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This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy-making on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might conflict with each other. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes supervisory considerations into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to monetary policy.
The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and supervisory decision-making, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy mandate and the SSM Regulation, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or smooth monetary policy transmission). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy.
As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor’s legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law’s indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving.
Si bien el discurso sobre los derechos humanos se volvió fundamental para desafiar la austeridad en el período que siguió a la Gran Crisis Financiera desde una perspectiva histórica, el que los derechos humanos desempeñen este papel es más la excepción que la regla. El discurso en materia de derechos humanos en el contexto de la austeridad inducida por la deuda soberana ha variado mucho con el tiempo. Lejos de mostrar progreso, su historia revela los cambios del paradigma del derecho de los derechos humanos. Las páginas que siguen hacen foco en uno de esos cambios, ocurrido en la transición entre las décadas de los setenta y ochenta. En la década de los setenta, los Estados recientemente independizados invocaban los derechos humanos en especial para afirmar su soberanía y alejar la interferencia internacional. El paradigma estructural sobre derechos humanos desapareció abruptamente de los debates sobre austeridad en la década de los ochenta, cuando la crisis de deuda soberana golpeó al Sur Global y creó la necesidad de asistencias multilaterales para obtener liquidez. Frente a la presión de reconsiderar el impacto social de los programas de ajuste estructural que promovía, el Fondo Monetario Internacional desplazó los términos del debate y en lugar de hablar de “necesidades humanas”, un término relacionado con los derechos humanos, pasó a hablar de “capital humano”. En consecuencia, en el momento en que los derechos humanos adquirían el estatus de “última utopía”, dejaron de tener relevancia para la austeridad. Por lo tanto, que el discurso sobre los derechos humanos promueva o no los objetivos sociales dependerá del contexto y del momento histórico. El artículo culmina con una propuesta de paradigma político del derecho de los derechos humanos que refleja estas perspectivas.
Bitcoin stands like no other cryptocurrency for the profound transformation of financial markets in the digital economy. While the last few months saw the free trade in goods struggle against trends towards protectionism, cryptocurrencies seemed to tear down one border after the other – physical, geographic, and legal ones alike. A libertarian’s wet dream. Blockchain presents itself as a fortress against state intervention, for whatever purpose. Finally, a technological, market-based solution would put an end to the problem of monetary policy, payment transactions, and make whole chunks of government regulation superfluous. ...
Nicht nur die Geräuschkulisse des Brexits absorbierte ein Stück weit die Aufmerksamkeit für das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) zur Zulässigkeit des Anleihenkaufprogramms der EZB. Denn immerhin entschied Luxemburg damit über eine der nach wie vor seltenen Vorlagen aus Karlsruhe. Dazu mag auch beigetragen haben, dass seit der Stellungnahme des Generalanwalts Wathelet nicht mehr damit gerechnet wurde, dass der EuGH der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) einen sprichwörtlichen Strich durch die Rechnung machen würde. Dennoch ist das Urteil aus einigen Gründen bemerkenswert.
Christine Lagarde verband die Ankündigung ihres ersten, moderaten Rettungspakets mit der Aufforderung an die Mitgliedstaaten, fiskalische Hilfen bereitzustellen. Die Märkte scheinen sich das Vertrauen in die Fiskalpolitik indessen abgewöhnt zu haben. Da starke geldpolitische Signale zunächst ausblieben, ging die Talfahrt weiter, bis Lagarde im zweiten Versuch in die Fußstapfen ihres Vorgängers trat und die Schleusen öffnete.
Wallonien lässt die westliche Welt zappeln – und wird dafür je nach politischem Standpunkt des Betrachters als einzig aufrechtes gallisches Dorf besungen oder als eigennützige Erpresserbande geschmäht. Stutzig macht jedoch die prompte Reaktion, man hätte CETA besser doch nicht als "gemischtes Abkommen" einstufen sollen, sondern als Abkommen zwischen der EU und Kanada ohne direkte Beteiligung der Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Reaktion zeugt von Demokratieverachtung.