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Philosophy is essentially dialectical. One gets into a dialectic by a puzzle, an aporia in thought and understanding. The point of philosophizing is not (necessarily) to get hold of the ultimate, objective, and immutably correct answers. The point is rather to come to be able to see one’s way out of the aporia, and to understand how one got into it in the first place.
The essay that follows – which I am submitting as my dissertation – is dialectical in two senses. As a piece of philosophizing, the essay is guided by a problem, the problem of understanding how laws of nature are possible, and how it is possible for us to know them. The movement of thought generated by attempts to get out of the problem then yields some ideas that do not stay in the original context in which the problem was felt to exist. Two important ones are, first, perceptual experience is not the only ultimate source of warrant we have for empirical knowledge claims, and second, perceptual experience is not the only epistemically significant experience we can have. Both are consequences of the idea that the mastery of skills is a form of interaction with nature that provides epistemic warrant for nomological claims. I shall leave it to the epilogue to examine how this view of skills contrasts with the ways skills are ordinarily thought of in philosophy and the implication of it for empiricism.
The other sense in which the essay is dialectical is more interesting, and it has to do with the way in which I approach the problem that got me into started, namely, by paying special attention to the dialectic exchange between the realists and the antirealists about the laws of nature. Antirealism about the lawfulness of nature has experienced something like a post-Humean revival since the publication of van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image. Most, including me, have strong realist intuitions about nomological “connections” in nature. Philosophical positions that are strongly counterintuitive have mostly not ended well in history. So it becomes something of a puzzle why antirealism about laws of nature manages to enjoy popularity every now and then.
If we want to develop a semantic analysis for explicit performatives such as I promise you to free Willy, we are faced with the following puzzle: In order to account for the speech act expressed by the performative verb, one can assume that the so-called performative clause is purely performative and provides the illocutionary force of the speech act whose content is given by the semantic object denoted by the complement clause. Yet under this perspective, the performative clause that is, next to the performative verb, the indexicals I and you that refer to the speaker and to the addressee of the utterance context is semantically invisible and does not contribute compositionally its meaning to the meaning of the entire explicit performative sentence. Conversely, if we account for the truth conditional contribution of the performative clause and deny that the meaning of the performative verb is purely performative, then we have to find a way to account for the speech act expressed by the performative verb. Of course, there is already the widely accepted and very appealing indirectness account for explicit performative utterances developed by Bach & Harnish (1979). Roughly, Bach and Harnish solve this puzzle in deriving the performativity by means of a pragmatic inference process. According to them, the important speech act performed by means of the utterance of the explicit performative sentence is a kind of the conventionalized indirect speech act. However, the boundary between semantics and pragmatics can be drawn in many various ways. Therefore, I think there could be other perspectives regarding the interface between the truth-functional treatment of the declarative explicit performative sentences and the speech acts performed with their utterances and which are expressed by the performative verbs. Hence, this thesis consists in the experiment to develop a further analysis and to check out its consequences with respect to the semantics and pragmatics of explicit performative utterances and the new interface emerged. Briefly, the experiment runs as follows: First, I develop an analysis for explicit performative sentences framed by parenthetical structures such as in (1)(a). In a second step, this parenthetical analysis is applied to the proper Austinian explicit performative sentences in (1)(b). (1) a. Tomorrow, I promise you this, I will teach them Tyrolean songs. b. I promise you that I will teach them Tyrolean songs. To analyze at first explicit performatives framed by parenthetical structures bears the convenience that we are faced with two utterances of two main clauses. In (1)(a) there is the utterance of the host sentence Tomorrow I will teach them Tyrolean songs, and the utterance of the explicit parenthetical I promise you this, where the demonstrative this refers to the utterance of Tomorrow I will teach them Tyrolean songs. Since speakers perform speech acts with utterances of main clauses, I assume that the meaning of the explicit parenthetical I promise you this specifies that the actual illocutionary force of the utterance of Tomorrow I will teach them Tyrolean songs is the illocutionary force of a promise. Hence, instead of deriving an indirect illocutionary force by means of a pragmatic inference schema, we can deal with an ordinary direct speech act that is performed with the utterance of the host sentence. This kind of analysis stresses the particular discourse function of explicit performative utterances. Performative verbs are used whenever the contextual information is not sufficient to determine the illocutionary force of the corresponding implicit speech act. The resulting consequences of the parenthetical analysis are interesting since they cast a different light on performative verbs. Surprisingly, the performative verbs are not performative at all. They do not constitute the execution of a speech act, but are execution supporting. Instead of constituting the particular illocutionary force, they merely specify the illocutionary force of the utterance of the host sentence. For instance, the speaker utters the explicit parenthetical I promise you this for specifying what he is simultaneously doing. Hence the speaker does not succeed in performing the promise simply because he is uttering I promise you this. Rather, by means of the information conveyed by the utterance of I promise you this, the potential illocutionary forces of the utterance of the host sentence are disambiguated. Thus, it is not the case that explicit parentheticals are trivially true when uttered. Their function is more complex. Their self-verifying property (‘saying so makes it so’) is explained by means of disambiguation. Furthermore, according to the parenthetical analysis, instead of being purely performative, the performative verbs contribute compositionally their meanings to the truth conditions of the entire explicit performative sentence. Together with its consequences, this analysis is applied to the proper Austinian performatives, which display subordination. I assume that regardless of their structure, explicit performatives always semantically and pragmatically behave as the parenthetical analysis predicts.
