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Corporatist regulation has a hybrid structure in that it covers state regulation, regulated self-regulation as well as private-public co-regulation. Notably diverging from the standard mode of state regulation, such arrangements required a higher degree of legitimation. Corporatist concepts flourished in the Weimar Republic. This paper deals with three legal scholars’ considerations regarding how to legitimize corporatist models, namely Edgar Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Heinrich Herrfahrdt, and Friedrich Glum. Their institutional touchstone was the Imperial Economic Council, as provided for by article 165 of the Weimar Constitution. This article envisioned a multi-level system of economic councils ranging from regional economic councils up to the Imperial Economic Council and involving representatives of all occupational groups in the performance of state tasks. However, only a Provisional Imperial Economic Council, with a restricted consultative remit, was ever actually established. Based on this model, Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Heinrich Herrfahrdt, and Friedrich Glum conceptualized organizational structures aiming at the comprehensive inclusion of non-state actors. They were legitimized primarily with reference to their output; that is, these organizational forms were supposed to enable a more appropriate and efficient realization of public interests. The input-based argument was basically a question of participation, which implies considerable proximity to typical topoi of democratic legitimation. This similarity is perhaps counter-intuitive, given that corporatist concepts are traditionally associated with anti-democratic ideologies due to their anti-parliamentarian slant. The numerous points of convergence between corporatist and democratic thought simultaneously reflect the heterogeneity of democratic reasoning in the Weimar period and the openness for ideas that were sceptical of—or even hostile to—parliamentary democracy and the party-based state.
This thematic issue brings together research from political science and legal history about legitimacy discourses covering different forms of public–private co-regulation and private self-regulation, domestic and transnational, past and present. These forms of governance highlight the important role of non-state actors in exercising public authority. There has been a growing debate about the legitimacy of non-state actors setting and enforcing norms and providing public goods and services. However, the focus of this thematic issue is not on developing abstract criteria of legitimacy. Rather, the authors analyze legitimacy discourses around different cases of privatized or partly privatized forms of governance from the early 20th century until today. Legitimacy is subject to empirical and not normative analysis. Legitimacy discourses are analyzed in order to shed light on the legitimacy conceptions that actors hold, what they consider as legitimate institutions, and based on what criteria. The particular focus of this thematic issue is to examine whether the significance of democratic legitimacy is decreasing as the importance of regulation exercised by private actors is increasing.
If a report on state and perspectives of the history of social law is to be written, two problems involving demarcation have to be dealt with in advance. 1. What is social law? 2. What kind of literature has to be considered as a part of the history of social law? In both cases the boundaries can definitely be drawn in a subjective manner and can be oriented towards the interests and competences of the author insofar as the criteria are plausible. ...
Social law is an important cornerstone of the normative constitution of the modern state, if not one the most important. The stability of market-based societies in the current era primarily resulted from both the existence of legally guaranteed provisions against the risks of life and the legal mechanisms that make the social inequalities bearable – or, at the very least, that ensure a minimum standard of living and prevent those affected from being completely excluded from social participation. Social law is, however, not just a stabilizing element for democratically constituted market societies in a normal situation. Over the course of the 20th century, it was also used to great effect by dictatorial and authoritarian regimes as a means of securing power, and it was employed more often in times of war and crisis in order to keep peace within the state, to attenuate or pacify fragile social situations, not to mention to generate social consensus. Throughout all the ups and downs of recent history, social law has remained a key element involved in the shaping of society. ...
About 200 years ago, legal concepts based on the idea of formal equality prevailed. Over the last 150 years, however, the law has tried on a large scale to establish substantive equality, or at least to alleviate social and economic imbalances. To this day, the law which has undertaken this task has grown in scope and become increasingly differentiated. It has become one of the most important components of modern legal systems and has a history with its own distinctive contours. The terms used to summarise the corresponding legal materials are manifold: law of the welfare state, law of the provident state (état providence) (François Ewald), social law, social welfare law, etc. ...