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„Bedeutende Finanzplätze“ oder Finanzzentren sind eng abgegrenzte Orte mit einer beträchtlichen Konzentration wichtiger professioneller Aktivitäten aus dem Finanzdienstleistungsbereich und der entsprechenden Institutionen. Allerdings: „Finance is a footloose industry“: Die Finanzbranche kann abwandern, ein Finanzzentrum kann sich verlagern, möglicherweise auch einfach auflösen. Die Möglichkeit der Auflösung und der Abwanderung stellt eine Bedrohung dar, die in der Zeit der Globalisierung und der rasanten Fortschritte der Transport- und der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik ausgeprägter sein dürfte, als sie je war. Frankfurt ist zweifellos ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“, und manchen gilt er auch als bedroht. Allein deshalb ist unser Thema wichtig; und auch wenn die Einschätzungen von Bedeutung und Bedrohtheit keineswegs neu sind, ist es doch aktuell. Der Aspekt der Bedrohtheit prägt, wie wir die Frage im Titel verstehen und diskutieren möchten. Was ist ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“? Selbst wenn man das Attribut „bedeutend“ erst einmal beiseite lässt, ist die Frage keineswegs trivial. Sie zielt ja nicht nur auf eine Begriffsklärung, eine Sprachregelung ab. Hinter dem Begriff steht oft auch eine Vorstellung vom „Wesen“ dessen, was ein Begriff bezeichnet. Also: Was macht einen Finanzplatz aus? Und weiter: Warum gibt es überhaupt Finanzplätze als beträchtliche Konzentrationen von bestimmten wichtigen Aktivitäten und Institutionen? Welche Kräfte führen - oder zumindest führten - zu der räumlichen Konzentration der Aktivitäten und Institutionen, wie wirken diese Kräfte, und wie ändern sie sich gegebenenfalls? Diesen Fragen ist dieser Beitrag im Wesentlichen gewidmet, und sie prägen seinen Aufbau. Im Abschnitt II wird diskutiert, was ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“ ist oder woran man ihn erkennt und „was er braucht“. Im Abschnitt III gehen wir zuerst auf die Frage nach der in letzter Zeit unter dem Stichwort „the end of geography“ heftig diskutierten Vorstellung einer Auflösung oder Virtualisierung der Finanzplätze ein – nicht weil dies die wichtigere Bedrohung wäre, sondern weil es die grundlegendere Frage darstellt. Dann diskutieren wir den Wettbewerb von Finanzplätzen in Europa. Den Abschluss bilden Überlegungen zu den Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes Frankfurt und der möglichen Förderung seiner Entwicklung.
Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks' franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous as banks lack those incentives. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system effciency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics. Keywords: Banks, market structure, risk shifting, franchise value, capital regulation
The introduction of a common currency as well as the harmonization of rules and regulations in Europe has significantly reduced distance in all its guises. With reduced costs of overcoming space, this emphasizes centripetal forces and it should foster consolidation of financial activity. In a national context, as a rule, this led to the emergence of one financial center. Hence, Europeanization of financial and monetary affairs could foretell the relegation of some European financial hubs such as Frankfurt and Paris to third-rank status. Frankfurt’s financial history is interesting insofar as it has lost (in the 1870s) and regained (mainly in the 1980s) its preeminent place in the German context. Because Europe is still characterized by local pockets of information-sensitive assets as well as a demand for variety the national analogy probably does not hold. There is room in Europe for a number of financial hubs of an international dimension, including Frankfurt.
This paper discusses the so-called commercial approach to microfinance under economic and ethical aspects. It first shows how microfinance has developed from a purely welfare-oriented activity to a commercially relevant line of banking business. The background of this stunning success is the – almost universal – adoption of the so-called commercial approach to microfinance in the course of the last decade. As the author argues, this commercial approach is the only sound approach to adopt if one wanted microfinance to have any social and developmental impact, and therefore the wide-spread “moralistic” criticism of the commercial approach, which has again and again been expressed in the 1990s, is ill-placed from an economic and an ethical perspective. However, some recent events in microfinance raise doubts as to whether the commercial approach has not, in a number of cases, gone too far. The evident example for such a development is the Mexican microfinance institution Compartamos, which recently undertook a financially extremely successful IPO. As it seems, some microfinance institutions have by now become so radically commercial that all of those social and development considerations, which have traditionally motivated work in the field of microfinance, seem to have lost their importance. Thus there is a conflict between commercial and developmental aspirations. However, this conflict is not inevitable. The paper concludes by showing that, and how, a microfinance institution can try to combine using the strengths of the capital market and at the same time maintaining its developmental focus and importance.
At present, the question of how national pension or retirement payment systems should be organised is being hotly debated in various countries, and opinions vary widely as to what should be regarded as the optimal design for such systems. It appears to the authors of the present paper that in this entire discussion one aspect is largely overlooked: What relationships exist between the pension system and the financial system in a given country? As such relationships might prove to be important, the present paper investigates the following questions: (1) Are there differences between the national pension systems of three major European countries – Germany, France and the U.K. – and between the financial systems of these countries? (2) And if the existence of such differences can be demonstrated, is there a correspondence between the differences with respect to the various national pension systems and the differences as regards the countries’ financial systems? (3) And if such a correspondence exists, is there any kind of interrelationship between the national financial and pension systems of the individual countries which goes beyond a mere correspondence? Looking mainly at two aspects – namely, risk allocation and the incentives to create human capital – the authors of this paper argue (1) that there are indeed considerable differences between the financial and pension systems of the three countries; (2) that in both Germany and the U.K. there are also systematic correspondences between the respective pension systems and financial systems and their economic characteristics, but that such a correspondence cannot be identified in the case of France; and (3) that these parallels are, in the final analysis, based on complementarities and are therefore likely to contribute to the efficiency of the German and the British systems. The paper concludes with a brief look at policy implications which the existence of, or the lack of, consistency between national pension systems and national financial systems might have.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
