Open Access

Cross-predictability denotes the fact that some assets can predict other assets' returns. I propose a novel performance-based measure that disentangles the economic value of cross-predictability into two components: the predictive power of one asset's signal for other assets' returns (cross-predictive signals) and the amount of an asset's return explained by other assets' signals (cross-predicted returns). Empirically, the latter component dominates the former in the overall cross-prediction effects. In the crosssection, cross-predictability gravitates towards small firms that are strongly mispriced and difficult to arbitrage, while it becomes more difficult to cross-predict returns when market capitalization and book-to-market ratio rise.

Experiments are an important tool in economic research. However, it is unclear to which extent the control of experiments extends to the perceptions subjects form of such experimental decision situations. This paper is the first to explicitly elicit perceptions of the dictator and trust game and shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in how subjects perceive the same game. Moreover, game perceptions depend not only on the game itself but also on the order of games (i.e., the broader experimental context in which the game is embedded) and the subject herself. This highlights that the control of experiments does not necessarily extend to game perceptions. The paper also demonstrates that perceptions are correlated with game behavior and moderate the relationship between game behavior and field behavior, thereby underscoring the importance and relevance of game perceptions for economic research.

We educate investors with significant dividend holdings about the benefits of dividend reinvestment and the costs of misperceiving dividends as additional, free income. The intervention increases planned dividend reinvestment in survey responses. Using trading records, we observe a corresponding causal increase in dividend reinvestment in the field of roughly 50 cents for every euro received. This holds relative to their prior behavior and a placebo sample. Investors who learned the most from the intervention update their trading by the largest extent. The results suggest the free dividends fallacy is a significant source of dividend demand. Our study demonstrates that simple, targeted, and focused educational interventions can affect investment behavior.

The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.

This paper studies whether Eurosystem collateral eligibility played a role in the portfolio choices of euro area asset managers during the “dash-for-cash” episode of 2020. We find that asset managers reduced their allocation to ECB-eligible corporate bonds, selling them in order to finance redemptions, while simultaneously increasing their cash holdings. These findings add nuance to previous studies of liquidity strains and price dislocations in the corporate bond market during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, indicating a greater willingness of dealers to increase their inventories of corporate bonds pledgeable with the ECB. Analysing the price impact of these portfolio choices, we also find evidence pointing to price pressure for both ECB-eligible and ineligible corporate bonds. Bonds that were held to a larger extent by investment funds in our sample experienced higher price pressure, although the impact was lower for ECB-eligible bonds. We also discuss broader implications for the related policy debate about how central banks could mitigate similar types of liquidity shocks.