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Ziel dieser Untersuchung ist es, die Legitimität der Kriminalisierung des Glücksspiels in Brasilien zu hinterfragen. Dies geschieht mit besonderem Augenmerk auf das spezifische brasilianische Glücksspiel, das „Spiel der Tiere“ (Jogo do bicho), das Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts in der Stadt Rio de Janeiro, der Hauptstadt des damaligen kaiserlichen Brasiliens, entstand. Es handelt sich um eine Form des Glücksspiels, die sich in ganz Brasilien verbreitet hat und bereits Gegenstand mehrerer akademischer Studien in den Bereichen Anthropologie und Soziologie war. Das Verbot dieser Art von Glücksspiel, seine Kriminalisierung, seine große Beliebtheit und seine gesellschaftliche Toleranz sind jedoch Gründe dafür, dass das Spiel der Tiere im Besonderen und das Glücksspiel im Allgemeinen auch im juristischen Bereich, insbesondere im Strafrecht, ein bisher vernachlässigter Forschungsgegenstand von großem Interesse ist.
Das Hauptaugenmerk dieser Arbeit liegt auf der Analyse der Kriminalisierung des Glücksspiels, das in Brasilien seit über einem Jahrhundert unter freiem Himmel praktiziert wird. Bei dieser Analyse werden die Gründe für die Kriminalisierung und die Legitimität des Verbots in Frage gestellt. Zu diesem Zweck ist der Text, abgesehen von der Einleitung und der Schlussfolgerung, in sechs Kapitel unterteilt.
Kapitel 1 beschreibt die Geschichte des brasilianischen Tierspiels, die Ursprünge seines Verbots und seiner Kriminalisierung. In Kapitel 2 wird über die Wirklichkeit der Strafverfolgung in diesem „Kriminalitätsbereich“ berichtet. Kapitel 3 stellt den ent-sprechenden Straftatbestand des brasilianischen „Código Penal“ im Kontext der Systematik des brasilianischen Strafgesetzbuches vor. Kapitel 4 widmet sich zunächst den verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen der Kriminalisierung, und danach einem Überblick über das deutsche Glücksspielverbot und die Glücksspielregulierung. Ergänzt wird diese Suche in Kapitel 5, in dem die Forschung das strafrechtliche Glücksspielverbot in den Kontext der Debatte über die Abgrenzung zwischen und den Zusammenhang von Recht und Moral. Im abschließenden Kapitel 6 wird das (strafrechtlich sanktionierte) Glücksspielverbot mit den klassischen Legitimations-anforderungen konfrontiert.
Was in der strafrechtlichen Literatur der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zur Rechtfertigung des Verbots zu lesen ist, deutet auf einen großen Einfluss moralischer Argumente hin. Diese Argumente haben bis heute an Gewicht nicht verloren, auch wenn die Befürworter der Beibehaltung der Kriminalisierung versuchen, ihre letztlich moralistische Ideologie gegen das Glücksspiel mit Argumenten wie der Begleitkriminalität des Glückspiels zu verschleiern, die eher eine Folge als eine Ursache der Kriminalisierung ist.
Egon Lorenz – zum Gedenken
(2020)
This paper analyses disclosure duties in insurance contract law in Germany on the basis of questions developed in preparation of the World Congress of the International Insurance Law Association (AIDA) 2018. As risk factors are within the policyholder’s sphere of knowledge, the insurer naturally depends on gaining such knowledge from its policyholder in order to calculate and evaluate premium and risk. Legal approaches as to how the insurer may obtain relevant information and the legal consequences differ in national insurance contract laws around the globe. Taking part in this legal comparison, the paper describes the key elements of such a mechanism from a German perspective and comprises both duties of the policyholder and duties of the insurer.
As for the policyholder, these issues are differences between a duty to (spontaneously) disclose and a duty not to misrepresent as a reaction to questions of the insurer, the prerequisites and remedies of such duty, the subjective standard of the disclosure duty and a duty to notify material changes during the contract term. On the other hand, the paper also addresses an insurer’s duty to investigate, a duty to ascertain the policyholder’s understanding of the policy and a duty to inform during the contract term or after the occurrence of an insured event. In doing so, the paper offers a comprehensive and critical overview on the transfer of knowledge in the insurance (pre-)contractual relationship.
We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors’ shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
This paper shows that judicial enforcement has substantial effects on firms’ decisions with regard to their employment policies. To establish causality, I exploit a reorganization of the court districts in Italy involving judicial district mergers as a shock to court productivity. I find that an improvement in enforcement, as measured by a reduction in average trial length, has a large, positive effect on firm employment. These effects are stronger in firms with high leverage, or that belong to industries more dependent on external finance and characterized by higher complementarity between labor and capital, consistent with a financing channel driving the results. Moreover, in presence of stronger enforcement, firms can raise more debt to dampen the impact of negative shocks and, in this way, reduce employment fluctuations.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.
This paper documents that resource reallocation across firms is an important mechanism through which creditor rights affect real outcomes. I exploit the staggered adoption of an international convention that provides globally consistent strong creditor protection for aircraft finance. After this reform, country-level productivity in the aviation sector increases by 12%, driven mostly by across-firm reallocation. Productive airlines borrow more, expand, and adopt new technology at the expense of unproductive ones. Such reallocation is facilitated by (i) easier and quicker asset redeployment; and (ii) the influx of foreign financiers offering innovative financial products to improve credit allocative efficiency. I further document an increase in competition and an improvement in the breadth and the quality of products available to consumers.
In times of crisis, governments have strong incentives to influence banks’ credit allocation because the survival of the economy depends on it. How do governments make banks “play along”? This paper focuses on the state-guaranteed credit programs (SGCPs) that have been implemented in Europe to help firms survive the COVID 19 crisis. Governments’ capacity to save the economy depends on banks’ capacity to grant credit to struggling firms (which they would not be inclined to do spontaneously in the context of a global pandemic). All governments thus face the same challenge: How do they make sure that state guaranteed loans reach their desired target and on what terms? Based on a comparative analysis of the elaboration and implementation of SGCPs in France and Germany, this paper shows that historically-rooted institutionalized modes of coordination between state and bank actors have largely shaped the terms of the SGCPs in these two countries.