the optimal target criterion must also depend on housing prices. In the empirically realistic case where housing is subsidized and where monopoly power causes output to fall short of its optimal level, the robustly optimal target criterion requires the central bank to 'lean against' housing prices: following unexpected housing price increases, policy should adopt a stance that is projected to undershoot its normal targets for inflation and the output gap, and similarly aim to overshoot those targets in the case of unexpected declines in housing prices. The robustly optimal target criterion does not require that policy distinguish between 'fundamental' and 'non-fundamental' movements in housing prices.
We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.