The individual parameter
(2018)
The present thesis tackles the unification of two-dimensional semantic systems, which are designed to deal with context-dependency of a certain kind i.e. indexicality, with dynamic theories of meaning, designed to capture facts about anaphoricity and the distribution of definite and indefinite articles. The need for a more principled look at this unification is twofold. Firstly, there is an overlap of these two families of theories in terms of empirical data, namely third person personal pronouns, as well as definite descriptions. Both kinds of expressions have anaphoric as well as non-anaphoric usages, whereas some of the latter ones can be captured in terms of indexicality. But, on the other hand, no language, especially not German and English, the main sources of data in this thesis, seems to distinguish these two usages formally, i.e. by employing different expressions. Hence the need for a unified framework in which this sort of ambiguity can be treated. Secondly, the theoretical state is dissatisfactory in the sense that the families of theories take very disparate forms that are not easy to relate conceptually.
The overlap in empirical area of application strongly suggests that this dichotomy is an artifact of the way these theories traditionally are developed and justified. This thesis seeks to overcome this state of the field. It proceeds as follows.
The first chapter discusses the way in which theories indexicality are designed. After taking a closer look some hallmarks of these theories such as the notions of index- and context-dependency themselves, double indexing, etc., it develops a notion of index dependency that makes use of a more complex individual parameter than the one that is usually assumed in the literature. Apart from agents and addressees, the two standard components of indices that represent contexts, additional objects are assumed. This leads to a variant of the semantics of deictically used third person expression that is called ‘indexical theory of demonstratives’, which is then investigated further.
The second chapter discusses the classics of dynamic semantics: DRT, DPL, and FCS. It arrives at the common core of all of these theories that consists in the assumption of a novel sort of variable namely active variables as opposed to free and bound ones that are intended to model the behavior of (in)definite descriptions and pronouns. The projection behavior of these variables or discourse referents is described either in (discourse-)syntactic or semantic terms. The chapter also arrives at a new formulation of the uniqueness condition that is thought to be part of the semantics of definite descriptions and sketches an account of transparent negation.
The third chapter then combines the insights of the previous ones by developing the notion of representation that connects the entities of evaluation of the first chapter i.e. indices with those of the second namely sets of assignments, a.k.a. files. The formal language that emerged in the second chapter is endowed with two kinds of variables for situations to allow for double indexing within a dynamic setting. A novel interpretation mechanism for the so designed language is proposed, which is shown to capture not only those aspects that are known to exist in two-dimensional frameworks, but also certain other index-index interactions that are described in yet another body of literature.
The final chapter discusses potential flaws of the theory and sketches an account of allegedly bound indexicals that is compatible with Kaplan’s infamous ban on monsters.
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit einem spezifischen Phänomen innerhalb der Sprachphilosophie und der linguistischen Pragmatik – den explizit performativen Äußerungen (Austin 1979). Im Zentrum der Arbeit stehen die detaillierte Explikation und der kritische Vergleich zweier prominenter Erklärungsmodelle von Performativen: Einerseits Bach/Harnish’s (1979) Analyse dieser Äußerungen als indirekte Sprechakte, andererseits Searle’s (1989) Behandlung von Performativen als Deklarationen. Die Arbeit gliedert sich wie folgt. Kapitel 1 führt die terminologischen Grundlagen ein und dient der Darstellung des Performativitätsproblems. Kapitel 2 befasst sich mit der Nachzeichnung der Standardisierten Indirektheit von Performativen nach Bach/Harnish (1979) und der Kritik an diesem Modell. Nach einer Einführung in das intentionale Kommunikationsmodell von Grice erfolgt eine Darstellung der allgemeinen Prinzipien von Bach/Harnish’s Kommunikationstheorie, die in expliziter Anlehnung an Grice konzipiert ist. Grundlage für die Behandlung der Analyse expliziter Performative ist vor allem die Darstellung des Speech Act Schema, also des inferentiellen Rasters, das Bach/Harnish sprachlicher Kommunikation zugrunde legen, sowie die Erläuterung der Begriffe der Konventionalisierung und Standardisierung. Die eigentliche Darstellung der Theorie präsentiert zwei unterschiedliche Muster zur inferentiellen Entschlüsselung der indirekten Bedeutung explizit performativer Äußerungen und schließt mit einem Modell, das die beiden Indirektheitsanalysen und Standardisierung integriert. Die Kritik wägt beide Indirektheitsanalysen gegeneinander ab, befasst