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"Toleranz kommt vor Glückseligkeit" : eine Zeitreise mit der Tugend des gegenseitigen Respekts
(2016)
Toleranz ist gerade da nötig, wo sie besonders schwerfällt. Das war schon vor gut 300 Jahren so, als Denker wie der französische Philosoph Pierre Bayle in Zeiten religiöser Auseinandersetzungen den Grundstein für ein fortschrittliches Toleranz-Verständnis legten. Warum der Begriff gerade heute wieder Konjunktur hat und wie umstritten er noch immer ist, erläutert der politische Philosoph Rainer Forst im Gespräch mit Bernd Frye.
Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen : zur Idee eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms
(2010)
Ein geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsprogramm betritt mit der These, dass wir in einer Zeit tiefgreifender sozialer Veränderungen leben, kein Neuland. Ein thematischer Fokus auf die Frage der Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen mit Bezug auf die entsprechenden Verschiebungen, Umbrüche und Konflikte in verschiedenen Gesellschaften und auf transnationaler Ebene bringt dagegen etwas Neues und Wichtiges ans Licht. Das ist jedenfalls unsere Überzeugung.
Ernst Bloch pointed out in a particularly emphatic way that the concept of human dignity featured centrally in historical struggles against different forms of unjustified rule, i.e. domination – to which one must add that it continues to do so to the present day. The “upright gait,” putting an end to humiliation and insult: this is the most powerful demand, in both political and rhetorical terms, that a “human rights-based” claim expresses. It marks the emergence of a radical, context-transcending reference point immanent to social conflicts which raises fundamental questions concerning the customary opposition between immanent and transcendent criticism. For within the idiom of demanding respect for human dignity, a right is invoked “here and now,” in a particular, context-specific form, which at its core is owed to every human being as a person. Thus Bloch is in one respect correct when he asserts that human rights are not a natural “birthright” but must be achieved through struggle; but in another respect this struggle can develop its social power only if it has a firm and in a certain sense “absolute” normative anchor. Properly understood, it becomes apparent that these social conflicts always affect “two worlds”: the social reality, on the one hand, which is criticized in part or radically in the light of an ideal normative dimension, on the other. For those who engage in this criticism there is no doubt that the normative dimension is no less real than the reality to which they refuse to resign themselves. Those who critically transcend reality always also live elsewhere.
Immer wieder sieht man sich – einer Zeitreise gleich – heutzutage rückversetzt in die trüben Zeiten religiöser Konfrontationen, denkt man an die Diskussionen über Pläne zum Bau von Moscheen, die Regensburger Rede des Papstes, Karikaturen in dänischen Zeitungen oder Kopftücher von Lehrerinnen. Und so ist es ganz folgerichtig, dass der ehrwürdige Begriff der Toleranz allerorten bemüht wird, um konfliktentschärfend zu wirken. Gleichwohl fällt auf, dass häufig jede der streitenden Parteien ihn für sich reklamiert. Was also heißt »Toleranz« genau?
Das Werk von Jürgen Habermas ragt einsam aus der Theorielandschaft unserer Tage heraus, denn ihm ist es auf einzigartige Weise gelungen, eine einheitliche Theorie in der Vielzahl der disziplinären Stimmen der Philosophie und der Sozial- und Rechtswissenschaften zu schaffen: die Theorie des Diskurses. Sie hat auf all diesen Gebieten innovativ und paradigmenbildend gewirkt, was sich nicht zuletzt daran zeigt, wie stark seine Erkenntnisse auf neuere Forschungsprogramme wirken. Ein Beispiel hierfür ist der Frankfurter Exzellenzcluster »Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen«, der seit Herbst 2007 von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft gefördert wird und unter anderem neun neue Professuren an der Goethe-Universität geschaffen und besetzt hat. In mehr als 30 Forschungsprojekten arbeiten Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler zu unterschiedlichen Fragestellungen der Veränderung gesellschaftlicher Ordnungen.
The title I have chosen seems to signal a tension, even a contradiction, in a number of respects. Democracy appears to be a form of political organisation and government in which, through general and public participatory procedures, a sufficiently legitimate political will is formed which acquires the force of law. Justice, by contrast, appears to be a value external to this context which is not so much linked to procedures of “input” or “throughput” legitimation but is understood instead as an output- or outcome-oriented concept. At times, justice is even understood as an otherworldly idea which, when transported into the Platonic cave, merely causes trouble and ends up as an undemocratic elite project. In methodological terms, too, this difference is sometimes signalled in terms of a contrast between a form of “worldly” political thought and “abstract” and otherworldly philosophical reflection on justice. In my view, we are bound to talk past the issues to be discussed under the heading “transnational justice and democracy” unless we first root out false dichotomies such as the ones mentioned. My thesis will be that justice must be “secularised” or “grounded” both with regard to how we understand it and to its application to relations beyond the state.
Allen Buchanan argues that a particular set of false factual beliefs, especially when part of a comprehensive ideology, can lead persons to develop ‘morally conservative’ convictions that stand in the way of realising justice even though these persons have a ‘firm grasp of correct principles of justice and a robust commitment to their realisation’. In my remarks, I raise some questions concerning the core argument: How ‘firm’ can a grasp of principles of justice be if a person is blind to the realities of injustice? And how ‘sincerely committed’ to justice can such an injustice-insensitive person be? Alternatively: How firm is that grasp or commitment if one has a radically pessimistic view about human nature so that one does not believe that (egalitarian) justice can or could ever be realised? Secondly, I ask: If such ideologies or false beliefs are in play in reproducing injustice, do they not also ‘mask’ existing injustices?
Os limites da tolerância
(2009)
Este artigo apresenta os elementos constitutivos do conceito de tolerância e discute duas concepções diferentes do termo, como permissão e como respeito moral, que expressam modos diversos de demarcar os limites da tolerância. A tolerância é apresentada como um conceito que, para ganhar algum conteúdo, depende normativamente de um direito à justificação baseado na idéia de um uso público da razão segundo o qual as práticas e as instituições político-jurídicas que determinam a vida social dos cidadãos devem ser justificáveis à luz de normas que eles não podem recíproca e genericamente rejeitar.
This paper challenges widespread assumptions in trust research according to which trust and conflict are opposing terms or where trust is generally seen as a value. Rather, it argues that trust is only valuable if properly justified, and it places such justifications in contexts of social and political conflict. For these purposes, the paper suggests a distinction between a general concept and various conceptions of trust, and it defines the concept as a four-place one. With regard to the justification of trust, a distinction between internal and full justification is introduced, and the justification of trust is linked to relations of justification between trusters and trusted. Finally, trust in conflict(s) emerges were such relations exist among the parties of a conflict, often by way of institutional mediation.
Sobre la libertad política
(1998)
Este artículo presenta un argumento en favor de un concepción intersubjetivista de la libertad política constituida por cinco diferentes nociones de autonomía: moral, ética, legal, política y social. Más allá de las nociones estrictamente liberales o comunitarias, negativas o positivas, el concepto de libertad política incluye todas aquellas libertades que los ciudadanos, en tanto continentes y usuarios autónomos de la libertad, pueden conceder y garantizar de forma recíproca y general. Así, en la base de este concepto reposa un principio de justiticación moral y política.
