European Central Bank: Working paper series
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367
Using a normalized CES function with factor-augmenting technical progress, we estimate a supply-side system of the US economy from 1953 to 1998. Avoiding potential estimation biases that have occurred in earlier studies and putting a high emphasis on the consistency of the data set, required by the estimated system, we obtain robust results not only for the aggregate elasticity of substitution but also for the parameters of labor and capital augmenting technical change. We find that the elasticity of substitution is significantly below unity and that the growth rates of technical progress show an asymmetrical pattern where the growth of laboraugmenting technical progress is exponential, while that of capital is hyperbolic or logarithmic.
359
This paper employs individual bidding data to analyze the empirical performance of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank (ECB). We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables such as collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size, and experience. Panel regressions reveal that a bank’s bidding depends on bank characteristics. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. In contrast to the ECB’s main refinancing operations, we find evidence for the winner’s curse effect in LTROs. Our results indicate that LTROs do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes. JEL classification: E52, D44
297
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
280
Recent empirical studies on the inflation-growth-relationship underline that inflation has negative growth effects already under relatively modest rates. Most contributions to monetary growth theory, however, have difficulties in explaining such a pattern. It is shown in this paper that this problem can be overcome by establishing a link between monetary instability and the aggregate elasticity of factor substitution. Several microeconomic justifications can be found for a negative influence of inflation on factor substitution. It turns out that already in a simple neoclassical monetary growth model this effect is usually strong enough to question the superneutrality benchmark result in the steady state and to dominate all potential positive effects of inflation along the convergence path. In a more general perspective the paper contributes to a better integration of institutional change in aggregate models of economic growth.
47
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, bank charter values, and risk taking for European banks. Utilising cross-sectional and time series variation in the existence of deposit insurance schemes in the EU, we find that the establishment of explicit deposit insurance significantly reduces the risk taking of banks. This finding stands in contrast to most of the previous empirical literature. It supports the hypothesis that in the absence of deposit insurance, European banking systems have been characterised by strong implicit insurance operating through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress. Hence the introduction of an explicit system may imply a de facto reduction in the scope of the safety net. This finding provides a new perspective on the effects of deposit insurance on risk taking. Unless the absence of any safety net is credible, the introduction of deposit insurance serves to explicitly limit the safety net and, hence, moral hazard. We also test further hypotheses regarding the interaction between deposit insurance and monitoring, charter values and "too-big-to-fail." We find that banks with lower charter values and more subordinated debt reduce risk taking more after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, in support of the notion that charter values and subordinated debt may mitigate moral hazard. Finally, large banks (as measured in relation to the banking system as a whole) do not change their risk taking in response to the introduction of deposit insurance, which suggests that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance does not mitigate "too-big-to-fail" problems.