sich mit der generellen Frage, ob Performative die Eigenschaften indirekter Sprechakte besitzen und untersucht, inwiefern die Annahme des Vollzugs eines assertiven Aktes mit Performativen problematisch ist. Kapitel 3 wendet sich der Searle’schen Deklarationsanalyse performativer Äußerungen zu. Zu Beginn werden die Grundlagen dieses Modells verfügbar gemacht. Dazu wird, neben einem kurzen Überblick über Searle’s Theorie auf dem Stand von „Sprechakte“ (1971), seine Klassifikation illokutionärer Akte detailliert dargestellt. Vor diesem Hintergrund erfolgt die Nachzeichnung des Deklarationsansatzes. In der anschließenden kritischen Betrachtung des Modells wird die Idee der Intentionsmanifestation diskutiert und es wird geprüft ob sich die unterstellte Existenz einer assertiven illokutionären Rolle von Performativen bestätigen lässt. Insbesondere wird schließlich die illokutionäre Kategorie der Deklarationen hinterfragt. Kapitel 4 dient einer vergleichenden Gegenüberstellung der beiden zuvor behandelten Theorien und versucht abzuwägen, welcher Ansatz die Funktion und Eigenschaften explizit performativer Äußerungen besser erfasst. In Kapitel 5 wird der Versuch unternommen, eine alternative Sicht zu entwickeln. Das besondere kommunikative Potential der Klasse der explizit performativen Äußerungen wird dabei mit ihren semantischen und pragmatischen Aspekten in Verbindung gebracht. Auf diese Weise soll ein Ansatz verfolgt werden, der die deskriptive Eigenschaft von Performativen mit ihrer optionalen performativen Verwendung in Beziehung setzt, ohne diese auf eine assertive illokutionäre Rolle zurückführen zu müssen. Kapitel 6 dient einer abschließenden und resümierenden Betrachtung der im Verlauf der Arbeit unternommenen Überlegungen
This thesis investigated the acquisition of restrictive and appositive interpretations of relative clauses in German-speaking children between the age of 3 and 6 in three experiments.
The theoretical background shows that restrictive relative clauses are semantically less complex than appositive ones. This assumption is supported by observations from a typological overview on the semantic functions attested across languages. It is shown that the existence of appositive relative clauses implies the availability of restrictive readings in a given language. Furthermore, restrictive readings may be favored due to the functioning of general processing principles. Previous research on the acquisition of relative clauses demonstrates that the acquisition of the semantic functions of relative clauses is an understudied area. In contrast, the acquisition of syntactic aspects of relative clauses is well documented. Relative clauses start to be produced in the third year of life and can be interpreted target-like between the age of 4 and 8 depending on their structure. Which semantic interpretation children assign to relative clauses at this age, however, is still an open question.
Based on the formal background and insights from previous studies, three experiments were designed: two picture selection tasks and one acceptability task. The crucial aspect of the experimental design constitutes the interaction of an ordinal number word and the interpretation of the relative clause in sentences like “Take the third car(,) that/which is red”. The scope of the ordinal number reveals whether the relative clause had been attached restrictively at the NP-level or whether it had been attached higher up at the DP shell resulting in an appositive interpretation.
The results of the experiments demonstrate that 4- to 6-year-old German-speaking children and adults prefer restrictive readings over appositive ones. This preference is found within the group data and is mirrored by the results of an individual analysis. In addition, while the majority of children has acquired restrictive readings at the age of 4, appositive interpretations are mastered only by about half of the children between age 4 and 6. Interestingly, 3-year-old children show a different pattern than their older peers. Appositive but not restrictive interpretations seem to be available to these children. Although the results may be taken as evidence that appositivity is acquired before restrictivity in relative clauses by German-speaking children, I propose the contrary. Based on assumptions about the complexity of restrictive and appositive derivations, I argue that the appositive interpretations observed at the age of 3 do not result from a target-like syntactic and semantic representation. I propose that 3-year-old children do not yet identify relative clauses as nominal modifiers. Instead, they are derived from an incorrect attachment of the relative clause higher up in the syntactic tree.
The results of the three experiments are the first to show that neither a prototypical unintegrated prosodic contour nor the presence of a lexical marker, the discourse particle “ja”, or a visual context biasing for appositivity led to an increase of appositive interpretations in the children’s groups. Adults, in contrast, were sensitive to the presence of the discourse particle and the cues from the visual context. As for children, the prosodic format of the relative clauses did not systematically change the interpretation preferences of adults.
