Open Access

The introduction of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) in general, and of a digital euro in particular, has attracted growing interest from academic research, central banks and political decision-makers. Most of the existing literature is focused on the impact of a digital euro on monetary policy issues, financial stability – especially the potentially enhanced risk of bank runs – and related questions concerning the design options of a digital euro. However, a digital euro could negatively affect the profitability of the European banking sector. Fees from payment transaction services could decline and refinancing costs could increase, as comparatively cheap financing from retail deposits would have to be replaced in part by more expensive financing instruments such as bonds or open market operations with the ECB. This paper deals with these aspects by estimating the potential impact of a digital euro in a simulation model based on current market data. The analysis demonstrates that the annual fee losses could be in the range of €2.1 billion to €4.2 billion. The associated refinancing need due to replacements of deposits by digital euro holdings could be in the range of €324 billion to €650 billion, translating into additional refinancing costs of around €6.5 billion to €19.5 billion p.a.. Therefore, a fair compensation model for banks and payment service providers is needed to avoid adverse consequences for the profitability and resilience of the European financial sector. The paper also discusses the general need for a retail digital euro in light of the expected benefits and risks as well as implications for design options to mitigate inherent risks.

We study how investors respond to inflation combining a customized survey experiment with trading data at a time of historically high inflation. Investors’ beliefs about the stock return-inflation relation are very heterogeneous in the cross section and on average too optimistic. Moreover, many investors appear unaware of inflation-hedging strategies despite being otherwise well-informed about inflation rates and asset returns. Consequently, whereas exogenous shifts in inflation expectations do not impact return expectations, information on past returns during periods of high inflation leads to negative updating about the perceived stock-return impact of inflation, which feeds into return expectations and subsequent actual trading behavior.

We educate investors about the benefits of dividend reinvestment and costs of misperceiving dividends as free income. The intervention increases planned dividend reinvestment in survey responses. Using trading records, we observe a causal increase in dividend reinvestment in the field of roughly 50 cents for every euro received. This holds relative to investors’ prior behavior and various control samples. Investors who learned the most from the intervention update their trading the most. The results suggest the free dividends fallacy is a significant source of dividend demand. Our study demonstrates that simple, targeted, and focused educational interventions can affect investment behavior.

We provide empirical evidence that the pricing of green bonds tends to be highly sophisticated and based on a two-tiered approach. When buying a green bond, investors do not look only at the green label of the bond but also consider additional characteristics that involve the soundness of the underlying project and the environmental score of the issuer. By comparing the yields at issuance of green bonds to those of a matched control sample of conventional bonds, we identify a premium of 16 basis points for the green label alone. However, when the environmental score of the issuer is in the top tercile of the cross-sectional distribution, the greenium increases up to doubling. Green certification and periods of heightened climate uncertainty also significantly influence the size of the greenium. Additionally, we find that this pricing mechanism fully emerged only after the Paris Agreement came into force in late 2016.

Some observers warn that a high level of economic dependence on China could negatively affect the economic resilience of Western economies and therefore recommend reducing such dependence by gradually decoupling from China. On the other hand, industry leaders emphasise the economic importance of China and warn against any kind of trade conflicts. Against this background, we briefly analyse the development of China’s export strategy. We find that the export intensity of the Chinese economy is diminishing and that exports are becoming more diversified overall. In addition, the relative importance of the United States and the European Union as export markets has been reduced, indicating a gradual decoupling of China from Western economies. Conversely, we find that exports to China have become more important, both for the EU and the United States. Although the figures remain at a non-critical level, Europe’s export activities could be more diversified as well.