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From the mid-seventies on, the central banks of most major industrial countries switched to monetary targeting. The Bundesbank was the first central bank to take this step, making the switch at the end of 1974. This changeover to monetary targeting was due to the difficulties which the Bundesbank - like other central banks - was facing in pursuing its original strategy, and whichcame to a head in the early seventies, when inflation escalated. A second factor was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which created the necessary scope for national monetary targeting. Finally, the advance of monetarist ideas fostered the explicit turn towards monetary targets, although the Bundesbank did not implement these in a mechanistic way. Whereas the Bundesbank has adhered to its policy of monetary targeting up to the present, nowadays monetary targeting plays only a minor role worldwide. Many central banks have switched to the strategy of direct inflation targeting. Others favour a more discretionary approach or a policy which is geared to the exchange rate. In the academic debate, monetary targeting is often presented as an outdated approach which has long since lost its basis of stable money demand. These findings give riseto a number of questions: Has monetary targeting actually become outdated? Which role is played by the concrete design of this strategy, and, against this background, how easily can it be transferred to European monetary union? This paper aims to answer these questions, drawing on the particular experience which the Bundesbank has gained of monetary targeting. It seems appropriate to discuss monetary targeting by using a specific example, since this notion is not very precise. This applies, for example, to the money definition used, the way the target is derived, the stringency applied in pursuing the target and the monetary management procedure.
Die Betreuer am neuen Markt sollen die Effizienz des Handels durch Bereitstellung zusätzlicher Liquidität erhöhen. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den Liquiditätsbeitrag der Betreuer in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Jahren. Die Beteiligung der Betreuer am Umsatz des Marktes hat im beobachteten Zeitraum deutlich abgenommen. Ihre Orderlimits und -volumina hingegen haben die Markttiefe erhöht. Weiterhin zeigt sich, daß die Betreuer sowohl in liquiditätsschwachen Titeln als auch in liquiditätsschwachen Marktphasen zur Steigerung der Liquidität beigetragen haben.
Frankfurts Position im internationalen Finanzplatzwettbewerb : eine ressourcenorientierte Analyse
(1999)
Der vorliegende Aufsatz stellt die Vorgehensweise und die wichtigsten Ergebnisse einer internationalen Finanzplatzstudie vor, die im Jahre 1998 im Auftrag des Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main) durchgeführt wurde. Ziel dieser Studie war es, aus der Analyse wichtiger Finanzplatzressourcen und den Wechselwirkungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Ressourcen Rückschlüsse auf Frankfurts Position im internationalen Finanzplatzwettbewerb zu ziehen. Aus ressourcenorientierter Sicht (Resource-Based-View) konnte gezeigt werden, daß der Finanzplatz Frankfurt einerseits größere Wettbewerbsnachteile gegenüber den Finanzzentren New York und London aufweist, die kurz- und mittelfristig kaum aufholbar sind. Andererseits besitzt der Finanzplatz Frankfurt Wettbewerbsvorteile gegenüber den Finanzzentren Paris und Tokyo. Diese sind aus der Sicht Frankfurts kurz- bis mittelfristig verteidigbar. Im Gegensatz zu den Wettbewerbsnachteilen Frankfurts im Vergleich zu den angelsächsischen Finanzplätzen fallen die Wettbewerbsvorteile Frankfurts gegenüber Paris und Tokyo aber deutlich geringer aus.
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.