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Traditional tests of the CAPM following the Fama / MacBeth (1973) procedure are tests of the joint hypotheses that there is a relationship between beta and realized return and that the market risk premium is positive. The conditional test procedure developed by Pettengill / Sundaram / Mathur (1995) allows to independently test the hypothesis of a relation between beta and realized returns. Monte Carlo simulations show that the conditional test reliably identifies this relation. In an empirical examination for the German stock market we find a significant relation between beta and return. Previous studies failed to identify this relationship probably because the average market risk premium in the sample period was close to zero. Our results provide a justification for the use of betas estimated from historical return data by portfolio managers.
Frankfurts Position im internationalen Finanzplatzwettbewerb : eine ressourcenorientierte Analyse
(1999)
Der vorliegende Aufsatz stellt die Vorgehensweise und die wichtigsten Ergebnisse einer internationalen Finanzplatzstudie vor, die im Jahre 1998 im Auftrag des Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main) durchgeführt wurde. Ziel dieser Studie war es, aus der Analyse wichtiger Finanzplatzressourcen und den Wechselwirkungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Ressourcen Rückschlüsse auf Frankfurts Position im internationalen Finanzplatzwettbewerb zu ziehen. Aus ressourcenorientierter Sicht (Resource-Based-View) konnte gezeigt werden, daß der Finanzplatz Frankfurt einerseits größere Wettbewerbsnachteile gegenüber den Finanzzentren New York und London aufweist, die kurz- und mittelfristig kaum aufholbar sind. Andererseits besitzt der Finanzplatz Frankfurt Wettbewerbsvorteile gegenüber den Finanzzentren Paris und Tokyo. Diese sind aus der Sicht Frankfurts kurz- bis mittelfristig verteidigbar. Im Gegensatz zu den Wettbewerbsnachteilen Frankfurts im Vergleich zu den angelsächsischen Finanzplätzen fallen die Wettbewerbsvorteile Frankfurts gegenüber Paris und Tokyo aber deutlich geringer aus.
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.
Corporate governance is currently a topic of great worldwide interest to academics, legislators, and practitioners. In addition to several academic articles, it has prompted active involvement of the OECD, the EU, the German Monopolkommission, the Bundestag, and several other institutions. Especially in comparison to the Anglo-American system, German corporate governance is characterized by lesser reliance on capital markets and outside investors, but a stronger reliance on large inside investors and financial institutions to achieve efficiency in the corporate sector. Since data on German corporations have become more easily available in recent years, the discussion has lately become more scientific and started to focus on studying the benefits and costs of the German system. The empirical results presented in this survey focus on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance in Germany. I summarize several empirical studies on this topic and put them into context to the institutional and legal environment in Germany. Due to data restrictions on unlisted firms, most results are based on corporations trading in official markets, representing the first-tier stock market in Germany. These firms have to publish large blockholdings exceeding 25% in their annual report. While this type of ownership data has been accessible for several years, information on voting control has only become available with the 1995 transposition of the European Union’s Transparency Directive into national law (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG).
We first analyze legal provisions relating to corporate transparency in Germany. We show that despite the new securities trading law (WpHG) of 1995, the practical efficacy of disclosure regulation is very low. On the one hand, the formation of business groups involving less regulated legal forms as intermediate layers can substantially reduce transparency. On the other hand, the implementation of the law is not practical and not very effective. We illustrate these arguments using several examples of WpHG filings. To illustrate the importance of transparency, we show next that German capital markets are dominated by few large firms accounting for most of the market’s capitalization and trading volume. Moreover, the concentration of control is very high. First, 85% of all officially listed AGs have a dominant shareholder (controlling more than 25% of the voting rights). Second, few large blockholders control several deciding voting blocks in listed corporations, while the majority controls only one block.
Es gibt Überlegungen, Kreditinstituten den Besitz der Anteilsmehrheit an Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAGs) zu untersagen. Dahinter steht die Vorstellung, daß solche Beteiligungen Gestaltungsspielräume eröffnen, die mißbräuchlich genutzt werden. Die Neuemission von Aktien ist einer der Fälle, die in diesem Zusammenhang erörtert werden. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es zu prüfen, ob die zum Konzernverbund einer konsortialführenden Bank gehörenden KAGs bei Erstemissionen anders behandelt werden als andere KAGs.
Untersucht werden 46 Neuemissionen der Jahre 1994 bis 1997. Insgesamt deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, daß die KAGs in ihren Anlageentscheidungen unabhängig sind, und daß keine mißbräuchliche Nutzung eventuell vorhandener Informationsvorsprünge vorliegt.
Shareholder voting is back on the agenda of public debate for several reasons. One is the investors’ internationalization of capital investments and the raising of funds globally by companies. It can be predicted that considering the growing together of capital markets the trend to international investments will increase not least because the introduction of the Euro will create a uniform European stock market. This leads to the question how the law deals with this development and its problems. The EU Commission has commissioned a comparative study dealing, inter alia, with shareholders’ representation at general meetings in the EU member states.1 The aim is to simplify the operating regulations for public limited companies in the EU. Furthermore, the internationalization of shareholdings leads the investors to ask how their interests are protected abroad. Are the mechanisms of shareholder protection sufficient for foreign investors? In particular the formation of transnational companies like Daimler-Chrysler will change corporate governance systems. It remains to be seen whether and how foreign institutional investors will use measures of - in this case - German corporate law to control the management. From a microeconomic point of view the question is what specific features of a given corporate governance system might contribute to better performance of firms. The following remarks will however, be confined to one specific aspect of corporate governance only, the exercise of shareholders’ voting rights at the general meeting.
Der deutsche Markt für Venture Capital (VC) ist trotz erfreulicher Fortschritte insbesondere in den letzten drei Jahren im Vergleich zum weltweit größten VC-Markt in den USA unterentwickelt. Venture Capital-Investitionen beliefen sich in Deutschland im Jahr 1996 auf 0,04% des Bruttoinlandsproduktes, weniger als ein Drittel des U.S.-amerikanischen Niveaus. Obwohl seither ein deutlicher Anstieg zu verzeichnen ist, hat der deutsche VC-Markt mit einem Fondsvolumen von ca. 18,6 Milliarden DM nach jüngsten Angaben nur etwa ein Achtel der Größe des amerikanischen Marktes.