The proposed acquisition path may not be specific to German. Instead, it is predicted to hold cross-linguistically and may also be transferred to the interpretation of adjectives. Moreover, the assumptions on how children integrate relative clauses during comprehension may be generalized to other types of subordinate clauses.
This thesis investigates the acquisition of compositional and lexical semantic properties of adjectives in German-speaking children between the age of two and five years.
According to formal semantic approaches, there are intersective and non-intersective adjectives, subsective and non-subsective adjectives as well as gradable and non-gradable adjectives. These properties concern the compositional mechanisms involved in nominal modification, i.e., the combination of adjectives and nouns. In addition, adjectives differ regarding lexical semantic properties that contribute to the adjectives' meaning. Differences in the adjectives' scale structure have led to the theoretical assumption that gradable adjectives should be distinguished into relative and absolute gradable adjectives. In addition, meaning components such as multidimensionality or subjectivity have led to the distinction between dimensional and evaluative gradable adjectives. These properties have been mostly investigated independently of each other in both theory and acquisition research. I suggest a classification system for adjectives that combines different semantic properties. This system results in six adjective classes constituting a Semantic Complexity Hierarchy. Assuming that these adjective classes differ in semantic complexity, I propose an operationalization of semantic complexity that takes into account the adjectives' length of description, their type complexity, and lexical properties that contribute to the adjectives' meaning.
Regarding the question of how monolingual German-speaking children acquire the semantics of adjectives, I hypothesize that the order of acquisition of adjectives is determined by their semantic complexity. This hypothesis is tested in a spontaneous speech study and a comprehension experiment.
The spontaneous speech study is a longitudinal investigation of the production of adjectives from 2;00 to 2;11 years based on transcripts from a dense data corpus. The results provide evidence that the mean age of acquisition for the adjective classes in the Semantic Complexity Hierarchy follows the order predicted by semantic complexity. The same order was observed for the age at which the number of types for each class increased most. A preliminary analysis of the input indicates that the frequency of parental adjective use is related to the order of acquisition, but it is unlikely that frequency determines the order completely.
The comprehension experiment focuses on two specific adjective classes. I examine children's and adults' interpretation of relative (big, small) and absolute (clean, dirty) gradable dimensional adjectives with a picture-choice task. These two classes are of the same semantic complexity because they are both gradable, but they have different scale structures. As a result, they must be interpreted differently due to lexical semantic properties. I investigate whether children calculate different standards of comparison for relative and absolute gradable adjectives and whether they distinguish between relative and absolute gradable adjectives regarding the relevance of the explicit comparison class. The results indicate that as of age 3, children distinguish between relative and absolute gradable adjectives with regard to the standard of comparison. However, with respect to the relevance of the comparison class, for 3-year-old children, unlike for 4- and 5-year-olds, changes in the noun, i.e., in the explicit comparison class, led to non-adult-like responses regarding both relative and absolute gradable adjectives.
On the basis of the empirical findings, I propose an acquisition path stating that children enter the acquisition process with inherent linguistic knowledge, the Semantic Complexity Hierarchy, and cognitive abilities to categorize their environment. I suggest that initially, children apply the least complex interpretation available in the Semantic Complexity Hierarchy to all adjectives: all adjectives are interpreted as properties of individuals that are not gradable. To access other levels of the Semantic Complexity Hierarchy and to establish more complex adjective classes, positive evidence from the input and conceptual properties of adjectives, e.g., COLOR, MENTAL STATE, PHYSICAL PROPERTY etc., can operate as triggers.
Anankastic relatives
(2016)
This dissertation investigates a semantic puzzle in German concerning certain sentences with an intensional transitive verb and a modalized relative clause modifying its indefinite object. In their unspecific reading, the modal inside the relative clause seems to lack a semantic contribution and the construal of the relative clause appears spuriously ambiguous between a restrictive and an appositive reading. However, as a thorough discussion of a wide range of data reveals, the embedded modal is actually anaphoric to the matrix attitude and does contribute to the sentence meaning. But then, precisely due to its anaphoricity, this semantic contribution is restricted and in some cases very subtle; in particular, the semantic phenomenon under scrutiny cannot be analyzed as an instance of modal concord. Rather, previous observations on related data involving epistmic anaphoric modals and anankastic conditionals turn out to indicate the direction for an adequate analysis of the relevant semantic observations. For the restrictive construal, a conservative account is developed containing a fine-grained Lewis-Kratzer-style modal semantics, but with a twist: the anaphoricity of the modal is taken care of by restricting the anaphoricity of the modal to the ordering source of the matrix verb; moreover, the embedded modal receives a historical modal base. In this way compositionality issues and problems of cross-identification are avoided. Finally, the non-restrictive construal is analyzed as an instance of modal subordination, exploiting the well-studied parallel between appositive relatives and discourse anaphora.