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TEIL I Die Bauentwicklung des Zahnärztlichen Universitäts-Institutes in Frankfurt am Main von 1960 bis zur Fertigstellung des Erweiterungsbaus im Jahr 1973 ( bearbeitet von: Thomas Kick ) Die vorliegende Arbeit reiht sich ein in die Gesamtdarstellung der Geschichte des Zahnärztlichen Universitäts- Institutes in Frankfurt am Main. In der Dissertation von Bald-Duch wird ein geschichtlicher Überblick von der Gründung der Heilanstalt Carolinum im Jahre 1890 bis zum Tode von Otto Loos am 1. April 1936 gegeben, die Arbeit von Roeloffs-Nuthmann umfasst die Darstellung des historischen Werdegangs des Zahnärztlichen Institutes in Frankfurt am Main während der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft und der Nachkriegsjahre bis hin zum Zentrum für Zahn-, Mund- und Kieferheilkunde Carolinum. Diese Dissertation vervollständigt die Dokumentation der Entwicklung des Zahnärztlichen Universitäts-Institutes Carolinum für die Jahre 1960 bis 1986, wobei der Schwerpunkt der Darstellung auf die Bauentwicklung und dabei insbesondere auf die Planung und Errichtung des Neubaus des Zentrums der Zahn-, Mund- und Kiefer- heilkunde Carolinum gelegt wurde. Zu Beginn der sechziger Jahre wurden Verhandlungen zur Übernahme der Städtischen Universitätskliniken und der angeschlossenen Institute in Frankfurt am Main durch das Land Hessen aufgenommen. Davon betroffen war auch das Zahnärztliche Universitäts-Institut Carolinum, das in die Verwaltung der Universität übergehen sollte. Professor Flesch-Thebesius als Vorsitzender des Vorstandes der Freiherr Carl von Rothschild
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.
Using granular supervisory data from Germany, we investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policies via central banks’ purchase of corporate bonds. While this policy results in a loosening of credit market conditions as intended by policy makers, we document two unintended side effects. First, banks that are more exposed to borrowers benefiting from the bond purchases now lend more to high-risk firms with no access to bond markets. Since more loan write-offs arise from these firms and banks are not compensated for this risk by higher interest rates, we document a drop in bank profitability. Second, the policy impacts the allocation of loans among industries. Affected banks reallocate loans from investment grade firms active on bond markets to mainly real estate firms without investment grade rating. Overall, our findings suggest that central banks’ quantitative easing via the corporate bond markets has the potential to contribute to both banking sector instability and real estate bubbles.
We employ a proprietary transaction-level dataset in Germany to examine how capital requirements affect the liquidity of corporate bonds. Using the 2011 European Banking Authority capital exercise that mandated certain banks to increase regulatory capital, we find that affected banks reduce their inventory holdings, pre-arrange more trades, and have smaller average trade size. While non-bank affiliated dealers increase their market-making activity, they are unable to bridge this gap - aggregate liquidity declines. Our results are stronger for banks with a higher capital shortfall, for non-investment grade bonds, and for bonds where the affected banks were the dominant market-maker.
We investigate how unconventional monetary policy, via central banks’ purchases of corporate bonds, unfolds in credit-saturated markets. While this policy results in a loosening of credit market conditions as intended by policymakers, we report two unintended side effects. First, the policy impacts the allocation of credit among industries. Affected banks reallocate loans from investment-grade firms active on bond markets almost entirely to real estate asset managers. Other industries do not obtain more loans, particularly real estate developers and construction firms. We document an increase in real estate prices due to this policy, which fuels real estate overvaluation. Second, more loan write-offs arise from lending to these firms, and banks are not compensated for this risk by higher interest rates. We document a drop in bank profitability and, at the same time, a higher reliance on real estate collateral. Our findings suggest that central banks’ quantitative easing has substantial adverse effects in credit-saturated economies.
