SAFE white paper series
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109
SAFE's monthly Manager Sentiment Index is constructed by extracting sentiment from corporate financial disclosures of listed companies in Germany, offering significant insights into top management’s perspectives. This white paper outlines the methodology behind the index and its financial implications. Information about managers’ assessment of firms’ performance and financial conditions is material to investors but, at the same time, hard to observe. The SAFE Manager Sentiment Index quantifies managers’ beliefs using textual analysis of financial reports and earnings conference call transcripts. We show that the index is a strong predictor of future stock market returns. In summary, the SAFE Manager Sentiment Index provides a practical tool for key stakeholders such as investors, analysts, and policymakers seeking timely signals of corporate sentiment.
108
In this paper, the ECB monetary policy stance is assessed by comparing the recent tightening cycle (2022-today) with the two preceding ones, which took place in 2000-2001 and in 2006-2008. Interest rates, quantitative indicators and monetary conditions indices (MCIs) are used for this purpose. The main finding is that at the peak of the latest tightening cycle, the ECB monetary policy stance was no more restrictive than it was at the peak of the two preceding ones; actually, probably less. This contrasts with the fact that in the more recent case inflation was higher and more persistent than in the two earlier episodes.
This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 4 December 2024.
107
Over the past decade, the Single Supervisory Mechanism focused on making banks safer, resulting in stronger banks but limited euro area cross-border integration. We argue that overbanking hinders both cross-border integration for the EU and the development and integration of capital markets. In addition to a common supervisory authority and to attain the strong and integrated financial system Europe needs going forward, the Banking Union and Capital Markets Union need to coexist and complement each other.
This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
105
Banking Union is crucial for European integration, ensuring financial stability in the single market for financial services. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) plays an essential role in interpreting and enforcing the legal framework of the Banking Union, especially regarding the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). This in-depth analysis scrutinises the pertinent CJEU case law and highlights its implications for the Banking Union and the EU legal order.
This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
104
This paper shows that support for climate action is high across survey participants from all EU countries in three dimensions: (1) Participants are willing to contribute personally to combating climate change, (2) they approve of pro-climate social norms, and (3) they demand government action. In addition, there is a significant perception gap where individuals underestimate others' willingness to contribute to climate action by over 10 percentage points, influencing their own willingness to act. Policymakers should recognize the broad support for climate action among European citizens and communicate this effectively to counteract the vocal minority opposed to it.
103
In recent decades, biodiversity has declined significantly, threatening ecosystem services that are vital to society and the economy. Despite the growing recognition of biodiversity risks, the private sector response remains limited, leaving a significant financing gap. The paper therefore describes market-based solutions to bridge the financing gap, which can follow a risk assessment approach and an impact-oriented perspective. Key obstacles to mobilising private capital for biodiversity conservation are related to pricing biodiversity due to its local dimension, the lack of standardized metrics for valuation and still insufficient data reporting by companies hindering informed investment decisions. Financing biodiversity projects poses another challenge, mainly due to a mismatch between investor needs and available projects, for example in terms of project timeframes and their additionality.
102
Almost ten years after the European Commission action plan on building a capital markets union (CMU) and despite incremental progress, e.g. in the form of the EU Listing Act, the picture looks dire. Stock exchanges, securities markets, and supervisory authorities remain largely national, and, in many cases, European companies have decided to exclusively list overseas. Notwithstanding the economic and financial benefits of market integration, CMU has become a geopolitical necessity. A unified capital market can bolster resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic sovereignty, reduce dependence on external funding, and may foster economic cooperation between member states.
The reason for the persistent stand-still in Europe’s CMU development is not so much the conflict between market- and state-based integration, but rather the hesitancy of national regulatory and supervisory bodies to relinquish powers. If EU member states wanted to get real about CMU (as they say, and as they should), they need to openly accept the loss of sovereignty that follows from a true unified capital market. Building on economic as well as historical evidence, the paper offers viable proposals on how to design competent institutions within the current European framework.
This note outlines the case for speedy capital market integration and for the adoption of a common regulatory framework and single supervisory authority from a political economy perspective. We also show the alternative case for harmonization and centralization via regulatory competition, elaborating how competition between EU jurisdictions by way of full mutual recognition may lead to a (cost-)efficient and standardized legal framework for capital markets. Lastly, the note addresses the political economy conflict that underpins the implementation of both models for integrating capital markets. We point out that, in both cases, national authorities experience a loss of legislative and jurisdictional competence at the national level. We predict that any plan to foster a stronger capital market union, following an institution based or a market-based strategy, will face opposition from powerful national stakeholders.
101
This study analyses potential consequences of exiting the Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) of the European Central Bank (ECB). Thanks to its asset purchase programs, the Eurosystem still holds plenty of reserves even with a full exit from the TLTROs. This explains why voluntary and mandatory repayments of TLTRO III borrowing went smoothly. Nevertheless, the more liquidity is drained from the banking system, the more important becomes interbank market borrowing and lending, ideally between euro area member states. Right now, the usual fault lines of the euro area show up. The German banking system has plenty of reserves while there are first signs of aggregate scarcity in the Italian banking system. This does not need to be a source of concern if the interbank market can be sufficiently reactivated. Moreover, the ECB has several tools to address possible future liquidity shortages.
This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
100
This paper addresses the need for transparent sustainability disclosure in the European Auto Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) market, a crucial element in achieving the EU's climate goals. It proposes the use of existing vehicle identifiers, the Type Approval Number (TAN) and the Type-Variant-Version Code (TVV), to integrate loan-level data with sustainability-related vehicle information from ancillary sources. While acknowledging certain challenges, the combined use of TAN and TVV is the optimal solution to allow all stakeholders to comprehensively assess the environmental characteristics of securitised exposure pools in terms of data protection, matching accuracy, and cost-effectiveness.
99
In its first ten years (2014-2023), the banking union was successful in its prudential agenda but failed spectacularly in its underlying objective: establishing a single banking market in the euro area. This goal is now more important than ever, and easier to attain than at any time in the last decade. To make progress, cross-border banks should receive a specific treatment within general banking union legislation. Suggestions are made on how to make such regulatory carve-out effective and legally sound.